Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05?

[Feinder]

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?

[wworld7]

If I rememebr correctly KB was too far away to attack before 12/7.

I forget at what point they had orders to turn around if spotted prior to the attack.

Flipper

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?

Link to KB's orders.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html

In summary IJN forces were ordered to counterattack any enemy forces attempting to interfere with ( or attack ) their operations.

[Feinder]

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Fine.

Let's say search planes from a USN CV stumbles across KB.

We'll even say that KB spots the USN CV. According to orders, KB increases CAP, and readies a strike (to fire if fired upon).

USN CV skipper radios Pearl, "Um. There's a really, REALLY, big TF with lots of carriers heading your way..."

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).

-F-

[Bobthehatchit]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Fine.

Let's say search planes from a USN CV stumbles across KB.

We'll even say that KB spots the USN CV. According to orders, KB increases CAP, and readies a strike (to fire if fired upon).

USN CV skipper radios Pearl, "Um. There's a really, REALLY, big TF with lots of carriers heading your way..."

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).

-F-

Considering it would be one/two on six, probaby shadow them with float planes or dauntlesses and keep a rotating cap up and prepare to get the hell out of dodge or die gloriously.

If that was a british TF they'd close with the enemy and prepare to carryout boarding actions!

[Przemcio231]

Well from what you write here US CV attacks Japs but gets sloughtered... Kimmel send his fleet to intercept the Japs and Us BB's are sunk in deep water[:D]

[mlees]

Are you looking for actual historical records of orders, or are you asking for speculation?

The only "historical" info I remember on this point was when Halsey (in command of the Enterprise reinforcing Wake) asked Admiral Kimmel "what do I do if I spot a Jap?"

Kimmel replied "Use your common sense."

Speculation: If a single USN CV (Lexington or Enterprise) spots the KB as it is N to NE of Midway, shaping a course for Hawaii.

1. USN CV "shadows", and sends regular sighting reports to CinCPAC. CAP is at max, strike group readied. Carrier(s) would attempt to remain in shadow/contact until landbased air recce can take over these duties, then the CV's would withdraw beyond immediate strike range, but remain within 4-6 hours steaming distance of strike range in the event of a DoW.

2. Army troops and land based air in Oahu (and later PAC wide) are put on alert. Aircraft may be dispersed to outlying airfields on other islands. CAP, ASW, and search missions are dramatically stepped up. Leaves cancelled, all personnel return to units, ammo broken out. Strike aircraft prepped.

3. Pac Fleet units in port are sortied as soon as feasible. I would suggest that the slow BB force would be sortied away from the approaching KB. Subs would sortie into path of KB for scouting and, if in the case of a DoW, attack. Lexington and Enterprise would be ordered to conduct ops together. Saratoga (on west coast) would be ordered to Hawaiian area ASAP. Convoys in or near the Hawaiian area would be rerouted. If possible, Enterprise and Lex groups would wait until KB is in range of land based air out of Hawaii for max cooperation of air strikes.

4. Diplomatic messages would be fired off, including probably, an ultimatum for the KB to withdraw west of the Dateline.

This is about as far as my imagination takes me.

Edit: Sorry, I was answering this question:

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).

[jwilkerson]

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Not sure a reading of the various orders supports that interpretation. I'll quote several relevent excerpts below:


The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.

2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters

JCW: so these two taken together (and the second is referring to the first) seem to authorize force to be used if threatening or endangering acts are taken ... were I the commander in question, I would not interpret this to mean only fire if fired upon, I would take this to mean, fire if as the commander on the spot, I mean enemy actions endanger the success of my mission. Such actions could include anything, movements, recon flights, anything that makes me as the commander believe my mission is threatened.

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?

Interesting Feinder

A. Knowing how the Japanese were during the war I doubt this was much in their minds. The Japanese would have convinced themselves the the US would be totally off guard, being too busy being decadent Americans to put up much of a fight...not far from the truth, but point is Japan seldom seemed to have a plan B.

B. The commander would probably have gone on with the attack anyway.

C. Had word gotten to PH about the fleet Kimmel would have dropped his golf clubs and gotten the fleet to sea. However, if smart he would have hung back away from PH and let the Army Air corp weaken the KB first, then sent in the fleet...which still would have been a futile effort, those slow BBs would never have closed with the KB, but it wouldn't have been as sever a whooping as charging a strong KB.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Not sure a reading of the various orders supports that interpretation. I'll quote several relevent excerpts below:


The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.

2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters

JCW: so these two taken together (and the second is referring to the first) seem to authorize force to be used if threatening or endangering acts are taken ... were I the commander in question, I would not interpret this to mean only fire if fired upon, I would take this to mean, fire if as the commander on the spot, I mean enemy actions endanger the success of my mission. Such actions could include anything, movements, recon flights, anything that makes me as the commander believe my mission is threatened.

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."

[jwilkerson]

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."

Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."

Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.

Well, I don't know the individual commanders personalities well. However, remember that political wheels were turning. Diplomatic relations were being severed and it is unlikely that IF the Japanese wanted to turn back at the last minute that A: they could call off any off thier other invasions and B: the morning of 12/7 Japanese diplomats were supposed to be handing the US an indirect declaration of war - it was actually several hours late being delivered. I suspect there was a predetermined point of no return on that voyage to PH and by the time the KB was getting near the base, it was already passed...just my suspicion, but it would almost be necessary considering the timing that had to occur with other attacks and with the diplomats. I doubt Nagumo could have turned aside even if he wanted to.

[Feinder]

Are you looking for actual historical records of orders, or are you asking for speculation?

I don't really have an agenda on this thread. I was simply curious what some of the leaned one here thought. Frankly, I don't really even have an opinion, because I didn't know what the orders were. I'm reading y'alls responses, before forming an opinion (for once [;)]).

-F-

[mlees]

This dispatch is top secret.
This order is effective at 1730 on 2 December:
***** Combined Fleet Serial) #10.
Climb NIITAKAYAMA 1208, repeat 1208!

So, on 2 December (Tokyo time), 6 days prior to the actual attack, the fleet was given the green light.

I suggest that the fleet would have attempted to carry out it's orders, as written, with preservation of the fleet as an unspoken assumption.

However, on the comments that Nagumo was a big chicken, I respectfully point out that in the battle of Midway, Naguma "charged" ahead (with only the Hiryu remaining) after at least two spotted USN carriers. His reports to Yamamoto that day indicated that he (Nagumo) thought that he was engaging anywhere from 2 to 6(!!) enemy carriers. Not the actions of a man who had no nads...

[Terminus]

Might have been the action of a man who thought that his bosses would fire him if he did something considered timid for a second time.

[mlees]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Might have been the action of a man who thought that his bosses would fire him if he did something considered timid for a second time.

Hehe. Maybe. But I think that the actual man was not lacking in guts, but lacking in aviation experience. He relied on his staff to work out the details, and as such, has been seen as "less than ideally effective" as a CV TF commander.

Also, he seems to lack the ability to improvise on the spot, and to recognise when to depart from "the plan".

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."

Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.

Even Halsey might have passed on attacking at odds of 1:6. Strikes me that the most likely event would be Nagumo turning around as he had been ordered to launch "a suprise attack" and that would undoubtedly be impossible once KB was spotted. The really interesting possibility would have been KB being spotted by a submarine as occurred to the Japanese in 1944 on their way to the Marianas. Then it would have been a matter of "when?" If it were Saturday, the Pacific Fleet wouldn't have had time to sortie...., but all the AAA would have been manned and the CAP fully prepared and in the air. If on Friday, the fleet could have sortied, either to run (likely without it's CV's to provide air cover) or intercept.

Probably the most likely UNTIL KB raised speed and turned South late Saturday would be to turn around if they knew they'd been spotted. After that point they might very well have gone ahead. They themselves weren't really expecting the degree of suprise they achieved, so trying to fight their way in is a feasible choice. It's lots of fun to speculate...

[ChezDaJez]

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.

Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH, I think that he would have launched against a US CV. Afterall, the CVs are what they were seeking.

Assuming KB sank the CV and was not significantly damaged in return, I think he would then still have attempted to strike Pearl Harbor, even if the US fleet had sortied. Potentially, this could have had far worse consequences than the historical attack as they would have had to concentrate on repair and fuel storage facilities instead. Pennsylvania would still have been in dry dock. The rest of the BBs would have sortied south if they were smart but it's possible that 1 or 2 may have still been close enough to port to be discovered and attacked.

Another option would have been to sail to a point where he thought the US BBs might sortie to and attempt to strike them there. This would have the benefit of avoiding the hornet's nest that would now surely be Pearl Harbor and sink many of the BBs in deep water.

Just a thought. "What ifs" can be fun to postulate on.

Chez

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.

Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH, I think that he would have launched against a US CV. Afterall, the CVs are what they were seeking.

Assuming KB sank the CV and was not significantly damaged in return, I think he would then still have attempted to strike Pearl Harbor, even if the US fleet had sortied. Potentially, this could have had far worse consequences than the historical attack as they would have had to concentrate on repair and fuel storage facilities instead. Pennsylvania would still have been in dry dock. The rest of the BBs would have sortied south if they were smart but it's possible that 1 or 2 may have still been close enough to port to be discovered and attacked.

Another option would have been to sail to a point where he thought the US BBs might sortie to and attempt to strike them there. This would have the benefit of avoiding the hornet's nest that would now surely be Pearl Harbor and sink many of the BBs in deep water.

Just a thought. "What ifs" can be fun to postulate on.

Chez

As long as we're speculating, let's speculate on something likely. We know where the US CV's were, where they were going to or coming from. And we know that Kido Butai was coming due South out of the poor weather they'd been using to screen their advance. So the chances of them meeting or even spotting each other is virtually nil. Given where the Japanese were coming from they might have been spotted by a stray steamer (which they would undoubtedly have sunk---the only question would be if a believable radio message had been gotten off); a submarine (which might or might not have been spotted by the Japanese); or possibly an aircraft patrol once KB had left the area of rotten weather ( would have required an unlikely coincidence, or a lost aircraft).

Now KB launched it's dawn strike at Oahu from 240 miles North. So if the Pacific Fleet had had warning and sortied Saturday Night, it would have been 125-150 miles South, East, or somewhere from Oahu. The assumption that KB would have found and sunk the Pacific Fleet "in deep water" is highly speculative.
Historically 5-7 US Pursuit Planes made it into the air during the raid, and shot down 7-12 Japanese A/C.
Had the entire American fighter force been up on CAP when the "suprise" attacks arrived it's fairly obvious that Japanese losses would have been pretty substantial. Especially losses of those irreplaceable veteran aircrews. The Japanese were going to make those strikes on the morning of the 7th..., they would have had no way of knowing their target wasn't there. And if the defense was ready, they were going to get hurt. Now the remnants have to fly back to the carriers, re-arm and re-fuel, and find Kimmel's Fleet..., knowing that the US CV's were still unaccounted for and out there somewhere. And that US submarines and long ranged bombers from Oahu would be looking for them. I don't see Nagumo sticking around under those circumstances.

Now given the number of Japanese subs in the area, Kimmel might have lost some ships "in deep water". But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.

[niceguy2005]

I would assert again, I find it hard to believe that Nagumo would have turned away unless he was certain he was attacking a vastly superior force. The reason is that the attack on PH was absolutely crucial to Japanese strategy. Failing to carry out the attack, even for very good reasons would have been disastorous to Japanese plans and Nagumos career. Once they committed by sailing that far, they were committed. IF the US had discovered them it would have been considered an act of aggression and that was all FDR needed to declare war. IMO.