Oil supply

[el cid again]

This seems strange:

The total oil on both sides at the start is about 4716 tons per day.

That means, neglecting any "free" oil to Allied edge of map locations, if Japan captured every last place on the map, it is able to get less than half the oil it needs for its initial industry (never mind the industry it captures). This is nothing like Parillo's "more than enough oil" for the needs of Japan's economy in the East Indies alone.

Resources are not much better. Japan starts with less than half the resource points needed by its industry - and must capture about half the allied points on the map - to just feed initial industry - much less expanded and/or captured industry.

We cannot play any economically sensible strategies with these numbers folks. And it is fictional to try. Japan is doomed - as my long range AI vs AI games are showing- it is eating its tail (reserves). Now that is what really happened, but it need not be what happens - as Parillo points out. Japan failed to exploit what it captured - but it captured "more than enough." Well - in WITP - that isn't an option.

[Mike Solli]

What is 4716 tons of oil equal to in points? If you assume 1 ton = 1 point, then you're missing something. Off the top of my head here's what I come up with (in points) for the places Japan can take:

Japan - 250
China/Manchuoko - 475
Formosa - 50
Burma - 50
Summatra - 800
Borneo - 800
Java - 200
Ambonia - 50?

That makes a grand total of about 2675 points in facilities. Multiply x6 and you get 16050 points per day produced. Prior to the Allied bombing offensive, my HI for my mid-1942 PBEM is about 13500. That leaves an excess of about 2500 oil points per day, or 75000 points per month.

Edit: My game is in mid July 1942. The Japanese start with 1.8 million oil reserves. I currently have 1607443 oil reserves and over 250k in convoys heading to various ports. I'm gaining ground, albeit slowly, but I'm working toward a 7 month supply at each region. I'm almost there and will be in a month or two.

[el cid again]

What is 4716 tons of oil equal to in points? If you assume 1 ton = 1 point, then you're missing something. Off the top of my head here's what I come up with (in points) for the places Japan can take:

Japan - 250
China/Manchuoko - 475
Formosa - 50
Burma - 50
Summatra - 800
Borneo - 800
Java - 200
Ambonia - 50?

That makes a grand total of about 2675 points in facilities. Multiply x6 and you get 16050 points per day produced. Prior to the Allied bombing offensive, my HI for my mid-1942 PBEM is about 13500. That leaves an excess of about 2500 oil points per day, or 75000 points per month.

Edit: My game is in mid July 1942. The Japanese start with 1.8 million oil reserves. I currently have 1607443 oil reserves and over 250k in convoys heading to various ports. I'm gaining ground, albeit slowly, but I'm working toward a 7 month supply at each region. I'm almost there and will be in a month or two.

First, what scenario are you running? It matters a lot. There are lots of secret, hidden supplies in CHS, for example: I am running an almost "pure" economy with no "secret" supply - except at the map edge where supply pours in and is not in the hex (and I don't want it bombed or damaged in fighting).

Second, yes - 1 supply point = 1 ton.

Third, I am reading the actual intel screens: is not the display "oil' meaning "oil"???

Fourth, resources are similar - do not "resources" mean "resources"?

Fifth, Japan for itself alone (not the empire - the islands only)
imported 66,150 of COAL tons per day in 1941
and 53,687 tons per day in 1942.

We have nothing like these numbers available to get - much less import to just a fraction of Japanese industry. I estimate upwards of 100,000 tons per day is required by Japan and almost the same amount by the Allies on map. This in resources and oil (combined) alone - not saying anything about supplies, fuel or other things transported. 100,000 tons per day arriving requires as much at sea for every day of sailing and loading, net, round trip, for the average voyage. That is a bunch of cargo.

There can be no oil in Formosa - where do you see that? If there is any, I will remove it.

Actual numbers of selected commodities: 99,453 average daily cargo of resources in 1941 and 77,447 tons in 1942 - excluding oil. Japans best quarter was 8222 tons per day of oil imports - a number Parillo says could and should have been much higher. My guess of 100,000 tons per day imports was remarkably close!

[el cid again]

Lets do this another way:

You list 1050 oil centers in DEI. That should produce 7 tons of petroleum products per day: 6 oil and 1 fuel each = 7350 tons. Actual production was 7,900,000 tons per year = 21,644 tons per day. So the game is understating oil centers by about a factor of 3 (since this data is hard).

[Mike Solli]

You're assuming 1 oil point = 1 ton. If this is the case, then yes, the game is off by a factor of 3. Let's say 1 oil point = 3 tons. Then Witp is dead on. Where did you get the 1 point = 1 ton figure?

The reason I question this is because I'm not running out of oil (or resources). Now I expect things to change in late 43 - 44, but that's historical too.

I'm playing Andrew Brown's scenario 115.

We can talk about tons all day long, but the game uses points. That's what I use to make comparisons in this game.

Edit: And yes, my numbers come from the intel screen too. I track all those numbers daily in a spreadsheet.

[joliverlay]

Peak Japanese oil production in WW2 was 20.1 Million Barrels in 1943, close to the pre war estimate of 23.6. However consumption peaked at 53 million barrels in 1942 and 42 million barrels in 1943. (It was lower because the were running out.) The problem is that consumption was running 17 million barrels (50%) higher than estimated. There was not enought oil availabe in the area (after capture) to fully operate Japans existing industry. The game is correct. No matter how well you, as Japan, manage your industry you wont have enough oil. Don't build heavy industry and don't repair it.

[joliverlay]

Another comment for El Sid.

Japan did not conquor enough oil to feed its needs. It almost met its anticipated needs, not the actual consumption.

The pre war production from the DEI was only 17.7 million barrels per year. The Japanese assumed they would get that up to 30 million barrels per year in two years. That was a fantasy. They approached but never exceeded pre war production. This left a deficit of 5-10 million barrels per year based on planned consumption, and up to 25 million barrels per year based on actual consumption. There was not enough production capaicity to satisfy Japans actual usage. Why do you say they had all the oil they needed??

[el cid again]

You're assuming 1 oil point = 1 ton. If this is the case, then yes, the game is off by a factor of 3. Let's say 1 oil point = 3 tons. Then Witp is dead on. Where did you get the 1 point = 1 ton figure?

The reason I question this is because I'm not running out of oil (or resources). Now I expect things to change in late 43 - 44, but that's historical too.

I'm playing Andrew Brown's scenario 115.

You cannot run out of oil in Andrew's scenario - because some of it a appears by "magic" - right in Japanese cities - not from oil centers at all. I am running a 'pure' economy - where you get oil and resources from centers (or if ALLIES the map edge) and then move it to industrial centers - which use it. Different kettle of fish. The point is to make shops needed to move resources - and supplies - and giving the campaign its strategic point (can Japan establish an autarky?) According to Parillo - there is 'more than enough' to do so - can you? My goal is to set up the game so we can find out.

As for oil = tons - it must - or there is no meaning to the ratings of ships. Do you really want tankers divided by 3 in capacity? Then try to fill your ship fuel tanks! Anyway, Andrew and I did some work on this a while back - and we were told off the board to go with tons. It may not be the standard - there may be NO meaning to these points - but there will be one - and this is it. My job is to get the data right. The game is going to get it right too - eventually.

[el cid again]

Peak Japanese oil production in WW2 was 20.1 Million Barrels in 1943, close to the pre war estimate of 23.6. However consumption peaked at 53 million barrels in 1942 and 42 million barrels in 1943. (It was lower because the were running out.) The problem is that consumption was running 17 million barrels (50%) higher than estimated. There was not enought oil availabe in the area (after capture) to fully operate Japans existing industry. The game is correct. No matter how well you, as Japan, manage your industry you wont have enough oil. Don't build heavy industry and don't repair it.

This is to some degree a misunderstanding. I am working with what is in the area - not what Japan did with it. Japan had the largest copper mine in asia - and never mined anything from it. Never mind, it was there, and could have been mined. Japan had significant oil production - better than pre war estimates in fact - so your data is flawed: but it failed to move it well - particularly later in the war. So it didn't have it where it was needed. The game is quite wrong in this - and the difinitive study is Parillo: I recommend you look at it. NEI alone is "more than enough" for the needs of the empire. And there is a good deal of oil in Japanese territories - shale oil - synthetic oil and old fashioned crude oil. The question is one of organization - and also of resources. There are not enough of these either. No point in pretending we are modeling the economy of Japan if it cannot run. But it could - there is actually on the order 100% more resources in the area than needed. Getting control, undamaged, moving them, having undamaged industry - all are issues - but UNLESS we get this right - the merchant marine has no job - and killing it has no effect.

[el cid again]

Another comment for El Sid.

Japan did not conquor enough oil to feed its needs. It almost met its anticipated needs, not the actual consumption.

The pre war production from the DEI was only 17.7 million barrels per year. The Japanese assumed they would get that up to 30 million barrels per year in two years. That was a fantasy. They approached but never exceeded pre war production. This left a deficit of 5-10 million barrels per year based on planned consumption, and up to 25 million barrels per year based on actual consumption. There was not enough production capaicity to satisfy Japans actual usage. Why do you say they had all the oil they needed??

Because they did. Because it is true. And because there is no doubt about it whatever, using scholarly materials, in Dutch, English or Japanese. Don't use bbls - I worked on the oil fields - I know it is fashionable - but for shipping - use tons. It is 7.9 million tons per year for DEI - and that is not anything like all the oil they had. They get oil from Sakhalin Island, Oil from Machukuo, oil from coal (a process we still value and consider using today), oil from China - and some oil in other places. They restored Dutch oil production - with local help - ahead of plan - and they never planned to produce more than that - so your source is the fantasy one. I have this - among other things - in a declassified US Army report I just got for Joe and I about Palembang. This is not a subject for debate or negotiation: I am going with the official and scholarly record: we just need to calibrate the game so it is right - and I am posting notice of the numbers problems. I am not asking for data - I have the data. It does not matter what you read on the web somewhere - we use scholarly materials and official materials and there is no doubt when all agree - and I am not interested in the propaganda view that Japan never had a chance. It defeated itself - and to some degree was defeated by the gutting of its shipping (although it helped in that by stupid policies). The game must address this - or never make any logistical sense at all. UNTIL it makes logistical sense I cannot play it. A professional thing.

[joliverlay]

El Cid,

Your statement that there is no doubt, based on any scholoarly materials, in any langauge, seems intended to cast doubt on my use of scholarly articles and condesending. Any assertion that all scholarly articles on any subject are all in agreement about anything seems a bit strong and perhaps casts doubt on the validity of your own point of view. Unaminious agreement amongst scholars is something I have rarely noticed in 30 years of scholarly research. Your criticism of my use of barrels seems another unnecessary hit. If production and consumption are both give in the same units (barrels, tons or otherwise) the ratio of production to consumption remains equally valid. Japanese consumption exceeded production, even total pre war production in the region. I think, from what I've read so far, that this is a fact.

You mention synthetic oil as a possible source of new oil. The Japanese synthetic program started by the military as early as 1937 and never exceeded more than about 2 million barrels per year. Its not that they did not try this, rather they did the best they could and it was a miserable failure. This production is included in the production figures I posted above.

Are you making reference to resources in the ground or actual production? If its in the ground, keep in mind that Japan imported the technology needed for drilling and oil production from the West, mostly the U.S. They had very limited capabiites to support oil drilling and production. Thats why the had trouble getting the DEI back up to pre war levels. In fact I don't agree with your assertion that they even made it.

I hear you saying Japan was hindered by transportation not by production. Many authors (perhaps not scholars?) argue that Japans actual consumption exceeded the total pre war production figures for the areas they occupied. If this is so, its not a transporation issue. A production increase is needed. You say my report they proposed increasing it in the DIE is a fantasy. Do you think I made that up? If they did not plan on increasing production in the largest, most productive oil fields they occupied, how on earth were they supposed to get the extra oil up above and beyond pre war production? More synthetic oil? Drilling? Are we to believe that getting more oil from the DEI was fanasy, but getting it from new fields or synthetic sources was reality?

I'm having a hard time beliving any of this. I beieve a scholar may claim it, I just don't belive it is settled. If you have different production and consumption figures post them. That would be more convincing that calling my sources propaganda.

My most recent source is Victory at Sea by Nofi and Dunnigan, whom I'm sure you will discredit, but I've seen similar claims in other works over the years.

[Mifune]

Actually Dunnigan & Nofi talk about the inefficiencies of the Japanese Merchantmen on pages 330-332, which lends credence to the transportation rather than production issue. Japan had many policies that led to these factors, of course those playing as the Japanese side in WitP will play as a more unified thus efficient model.

[el cid again]

You mention synthetic oil as a possible source of new oil. The Japanese synthetic program started by the military as early as 1937 and never exceeded more than about 2 million barrels per year. Its not that they did not try this, rather they did the best they could and it was a miserable failure.

Your definition of failure and mine are obviously quite different. What the program failed to do was INCREASE the rate of production to its goals. There were various technical problems in doing so - getting certain materials - keeping a trained work force (both services tended to draft workers critical to specialist industries) - being the first two on a list a dozen items long. But a failure to INCREASE a what is a significant capability is not a failure in toto - and I am mystified at your joy in using such negative language? At the behest of a US President, we began research into restarting that program as late as the 1970s, and we have yet to conclude it is not worth using in certain economic contingencies - contingencies which seem likely to come to pass as soon as this year.
[That is, the problem is cost, not technology, and when Japan needed oil, cost was not a limitation.]

Japan had several programs of this sort. By LAW, ALL civil vehicles in Japan were "self fueling." This was not cheap for vehicle owners. But it was - and remains - perfectly feasible. And it means national petroleum reserves need to supply NO civil vehicles. I know one US officer who thinks this should be OUR policy now. It is viable - just expensive. But maybe not as expensive as what we are doing will turn out to be? Anyway, a program can be quite successful and not be what we do, or did, or would consider the most cost efficient in today's terms. It all depends on the situation.

For reasons unclear to me - I was married in China - I was home ported in Japan and the Philippines - and I have spent time in other Asian nations - there is a good deal of hubris and racist attitudes about "we are surperior" - on BOTH sides of the Pacific. I subscribe to none of it. The Japanese were neither inferior nor superior - automatically - in any subject. And doing it different is not the same as getting it wrong.

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

You mention synthetic oil as a possible source of new oil. The Japanese synthetic program started by the military as early as 1937 and never exceeded more than about 2 million barrels per year. Its not that they did not try this, rather they did the best they could and it was a miserable failure.

Your definition of failure and mine are obviously quite different. What the program failed to do was INCREASE the rate of production to its goals. There were various technical problems in doing so - getting certain materials - keeping a trained work force (both services tended to draft workers critical to specialist industries) - being the first two on a list a dozen items long. But a failure to INCREASE a what is a significant capability is not a failure in toto - and I am mystified at your joy in using such negative language? At the behest of a US President, we began research into restarting that program as late as the 1970s, and we have yet to conclude it is not worth using in certain economic contingencies - contingencies which seem likely to come to pass as soon as this year.
[That is, the problem is cost, not technology, and when Japan needed oil, cost was not a limitation.]

Japan had several programs of this sort. By LAW, ALL civil vehicles in Japan were "self fueling." This was not cheap for vehicle owners. But it was - and remains - perfectly feasible. And it means national petroleum reserves need to supply NO civil vehicles. I know one US officer who thinks this should be OUR policy now. It is viable - just expensive. But maybe not as expensive as what we are doing will turn out to be? Anyway, a program can be quite successful and not be what we do, or did, or would consider the most cost efficient in today's terms. It all depends on the situation.

For reasons unclear to me - I was married in China - I was home ported in Japan and the Philippines - and I have spent time in other Asian nations - there is a good deal of hubris and racist attitudes about "we are surperior" - on BOTH sides of the Pacific. I subscribe to none of it. The Japanese were neither inferior nor superior - automatically - in any subject. And doing it different is not the same as getting it wrong.

Sid,

this is all nice and well - but is it really a problem in the game? I've yet to see a Japanese player complain about not enough oil present in the game, and there're some games (look at the AAR section) that are well in 1943. In my own PBEM vs. Mogami (currently in July 1943) he captured most oil wells (relatively) intact and it seems that he does not have any problems production-wise (my subs start to score quite convincing, but this is another thing and quite historical).

K

[el cid again]

Are you making reference to resources in the ground or actual production? If its in the ground, keep in mind that Japan imported the technology needed for drilling and oil production from the West, mostly the U.S. They had very limited capabiites to support oil drilling and production. Thats why the had trouble getting the DEI back up to pre war levels. In fact I don't agree with your assertion that they even made it.

Fine. Find another thread. I am engaged in calibrating a game based on data available. I am uninterested in debating basic facts. Japan did have severe problems. They also made a huge mistake- they put all their apples in one basket - oil expert wise. That is, they put them all one ONE ship - and the ship was sunk - and ALL were killed! So that should have been that = no chance to restore DEI production. But they also got lucky - it can happen you know. Even to the enemy. In this case, neither Japan nor the Dutch counted on locals attitudes - or abilities. The NATIVES did it for the Japanese. And they did it FASTER than was planned. In fact, it became the subject of a major military investigation during the war: serous students of PTO will tell you that the Japanese commander for DEI was charged with not enforcing Japanese policy re locals. Investigation concluded the charges were justified - but should not be proceeded with - because the fruits of genuine collaboration were so great for Japan. So the general was left in his job, and his policy was allowed to continue (forbidden or not), and eventually Japan changed its entire policy - oddly enough as a sort of revenge against the hated colonial powers. They had no hope of winning any more the immediate war, but they didn't want the colonial powers back either: they COULD poison the area to that - and they did it. They REALLY armed, trained, equipped, and organized the natives - and they restored admin authority to locals taken in over a century of colonial rule. These policies were never successfully overturned - unless Hong Kong counts as an exception. In particular, the Dutch were unable to return to power in the Indies, and they tried, at great cost.

I can teach courses in this material. But that is not my present purpose: I am simply implementing what needs to be implemented. You may disregard the major scholarly sources and the official records, national and company, if you wish. I don't wish. More than a few historians have commented on the unexpected and early ability of the Japanese to restore oil production: disregard them all. I am not the thought police. But this isn't an esoteric subject - and it is not one I have ever encountered any debate about - among historians of any nation. We may argue forever about Japanese midgets - and the available data is too thin to be sure who is right. But there is no reasonable basis to doubt oil production records.

I believe you are confusing numbers - the numbers we need and the numbers that happened - which are quite different. We need to define what is available - and we cannot know which side will be using it in any particular case - or for how long? Japan is not really required to invade Sumatra at all - and if it does not - the Allies get the oil there. The ONLY thing we do is define it - whoever has it - whoever gets it - whoever takes it back again is not the subject. We do it honestly, accurately, from the best data available- and we don't pay the slightest attention to rumors that "it didn't happen." It may indeed not happen that damage inflicted is repaired, or oil pumped is shipped, or oil shipped arrives - that is for the game to decide - not us. We ONLY define what is there to pump, ship, etc. And we don't do that based on what anyone needs either: it just happens we KNOW that it is "more than enough to meet the needs of the Empire" (Parillo). Because we KNOW it, I cited that as a reason to make it so. It is not a query - it is a statement. And I am not going to debate about it. I have studied this matter for decades, been to every important historical site, and even done a tour on oil fields myself. You are free to believe I, Parillo, and the official records are full of prunes if you prefer to think some other source is right- and I guess then that the Japanese were also insane to think they could set up an autarky. But they were not.

[joliverlay]

I am negative about Japan's synthetic fuel production for the following reason, the chemistry. The chemistry behind the process limits what is possible based much more on resources and energy that monetary cost or national will.

Liquid fuels typically have the formula CX H2X...or two hydrogens per carbon atom. Coal is basically pure carbon. Conversion of coal to a fuel like disel or gasoline requires a hudge source of hydrogen. Two atoms of hydrogen per carbon atom. This can come from methane (if you have excess) or hydrolysis of water which takes hudge amounts of energy. (With hyrodlysis you lose more energy than you gain, you just change the form of the energy containing material.)

The reason we do not convert coal to oil (or change completely to hydrogen cars) is that we do not have a source of hydrogen that does not require unreasonable quantities of energy to produce. Likewise Japan did not produce more synthetic fuel because the resources were not available to her. [Hydrogen]

We will likely not convert coal ot oil in quantitiy until we decide to use nuclear power (or lots more coal) to make sufficient cheap electricity for large scale hydrolysis of water to produce hydrogen. Even our infrastructure cannot support large scale fuel conversion processes that use more energy that they produce.

[el cid again]

I am negative about Japan's synthetic fuel production for the following reason, the chemistry. The chemistry behind the process limits what is possible based much more on resources and energy that monetary cost or national will.

Liquid fuels typically have the formula CX H2X...or two hydrogens per carbon atom. Coal is basically pure carbon. Conversion of coal to a fuel like disel or gasoline requires a hudge source of hydrogen. Two atoms of hydrogen per carbon atom. This can come from methane (if you have excess) or hydrolysis of water which takes hudge amounts of energy. (With hyrodlysis you lose more energy than you gain, you just change the form of the energy containing material.)

The reason we do not convert coal to oil (or change completely to hydrogen cars) is that we do not have a source of hydrogen that does not require unreasonable quantities of energy to produce. Likewise Japan did not produce more synthetic fuel because the resources were not available to her. [Hydrogen]

We will likely not convert coal ot oil in quantitiy until we decide to use nuclear power (or lots more coal) to make sufficient cheap electricity for large scale hydrolysis of water to produce hydrogen. Even our infrastructure cannot support large scale fuel conversion processes that use more energy that they produce.

Oddly, I studied organic chemistry- as an electrical engineering student! I didn't need more physics or other sciences - and I had to study something- and there was this good teacher. My entire class took all her classes - ending up with minors in organic chemistry - never mind we didn't need such. And I substantially agree with you. The guy who did the synthetic oil for Japan was also the guy who bet on nuclear power for Japan shortly after the discovery of fission - and who built all of its functional reactors during the war (as well as an unfueled one taken to the USSR in 1946). The Russians operated his prototype until 1948.
He also had something like the TVA - hydro power - and used it to make the worlds greatest supply of heavy water (never mind Norsk Hydro - we just didn't have a clue who was the big producer - it was Noguchi). That is why he could make reactors - no enriched fuel and no pure carbon needed - heavy water is better anyway. But he never could get the synthetic fuel production above 2 or 3 hundred thousand tons per year.
It leveled off instead of going up as planned. [And it might be bbl vice tons - I am working from memory]. Whatever, I don't regard that as a failure at all. And - we are playing with his product now - in Alaska - it is white! From coal. You can pump it like oil through a pipeline.