Why Partisan Formula needs to be recoded...

[spence]

China had not surrendered as of 12/07/41. Japan's treatment of the Chinese in its war with them up to that point had been bad enough to gross out Nazis. The likelihood that any amount of Japanese "make-nice" would bear fruit with either the government or the populace in the recognizable future is miniscule especially considering that two most powerful countries in the world had by default just made an alliance with it/them.
It should not be within the power of the Japanese (militarist) player in this game to change his spots to become a liberal democrat winning hearts and minds with his gracious reforms. That bridge was burnt before the game began...it resulted in most of his Army being tied down protecting what he had previously gained. By judicious use of what little reserves he has he might slowly defeat the Chinese but without fresh troops it should remain a real longshot and take a long long time..

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
IF Japan could win and did try to win, it might take about 6-12 months IMHO. And note there is a terrible penalty if it does try: all the stuff sent to China is not avaiable somewhere else.

Wow, you have to be kidding right? Japan had 100% of its resources dedicated to defeating China between 1937 and 1941 and still lost. Anything they then sent to the Pacific, DEI, Malaya, etc. was reducing that 100% effort, so sending it back later should in no way make it possible to then defeat China in 6-12 months. They had 5 years to win 1 on 1 and lost, no way Japan could have beaten China after they then attacked the western allies too. Their last best hope of defeating China was their attempt to isolate the country completely by cutting the Burma Road (didn’t help at all), but this was not the cause of the war with the west.

Western powers were strangling Japans ability to wage their war in China with tightening economic sanctions, Japan went to war with the west in order to secure the needed resources to continue their war in China. But by then China was already lost and no amount of additional oil or ore from the DEI’s was going to give Japan even a semblance of a chance to win in China once the west was in the fight.

Your pro-Japanese slant on this debate is becoming more and more irrational. China was never “nearly defeated”. They were beset by a modern and vicious opponent and 5 years of bloody conflict had put a severe strain on the country, but they were far from ever being close to defeated. Japan thought China would collapse easily once the major cities and industrial centers were taken. Japan way underestimated what it would take to win in China and wasn’t prepared for the kind of war they would have needed to wage to come even close to winning.

By 1941 the war was already lost in China, simply continuing the war was impossible without attacking the west, and that, simply put, was an insane course of action. But Japans medieval Bushido Code which was instilled in its officer corps wouldn’t allow their military leaders to admit defeat, so insanity was the course they took.

I do agree however that games should allow players to explore different possibilities. But those “possibilities” have to be based on rational possibilities. A conquest of China in 6-12 months after 1941 is IMHO irrational in the extreme and has no basis whatsoever on the historical realities of the situation in China.

Sorry for the harsh tone, but if you’re in charge of the changes we will see in RHS in China, I’m afraid of what will occur based on this kind of an assumption and feel it needs very serious consideration from everyone in the community before anything is implemented.

Jim

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Neither the PLA nor the KMT claim to have had "modern mechanized divisions."

By mechanized, I meant 2 of the divisions Japan lost in China were considered armored formations. They had an abundance of modern mechanized equipment when compared to other Japanese formations in country. I'll have to try and dig up the source where I read about this, as my memory is very vague on what I actually read.

Jim

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I am very pleased with the idea of gurilla units being immoble and intend to test it now.

The problem I have with trying to represent Chinese guerilla forces on map is two fold. First they can’t disappear into the populace and reappear later as they historically did whenever the Japanese threatened them. Second the supply rules in the game means a fixed unit can simply be isolated and will slowly die off over time due to lack of supplies. These forces were easily kept fed and supplied by local cottage industries in their areas and needed no outside assistance for the entire war.

Additionally the real threat of these forces wasn’t their ability to control the primitive interior of China. Rather it was their sheer size and their ability to attack unprotected areas of the rail network in China. Their massive numbers (massive when compared to traditional partisan style forces in Europe) meant that police or security type troops couldn’t handle them, regular combat forces were needed. They were also very mobile because they weren’t tied down by the need to protect heavy guns or a logistics network, these forces could abandon any ground they stood on and redeploy hundreds of miles away with no loss in capabilities. The fact they were simply a mob of riflemen was the reason Japan couldn’t pin them down to a traditional set piece battle unless the Chinese chose to fight one.

Your idea will simply add victory points to the Japanese side as he can choose to totally ignore the partisans or not. And no matter what he chooses to do, the units will die within a year, which is something the Japanese never could do. The threat persisted throughout the war and needs to persist in the game. None of the punitive campaigns Japan launched did anything more than suppress enemy activity for a while, and none of them ever allowed Japan to stop garrisoning any portion of the rail netowork with regular combat troops.

Jim

[el cid again]

I concur without quibble with every phrase Spence writes below. Nor do I wish to allow a Japanese player to become a liberal democrat - which means no war at all. I am talking about something very different, very real, and in fact, very involved with what happened - but there is no neat word to describe it in English. IJA had a faction, once in control and always a contender for control, which liked the solution adopted in Manchukuo - and two smaller "nations" to the SW of there. We don't usually understand this was not a populated area UNTIL Japan did its economic and administrative miracle, or that they sought to ATTRACT skilled Chinese to that area (along with Koreans, Russians and Japanese) - and succeeded in doing so. The system is not democratic in the least - but it is enterpreunere friendly - and in fact forbade the big economic entities any ability to compete at all by law. It is, truly, a Fashist concept - government tontrol by regulation of truly private enterprise. This policy worked throughout the decade of Japan-China conflict (1935 to 1945) although it began in 1932 - and elements of it were adopted in the rest of China in 1945 - with truely lasting impacts (insofar as they were never reversed and became the basis of legal actions since). Turning loose impressed workers does not make them love you - for example - but it is a major step toward a better relationship with the population. This sort of thing is mirrored by Nazi Germany as well - even Hitler repealed the Commisar Law - because it was so counterproductive.
Things liberals might applaud were done by both Axis powers - not because they were liberal - but because it was too counterproductive to keep doing otherwise - and they figured it out. Japan was way ahead of Germany in its policy of tolerating "inferior races" for economic reasons - if only in colonial areas - and the attempt to import German Jews in numbers (several thousand did arrive, but the plan failed - they spent the war in the former colonial enclave of wealthy foreigners in Shanghai) should indicate a different "solution" than Germany found for them (although, to be fair, German diplomats almost succeeded in getting that solution adopted in Shanhai as well).
Japan had official institutions (I mean by this the Foreign Ministry and also a private association dedicated to promoting Asia for the Asians) which had numbers of educated professionals that supported the policy I decribe - and one fan of these was the Prime Minister himself. In the end the IJA was given control - and worse local control in the case of China - so local policy could be and was for too long very different than it should have been. But forcing the generals in Peking and Nanking to honor the national policy is hardly the same as advocating Democracy in Asia.

China had not surrendered as of 12/07/41. Japan's treatment of the Chinese in its war with them up to that point had been bad enough to gross out Nazis. The likelihood that any amount of Japanese "make-nice" would bear fruit with either the government or the populace in the recognizable future is miniscule especially considering that two most powerful countries in the world had by default just made an alliance with it/them.
It should not be within the power of the Japanese (militarist) player in this game to change his spots to become a liberal democrat winning hearts and minds with his gracious reforms. That bridge was burnt before the game began...it resulted in most of his Army being tied down protecting what he had previously gained. By judicious use of what little reserves he has he might slowly defeat the Chinese but without fresh troops it should remain a real longshot and take a long long time..

[el cid again]

Wow, you have to be kidding right? Japan had 100% of its resources dedicated to defeating China between 1937 and 1941 and still lost.

Nope. Not kidding. And you are incorrect: Japan did not have "100% of its resources dedicated to defeating China between 1937 and 1941." During that period Japan fought no less than two wars with the USSR, occupied Indochina, and continued to defend Japan proper. The Kwangtung Army was at all times stronger than forces in China, which was a poor cousin, getting obsolete equipment of all sorts, and even units called "infantry units" wholly devoid of regular support assets. I have no clue what gives you the impression that the IJA went to China, abandoned Japan and Manchukuo (and two other so called pupet regimes near it), or that it lacked any reserves so it could contemplate operations in 1941 (occupy Indochina in two stages, then send 11 divisions into the Southern Resource Area) - but this is utterly false and misleading.

Again - I must repete my thesis since you are not listening - Japan was (always and remains) an EXTRAORDINARILY divided society. The idea of a unified effort NEVER was popular in Japan - and to the extent it occurred it was very much under the pressure of WWII - and far too late to matter. [Plans for a Grand Escort Command were not implemented until midwar, and assets were never given to it in any reasonable sense. Unification of production standards between the army and navy came to pass only as the war wound down. Things we regard as SOP were anything but in Japan.] Japan had opponents of war with China - not just in civil society - but in IJA itself. For an inside look - from a radical nationalist point of view which nonetheless is much more liberal than you would imagine - read Tsuji's first book. Since he travels for years with KMT, you also get a look at Chinese military practice at the same time.

[el cid again]

Anything they then sent to the Pacific, DEI, Malaya, etc. was reducing that 100% effort, so sending it back later should in no way make it possible to then defeat China in 6-12 months. They had 5 years to win 1 on 1 and lost, no way Japan could have beaten China after they then attacked the western allies too. Their last best hope of defeating China was their attempt to isolate the country completely by cutting the Burma Road (didn’t help at all), but this was not the cause of the war with the west.

This is well thought thrugh although not really correct in conclusions. But it does correctly say Japan has a number of problems - and any effort to conquer China is going to require assets of value on other fronts. It is one reason I think the Russians need to be able to attack - what if Manchukuo is stripped entirely - STILL no attack - of a FORMER RUSSIAN territory the Russians still wanted? I think not. As for the South, strip it and the US/UK/Dutch have an easy time of it. So the defense of China is really related to these other areas - and Japan ignores them to its peril. But that does not mean it is not an OPTION to focus on China. The key is "force multipliers" in modern parlance - send planes for example - and stop pissing off so many people by stupid policies. If you allow rich men to profit and warlords to rule districts, there is no shortage of people to cooperate with in China - these were norms - and practice on all sides no matter who was winning where. What hurt Japan was most of all profiteering generals who looted the neighborhood - and China expeditions attracted men interested in this. It was possible to control them - and Tojo made his mark in IJA by doing just that - so knowing how was not an issue. But it was not easy to control them. It meant a different clique in control - men like the general who first organized the invasion of Manchuria and Tsuji - both demonized in our history - but in fact both quite different than the men that ended up in control. Theirs was a breed similar to late 19th centuray American empire builders - people who annexed Hawaii, fomented revolution in Panama, broke Adm Dewey's promice to recoginze the Philippines AFTER they fought for us (when we had NO army on the ground), etc. They are nationalists and even colonialists, but in their own way, ethical and effective leaders who had some skill at organizing things in functional ways.

[el cid again]

Western powers were strangling Japans ability to wage their war in China with tightening economic sanctions, Japan went to war with the west in order to secure the needed resources to continue their war in China. But by then China was already lost and no amount of additional oil or ore from the DEI’s was going to give Japan even a semblance of a chance to win in China once the west was in the fight.

OK - you wnat to go down this road. So tell the truth. Japan was FORCED into the modern world by European and American naval forces. AFTER the British bombarded Kagoshima with battleships, Adm Dewey threatened more of the same if they did not allow trade. Japanese policy was harsh - drown girl babies in years of famine - so it would not outstrip its food supply. No problem, we said - we will ALWAYS trade with you - allow your population to grow. So they did. A century later, Japan does not have the option of going back - it has the least tillable land of any major nation. Killing the Japanese economy is murder - and we know it and approve - one cabinet official wanted to force Japan back to an agrarian society with the loss of - what ? 80% of its people - and we REALLY DID let Japanese starve in 1946-1948 (Saburo Sakai lost his wife to starvation in thiis period - under OUR administration). Japan would never agree to lose Taiwan and Korea - even in 1945 when it is ready to surrender - becuase it means starvation. [We made them do it - and then let them starve too]. Japan indeed went to war - and almost no Japanese politician or historian says it was wrong today - because it was something wholly unacceptable - and we knew it would be - to demand we dictate Japanese policy. We MIGHT have stood up to Japan in 1935 or 1937 with effect - but we did not. AFTER five years of war - and casualties - it was not an option to ask them to leave China - and we knew it. See Ambassador Grew on the subject. Roosevelt wanted Japan in the war as a device to get war with Germany - he didn't respect Japan as a potential opponent. Not sure how he thought that would work either? But he got lucky - Germany declared war on us - did he anticipate that? Why does a Japanese attack put us at war with Germany? I have no clue - normally.

[el cid again]

Your pro-Japanese slant on this debate is becoming more and more irrational. China was never “nearly defeated”.

I am not pro Japanese. I am familiar with Chinese materials. You are ignoring them.
Not the same thing. See Thunder Out of China, China's Bitter Victory, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, The Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, China and the Origins of the Pacific War for hints in English by Chinese (red and blue), American and European scholars. For stratetic issues, see Armageddon - which is not kind ot Allied motives or plans - or that account of the British subtitled "grave of a dozen schemes" - I will think of it later - a history of British plans in Asia during the war. I am a student of IJA, PLA and KMT, and I am familiar with the USA and USMC - so I write from an American perspective. If WE do something it is brilliant - if IJA does it the same thing is stupid. Bunk. I was trained by a US Army historian NOT to depend on secondary analysis by American writers for events in alien lands. Then - quite unintentionally - I spend my life in Asia - I went to Viet Nam - was home ported in Japan - advance home ported in the Philippines - and often visited Taiwan and Hong Kong. I ended up getting married in China, and my father in law is a war hero to whom a monument is built in a village - the only such monument I have seen anywhere in the world in a village - they had to build a road there to make it in the 1990s. [While he was from Fukien, and 100% Chinese, this monument is in Luzon - where he was sort of a one man LURPS team for the USA, and a local hero among mountain people there.] I have no illusions about the nature of the Japanese regime - nor of the competing (and awful) Chinese regimes - and I am glad I do not have to choose between KMT, CCP and IJA! It is not much different from living in Eastern Europe and choosing between Hitler, Stalin or maybe some local nationalist. You cannot get it right if you think "everyone on the American side was right and everyone on the other side was pure evil." And even Americans were not very liberal in places - see Burma (no prisoners) or the cruise of USS Wahoo (machine gun swimmers for hours on end - rewarded by a Navy Cross) - or bombing campaigns so severe we can hardly imagine them (we admit 800,000 killed in less than a year - and that is more than the 600,000 than Japanese military forces suffered in a decade of war - but it probably was 800,000 in two days at Tokyo - according to an American academic I met there collecting the real data.) War Without Mercy gives you a clue - although in that case the writer is pro-Japanese (his wife is Japanese). I read everyone and have no need to sympathize with any nationalist point of view.

[el cid again]

They were beset by a modern and vicious opponent and 5 years of bloody conflict had put a severe strain on the country, but they were far from ever being close to defeated.

This is false: the REASON for us going to war is the peril of China. The embargo's of the summer of 1941 were meant to change that. Chiang was in negotiation with Japan and his number two had defected (to become leader of the Nanjing regime - in his former capital). The CHINESE say they were nearly defeated - why do you doubt them? Should not they know?

[el cid again]

Japan way underestimated what it would take to win in China and wasn’t prepared for the kind of war they would have needed to wage to come even close to winning.

Here I will agree with you.

To win in China Tojo had to become more secure (he had three bosses behind the scenes), and to ally with the man he feared might replace him (Gen Yamashita).
This is not what happened and not particularly likely, but not impossible either. It is legitimate for a player to want to do that. Put the Foreign Ministry in charge of foreign policy (again), put the IJA under Yamashita, and reform it as he proposed in 1941,
adopt pre war plans for a Grand Escort Command and unified standards for the Army and Navy in production. In China itself, unify under a single regime - do not attempt rival ones - my choice being the Nanjing one with such a large slice of KMT people and its second most powerful politician - and give Chiang terms he might be able to live with.
If Yamashita ran IJA, the Navy might have been heeded as well - war with the West was going to be dangerous and hard to win. Just a real effort to negotiate might have made the Americans less a problem - the President didn't intend the embargo be total as it turned out to be - and any progress might have been rewarded by loosing. Japan also found a way to "cheat" using Thailand as a middleman - such mechanisms might have been expanded. The oil/iron/rubber embargo was a problem - and failing ending it possibly war with the US/UK was going to happen - but I am not 100% certain this need have been the outcome. The biggest problem is one not in most books: Roosevelt ordered three ships to START A WAR with Japan - so probably there was going to be a war. [See The Cruise of the Lanoiak by RADM Vince Trolly, her captain, when he was an LT]. But certainly a quite different policy/strategy was possible, using historical policies and advocates, not fictional ones. Which is what a game should allow us to explore.

[el cid again]

By 1941 the war was already lost in China, simply continuing the war was impossible without attacking the west, and that, simply put, was an insane course of action.

In geostrategic terms, yes

Yet what was the alternative? IF Japan caved to the embargo - and withdrew from China (not Manchuria - that was not demanded) - it more than lost face (a big deal in East Asia) - it THEN would expect to have US/UK/NEI dictate its policy FOREVER in ANY AREA.

Grew wrote at the time this was inconcevable - that the embargo must lead to war - and he was quite right. Japan could not allow its foreign policy to be dictated by us. Nor were we trying to avoid war - it is pretty clear we just hoped to put the onus on them for starting it.

[el cid again]

I do agree however that games should allow players to explore different possibilities. But those “possibilities” have to be based on rational possibilities. A conquest of China in 6-12 months after 1941 is IMHO irrational in the extreme and has no basis whatsoever on the historical realities of the situation in China.

If 6-12 months is unrealistic, what IS a realistic possibility? Are you saying it would take two or three campaign seasons? I might have to agree with that. I have the impression you are saying - you did use the word - it is NEVER possible.

[el cid again]

Sorry for the harsh tone, but if you’re in charge of the changes we will see in RHS in China, I’m afraid of what will occur based on this kind of an assumption and feel it needs very serious consideration from everyone in the community before anything is implemented.

The focus of RHS is not China. This is for two reasons:

1) The game is not focused on China. Maybe it should be, but it isn't. It needs to address serious issues of several kinds, like rational production, air combat, bad data for ships, etc. This is the focus of RHS.

2) The land combat system is not only broken, it is not fixable sans code changes, and this per Joe, a professional programmer with connections to Matrix even before he got hired. China will NEVER be fixable by ANYTHING I can do at this point - so I am not trying.

For these reasons, RHS is not looking at China per se.

That said, I DID implement reforms proposed in China threads:

1) Added mountains (and other rough terrain)

2) Added towns and trails, with a view to improving supply of otherwise isolated Chinese units

3) Moved a few Chinese units reported to be errors

4) Added some local supply = same motive - help isolated Chinese troops.

What problems - if any - do you have with any of these measures?

What suggestions - if any - do you have to do more?

My only other change - from this discussion - is with respect to guerilla units. The choice in my view lies between killing them (the system is not designed for them) and immobilizing them - I am testing the latter. Comments are welcome - but not the suggstion to treat them like first line troops - which is clearly wrong.

[el cid again]

By mechanized, I meant 2 of the divisions Japan lost in China were considered armored formations.

OK. I am on more solid ground here. Whatever you are reading is bunk. No other option. EDIT - I have thought of a possibility in language - see below.

Japan only formed one thing remotely like an "armored" division ever - the "tank group." It is a wierd creature - in IJA terms it is similar to a "cavalry group" - which they had one of in China. Also it is similar to the late war "airborne group." A "group" is a formation worthy of a division ocmmander too weak to justify with the formal title division. Only four tank groups ever formed up, and only one ever fought non-Soviets - and none ever was in China - unless you consider Manchukuo to be part of China. There were indeed two there - and they were indeed defeated - by the Soviet Red Army in August Storm. The only one ever to fight other in the last few days of hte war against the Russians was the Second - on Luzon - a horrible battle - probably the only tank battle in history where one side NEVER fired a shot! [The US never let the enemy be in range!] And even then it was such a stripped unit that callling it a division is probably incorrect. All up, a Japanese tank group had one regiment of motorized infantry, one battalion of mechanized infantry, and three battalions of tanks (called regiments). There was an artillery unit (a baby regiment) which at least was motorized, but not mechanized, an AA unit (a battalion), an engineer unit (battalion) and various support units. No such formation was ever committed to China.

EDIT: Tsuji calls the tank regiment in Malaya a "brigade." Maybe someone else used this term in China? Maybe you are misremembering "brigades" as "divisionns"??
In that case, it is possible two such "regiments" - which are really battalions - were wiped out in China.

[treespider]

Roosevelt ordered three ships to START A WAR with Japan - so probably there was going to be a war. [See The Cruise of the Lanoiak by RADM Vince Trolly, her captain, when he was an LT].

Roosevelt didn't order Tolley to "Start a War". Tolley's orders were to patrol off the coast of Indo-China and gain information on the Japanese invasion fleet, if he happened to be attacked while carrying out his orders....oh well.

Tolley took command of Lanikai Dec 4 and was still sitting in Manilla Bay on Dec 7/8. The British and Americans had plenty of intel during this time that there was going to be a Japanese attack, they just didn't know where. So your suggestion and Tolley's claims are actually irrelevant, everyone already knew there was going to be a war and it wasn't going to be the Lanikai that started it. Although to make that claim probably fitted Tolley and the publishers purposes when the book was released during the Pearl harbor revisionist furor...

[treespider]

as an addendum to the above...

One of these concerned Roosevelt's December 1, 1941 order to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering the immediate dispatch of three "small vessels" armed with a machine gun and deck cannon, each commanded by a U.S. Naval officer, and flying the American flag. The three little ships were directed to sail into the path of Japanese Navy convoys that Washington knew were then steaming southward. Had the American ships been attacked by the Japanese, Barnes was now confident that this would have saved Pearl Harbor. "There can be little doubt that the Cockleship plan of December 1st was designed to get the indispensable attack by a method which would precede the Pearl Harbor attack, avert the latter, and save the Pacific Fleet and American lives," he wrote of this aspect of the mystery.

A part of the story that had hitherto been largely overlooked, even by many Revisionists, concerned the secret agreements Roosevelt had entered into with the British and Dutch and which led to America technically being at war with Japan four days before Pearl Harbor. As Barnes succinctly explained, in April 1941 the U.S., British, and Dutch agreed to take joint military action against Japan if the Japanese sent armed forces beyond the line 100 East and 10 North or 6 North and the Davao-Waigeo line, or threatened British or Dutch possessions in the southwest Pacific or independent countries in that region. The agreements were known as ABCD. Thereafter, Admiral Stark said that war with Japan was not a matter of if, but rather when and where. Roosevelt gave his approval to the attendant war plans in May and June. On December 3, 1941, the Dutch invoked the ABCD agree ment, after Japanese forces passed the line 100 East and 10 North, and were thought to be headed toward Dutch territory as well as the Kra Peninsula and Thailand. The U.S. military attache in Melbourne, Australia, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, was contacted by the Australians, British, and Dutch and informed that the Dutch were expecting the U.S. Navy to offer assistance. Merle-Smith relayed this information to his superiors by coded message. It should have reached Washington in the early evening of December 4.

[el cid again]

Roosevelt didn't order Tolley to "Start a War". Tolley's orders were to patrol off the coast of Indo-China and gain information on the Japanese invasion fleet, if he happened to be attacked while carrying out his orders....oh well.

No they were not. His orders - and USS Isabel actually made a pre-war patrol under these same orders - and a third vessel was working up for the same mission - were (according to him)

to find an IJN naval force near Indochina

to illegally maneuver in its way until it was warned off by a shot over the bow (running under NO colors like a pirate - AND with a concealed gun)

to then run up the flag and radio the message "a USN warship has been attacked"

To do this his yaht was given a 3 inch gun, a flag, and a radio - and he got 3 CPOs to help - and kept its civil crew otherwise! This was to be a "USN warship"!!! Sort of a Gulf of Tonkin Incident a generation early.

[el cid again]

Tolley took command of Lanikai Dec 4 and was still sitting in Manilla Bay on Dec 7/8. The British and Americans had plenty of intel during this time that there was going to be a Japanese attack, they just didn't know where. So your suggestion and Tolley's claims are actually irrelevant, everyone already knew there was going to be a war and it wasn't going to be the Lanikai that started it.

No one "knew" anything for sure. Confusion abounded four days later, after it had begun. I know a British cypher officer (captain) at Singapore had figured it out - was forbidden to tell the Americans - and sent it to Adm Hart anyway. But it was anything but clear that the war would start when it did - the indication was that enemy merchants would ALL be in port by Dec 7 US time - it did not mean the war must begin that same day. There are lots of things that seem clear in hindsight. Trolly's orders were not cut Dec 3 - they were conceived in November in Washington by the President - who sent them OUTSIDE the chain of command to Adm Hart - who in his turn did NOT inform MacArthur (who was not his superior in any case - Asiatic Fleet was NOT subordinate to USAFFE - whatever WITP shows) or Nimitz (who was his superior) - nor "Tom Thumb" (commander of Force Z - who was in Manila when the war was about to begin). You do not direct three ships to break the rules of the road, do so under no colors, then falsely claim to have been knowingly engaged by IJN if you don't WANT a war. That is the point - Roosevelt had decided not to wait for spring - the date it was agreed we would be ready to fight - and had not told Gen Marshall or adm King about his decision either. Probably to avoid political compliations and preserve plausable deniability, in our modern terms. Roosevelt was big at this sort of thing - US law meant not a whit to him - he misused ONI on many occasions - and often it bit us in terms of unintended consequences. This was status quo for his modus operendi - he felt a commander in chief was not constrained by law or morality - and he said so on the occasion of authorizing Lend Lease - which was illegal three different ways. When Congress passed it, those laws changed - but BEFORE they passed it - they were the "supreme law of the land." Roosevelt never cared - he felt he could do anything. We went to war in the Atlantic before the war began - not legally perhaps - but factually.

[el cid again]

Although to make that claim probably fitted Tolley and the publishers purposes when the book was released during the Pearl harbor revisionist furor...

The book was published by US Naval Institute. It has been put back into production again (at my request) by the same USNI - in an age of no revisionist furor. USNI has some political principles - but these are rather formal and academic - and specifically avoid things controversial about US policy. [One historian - Scalia - author of Germany's Last Voyage to Japan - was threatened with suit if he published his appendix a document I wrote on the cargo of U-234 - the subject of the book. Never mind a famous Oak Ridge chemist is my neighbor, and we had solid technical documentary evidence - it was way too controversial - and unacceptable to suggest the US ever did anything that might not look good today.] For whatever reason, USNI does not consider Roosevelts behaviors as controversial - probably they are too well established. See Double Edged Secrets on ONI - and Roosevelt - for another USNI book revealing similar behaviors. This is not new material - nor is it particularly surprising inside USN - where many used to have direct knowledge.