Why Partisan Formula needs to be recoded...

[el cid again]

The Japanese kept their 'puppet' troops short of heavy weapons, as they simply did not trust them not to go over to the Nationalists or Communists when the opportunity arose.

Quite correct - and also very misleading. It is left out this is the NORM in China for ALL Chinese armies. Artillery was quite rare - and might be of museum quality - or even non-functional. If it could work, that did not imply any ammunition was available for it. If there was ammunition, that did not imply there was a single person capable of spotting, or running a fire direction center: direct fire was often the only mission possible. In China an MMG was a big deal heavy weapon. Most units had NONE. So a unit with ONE was quite well off. A unit with an actual heavy weapons company - normally two formed a platoon and 2 or 3 platoons a company - was a very fine formation, heavy weapons wise.

[el cid again]

If the "millions" of Japanese Chinese troops were anything better than utterly useless, Japan would not have been forced to keep more than 80% of their in country armies in the rear garrisoning the rail network.

This is hardly true. China was - and remains - the world's most populous nation. Parts of China were - and are - very densely populated. One could have very large forces in a country like that and it might seem like they were woefully inadequate - regardless of troop quality. Frankly the problems Japan had in China were much more political than military. Until Japan began attacking China, most Chinese admired Japan for standing up to colonial powers. Japan squandered a great deal of good will by its policies. To some extent this changed late in the war (pressed labor was ended - by order - no matter who you were you could not use it any more; siezed properties were returned; administration taken from China by colonials of various nations was returned to Chinese). But it was too late to buy the kind of good will that better policy could have bought earlier. For a more successful example of Imperial Japanese "occupation" (Japan NEVER occupied like we did - it ALWAYS used local officials, except in special enclaves, like Balikpapan) see the Dutch East Indies. IF Japan had adopted a more rational policy, it could have had peace in China, kept Manchukuo, and needed no occupation troops whatever.

[el cid again]

But what I find amazing is your total lack of regard for Chinese troops. You give them no credit at all for the hard 5 years they fought the Japanese before Dec. 1941, and the sacrifices and heroics of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese that died in major battles around Changsa, Shanghai, Nanking, etc., etc.

I am sorry this is your impression. Correcting errors in your and other's statements should not be taken to imply that I am not fully in sympathy with China in this period of history - for I am. Note that I was married in China, my wife is ethnic Chinese (maiden name Lim), and I am not in the least anti-Chinese! I am something of a contemporary student of Chinese military affairs, and write extensively about ROC and CCP military forces. I have a fairly large collection of honors for Chinese units translated from Chinese materials - most of them being WWII era victories of one sort or another. I have carefully used even handed language - implying that MOST Chinese troops of BOTH sides were poorly equipped, very poorly supported, generally unpaid, virtually untrained in a modern sense, and poorly led. In that context, that troops engaged the IJA at all, and sometimes were effective, should be regarded as great praise - not criticism. Note, however, that it is a common view among Chinese military historians that Chinese troops spent MORE time fighting each other than the Japanese in this period! Giving them all to a unified command is grossly inaccurate and misleading about what they could do - or did do.

[el cid again]

There are plenty of accounts in the history of China’s war where poorly supplied and out tech’d Chinese troops raised themselves to heroic feats to fight against the Japanese. But many westerners are prejudiced against the Chinese because of Chiang Kai-Shek’s political machinations after the western allies entered the war.

Whatever you may wish to believe about me, know that I am much more criticized for "going native" than being prejudiced against people of any ethnicity. I am not hostile to languages other than English, and my wife says I know the geography and history of her country better than she does. I do believe Chiang engaged in "political machinations" both BEFORE as well as after the Allies entered the war - but I am not offended by them. I expect a leader to do what he believes is in his nations interests.

[el cid again]

Chiang’s policy was to allow the western allies to beat Japan and do as little as possible in order to preserve his strength for the coming battles with the communists.

I tend to agree. I also tend to think this was a wise policy. Would you, in his office, have done differently? If you did, would it have been wise?

[el cid again]

The Chinese soldier was no worse or better than any other nation’s soldiers. Their weakness was due to technological inferiority, not some coward gene that pre-disposed them to seek ways of saving their own skins. The corrupt government also produced some piss poor leadership in the officer corps, but on a one for one basis the average Chinese soldier was just as good as any other nations soldiers when equipped well.

Here you display your true failure to grasp the situation in China - then and to some degree still. Note that at NO TIME did I allege Chinese troops were cowardly. They are probably better than Americans, on the average IN IDENTICAL CONDITIONS. [The position that Americans are "brittle troops" is not a popular one, but I believe it is true. Americans are used to dishing it out. They do not like it when they are not superior in firepower. Sometimes they have surrendered when they should not have done.] The problem with Chinese troops is cultural. In part, you correctly identify corruption as an issue: it is a big deal and it was not Chiang's invention or fault. China was more or less destroyed in the mid-19th century - mostly by an insane emperor - and then exploited by many colonial powers - including the USA (which maintained China squadrons for decades - units that did things like protect opium runners - I once read a USNI Proceedings article about American flag opium runners in the mid 1920s!) This prevented China from entering the modern era. Her military was, by and large, a traditional one, a wholly different creature than a western army. [The Navy is different. But it had expended itself wholly by the time we think WWII began. It may have been honorable and competent, but it wasn't around any more.] Chinese "soldiers" were not soldiers in national service (although airmen were, and sailors were) in the western sense. The very system forced them to engage in economic activities - above all growing food - to survive. This is not a fault - but it is a fact and it prevented them from being full time soldiers in our sense. Lacking modern weapons, and even ammunition for old weapons, and heavy weapons, is not a fault - but it is a weakness. One can say these things and STILL be impressed with those who fought anyway. I am.

[el cid again]

When properly equipped, Chinese divisions were the equal or better than Japanese divisions.

False. Ours were not. How could China's have been? Japanese solders were - in the view of Gen Stillwell - someone familiar with US soldiers you must admit - but also someone exposed to Chinese soldiers - and someone who led them successfully in combat - Japanese soldiers were the "best in the world." Not until current times has the US Army achieved the sort of superiority that allows it to engage in offensive against superior forces that IJA had in 1940. Many aspects of WWII era IJA are now aspects of the US Army. Either we learned from them - or we came to the conclusion their practices were right independently. [I refer to things like "attack at night" - "put an anti-tank team in every infantry squad" - "substitute diesel engines for gasoline engines in tanks" (IJA was first to invest in that) - "put heavy weapons in separate units to be attached to regular formations as required" (here Gen Marshall believed in the concept - but we still did it less than Japan did at the time) - and many similar concepts.] Japan could expect a major army force to engage when outnumbered 2:1 in all respects (numbers of men, aircraft, artillery, transport vehicles, specialist formations) etc and win. At no time prior to 1950 was that true of any sort of Chinese troops. [You can argue it was when they attacked on Thanksgiving Eve along the banks of the Chong Chong River in Korea - achieving rates of advance equal to the best armored offensives in history against an Allied force with much better equipment. But that was in 1950, not WWII.]

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

If the "millions" of Japanese Chinese troops were anything better than utterly useless, Japan would not have been forced to keep more than 80% of their in country armies in the rear garrisoning the rail network.

This is hardly true. China was - and remains - the world's most populous nation. Parts of China were - and are - very densely populated. One could have very large forces in a country like that and it might seem like they were woefully inadequate - regardless of troop quality. Frankly the problems Japan had in China were much more political than military. Until Japan began attacking China, most Chinese admired Japan for standing up to colonial powers. Japan squandered a great deal of good will by its policies. To some extent this changed late in the war (pressed labor was ended - by order - no matter who you were you could not use it any more; siezed properties were returned; administration taken from China by colonials of various nations was returned to Chinese). But it was too late to buy the kind of good will that better policy could have bought earlier. For a more successful example of Imperial Japanese "occupation" (Japan NEVER occupied like we did - it ALWAYS used local officials, except in special enclaves, like Balikpapan) see the Dutch East Indies. IF Japan had adopted a more rational policy, it could have had peace in China, kept Manchukuo, and needed no occupation troops whatever.

But they didn't...and they did need to maintain the rear garrisons...

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The Japanese kept their 'puppet' troops short of heavy weapons, as they simply did not trust them not to go over to the Nationalists or Communists when the opportunity arose.

Quite correct - and also very misleading. It is left out this is the NORM in China for ALL Chinese armies. Artillery was quite rare - and might be of museum quality - or even non-functional. If it could work, that did not imply any ammunition was available for it. If there was ammunition, that did not imply there was a single person capable of spotting, or running a fire direction center: direct fire was often the only mission possible. In China an MMG was a big deal heavy weapon. Most units had NONE. So a unit with ONE was quite well off. A unit with an actual heavy weapons company - normally two formed a platoon and 2 or 3 platoons a company - was a very fine formation, heavy weapons wise.

Its not misleading...the quote is in reference to the "millions of Japanese Chinese troops". It was not about the KMT or CCP... It was about the Japanese 'Puppet" forces.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

So ...would the practical solution be to add the full Chinese OOB - AND - some Japanese garrison units for China?

A practical solution would involve several elements:

1) evaluate different forces - some you don't put in at all - that is NO troops is more accurate than any at all! These would include units that vaporized under pressure historically.

2) Overrate the size of formations - call a battalion a regiment for example - a regiment a division - and so on. And a corps is called an army - that is really true by the way. Then outfit these units with almost no heavy weapons. It is quite common for a SINGLE artillery piece to decide a "battle" - and then without shooting at all - or shooting only to proove it has shells! Most units are almost pure infantry.

3) Break up Japanese Independent Infantry Brigades and Regiments into battalions - there is NO real brigade - everything is attached out - even tiny slices of engineers and comm guys. These battalions become the "good" occupation troops.

4) Create troops for the Peiking and Nanjing regimes to Japan (as well as those of Manchukuo and Liaoning).

5) Give control of CCP units to the Soviet Player - classify them as Soviet - or else use a blank nation - they are allied but NOT KMT. Make the CCP command independent.

6) Make all guerilla units static. They live of the LOCAL land and are not very easily moved. [Not even the language is the same. There are 634 languages in China today - and at least as many in WWII. The local land is hard pressed too - it isn't good times - feeding a lot more troops is NOT going to be popular, easy or even possible.]
This is just off the top of my head. Probably there is more to it than this, but it is a fair start.

Also, use the new RHS map. [It will release in a few days - it is in test now and final errors are being corrected.] IT will work with CHS - you won't have to use it with RHS. But it gives China more mountains - something it needs to defend better. Also more trails.

Although I agree that guerilla units would appear somewhat 'static' in game terms, I believe with the current game engine that would be highly impractical.
The game engine does not recognise 'guerilla' type units - they are treated as regular line units. Guerilla units in WitP do not have the ability to hit and then melt into the countryside and reappear at their choosing.
Static guerilla units would be just weak infantry that can't even run - and destroyed all too easily...so I think making them static would not be desierable with the current game engine.

B

[Nikademus]

The game engine does not recognise 'guerilla' type units

how true.....I still remember the time Bangkok was "occupied" by a sub landed fragment of 100 men.

[8|]

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

The game engine does not recognise 'guerilla' type units

how true.....I still remember the time Bangkok was "occupied" by a sub landed fragment of 100 men.

[8|]

You mean - you had no garrison there at all??!![:-]

[Nikademus]

at the time, no. every major LCU had been needed to complete ops in Burma and Malaya (which finished neck and neck with the historical time line) This was way back to and might have been before base unit's got some instrinsic assault value. Kind of highlights the point though. Being operational in scope the game's primary LCU type (outside of specialized units such as NLF/SNLF units or USMC "raider" battalions) is the division or brigade. Divisions can be broken down into regiments....some brigades into halves. Japan to use an example only starts the game with 11 available full divisions for SRA ops.....am i the player really expected to devote a third of a div to each major rear area base to protect against a 100 man unit landed by sub that can somehow sequester an entire city? If one wants guerilla warfare, they need the ability to control unit disposition down to the battalion and even company level. This game is too big for such a thing.

I believe in garrisoning as mentioned previously, but garrisoning against enemy mainline forces and that stretches me thin enough. I can't cover everything as it is in my 1943 game and my opponent has taken advantage, landing on empty dot bases instead and hyperbuilding them into bomber bases through mass ENG stacking.

[Big B]

Adding a little infantry to each base force would be sufficient (appearantly already done) to protect against that type of thing.[8D]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

at the time, no. every major LCU had been needed to complete ops in Burma and Malaya (which finished neck and neck with the historical time line) This was way back to and might have been before base unit's got some instrinsic assault value. Kind of highlights the point though. Being operational in scope the game's primary LCU type (outside of specialized units such as NLF/SNLF units or USMC "raider" battalions) is the division or brigade. Divisions can be broken down into regiments....some brigades into halves. Japan to use an example only starts the game with 11 available full divisions for SRA ops.....am i the player really expected to devote a third of a div to each major rear area base to protect against a 100 man unit landed by sub that can somehow sequester an entire city? If one wants guerilla warfare, they need the ability to control unit disposition down to the battalion and even company level. This game is too big for such a thing.

I believe in garrisoning as mentioned previously, but garrisoning against enemy mainline forces and that stretches me thin enough. I can't cover everything as it is in my 1943 game and my opponent has taken advantage, landing on empty dot bases instead and hyperbuilding them into bomber bases through mass ENG stacking.

[Nikademus]

Thats been done, but there are still only so many base forces. Remember what Sun Tzu said...."He who defends everything...defends nothing"

Had to make some hard choices on what to garrison. Java for example, is very well invested but its a priority target, temptingly close to Oz.

[treespider]

If one wants guerilla warfare, they need the ability to control unit disposition down to the battalion and even company level. This game is too big for such a thing.

Or represent it abstractly with the partisan value as has been done in the game...

[Nikademus]

I don't agree but as i've given my reasons for it, i wont re-hash it.

[el cid again]

IF Japan had adopted a more rational policy, it could have had peace in China, kept Manchukuo, and needed no occupation troops whatever.


But they didn't...and they did need to maintain the rear garrisons...

To some extent I agree with you. It regard comprehensive reform as structurally unlikely - and if it happened there would be no war to fight.
But more limited reforms were not only possible - they are HISTORICAL - we don't say this much (we must condemn the enemy after all) but (a) Tojo himself was not corrupt at any time in his career; (b) signifiant reforms WERE adopted and, in fact, survived the end of the war. IF players are in control, then we need to say they could have adopted those reforms sooner. It was, by 1941, too late not to piss off Chinese - but not too late to work out accomodations that would matter. While I want Japan to need garrisons, I don't think you grasp these are not all IJA in character. Nor do I believe you grasp the essential nature of the other Chinese troops. These were, mainly, not troops in the Western sense that could be effective in an offensive.

[el cid again]

Its not misleading...the quote is in reference to the "millions of Japanese Chinese troops". It was not about the KMT or CCP... It was about the Japanese 'Puppet" forces.

It is misleading because you quoted it to mislead. You want to say Japanese puppet forces (itself a propaganda term more misleading than accurate) were ineffective. You were not trying to say - and do not believe- MOST Chinese troops were similarly ineffective. You want to count other Chinese troops as modern soldiers, but wholly ignore the puppet troops. In a real sense, most troops in China are puppet troops - and very few were national in character for any participant. Saying those in Japanese service don't count, but others do, is a misunderstanding of the situation. The closest thing to real soldiers in China were more or less gone before Pearl Harbor (expended in the defense of Nanjing).

[el cid again]

Although I agree that guerilla units would appear somewhat 'static' in game terms, I believe with the current game engine that would be highly impractical.
The game engine does not recognise 'guerilla' type units - they are treated as regular line units. Guerilla units in WitP do not have the ability to hit and then melt into the countryside and reappear at their choosing.
Static guerilla units would be just weak infantry that can't even run - and destroyed all too easily...so I think making them static would not be desierable with the current game engine.

The guerilla troops do NOT have the ability to "hit and run" MAJOR formations - they can hit a convoy or some isolated roadblock or facility.
So in our game terms they are best represented as a force in an area that is tied to that hex - this is true and functional. If an enemy force ignores them, and does not garrison the hex or wipe them out, then the hex is Chinese, and so are other hexes in its zone of control. Nice simulation actually.