History or Balance

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

ORIGINAL: Charles_22
[:D]I don't know what game you've been playing, but clearly as Japan I am able to take over quite a bit of the economy (if you can call changing factories that).
Part of the point I was making, even outside the confines of changing factories, no matter what I command, it still isn't Japan, or the allies for that matter, if any of us are controlling them. People can't recreate history in this thing if they tried. That would require controlling both sides by the same person and hoping that their interpretation is correct.

Well, it's true, the game allows you to take over "control" of aircraft factories (my point in this regard was that the game itself went wrong in many ways from the outset, and this was one of them). A bad decision, in my estimation, and one that doesn't work, but to each his own. Now, we have a wild-eyed, footloose and fancy free pilot system that allows you to grab Charlie Wunnut out of his PBY and turn him into Ace Destroyer the Zero Killer all in one fell swoop. *sigh* People are giggling and ga-ga over it, so I guess I'm not going to persuade anyone of anything here anymore (as though I ever did).

Yes, I agree with you completely, Charles, the point is not to "recreate history." The point is to play within the confines of "historical reality." Of course, we're not going to get anywhere hashing that over, as it's been hash reheated a hundred times already.

I have tried to make clear, apparently with little or no success, that I see wargaming as a hobby in which the game presents you with a situation, and you deal with it, "winning" or "losing" in consonance with victory conditions imposed by the game. I just see too many people on these forums who want to stand that on its head and present the game with the situation and demand that the game deal with it, with "winning" and "losing" determined as in "Capture the Flag."

That's not what I want, but I'm a dinosaur, and I know it. The legions of your new brave world will enjoy their pastimes long after I am fossil fuel.

Hey, make this real-time and the youngsters are set.

[Ursa MAior]

It is probably my bad english, but something like two pages ago I mentioned a possible workaround, which went unnoticed. What if there was an ordinary declaration of war? I mean as the japanese have originally planned. DOW and after an hour, attack. Or I go further after handing over an ultimatum wait for a day or two to and then attack. I seriously doubt, that in such a situation and after suffering serious losses, the US public would have wanted to fight on for DEI, or Hong Kong (the british Empire), and yes even PI.

BTW everyone (not only IJ FBs) wouild like to try their mettle against their historical counterparts.

Edited for grammar.

[Sonny]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

.......................................

because I don't like kicking two legged puppies.

.......................

You miss out on a lot of fun in life don't you.[:D]

[mlees]

It is probably my bad english, but something like two pages ago I mentioned a possible workaround, which went unnoticed. What if there was an ordinary declaration of war? I mean as the japanese have originally planned. DOW and after an hour, attack. Or I go further after handing over an ultimatum wait for a day or two to and then attack. I seriously doubt, that in such a situation and after suffering serious losses, the US public would not have wanted to fight on for DEI, or Hong Kong (the british Empire), and yes even PI.

Yet the US public was more than willing to go the long road versus Hitler, and he DOW'd the US after PH in a fit of unclarity. (The USN had been on a "shoot on sight" footing with Uboats for several months by this time.)

The (U.S.) John Q. Citizen has been portrayed throughout the last century as lacking a backbone. Yet, the only time that has proven to be true was 'Nam (and maybe Somalia). All the other conflicts, the US stuck it out, as far as I know. I know that the dictatorships of Germany and USSR have both viewed the Democracies, and the USA in particular, as weak. Despite the fall of those regimes, the concept lingers on...

Anyway, I do not understand how this is a "workaround" for this game.

The diplomatic negotiations are not modeled in this game. Are you asking the Allied player to "retire" all US forces after a certain set of conditions are met by the Japanese player?

[mdiehl]

What if there was an ordinary declaration of war? I mean as the japanese have originally planned. DOW and after an hour, attack

IRL no American would have been mollified by this technicality. Even assuming that the Japanese delivered their DoW a couple hours before the attack it would be apparent, should any attack fall on the heels of the DoW, that the Japanese had been all along negotiating in bad faith in order to conceal their imminent war plans until the last moment. American resolve would probably have been even more determined than ever, since the outright lies and duplicity involved in the previous three months of negotiation would have been compounded by the insulting assumption that "Americans are so dumb that this absurd technicality will matter to them."

[mdiehl]

they want parity or advantage during the clear advantage years for IJ

The problem is evident right there. Japan had no "clear advantage years" they had no clear advantage on any day after 7 December, apart from the vast amount of time they spent planning and setting up their opening moves. These advantages had nothing at all to do with equipment, tactics, or training (with the sole exception of the Type 93 torpedo), and everything to do with good preparation, poor allied logistical status at war's start, and Japanese advantage of interior lines.

It *ought* to be up to the Japanese player to ensure these successes by good operational planning, logistics, and concentration of forces. Instead, from what I've seen, Axis Fanboys want to hardcode Japanese superiority as a substitute for operational talent on the part of Japanese players. And moreover they want to rationalize Japan's economic system in ways the real Japanese could not have, even had they wanted to.

[Ursa MAior]

Aren't we a bit oversensitive, heh?

There is no way I wanted to say or even suggest, that US citizens were lacking a backbone. While definitely critical towards fanatics, I dont despise any nation. BUT you have to be aware that there are such things as national characteristics. Which is basically how the people from a given country think and behave, although in a wide range, but more or less the same, the way they are taught to (by parents, school, church etc.).

What I meant is that the Day of Infamy was the main, and IMHO only, reason why the society wanted to carry on till the end, no matter the cost. France and Italy surrendered, although they still had some chance to resist, because their will was broken.
Of course after a normal DOW a war follows, but say a decisive battle (aka warplan orange) with a major IJN victory would have been enough to call it a day, at least for the time being. Without the sneak attack on PH there is no way I can imagine that such people like the americans at that time (who despised all sorts of aggressive wars) would have wanted to fight it out the way they did after the Day of Infamy.

You are all too willing to forget about the fact, which J.P. Taylor pinted out first, that without the german DOW, even FDR would have not been enough to DOW the nazis. At least in 1941 (and probably for a couple of years). According to him (J.P. Taylor) this DOW was Hitler's greatest mistake even bigger than attacking Russia. Not to mention FDR's continous pressure on Japan. No Tojo and his predecessors were not Grail knights but neither were their US counterparts. I am not saying that they are comparable, but a war was coming handy for FDR and his staff (just as the second Gulf war in 1991). Check the building start dates of most WWII USN ships. Even Iowa was laid down in 40!

You know if you start to wave a piece of beefsteak in the front of a lion dont be surprised
if he swallows your arm with it!

What I meant with workaround is that, IMHO that if Dec. 7 sneak atack is off, Japan could achieve a sort of 'victory' by causing enough losses, and occupying enough territory to force a peace talks, at least in the covered period. Obviously you two see it another way.

[IS2m]

Who is J.P. Taylor, and is he related to A.J.P. Taylor?

[mdiehl]

Aren't we a bit oversensitive, heh?

Nope. Just correcting an obviously poorly reasoned and widely shared myth... that somehow pretending to play by Marquis of Queensbury rules by finessing the timing of the Pearl Harbor attack would somehow have convinced the mass of Americans that it was "Allowable because of a technicality." The claim is wrong, and no one making the claim has ever given even the scantiest of critical examination to the claim.

There is no way I wanted to say or even suggest, that US citizens were lacking a backbone.

You didn't, and no one took it that way.

BUT you have to be aware that there are such things as national characteristics.

A concept ("national characteristics") raised to a high level of general appreciation by Margaret Mead and substantially discredited by subsequent researchers in the field. Nevertheless, I digress..

Which is basically how the people from a given country think and behave, although in a wide range, but more or less the same, the way they are taught to (by parents, school, church etc.).

Which is basically an artificial construct used to gloss over a very very complex phenomenon. Culture, that is.

What I meant is that the Day of Infamy was the main, and IMHO only, reason why the society wanted to carry on till the end, no matter the cost. France and Italy surrendered, although they still had some chance to resist, because their will was broken.

Your meaning was perfectly clear, it's just that your assessment was wrong. The "day of infamy" was not the sort of thing about which Americans' feelings would have changed if by dint of better timing a declaration of war had been delivered minutes, or even hours, prior to an attack on the US. Your claim *might* hold some water if the attack had been delivered TWO WEEKS after a declaration of war on the US, because under such circumstances it would not have made the preceeding (November) negotiations such a transparent act of "negotiating in bad faith."

The PR problem (in part) for the Japanese in the US wasn't just that the Pearl Harbor attack was sudden and unexpected. It was that in order for said attack to have been launched they had to have committed themselves to war at minimum a month prior to the attack, during which month they made efforts to keep up the appearance of negotiation in order to lull the US into believing that negotiations were still potentially productive.

If you really want to get a glimmer of understanding of Americans' reaction to the "Day of Infamy" you should begin with actually reading the entirety of Roosevelt's speech before the US Congress.

Nor would it necessarily be the case that Americans in general would have reacted differently even if Japan had broken off negotiations in, say, October because:

1. Japan had TONS of negative PR in the US by dint of its China policies.

2. The US has ALWAYS reacted to territorial incursions into its own land or colonies as causus belli ad terminum. So Japan would have to have attacked Pearl Harbor but not invaded Wake, the Philippines, etc.

3. By dint of US wars prior to WW2 the Japanese had every reason to believe that it was going to be a long fight. Any scholar of the American Civil War would note that "War Weariness" was much more endemic among both the Federal and Rebel populaces in the United States, and yet both side fought that bloodiest-in-US-history war for five years until the "CSA" rebel forces in the field were utterly shattered and incapable of resistence.

[Ursa MAior]

ORIGINAL: IS2m

Who is J.P. Taylor, and is he related to A.J.P. Taylor?

Yes sorry left the A out.

[Ursa MAior]

I dont really have the time, unfortunately, to go through your arguments one by one, not to mention that there are some of mine you SIMPLY LEFT OUT. But since I know you and I dont want to get into flaming so all I say is that

1. I will read that speech

2. Still dont believe that the isolationist wing that was so strong, that somewhere in the begining of the twenties got a declaration (or something) through the congress that entering WWI was not in the interest of the american people, but of some bankers and ammunition manufacturers, simply ceased to exist by that time.

3. Civil wars are not comparable to any other war.

4. FDR and Churchill agreed on a Germany first. IF -and only in that case- the japanese have DOW-ed and attacked a few days/hours later, BTW it is not stupid technicalicity it is an infringement of international law, this priority would have not changed, because there was no need doing it. Yamamoto was right that he only can guarantee a peace good for Japan if it is signed in Washington, of course he did not mean to conquest it but to force the US beside the table. It is NOT a US speciality IMHO it is democracy speciality that they try to avoid wars as long as possible. Well at least that was the case until Bush Jr.

But you may be right that attacking Wake and the Phillipines was not something to be left out of sight when deciding the possible reactions to an unwanted war.

[mdiehl]

Well at least that was the case until Bush Jr.

[:D] Good one. But then Pres Bush has a sort of dogmatic commitment to the idea that Pure Ideology can triumph over any obstacle, regardless of facts on the ground. Something he, appropriate for this conversation, shares with the IJA planners of WW2.

[Ursa MAior]

Well in their case it was the fighting prowess that they held superior not ideology, but basically you are right.

[Feinder]

If you wish to listen...

Wav file of "Infamy" speech



Or read...

Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" Speech
To the Congress of the United States:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 -- a date which will live in infamy -- the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State of form reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government had deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces -- with the unbounded determination of our people -- we will gain the inevitable triumph -- so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, December 8, 1941

[Oznoyng]

Both. I think it is possible to have a balanced game that mirrors historical reality without simply replaying history (and that should be the goal as far as I am concerned.) The game should support "What if?" approaches to the game that allow the players to rectify historical blunders as well as create new ones.

There is only the smallest chance that Japan could ever have won WW2. In the end, Allied industry would bury Japan. The question for me is, could they have lasted longer? What if they had not lost Midway? What if the Reppu was developed earlier? What if they had began training pilots in quantity in early 41 instead of late 42? What if they had developed better ASW/mine warfare capabilities? What if the Allies had invaded Iwo before Japan fortified it? What if the bomb was developed earlier? Later? etc.

Within the context of those what if's, the job of the game system is to produce plausible results. The job of the game system is to determine the winner of the game seperate from winning the war. At least as far as the campaign game is concerned, the ultimate measure of victory should be the VJ date compared to history. Given the way the game system accelerates the war, that isn't a suitable answer. Just as Japanese operations early war can be accelerated, so can Allied Operations in 43, 44 and 45.

[DD696]

Agreed 100%. You have hit the nail on the head here dead center of where and what the game should be doing. Let the extremists on either side battle it out to their little heart's content, but what you have stated is exactly the way it should be.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

they want parity or advantage during the clear advantage years for IJ

The problem is evident right there. Japan had no "clear advantage years" they had no clear advantage on any day after 7 December, apart from the vast amount of time they spent planning and setting up their opening moves. These advantages had nothing at all to do with equipment, tactics, or training (with the sole exception of the Type 93 torpedo), and everything to do with good preparation, poor allied logistical status at war's start, and Japanese advantage of interior lines.

It *ought* to be up to the Japanese player to ensure these successes by good operational planning, logistics, and concentration of forces. Instead, from what I've seen, Axis Fanboys want to hardcode Japanese superiority as a substitute for operational talent on the part of Japanese players. And moreover they want to rationalize Japan's economic system in ways the real Japanese could not have, even had they wanted to.

You say there wa sno clear advantage and then go pointing out several. I was speaking most basically in the immediate PTO, but that was assuming, as happened, that the USA would be at war with Germany. With such conditions we can say that at least militarily she had the advantage (I said years, but it technically was closer to 'year'). Without the PH attack that advantage was shorter still.

[Mike Scholl]

Given the way the game system accelerates the war, that isn't a suitable answer. Just as Japanese operations early war can be accelerated, so can Allied Operations in 43, 44 and 45.

THIS is a problem. Some of it can be delt with by improving the logistical accuracy of the game program, but a portion is inevitable given the overall "hindsight" of both players. IRL neither side had a really accurate idea of what could be done, or what capabilities the other side had at any particular time. We who play the game have usually spent a lot of time studying the historiy of the events---that's an advantage no one at the time COULD have. Given many players desire to push towards whatever "Victory Conditions" the designers have established, some acceloration of play is virtually inevitable. We KNOW what the historical "players" couldn't know..., how it would come out and why. That's always been a problem with "historical simulation games". Ever seen a German Player in a "Bulge" game who wasn't preparing his defenses on the Southern Flank well BEFORE Patton showed up? It's the price we pay for wanting to "replay" historical events.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: Ursa MAior

Aren't we a bit oversensitive, heh?

There is no way I wanted to say or even suggest, that US citizens were lacking a backbone. While definitely critical towards fanatics, I dont despise any nation. BUT you have to be aware that there are such things as national characteristics. Which is basically how the people from a given country think and behave, although in a wide range, but more or less the same, the way they are taught to (by parents, school, church etc.).

What I meant is that the Day of Infamy was the main, and IMHO only, reason why the society wanted to carry on till the end, no matter the cost. France and Italy surrendered, although they still had some chance to resist, because their will was broken.
Of course after a normal DOW a war follows, but say a decisive battle (aka warplan orange) with a major IJN victory would have been enough to call it a day, at least for the time being. Without the sneak attack on PH there is no way I can imagine that such people like the americans at that time (who despised all sorts of aggressive wars) would have wanted to fight it out the way they did after the Day of Infamy.

You are all too willing to forget about the fact, which J.P. Taylor pinted out first, that without the german DOW, even FDR would have not been enough to DOW the nazis. At least in 1941 (and probably for a couple of years). According to him (J.P. Taylor) this DOW was Hitler's greatest mistake even bigger than attacking Russia. Not to mention FDR's continous pressure on Japan. No Tojo and his predecessors were not Grail knights but neither were their US counterparts. I am not saying that they are comparable, but a war was coming handy for FDR and his staff (just as the second Gulf war in 1991). Check the building start dates of most WWII USN ships. Even Iowa was laid down in 40!

You know if you start to wave a piece of beefsteak in the front of a lion dont be surprised
if he swallows your arm with it!

What I meant with workaround is that, IMHO that if Dec. 7 sneak atack is off, Japan could achieve a sort of 'victory' by causing enough losses, and occupying enough territory to force a peace talks, at least in the covered period. Obviously you two see it another way.

I basically agree with you, and that the terms of surrender for Japan would have even been less restricting had they not sneak attacked PH. I also do think it was possible to break the US will for war, if enough things went poorly (like invading mainland Japan with the inevitable HUGE losses) it's just that the European theatre, by the time of D-Day, had little chance to change US attitude, and though severe losses could have changed attitudes toward dealing with Japan, the PH attack just made it not as possible as otherwise. The damage the attack did to the equipment of war, was probably not as large a gain for the IJN as the increase in desire to substain fighting her to the US morale. Japan didn't help matters either by doing the same things a number of the Germams were doing in some of the killing/torture of prisoners and so forth.

[mdiehl]

You say there wa sno clear advantage and then go pointing out several.

The "advantage" that Axis Fanboys want is hardcoded advantage and ahistorical orders of battle. The hardcoded advantages include superior EXP ratings in a number of categories and the "zero bonus" as well. The ahistorical advantages include sealift capacity greatly exceeding anything the Japanese could *hope* to muster, much less *actually* deploy.

This differs from the Japanese advantages gained by good operational planning for the first three months of the war, and interior lines (which are there by virtue of having an accurate map). If the Japanese player wants the advantage of good operational plans and interior lines the Japanese player should MAKE good operational plans and not overstretch their logistical system. In WitP because the Japanese player has access to far better than historical logistics, there is no penalty for overstretching the logistical system. In WitP, Japanese "interior lines" basically encompass the entire map. A flaw that it shares with most board game attempts to model this as well.

I was speaking most basically in the immediate PTO, but that was assuming, as happened, that the USA would be at war with Germany. With such conditions we can say that at least militarily she had the advantage (I said years, but it technically was closer to 'year'). Without the PH attack that advantage was shorter still.

No. The advantage that they had lasted about 3 months. And that advantage was not at any time in superior training or equipment, nor even overall numbers. What the Japanese had was, by virtue of good plans and interior lines, a capability to concentrate superior numbers on parts of the allied "line" that were weak or easily isolated. That's all.

Had the US Armed Forces Far East command fought the same Japanese in, say, New Guniea, the Japanese would have been soundly defeated. They were only and solely capable of taking the PI because they were able to isolate the USAFFE by controlling the seas (with aircraft) around the PI, which in turn was solely doable because they had bases in close proximity to support that effort at the start of the war.

The advantage was a consequence of interior lines and short distances to the home islands. Once Indonesia, the PI, and Malaya had been captured (but never really assimilated) the Japanese advantage ceased to exist. The practical effect was that Japanese further efforts at expansion failed because the Japanese could not for the most part concentrate superior force under an umbrella of land-based air, and because they were flatly incapable of meeting the logistical demands of armies far in the field. That is why NONE of the Japanese offensives after March 1942, save the late war China offensive, succeeded strategically.

Operation MO: Defeated.

Operation MI: Defeated.

Tulagi/Guadalcanal logistical plan: Seized prior to completion.

Tulagi recapture effort: Defeated. There's a reason why one of the alternate Japanese names in Kanji for Guadalcanal translate as "Starvation Island."

Kokuda Trail Port Moresby campaign: Defeated.

Buna Reinforcement Effort: Crushed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

Upper Burma campaign: Defeated, followed by UK/Cwealth reconquest aided in part because Japanese logistics were so nonexistant the soldiers had to eat their dead.

The Japanese were incapable of fighting a sustained campaign beyond a circle roughly encompassed by eastern China, Borneo, Malaya, the Philippines, and a line connecting Truk to Wake Island. When they attempted operations outside of this line they failed. That's in part owing to good (and getting better) opposition but it's also heavily a coonsequence of geography, distance, and nonexistent logistical capability. Even in 1941-1942. It merely went from intolerably bad to much much worse once the subs and the mines started wolfing down their merchant marine.