I like the phase concept that PC:OWS will use. But I wonder if it can not be used to simulate C&C also.
The way it is now, units are given orders much like CM. They execute these orders (within the constraints of delays) for 40 seconds, and then the player gets to do a reaction type phase. The player essentially 'jumps down' to the boots and tracks level and tweaks targeting, etc. Basically its a 80 second 'turn'.
But I wonder if C&C can be modeled by having some units stay in a reaction type phase mode. The game could do a C&C check for each unit, using communication eqpt/LOS/proximity to HQs/etc, to determine if that unit has come back into C&C. Units in C&C can be given the full orders menus then.
This could force a Soviet player to make a more committed attack plan. He would have to do this because he knows he will not be as adaptable 'on-the-fly'.
An example is a Soviet T34 company that is attacking. Many of the tanks do not have radios. So the Soviet player must keep them close together and also give them detailed move orders. The detailed move orders generate long delays (as they should) and 'set' the overall attack plan.
If the German decides to flank this attack, the Soviet might get his whole plan defeated. Since many of the T34s can not get back into a command phase, the soviet player is forced into a defensive posture.
This is very similar to the idea of 'restricted-menus' I used to pitch for CM. Years ago I suggested that the actual menu commands that can be 'ordered' be dependant on C&C, training, status (pinned units can not be given movement orders,etc). Movement type orders (except withdrawl) are really dependant on command. Another idea I 'pitched' was for platoon SOPs. There is a platoon level Standard Operating Procedure menu (at the platoon HQ level). This SOP selection gives the overall 'posture' for the platoon. An example would be 'Defend'. This SOP only allows certain commands to appear in the units own orders menus. It has certain benefits and drawbacks. Likewise, a platoon SOP of 'ASSAULT' allows the player to get his men moving towards an objective. It has benefits also, less pinning, etc.
One of the many fundamental flaws with CM is the ease with which a player can attack. In real life (WWII) there was none of the unit coordination that appears in CM.
Command and Control idea
Moderator: koiosworks
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Yoozername
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RE: Command and Control idea
A related benfit might actually be improved AI. having the AI 'play' along these lines makes it more realistic also. Having the AI think in terms of platoons and platoon tactics would get away from the individualistic mob mentality of the CM 'AI'.
RE: Command and Control idea
ORIGINAL: Yoozername
An example is a Soviet T34 company that is attacking. Many of the tanks do not have radios. So the Soviet player must keep them close together and also give them detailed move orders. The detailed move orders generate long delays (as they should) and 'set' the overall attack plan.
But a real life company commander in such a case would not be required to keep his tanks close to him. Once in action and buttoned up, they would be unable to communicate in any event. Working off a map, a company commander might detach a platoon to approach an objective from a different direction. Communication would obviously be a problem in real life, and player omniscience a problem in game terms, but how would you defend a game design decision to keep the company's tanks "close together"? I think such a restriction would be more unrealistic than allowing the control to split the company.
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Yoozername
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- Joined: Fri Mar 03, 2006 10:42 pm
RE: Command and Control idea
I never said that the tanks HAD to stay together.
Soviet tanks without radios worked with hand/flag signals. In fact most nations tanks would also use them while keeping radio silence. When in LOS its obvious that they had better C&C is my point. Hence the example.
If the company wants to split off a platoon of 3 tanks (hopefully one has a radio), then it could be done (I would keep those 3 tanks close to each other of course) but I would suggest that that platoon, at the end of its movement orders be in a state of reaction phase till it gets back in C&C.
I am looking to model the superior C&C the germans enjoyed with 3 man turrets, radios in practically every vehicle, superior copulas, etc. I suppose I am looking for something like Relative C&C if you will.
On a related note, a soviet tank that is buttoned up and firing is very much locked into a reaction mode. Getting them to ceasefire would not be that easy.
Soviet tanks without radios worked with hand/flag signals. In fact most nations tanks would also use them while keeping radio silence. When in LOS its obvious that they had better C&C is my point. Hence the example.
If the company wants to split off a platoon of 3 tanks (hopefully one has a radio), then it could be done (I would keep those 3 tanks close to each other of course) but I would suggest that that platoon, at the end of its movement orders be in a state of reaction phase till it gets back in C&C.
I am looking to model the superior C&C the germans enjoyed with 3 man turrets, radios in practically every vehicle, superior copulas, etc. I suppose I am looking for something like Relative C&C if you will.
On a related note, a soviet tank that is buttoned up and firing is very much locked into a reaction mode. Getting them to ceasefire would not be that easy.
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Yoozername
- Posts: 1121
- Joined: Fri Mar 03, 2006 10:42 pm
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Yoozername
- Posts: 1121
- Joined: Fri Mar 03, 2006 10:42 pm
RE: Command and Control idea
A report that might be of interest...
The following report by the 3rd Panzer Division, based upon its combat experience in the spring and summer of 1942 touches on a lot of what has been bated about on this forum over the last few weeks regarding Soviet Tank Crews, and Soviet Armour combat practices. For those with longer attention spans; From Jentz, “Panzer Truppen Vol 1” pg 232 – 233.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the following report, the commander of the 3-Panzer-Division passed their knowledge on to the other Panzer-Divisions preparing for the major summer offensives: Combat Experience of the 3.Panzer-Division – Summer 1942
The Russian infantry is poor. They won't attack without accompanying tanks. Nothing has changed in regard to how they attack. The attack still always occurs in herds. In spite of attacks being beaten back, the attack will again and again be repeated in the same fashion without achieving any other results. The Russians can no longer withstand a concentrated German Panzer attack. He panics and abandons his position. This very clearly occurred during the battles by Charkow and also on the Kertsch peninsula. However, it should be clearly emphasized, that this only occurs as a result of massive Panzer attacks. During attacks at company strength, after he has recognized the low number of Panzers, he immediately gets back into his hole and stubbornly defends against the following infantry. During successful German breakthroughs, it has continuously proven to be necessary to relentlessly chase the opponent, even at night. He has mastered the concentration of large bodies of troops especially at night, so that when the attack is renewed in the morning a new defensive front must be broken through. The Russians have become very insensitive in the flanks.
The Russian tank forces are good. The level of training is also good. A Russian first lieutenant tanker captured near Charkow stated that the Russians feel that they are superior to the Germans in tanks. Use of the German Hohlraummunition (shaped charge shells) was known to the Russian first. However, the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the longer gun (which wasn't used near Charkow) was unknown to the Russians that came from Charkow. The captured officer's description of the organization of the Russian Tank Brigade is the same as other documents available by the Division. Command occurs by radio down to the company commander, within the company by flag signals (yellow flag held up - follow in a row; red flag held up - spread out; red flag swung side to side - enemy tanks, take positions).
The Russian tank crews are very sensitive to being fired at, even from weapons that can't harm him. He is almost always turned around and retreats when fired at from the flank by 3.7 cm and 5 cm anti-tank guns or the 5 cm Kw.K. L42 tank guns. In several cases he turned back when hit in the flank by heavy machinegun fire. In all cases, hardly any damage could be found on the tanks that had been fired at.
Because of the small amount of radio equipment and the lack of ability to observe to the side, the Russians have not been able to lead a concentrated tank attack. Therefore, at first only four tanks appear, while gradually the others follow by and by. He is a master in recovering tanks.
He knows that Germans breakthroughs in depth are conducted with long, large road columns. In many cases, therefore, he has successfully stopped the advance with two or three T34s positioned on a commanding height or even dug in. Well camouflaged, these are first identified after they open fire. The positions are chosen so that they can't be approached from the flanks. In every case, scouting for detours has cost so much time that contact with the opponent was lost. After several experiences, the current commander of the 3-Panzer-Division decided that advances would not be made on the larger roads but that these would be left free at first.
New weapons that have appeared are the British Mark II tank and an American tank. The 7.62 cm anti-tank/anti-air-craft gun was widely used. A Russian 12.7 mm anti-tank rifle with a two-man crew has newly appeared. It is recognizable by its very long barrel with a lifting support about 1.5 meters high. The bullet penetrates the sidewalls of our Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV. Ranges at which it can be fired are not known. The gunners have been instructed to fire at the glass blocks in the commander's cupola. Panzer-Regiment 6 lost six Panzer commanders because of this during the last battles.
While attacking with infantry it is necessary that coordination between the Panzers and infantry be exactly timed. Either the infantry advance in front to draw enemy fire so that the enemy weapons can be effectively engaged by the Panzers, or the infantry follow at about 300 meters directly behind the Panzers. This interval must be held and may not become longer or it results in fire from the recovering enemy making the advance of the infantry significantly more difficult. In addition it is at least as much the task of the infantry to combat enemy weapons as it is the task of the Panzers. The best experiences have been achieved in combating enemy tanks through cooperation between the Panzers and the Flak. Especially noteworthy is the fact that when Flak engage ground targets the 8.8 cm Flak guns present a very large and immobile target. It is in our interest to especially pay attention to the local defense of these Flak guns from enemy tank attacks.
This one is particularly interesting
The rumors that the Russian armor quality has become poorer are emphatically denied. But it is admitted that the penetration ability of armor-piercing shells is better in the warm part of the year than in the cold. According to the opinion of the experts, this is exclusively due to the differences in temperature.
It is strongly emphasized that every Panzer attack must absolutely follow prelaid plans, with the exception of the pursuit of retreating enemy. Artillery preparations are necessary, with Stukas joining in. Of vast importance for the Panzer- Regiment is medium-range frequency radio contact with the rear elements. It is a useful suggestion that the infantry and the Panzer on the same assignment use the same medium-range frequency so that they can hear the other's battle reports.
Panzer-Regiment 6 proposes that the turret numbers of the commander's Panzers be redone in a more subdued form. With the numbers as presently displayed, the regiment has lost many commanders. The first and second uniform of the commander was shot up; also the third uniform already has a considerable number of holes. The Russians understand and demonstrate great skill in seeking out and knocking out the commander's Panzers. Especially the Pz.Bef.Wg. which is identified by the frame antenna on the rear, is presently the target of his concentrated fire. Because of this the commander of Panzer-Regiment 6 transferred to a normal Pz.Kpfw.lll. Further, the regiment believes it more suitable that the commander and adjutant ride in one Panzer, instead of the commander and signals officer. The commander gains so much time for directing the battle and observation. His intentions are given to the adjutant in catchwords who converts them into radio language and transmits them. The signals officer rides in a second Panzer and monitors the radio traffic or follows further behind the commander's Panzer to maintain contact with the division on medium frequency or with aircraft on radios sets on their frequency.
Henceforth, Panzer-Regiment 6 is supplying its Pz-Kpfw.II with 2 cm Sprenggranaten. With this they possess a weapon that is very effective in combating enemy infantry. Their armor-piercing ammunition is no longer effective because of the increased thickness of the enemy armor. In battles against enemy tanks, it has been shown time after time that calmly waiting and letting the opponent come into close range is better than a showy attack. Besides a large number of knocked-out enemy tanks, no large number of our own are lost. A showy attack results in large losses to ourselves in addition to its possibility of success. This becomes very evident if the successes of the 3. and 23.Panzer-Divisions are compared. Slowly feeling out the front and flanks with the main force on the flanks, sector by sector, is most suitable. When possible, scout on foot and guide the Panzers on foot into selected positions, especially those for the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the long 7.5 cm Kw.K.40 tank gun.
The following report by the 3rd Panzer Division, based upon its combat experience in the spring and summer of 1942 touches on a lot of what has been bated about on this forum over the last few weeks regarding Soviet Tank Crews, and Soviet Armour combat practices. For those with longer attention spans; From Jentz, “Panzer Truppen Vol 1” pg 232 – 233.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the following report, the commander of the 3-Panzer-Division passed their knowledge on to the other Panzer-Divisions preparing for the major summer offensives: Combat Experience of the 3.Panzer-Division – Summer 1942
The Russian infantry is poor. They won't attack without accompanying tanks. Nothing has changed in regard to how they attack. The attack still always occurs in herds. In spite of attacks being beaten back, the attack will again and again be repeated in the same fashion without achieving any other results. The Russians can no longer withstand a concentrated German Panzer attack. He panics and abandons his position. This very clearly occurred during the battles by Charkow and also on the Kertsch peninsula. However, it should be clearly emphasized, that this only occurs as a result of massive Panzer attacks. During attacks at company strength, after he has recognized the low number of Panzers, he immediately gets back into his hole and stubbornly defends against the following infantry. During successful German breakthroughs, it has continuously proven to be necessary to relentlessly chase the opponent, even at night. He has mastered the concentration of large bodies of troops especially at night, so that when the attack is renewed in the morning a new defensive front must be broken through. The Russians have become very insensitive in the flanks.
The Russian tank forces are good. The level of training is also good. A Russian first lieutenant tanker captured near Charkow stated that the Russians feel that they are superior to the Germans in tanks. Use of the German Hohlraummunition (shaped charge shells) was known to the Russian first. However, the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the longer gun (which wasn't used near Charkow) was unknown to the Russians that came from Charkow. The captured officer's description of the organization of the Russian Tank Brigade is the same as other documents available by the Division. Command occurs by radio down to the company commander, within the company by flag signals (yellow flag held up - follow in a row; red flag held up - spread out; red flag swung side to side - enemy tanks, take positions).
The Russian tank crews are very sensitive to being fired at, even from weapons that can't harm him. He is almost always turned around and retreats when fired at from the flank by 3.7 cm and 5 cm anti-tank guns or the 5 cm Kw.K. L42 tank guns. In several cases he turned back when hit in the flank by heavy machinegun fire. In all cases, hardly any damage could be found on the tanks that had been fired at.
Because of the small amount of radio equipment and the lack of ability to observe to the side, the Russians have not been able to lead a concentrated tank attack. Therefore, at first only four tanks appear, while gradually the others follow by and by. He is a master in recovering tanks.
He knows that Germans breakthroughs in depth are conducted with long, large road columns. In many cases, therefore, he has successfully stopped the advance with two or three T34s positioned on a commanding height or even dug in. Well camouflaged, these are first identified after they open fire. The positions are chosen so that they can't be approached from the flanks. In every case, scouting for detours has cost so much time that contact with the opponent was lost. After several experiences, the current commander of the 3-Panzer-Division decided that advances would not be made on the larger roads but that these would be left free at first.
New weapons that have appeared are the British Mark II tank and an American tank. The 7.62 cm anti-tank/anti-air-craft gun was widely used. A Russian 12.7 mm anti-tank rifle with a two-man crew has newly appeared. It is recognizable by its very long barrel with a lifting support about 1.5 meters high. The bullet penetrates the sidewalls of our Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV. Ranges at which it can be fired are not known. The gunners have been instructed to fire at the glass blocks in the commander's cupola. Panzer-Regiment 6 lost six Panzer commanders because of this during the last battles.
While attacking with infantry it is necessary that coordination between the Panzers and infantry be exactly timed. Either the infantry advance in front to draw enemy fire so that the enemy weapons can be effectively engaged by the Panzers, or the infantry follow at about 300 meters directly behind the Panzers. This interval must be held and may not become longer or it results in fire from the recovering enemy making the advance of the infantry significantly more difficult. In addition it is at least as much the task of the infantry to combat enemy weapons as it is the task of the Panzers. The best experiences have been achieved in combating enemy tanks through cooperation between the Panzers and the Flak. Especially noteworthy is the fact that when Flak engage ground targets the 8.8 cm Flak guns present a very large and immobile target. It is in our interest to especially pay attention to the local defense of these Flak guns from enemy tank attacks.
This one is particularly interesting
The rumors that the Russian armor quality has become poorer are emphatically denied. But it is admitted that the penetration ability of armor-piercing shells is better in the warm part of the year than in the cold. According to the opinion of the experts, this is exclusively due to the differences in temperature.
It is strongly emphasized that every Panzer attack must absolutely follow prelaid plans, with the exception of the pursuit of retreating enemy. Artillery preparations are necessary, with Stukas joining in. Of vast importance for the Panzer- Regiment is medium-range frequency radio contact with the rear elements. It is a useful suggestion that the infantry and the Panzer on the same assignment use the same medium-range frequency so that they can hear the other's battle reports.
Panzer-Regiment 6 proposes that the turret numbers of the commander's Panzers be redone in a more subdued form. With the numbers as presently displayed, the regiment has lost many commanders. The first and second uniform of the commander was shot up; also the third uniform already has a considerable number of holes. The Russians understand and demonstrate great skill in seeking out and knocking out the commander's Panzers. Especially the Pz.Bef.Wg. which is identified by the frame antenna on the rear, is presently the target of his concentrated fire. Because of this the commander of Panzer-Regiment 6 transferred to a normal Pz.Kpfw.lll. Further, the regiment believes it more suitable that the commander and adjutant ride in one Panzer, instead of the commander and signals officer. The commander gains so much time for directing the battle and observation. His intentions are given to the adjutant in catchwords who converts them into radio language and transmits them. The signals officer rides in a second Panzer and monitors the radio traffic or follows further behind the commander's Panzer to maintain contact with the division on medium frequency or with aircraft on radios sets on their frequency.
Henceforth, Panzer-Regiment 6 is supplying its Pz-Kpfw.II with 2 cm Sprenggranaten. With this they possess a weapon that is very effective in combating enemy infantry. Their armor-piercing ammunition is no longer effective because of the increased thickness of the enemy armor. In battles against enemy tanks, it has been shown time after time that calmly waiting and letting the opponent come into close range is better than a showy attack. Besides a large number of knocked-out enemy tanks, no large number of our own are lost. A showy attack results in large losses to ourselves in addition to its possibility of success. This becomes very evident if the successes of the 3. and 23.Panzer-Divisions are compared. Slowly feeling out the front and flanks with the main force on the flanks, sector by sector, is most suitable. When possible, scout on foot and guide the Panzers on foot into selected positions, especially those for the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the long 7.5 cm Kw.K.40 tank gun.