AEF In WWI

[anarchyintheuk]

What controversy? The original poster basically asked how effective the AEF was. The responses seemed to stay on topic. MOO from what I've read is that the AEF was behind the British and French in terms of equipment, training and experience, i.e. its effectiveness, although inexperience in some instances was probably an advantage. I've never really anything on the Belgian Army so I don't have an opinion there.

As to whether the AEF was "decisive", guess that depends on your definition. IMHO I think the psychological effect of the AEF was more important than its actual accomplishments on the ground, important though they were.

[Big B]

Well, the accomplishments of the AEF on the ground was nothing less than saving France from defeat in May-June 1918 by being the only force available to stop the German offensive (on the Marne)..that's pretty darn big in itself, and if France collapsed - which was a huge possibility at the time - then Britain alone would have been sumarily kicked off the continenet.

In the counter offensives of summer 1918, US troops played the pivitol role. US Troops eliminated the St Mihel salient brilliantly, US divisions also fought under the British for the rest of the war - taking the St Quentin Canal, and in the Muese Argonne, they had to take on the best troops the Germans had left and over the worst part of the Western Front - and the only spot on the front where the Germans were determined to hold. Although the American Argonne drive stalled for a week in October - it got back on track and delivered the the main arterial rail line near Metz in November.

By November the US had more troops in France, and in the line than the entire British Empire.

So no, America did not win the war singlehanded. America was in fact a very late comer to the war - and America's greatest contribution may indeed have been the uplift it provided the Allies just by finally getting there...

But I see no evidence to suggest that the troops themselves weren't as good as their Allies, had deficincies greater than anyone else during the war, or were otherwise ineffective....which it seemed to me to be the general tone of some commentary.

[anarchyintheuk]

US forces only had limited (mostly insignificant in terms of numbers) exposure/effect during the early part of the Kaiserschlacht that started in late March, the only real period where there was a chance of defeat on the western front. Maybe I'm confused about the timeline, but I thought 2nd Marne was the last one and it was in July. The offensive was the least successful out the five. From memory, most of the forces were French, not US.

[Big B]

The spring offensives of March and April, were all aimed at maiming the British and Allied Armies in the north - as a prelude to the main effort against the French down the Marne in the late Spring and early summer.

The Germans did not try to knock out the British, fail, and then grumpily move southward searching for better luck - the plan was to punish the British Army, knock it back and leave it incapable of interference with the efforts against the French (who were the main objective). So no, the Americans were not engaged in Operation Michael in the Spring, but the Germans did indeed accomplish their objectives as far as plans against the British and Belgians went in the North.

In the late Spring and Summer, the Germans carried out their second - and most important part of their offensives - down the Chemin Des Dames to the Marne and on toward Paris. It wasn't until Summer 1918 that the Paris Gun was used, when the French Gov was getting ready to evacuate, and the crisis meeting of the Allied High Command took place - where Pershing cabled Washington that the crisis had come and he agreed to send American divisions into the line befor Paris.

Were the Majority of the troops in the line in that sector French? Yes, however, the French Field Army (4th?)in the Marne Sector was being destroyed and the troops sent into the Apex of the German advance were Amaerican - at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood - and there were no major French (or British) formations to throw into the line at that point...when Paris was threatened (and along with it, the French Gov).

Prior to that point, direct American presence at the front was meager and for training purposes only - from June on, the number of American troops taking part in major combat swelled enormously - like a tidal wave (outnumbering the British, I can't recall if they quite equaled the French - probably not in 1918). But that continuing tidal wave of troops is what caused the German collapse of all hope of winning the war.

[ShermanM4]

US forces only had limited (mostly insignificant in terms of numbers) exposure/effect during the early part of the Kaiserschlacht that started in late March, the only real period where there was a chance of defeat on the western front. Maybe I'm confused about the timeline, but I thought 2nd Marne was the last one and it was in July. The offensive was the least successful out the five. From memory, most of the forces were French, not US.

No not at all.....

The spring offensives of March and April, were all aimed at maiming the British and Allied Armies in the north - as a prelude to the main effort against the French down the Marne in the late Spring and early summer.

The Germans did not try to knock out the British, fail, and then grumpily move southward searching for better luck - the plan was to punish the British Army, knock it back and leave it incapable of interference with the efforts against the French (who were the main objective). So no, the Americans were not engaged in Operation Michael in the Spring, but the Germans did indeed accomplish their objectives as far as plans against the British and Belgians went in the North.

In the late Spring and Summer, the Germans carried out their second - and most important part of their offensives - down the Chemin Des Dames to the Marne and on toward Paris. It wasn't until Summer 1918 that the Paris Gun was used, when the French Gov was getting ready to evacuate, and the crisis meeting of the Allied High Command took place - where Pershing cabled Washington that the crisis had come and he agreed to send American divisions into the line befor Paris.

Were the Majority of the troops in the line in that sector French? Yes, however, the French Field Army (4th?)in the Marne Sector was being destroyed and the troops sent into the Apex of the German advance were Amaerican - at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood - and there were no major French (or British) formations to throw into the line at that point...when Paris was threatened (and along with it, the French Gov).

Prior to that point, direct American presence at the front was meager and for training purposes only - from June on, the number of American troops taking part in major combat swelled enormously - like a tidal wave (outnumbering the British, I can't recall if they quite equaled the French - probably not in 1918). But that continuing tidal wave of troops is what caused the German collapse of all hope of winning the war.

Yes and infact by the end of November 1918, The US Forces almost outnumbered both the French and British. Well, I will have to check on that when I get home from work. There were almost 1 million US Soldiers in France by the end of 1918.

Good points Big B. The Americans were put into the line along Marne and back east along the shoulder of the German advance in what was known Cheateu Thierry and Bellau Woods. Belleau Woods is where the 2nd Marine division really cut its teath. The famed Marine Corps line "Dig in? Hell we just got here..." was uttered there.

Anarchy in the UK if you interested in what the Americans did you shoud consider General US Grant and the "Rock of the Marne," "The Lost Battalion," The Soissons Salient, THe St. Mihiel Saliant, the Battle of Blanc Mont Ridge, the Meause-Argon Offensive. I am not trying to steal any thunder from the UK or the French, but I think the contribution has to be greater than just

As to whether the AEF was "decisive", guess that depends on your definition. IMHO I think the psychological effect of the AEF was more important than its actual accomplishments on the ground, important though they were.

psychological factor as you suggest. Still, I am not sure if the AEF brought any better strategies to the battle field or a better way of fighting. Though, I am impressed with the battles and Campaigns the AEF partook of, and I can't believe that the only real impact they had was limited to numbers or psychological factors. Also, it has been mentioned that the Germans did not have quality replacements by 1918. They were suffering from supply shortages, low moral, and fatigue. I just don't believe that was the only reason why the Americans had success on the battlefield.

Another thing about the number men of uniform was the losses. We can't forget that the French and the British paid an enormous price in terms of men for the amount of time they remained in the war. The US did not start taking heavy losses until the summer of 1918. I am pretty sure France suffered more killed in action than Great Britain and certainly the US. Though the populations of the two countries, France and Great Britain, are almost even today, I think at that time Great Britain actually had a larger population. Lets not forget, France was the first country in Europe to legalize contrceptives and Great Britain, by comparison, has always been the master of managing and allocating resources. France had a smaller population, suffered more losses, and had less men in uniform by 1918 than Great Britain and the US.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4


... Still, I am not sure if the AEF brought any better strategies to the battle field or a better way of fighting. Though, I am impressed with the battles and Campaigns the AEF partook of, and I can't believe that the only real impact they had was limited to numbers or psychological factors. Also, it has been mentioned that the Germans did not have quality replacements by 1918. They were suffering from supply shortages, low moral, and fatigue. I just don't believe that was the only reason why the Americans had success on the battlefield.

It wasn't at all, The Americans enjoyed as much success on the battlefield under adversity as anyone else did - especially when we compare the USA's efforts to everyone else's early efforts (because as I said above, for most of the troops the battles of Summer and Fall 1918 were their first combat experiences).
Different tactics and ways of doing things? All the Allied armies were different to a degree. The best book to read about the different approaches is called "The Defeat of the Imperial German Army 1917-1918" by Rod Paschall
US Doctrine put the emphasis on the primacy controlled rifle fire power, though Paschall comes to the conclusion that neither Britain, France, nor America had the right doctrine.(maybe - maybe not)

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4
Another thing about the number men of uniform was the losses. We can't forget that the French and the British paid an enormous price in terms of men for the amount of time they remained in the war. The US did not start taking heavy losses until the summer of 1918. I am pretty sure France suffered more killed in action than Great Britain and certainly the US. Though the populations of the two countries, France and Great Britain, are almost even today, I think at that time Great Britain actually had a larger population. Lets not forget, France was the first country in Europe to legalize contrceptives and Great Britain, by comparison, has always been the master of managing and allocating resources. France had a smaller population, suffered more losses, and had less men in uniform by 1918 than Great Britain and the US.

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population that GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000

[ShermanM4]

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population that GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000

[8D]Great thanks for the list! I've seen these numbers differ some what. Does this list account for for KIA, WIA, and MIA or is it just KIA? As for the populations of the two countries they are now almost 66million each. Both countires have similar reasons for this and other differing factors aswell. I will have to check up on the historical populations, but I thought I read at one time that Great Britain got ahead.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population than GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000

[8D]Great thanks for the list! I've seen these numbers differ some what. Does this list account for for KIA, WIA, and MIA or is it just KIA? As for the populations of the two countries they are now almost 66million each. Both countires have similar reasons for this and other differing factors aswell. I will have to check up on the historical populations, but I thought I read at one time that Great Britain got ahead.

Those numbers are all dead - no wounded (or missing) included. Are they all KIA, or do they include non battle deaths? I'm not sure, but I think they include all dead who died in the war zone - from KIA, DOW, and Illness... but I can't say for absolute fact.

[Maliki]

I only called it controversial because there seems to be a large difference of opinion between European and American historians on the AEFs impact.Most of which i think boils down to national pride.

As for the Meuse Aragonne campaign..I touched upon this earlier.It was some of the worst terrain to conduct an offensive operation in on the Western Front.The AEF did very well in conducting the campaign there.This was the prize given to it for not giving in to French and British demands of it being broken up and used as cannon fodder in their armies.

In most aspects,given its inexperience,the AEF performed well.But..The fact of the matter is that the inexperience of high and mid-level officers in command and control of such large numbers of troops and the logistics behind that,led to a less than optimal performance.I would give the AEF a B+ for effort in its operations...and also the fact that the Germans were alarmed enough by its entry that they launched a last desperate offenisve before it could be utilized as a whole in theater.Also that they were very impressed with the high morale and doggedness of the forces it employed.

Once again the major impact was a pyshcological one upon the German army.

The war may have been won by the major Entente powers by the starvation of the German home populace even without its introduction.It is also important to to remember that the US was viewed as a minor power by France and Britain..along the lines of Portugal.[X(]..Another major impact of it being that France and Britian did not face major social uphevial after wars end by it soaking up casualties that they would needed to have taken if the US had not entered the war.The two major powers were treading a very fine line,domestically,before Americas entry,

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Maliki

I only called it controversial because there seems to be a large difference of opinion between European and American historians on the AEFs impact.Most of which i think boils down to national pride.

This is very true, and I would like to point out that there has been a long revisionist movement by historians from across the pound to downplay the USA's contribution after the war. In Britain particularly, it has become chique for historians to barley even mention US involvment...kind of like ignoring the elephant standing in the room.

As for the Meuse Aragonne campaign..I touched upon this earlier.It was some of the worst terrain to conduct an offensive operation in on the Western Front.The AEF did very well in conducting the campaign there.This was the prize given to it for not giving in to French and British demands of it being broken up and used as cannon fodder in their armies.

In most aspects,given its inexperience,the AEF performed well.But..The fact of the matter is that the inexperience of high and mid-level officers in command and control of such large numbers of troops and the logistics behind that,led to a less than optimal performance. I would give the AEF a B+ for effort in its operations...and also the fact that the Germans were alarmed enough by its entry that they launched a last desperate offenisve before it could be utilized as a whole in theater.Also that they were very impressed with the high morale and doggedness of the forces it employed.

Once again the major impact was a pyshcological one upon the German army.

Well, I may disagree a small bit (the US Army certainly did have officers that needed to be and were replaced...but like I pointed out earlier - as mediocre as some US officers certainly were, that paled in significance compared to some of France and Britain's Senior Generals during the war).
Regardless - it is certainly true that US involvement made a massive psycological impact on the German High Command.

The war may have been won by the major Entente powers by the starvation of the German home populace even without its introduction.

Theoretically - perhaps. In the face of reality in 1918 with America as a nuetral..not a chance. The Germans would certainly have won the war outright on the battlefield in France long before the economic effects would have brought Germany down - in fact, under the assumption of US neutrality, with Russia out of the war and Eastern Europe pacified and Germany no longer fighting a two major front war - I see no reason to even expect that Germany would starve.

It is also important to to remember that the US was viewed as a minor power by France and Britain..along the lines of Portugal.[X(]..Another major impact of it being that France and Britian did not face major social uphevial after wars end by it soaking up casualties that they would needed to have taken if the US had not entered the war.The two major powers were treading a very fine line,domestically,before Americas entry,

Well, Britain and France may have wanted to view the US as a power as signifigant as Portugal, but the reality was quite different and Britain and France knew that all too well - that was one of the reasons why Pershing alone, of all the Allied National commanders, didn't have to do what Foch said or wanted. Pershing not only was the only Supreme commander with the full backing of his government - but it was also well understood of the power the USA wielded among the Big Three (GB, FR, USA) the USA could basically call the shots by 1918...it wasn't until after the war that Britain and France took advantage of Wilson's political weaknesses visa-vie an isolationist Congress, and shoved him aside at the Peace Table.

But overal Maliki, we pretty much agree..[;)]

Here are the facts of America's contribution from the Doughboy Center (online)

AMERICA'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY IN THE GREAT WAR
When America entered the Great War in April 1917, it had a small constabulary Army with no experience in industrial age warfare. It was spread from the east coast across the nation and the Pacific to the Philippines. Nineteen months later the United States had a 2 million man force concentrated in France. Flanders and Italy. Towards the war's end the American Expeditionary Force or AEF, as it came to be known, was occupying more of the Western Front than Britain and all her Commonwealth Nations combined, lending combat divisions to all the allies and leading offensive operations against the best defended sector still occupied by the Germans. The AEF could claim when the Armistice came to have never failed on the defensive to turn back the enemy nor failed on the attack to achieve its aims.
Much has been made in the last 80 years by former allies, academic historians and documentary film makers of the rough fits and starts and frequent gross inefficiencies of the American troops and their commanders during the First World War. Claims have been made on television recently that the United States made minimal military contribution to the war's conclusion and [grossly inaccurately] that the US only fought in one battle. The intriguing new work by Niall Ferguson THE PITY OF WAR, an effort to explain the causes and dynamics of the war is the latest work to treat the AEF's contribution somewhat dismissively.

John J. Pershing was certainly not an original thinking strategist nor tactician and he was apparently unfamiliar with the management principle of span of control. Casualties were often heavier than should have been necessary and the US First Army got bogged down temporarily in its biggest operation, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. But there were reasons for all this from a lack of experience by all the American soldiers starting with Black Jack Pershing to the insufficient number of trucks provided and the inadequate road network for the Argonne battle. Besides, the generals and doughboys of the AEF by the urgency of the moment had to learn by fighting; and the logistical problems of the Meuse-Argonne were all solved within a few weeks with the adversary driven from a position he had occupied and fortified for four years .
It is astonishing to discover other historians or commentators who miss the overarching point of the American participation in the Great War. In minimizing the value of the AEF on the battlefield they fail to analyze what its absence would have meant.
Without General Pershing's forces on the Western Front, Germany would have won the World War! By New Year's Day 1918, the British Army had been bled before Passchendaele, the French Army had suffered both defeat and mutiny from the Nivelle Offensive and Russia, then under Lenin, had withdrawn from the war. With its victory on the Eastern Front, the German Army had available over a million additional men to transfer to the West.
The key to Allied victory was Morale. It was the intense and undiminished morale of the US military combined with a staunch domestic backing which convinced the German they could no longer continue. When their morale collapsed on all fronts they sued for peace. The AEF with its operations broke the German morale.
Absent the arrival of the Americans, Ludendorff and Hindenburg did not have to make a desperate and exhausting roll of the dice as they did in resuming the offensive in March 1918. As Winston Churchill pointed out, with their reinforcements from the East they could have sat on their occupied sections of France and Flanders and dared the Entente to attack. Would Petain have ordered his enervated Poilus back on the offensive? Would Lloyd George have provided Douglas Haig the manpower to attempt a new variation on his 1917 campaign in the Ypres Salient? Without the presence of the AEF to provide the decisive margin it would have been most unlikely.

In addition to this strategic point, the specific contributions of the American armed forces to the demoralization and military defeat of the Central Powers can be easily charted chronologically:
• Spring 1917
The promise of a large AEF buoys French morale when their Army has been defeated and in mutiny.
American naval vessels allow the convoy system to succeed, keeping Britain in the war and facilitating the transport of the full expeditionary force to France, while freeing British ships to turn their blockade of Germany into what Capt. Liddell Hart called a "true stranglehold".
• Late 1917
American soldiers arriving in accelerating numbers compel the German High Command to attempt to win the war in early 1918 before the American presence can be decisive.
Initially, the doughboys are able to take over quiet sectors of the front, allowing British and French units to rest or redeploy to more active locales.
• May & June 1918
The AEF defends Paris on the Marne River line at Chateau Thierry.
• July 1918
American troops play the critical role in turning back the last German Offensive of World War I
Subsequently, US divisions totaling a quarter of a million men serve as the core attacking units in the Aisne-Marne counteroffensive of the Second Battle of the Marne.
• Late Summer 1918
The continuing avalanche of fresh American troops devastate the morale of both Germany's frontline soldiers and their high command; their presence also encourages the governments of Great Britain and France to allow their armies to continue the offensive operations necessary to expel the opposition from occupied territory.
• September 1918
At the St. Mihiel Salient and in the Argonne Forest, the US First Army mounts two major offensives on the same front within two weeks of one another; concurrently, the II Corps of the AEF collaborates with Australian troops in capturing the St. Quentin Canal in the Somme Sector.
• October 1918
55,000 Americans fighting under the 4th French Army capture Blanc Mont Ridge and force the abandonment of the Champagne by the German Army; King Albert of Belgium receives comparable American reinforcements for his assault in Flanders.
• November 1918
The reorganized First Army, despite enormous criticism, has met all the objectives of the Meuse Argonne Offensive and is threatening the Meuse-Antwerp line, the latest defensive position of the enemy.
The new US Second Army is deploying and initiating operations below Metz to the east. The AEF is now occupying 83 miles of the Western Front compared to 70 for the British Army and is planning to mount yet another major offensive on November 14th.
Only half of the expected AEF reached France before the Armistice; the rest were still training stateside. By November 11, 1918, 2,057,675 military personnel would arrive in France. Slightly over half of the 2 million+ were combat effectives and of the remainder about 30% had already become casualties.
By the War's end, the American units in France and Flanders commanded 83 miles of the 392 mile long Western Front. The other Allies held sections of the following lengths:
Belgian Army - 25 miles, British & Commonwealth - 70 miles, and French 214 miles.

[ShermanM4]

Good info Big B. [8D]

[ShermanM4]

Big B. to further your casualty list in the book the The Face of Battle, John Keegan wrote this, Counting the fighting infantry of a division at 10,000 and the number of British, French, Italian, and Russain divisions engaged against the Central Powers as 60, 110, 45 and 120, we get figures of 600,000, 1,100,000, 450,000 and 1,200,000 which are more or less the totals of deaths suffered by each cmobatant power at the moment its army underwent collapse or crisis.

Keegan was discussing the Battle of the Somme which started on July 1st 1916. The figures mentioned above are roughly accurate for the summer of 1917. Keegan admits that the British army suffered 100% casualties of its own divisional strength and underwent crisis. Now I can see how the AEF was cause for psychological and morale motivation as you and others have posted. Though I still have to give credit to the BEF because the UK did not fall under political turmoil as Russia did and did not have a mutiny like the French Army.

Keegan points out that the BEF had problems with self inflicted wounds and disobediance. DId the AEF suffer from these problems?

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4
Keegan points out that the BEF had problems with self inflicted wounds and disobediance. DId the AEF suffer from these problems?

I don't beleive insubordination and self inflicted wounds were particularly comon in the AEF, there of course will always be cases of that in every army in history - but to put it at the "problem" level indicates a general dissatisfaction, and the beginnings of real trouble with morale (not unlike our later experience in Vietnam towards the end). This did not particularly effect the AEF - however, had they gone for years as the Allies did - no doubt the problem would have shown up. As I recall reading, a lot of the initial enthusiasm for the war was wearing off by November 1918, though I am not suggesting, nor have I ever read that morale was becoming a "problem"

B

[ShermanM4]

don't beleive insubordination and self inflicted wounds were particularly comon in the AEF, there of course will always be cases of that in every army in history - but to put it at the "problem" level indicates a general dissatisfaction, and the beginnings of real trouble with morale (not unlike our later experience in Vietnam towards the end). This did not particularly effect the AEF - however, had they gone for years as the Allies did - no doubt the problem would have shown up. As I recall reading, a lot of the initial enthusiasm for the war was wearing off by November 1918, though I am not suggesting, nor have I ever read that morale was becoming a "problem"

Exactly, the AEF never experienced anything like the Somme. They did not suffer defeat and casualties prior to the battle and did not endure defeat and casualties afterward. Naturally, their outlook on the war was quite different than Great Britains. I agree things might have been different in that case for the had the AEF had a similar experience. Keegan, in the same book, writes about an experience during World War II, "This realization was to have important poictical after-effects druing the Second World War: 'On one occasion when [the Amiercan] General Marshall was in England, pouring forth the most cogent and logical arguments in favor of a promp invasion of the Continent ... Lord Cherwell remarked to him, "It's no use-- you are arguing against the casualties of the Somme."

[Syagrius]

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.

[ShermanM4]

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.

Yes but one could also make a different conclusion and say that the British suffered more casualites in the same period of time at the Somme for example. John Keegan wrote, "By the time the battle ended, 419,654 British soldiers had become casualies on the Somme, and nearly 200,000 French" This was between 1 July and 18 November 1916. The US was effectively in Combat from June to November of 1918 and suffered 116,516 KIA. Keegan points out that on the first day of the Somme there were 60,000 casualties of which 21,000 were KIA. Many posted claiming the AEF was green and mismanaged it still makes me wonder why the AEF met different results.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.

Yes but one could also make a different conclusion and say that the British suffered more casualites in the same period of time at the Somme for example. John Keegan wrote, "By the time the battle ended, 419,654 British soldiers had become casualies on the Somme, and nearly 200,000 French" This was between 1 July and 18 November 1916. The US was effectively in Combat from June to November of 1918 and suffered 116,516 KIA. Keegan points out that on the first day of the Somme there were 60,000 casualties of which 21,000 were KIA. Many posted claiming the AEF was green and mismanaged it still makes me wonder why the AEF met different results.

Numbers speak volumes, I for one have stressed that the AEF was by definition very green, but I have also pointed out that their training was not poor, and the basic tactics taught in the Field Manuals still are quite valid today. The US suffered about 300,000 combat casualties June - November 1918, of which under 60,000 were KIA (the remainder seems to have been noncombat deaths). For the numbers involved and the results gained - this is not bad by WWI standards.

I leave it at this; - The AEF did just fine (aside from logistical problems encountered in the Argonne). The idea that the AEF was somehow below the standards of the other combatants, and was in some undefinable way 'lacking' - is largely the result of constantly repeated, unsubstantiated criticism, that over the decades has taken on the mantle of truth through repetition.

[IronDuke_slith]

Lets not revise history too far the other way, though. A German assessment of the Meuse-Argonne attack stated.

"The American Infantry is very unskilful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by Tanks. This sort of attack offers exellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine guns."

To be fair, some was merely inexperience. There was an instance when advancing American infantry failed to clear trenches properly and were machine gunned from behind by Germans unmopped up, not a mistake British and French forces were making. One American historian wrote about Pershing's tactics.

"In the main, there weren't any tactics employed. Committing hundreds of thousands of infantrymen in a narrow zone directly against heavily defended and fortified positions guaranteed high casualties and small gains".

In the end, success was bite and hold. By mid end 1918 the British were having unbroken success with it and the Germans could produce no answer.

Hunter Liggett certainly improved things for the Americans and I'm sure they would have been better in 1919, but the war ended in 1918 and it is on their performance then we must adjudicate.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Big B]

IronDuke,

Maybe at this point we are kind of talking past each other. ...or at maybe we just see things from an entirely different light. But..

German assessments of the Americans also included statements like: "Their nerves are unshaken, the men must be rated as First Class"

And whoever that historian was (sounds like the controversial S.L.A.Marshall), stating that the Americans used no tactics at all - begs for an explanation of the meaning of the word by tactics? Infantry fowllowing behind tanks during an advance is a 'tactic'. Infantry, organized into squads and platoons with mutually supporting missions are also part of 'tactics' ...as opposed to a leaderless riotous mob.

I would also ask -if American attacks were massively too crammed with too many troops on too small a front - then why were American attacks successful (taking ground) and with less casualties than the French and British suffered at places like the Verdun and the Somme?

I have always freely agreed that the US Army was very green in 1918, and many times men forgot their training when under fire - and this does explain many circumstances of troops bunching up, learning the hard way to properly clear a trench, -etc. But it is important to also recognize (when pondering combat effectiveness) that American troops also accomplished their objectives and enjoyed success on the battlefield, so I would say it's fair to call them very much battlefield effective.... it's not as if they could not deliver what the generals ordered.

I also still do not agree that bite and hold won the war. -Those tactics (limited battalion sized attacks, where the infantry will not advance far - leaving the artillery out of supporting range) helped eat away at German positions for years, but produced no major gains....unless you consider Rowlinson's summer 1918 offensive as a bite and hold attack (which to my mind was nothing of the sort, it was a massive operation employing an entire army, with hundreds of heavy tanks and hundreds of aircraft, and was one of a series of large offensives that Foch ordered along the entire Western Front that summer ... to stretch the Germans to the breaking point).

Lastly, don't think I am suggesting that the French and British weren't very good indeed, I am merely stating (IMO) that US forces were also very effective where ever they operated (soldiers are there to die and take ground - and they did that) and as a whole, US participation on the Western Front was decisive - for all of the reasons stated earlier in this thread.
Too bad we live different sides of the pond - I would love to talk this over with you over a pint.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Big B

German assessments of the Americans also included statements like: "Their nerves are unshaken, the men must be rated as First Class"

This kinda assessment might have aimed at their psychological strength/stubbornness, not at their tactical/combat abilities. Compared to the psychological state of the average german soldier, the American forces showed less signs of battle fatigue (if any at all) than the Germans, or let's say than the French or British. I'm not saying that they didn't provide any combat value, I'm just pointing out that this assessment may have to be interpreted differently.

Infantry fowllowing behind tanks during an advance is a 'tactic'. Infantry, organized into squads and platoons with mutually supporting missions are also part of 'tactics' ...as opposed to a leaderless riotous mob.

Yes, but unlike in WW2 (where German Panzergrenadiers, Russians, and even American Inf troops used to use tanks as protection during the advance), where the tank's engines used to be able to put up decent speeds, tanks in WW1 used to be extremely slow, thus providing a lot of opportunities to shell the tanks and the following lined up troops on their slow advance. It's a tactic that led thousands of soldiers right to the shambles, imho...... means, it's rather a questionable one.

I would also ask -if American attacks were massively too crammed with too many troops on too small a front - then why were American attacks successful (taking ground) and with less casualties than the French and British suffered at places like the Verdun and the Somme?

Very interesting question.
The fact, that Germany's level of resources (manpower and ammo/supply) hit the bottom in 1918, might be one if not the major reason for these attacks being successful. Furthermore, the US approach used to be somewhat more aggressive, they also might have expected/accepted a higher amount of casualties (as experienced when they entered the theater), leading to bold attacks never conducted by the british/french. The british "Bite and hold" style used to result in smaller territory gains, but although it was supposed to be more careful and resource-saving, it offered opportunities to the Germans to inflict heavy casualties on quite a few occasions.

Assuming the US casualty rate was like 100 k from 1917-1918, then it might look like it's a very low rate. But they did not have to fight attritional battles like Verdun or the Somme offensive 1916. It would be interesting to see whether they really would have had these same "low" casualty rates if they'd have been in from the beginning, since 1914. Also, they did not have to cover as large sectors as the French/British, and they didn't have to cover their sector for a period of 4 years either.

A good number of strategical misinterpretations and mistakes might have added to the already strained/desperate situation on the German side. Furthermore, the implementation and use of the "Stormtroops" units (1918?), which appeared to be quite successful when spearheading attacks on trenches and when clearing them, was not applied to the entire front - for various reasons, therefor it only provided some local success. Losses among those specialized infantry units, unlike the huge pool of general replacements on the US side, could barely be replaced, if at all.

The German High Command was able to straighten or at least sort out breakthroughs (or attempts to make such a breakthrough) by directing reserves to a given sector, for 2 or 3 years. The implementation of these reserves can be seen as reserves serving in a "firebrigade" role, strengthening weak/contested sectors, or stopping enemy offensives where the enemy was about to gain vital ground.

This rudimentary WW1 doctrine, this way of using reserves, had been improved and deployed by the Germans in WW2, mostly executed by armoured divisions or "Abteilungen", or in ad-hoc scratch formations (so-called "Kampfgruppen") later on. German Airborne units (Monte Cassino, Arnheim) and American Airborne units (e.g. the 101st during the Ardennes offensive) had been deployed in a similar "firefighter" role imho, on the inf level, on quite some occasions.

In late 1918, the ability, to sort out enemy breakthroughs that way, was very limited, or even non-existent in some sectors, due to the lack of reserves. The sheer number of American troops and the dwindling ability to replace losses on the German side, to counter or slow down the Allied effort in late 1918, might have been one reason for the High Command to revise the situation (in terms of thinking about to surrender).

I also still do not agree that bite and hold won the war.

In fact, recent German studies (along with studies published during the last 30 yrs) display an interesting picture. The menpower resources appear to be sufficient halfway to carry on with fighting until (mid of) 1919, terrain losses taken into account here. But, logistically (ammo and food, even weapons/guns), the German Army may have collapsed after like 3 or 4 months after the actual surrender.
That said, "Bite and Hold" did hurt actually, and it was one reason for the situation getting worse for the Germans on the logistical side of things (menpower, supplies). It did not win the war, though.

The German High Command made a mistake when assessing the supply situation, actually. They expected the supplies to last for several weeks only, and, with some troops starting to be low on ammo and food (due to a partial collapse of the logistic system and due to the fact that the economy's production [food/ammo/equipment] output decreased tremendously), and with huge amounts of civilians starting to starve at home (in cities mostly), they decided to stop fighting. They did not want the troops to fight starving, as they feared chaos and mutiny - resulting in a massive collapse of the front line.
The situation in Austria and South East Europe (Hungary, Balkan) was never as desperate, but the (mistaken) assessments made by the German High Command back then lead to the actual decision to negotiate/surrender ASAP.

An interesting what-if would be to explore a situation where German civilians (women, older ppl) had been conscripted massively, country-wide, just like in WW2, to ensure production of ammo, supplies, weapons etc., in late 1917. In this case, the war may have lasted 'til 1920, but would have resulted in a defeat anyways, I guess, due to the massive superiority regarding equipment, menpower and ammuntion on the Allied side, after the US entered the war.

Anyway, IMHO, Germany rather lost WW1 on the "production" front mainly, as its economy could not keep up with the Allied output. The limited resources regarding menpower, after 4 yrs, did the rest.
That said, the US-participation was successful in terms of putting up virtually unexhaustable amounts of menpower and material/supplies, but never in terms of deploying decisive tactics or some kind of superior/decisive staff/personnel quality.

I see no reason to even expect that Germany would starve.

The German economy could not provide food / resources for both the civilians AND the Army, in the long run, as the system lacked organization and prioritization. The production focused on military supplies (ammo, guns and planes), but even the ammo production could not serve the needs at the end, let alone food production.

With the US remaining a neutral nation Germany still would have had to end the war by late 1919, either by winning it, or by surrendering. That's my guess.... and it seems that many German accounts point to the same conclusion.
It might have been different if there would have been the level of organization/planning that could be seen in WW2, coming into effect in 1943. The German production climbed to a wartime-high in (mid) 1944, when production lines had been tightened, and when planning/allocation had been centralized. Even the output level of luxury goods could be maintained if not raised, way into the year 1944.

The year 1918 did no feature that level of mass production, not on the German side, at least [:D].
Just my 2 cents.