I would simply reply to you that Japan may have had plans for ANYTHING, but their ability to carry through and deliver said plans and inflict their will on the enemy was totally LACKING...otherwise Japan (in the life and death struggle she was in) would have carried through and delivered on her plans..
The official US high school version of the war:
It was never in doubt - on economic grounds alone - the Allies simply had to win. Comforting I guess. But, if you are interested in history, the truth is much more complicated. The outcome was in considerable doubt.
Key to this was the USSR. Stalin made a deal with both Germany and Japan - and he made other deals with us - none of which were ultimately honored completely - all of which were honored to a degree. To be certain what Stalin would or would not do - well that is an act of faith - but not knowledge. To be certain what the fate of the USSR must be - with both Germany and Japan plotting its end - again that is an act of faith, not knowledge. The seemingly obvious solution of a coordinated effort is not what occurred - but surely it could have. And the USSR was an empire - a place full of unhappy ruled peoples - willing to cooperate in exchange for some autonomy (willing even to fight, as the Ukranian National Army shows). IF the USSR fell, the economic situation changes, and the Allies are on the wrong end of the situation: the conclusion of Luftwaffe Over Amerika is that, with Soviet resources, Germany COULD HAVE mounted out a strategic bomber force.
There are other possibilities: Japan's late offensive in China could have run sooner. A rail connection all the way to Saigon matters - and you cannot torpedo trains! Build a tiny rail link from Saigon's western spur to Phnom Penh and you conntct to the Thai/Malay rail system - of the same gage! Then you run all the way to Singapore - Singaport to Pusan. No ships at risk. And India could have been neutralized.
Finally, you make a fundamental error if you believe no one ever makes a mistake. A capability is not always going to be used - even if it "should" be. Or the reason it was not might be different than that it would not work. We have several Japanese wmd programs, all stopped by different officials, for ostensably different reasons. Yet WE BELIEVED these were so valuable as capabilities we cut deals: for example Ichii and ALL his people went free (except those the Russians got) - in exchange for the technical stuff to give US that capability that "could not matter" in your view.
Real life is not always simple. Sometimes there are possibilities. History is not the story of what inevitably had to happen. It is the story of what did happen, even if it was unlikely at times, likely but not required at others.
The key characteristic about Japanese civilization - and you might say a weakness - something we almost always assume wrongly about - is that it is an extraordinairily divided society. It is anything but unified in purpose, on any subject, at any time. The form of government, and the drive for consensus, fools us often: the extent to which Japanese and Japanese institutions failed to cooperate and coordinate is amazing by our standards. But they remain essentially human, susceptable to the same forces that have always driven all societies - and different leadership could have provided a different set of drivers for what was acceptable conduct. Many things indeed changed in the direction of more effective institutions - but thank goodness for us too late to be decisive. The Grand Escort Command was created only mid-war, and never given enough resources. But it was CONCIEVED in the 1930s, and plans to build for it were also fully worked out - just not implemented (in favor of things like Musashi and Kii - each worth 150 escorts in terms of steel).
THIS is why Yamamoto said
"There are three great fallicies in history: the Great Wall of China, the Pyramids of Egypt, and the battleship Musashi." Clearly SOME Japanese leaders knew better that what others did.
Japan has an essential strategic advantage = position. Adm King felt he needed 2 ships to every Japanese one to be EVEN because of it. Japan had another strategic advantage it failed to fully capitalize on: hatred of colonial empires. What happened in Malaya and Indonesia might have happened many times - with better policy. And Japan finally got it right - just too late to affect anything but the Cold War. Good for us. The truth is it is harder to defeat the enemy than yourself - nations that lose usually defeat themselves. The other guys just win because of the screw ups.
