Did the South have any chance of victory ?

[Twotribes]

Must just be me, but when I open the Post reply box it does not allow me to paste into it from my Firefox browser. Nor did it when i used Explorer. There is a link command, that would require me to write the URL down though.

[Missouri_Rebel]

hmmm I am using firefox and it works fine for me. Are you hitting Post reply? Not fast reply. that just centers on the window below.

[Twotribes]

Yes I use post reply , It opens a new box and that has no ability to call copy material from the browser all I have is a series of command boxes, one of which allows me to type in a URL for a link. was like that even with the normal explorer.

The command boxes are B(old) I ( not sure) U(nderline) hr ( not sure) quote link color list image code right center.

[RERomine]

As I understand it, those who feel secession was legal, believe the act of secession nullified a state's obligations to all aspects of the U.S. Constitution. To states in the Confederacy, it was null and void. Therefore, any statement short of something like "Once a state ratifies the U.S. Constitution, it may not be nullified by that state" leaves the question of legality open. The United States considered it to be unvoidable, where the Confederacy did not. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has the obligation to interpret the meaning of the U.S. Constitution in the matter of secession and that never happened.

The legality point could be argued until we are blue in the face, but no one can prove it and the only entity that could decide the issue (U.S. Supreme Court) could care less.

[andysomers]

The main point is that it was for sure not a black and white issue of whether a state could leave the Union at the time of the war.  The Civil War answered that question firmly.  Secession was not completely a Southern idea as well.  Examine the Hartford Convention of 1814, when several northern states openly debated the idea.
 
Again, the major outcome of the war (aside from the abolition of slavery obviously) was the establishment of the federal government as the supreme governing body of the land.  The United States ARE, before, the United States IS afterwards.
 
AS

[RERomine]

Unfortunately, it hasn't been argued by the only body who's opinion really counts on Constitutional law.

[andysomers]

...but firmly laid to rest on the battlefield.

[Jonathan Palfrey]

ORIGINAL: andysomers

...but firmly laid to rest on the battlefield.

I don't think war can be said to settle any question of principle. Unless you believe that Might is Right.

Admittedly, it does sometimes settle questions of practice.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey

ORIGINAL: andysomers

...but firmly laid to rest on the battlefield.

I don't think war can be said to settle any question of principle. Unless you believe that Might is Right.

Admittedly, it does sometimes settle questions of practice.

Agreed. The winning side isn't always the "right" side. In this case, the pre and post war United States were different, so the issue never came up again.

Are we ready to lower the curtain on this thread, so it's no where near the original thread topic?

[andysomers]

In this instance, I most certainly believe that Might made Right.  Alabamian by birth and by raising, Southern to the core, I believe the war proved secession wrong.  If that is still an issue, the whole war was, in my mind, essentially fought in vain.

AS

Oops, didn't see the other post. I agree - lay it to rest! Good discussion however!

[Goodwin]

[font="times new roman"]Sorry if I am reviving a thread that everyone is done with. I just couldn't let a discussion about the legality of secession pass without contributing what I believe is by far the most compelling argument on the issue, which was offered by the great American orator and Senator Daniel Webster in his famous debate with Hayne:[/font] [font="times new roman"]
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[/font][font="times new roman"]This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government and the source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the State legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government of the United States be the agent of the State governments, then they may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if it be the agent of the people, then the people alone can control it, restrain it, modify, or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the creature of the States, but that it is the creature of each of the States severally, so that each may assert the power for itself of determining whether it acts whithin the limits of its authority. It is the servant of four-and-twenty masters, of different will and different purposes and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government and its true character. It is, Sir, the people's Constitution, the people's government, made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared that the Constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The States are, unquestionably, sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. But the State legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given the power to the general government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of the State governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people. The general government and the State governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary. The national government possesses those powers which it will be shown the people have conferred upon it, and no more. All the rest belongs to the State governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the people have restrained State sovereignty, by the expression of their will, in the Constitution of the United States, so far, it must be admitted... We are here to administer a Constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the State governments.[/font][font="times new roman"]

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[/font] [font="times new roman"]Webster points out that the true sovereignty in the American people lies not with the states, but with the people, and therefore the states have no power over the constitution. States cannot secede because the states did not create the Constitution and endow it with its power, the people did that. The people further granted the federal government a certain power over the states, by making the Constitution the supreme law of the land, and extending the constitution to cover their “posterity.” This suggests that the state government do not have the right or power to remove themselves for the Constitution and the United States government.[/font] [font="times new roman"][/font]
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[/font][font="times new roman"][/font] [font="times new roman"]There are a few more legalistic/textual arguments against secession, but Webster's always seemed the most fundamental to me. Beyond even that, however, the nature of democracy forbids secession. In order for democracy to work, all must agree to accept majority rule. If secession were acceptable, there could be no true democracy, for the minority could always simply leave whenever the majority voted for something they did not like (such as Abraham Lincoln). This is not government, it is anarchy.[/font] [font="times new roman"]
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[/font][font="times new roman"]Williams Sherman actually argued something along these lines while writing about what it would take for the North to win the war and what that would mean in terms of the principals behind the war:[/font]

[font="times new roman, serif"]Another great and important natural truth is still in contest and can only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote is our great arbiter. Heretofore all have submitted to it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not necessarily physical majorities. The South, though numerically inferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority of numbers, and therefore by natural law are not bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in my judgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decide it, and it is the only question left to us as a people. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majority has both the natural and constitutional right to govern. If we cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to select their own government, and they have the argument. Our armies must prevail over theirs. Our officers, marshals, and courts must penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land before we have the natural right to demand their submission.

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[font="times new roman"]To briefly also address the main subject of the thread, I think it is evidence of how successful the later grand strategy employed, primarily, by Grant and Sherman was that there is now so much doubt as to whether the South could have ever won the war. At the beginning of the war, the attitude was much the opposite, with many believing that the North had no chance. Confederate Secretary of War George W. Randolph asserted, “They may overrun our frontier States and plunder our coast, but, as for conquering us, the thing is an impossibility. There is no instance in history of a people as numerous as we are inhabiting a country so extensive as ours being subjected if true to themselves.” And lest he be accused on misjudgment based on Southern pride and the myth that one Southerner could whip ten Northerners, the London Times basically agree with him when they editorialized, “It is one thing to drive the 'rebels' from the bank of the Potomac, or even to occupy Richmond, but another to reduce and hold in permanent subjection a tract of country nearly as large as Russia in Europe and inhabited by Anglo-Saxons. We have never questioned the superiority of the North for the purposes of warfare, but no war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully, except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is here.” Note that the Times agrees that the North is superior to the South for the purposes of warfare, and still gives the North no chance. I think it is a testament to the men who shaped and enacted the Union war effort that they were able to so drastically change the general perception of the South's chances in the war.[/font] [font="times new roman"]
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[Mike Scholl]

"[font="times new roman"]Webster points out that the true sovereignty in the American people lies not with the states, but with the people, and therefore the states have no power over the constitution. States cannot secede because the states did not create the Constitution and endow it with its power, the people did that. The people further granted the federal government a certain power over the states, by making the Constitution the supreme law of the land, and extending the constitution to cover their “posterity.” This suggests that the state government do not have the right or power to remove themselves for the Constitution and the United States government.[/font] "[font="times new roman"][/font]

 
You do realize that this is pure baloney?   The Delegates to the Constitutional Convention were not chosen in popular elections, they were chosen by the Legislatures of the Soverign States.   The Bi-cameral Legislature was put into place as a compromise of power between the large and populous States, and the smaller and less populous States.  The truth is that the right of succession is Constitutionally legal.  Maybe not justifiable, and under the circumstances of the time, perhaps not morally defensible---but it was Legal.  Can we put this issue to bed..., please?

[Twotribes]

NO, but we can move it to the other thread )

[Texican]

//Did the South have any chance of victory?//

Maybe. Just like in gaming, if the other side out-produces you, then your only chances are to act fast. I'd say the South had two viable options:

1) Go hyper aggressive in the Eastern theater. Maybe strip the entire Confederate Navy of its guns and use these as concentrated artillery batteries for their land army, then perform a "Sherman's-type march" up through the New England states, burning factories, farms, and cities; just a swath of destruction.

OR

2) Advance to sniper/guerilla tactics, sort of like North Vietnam did in the 1960's. Just make it so darned miserable for the Union Army to operate in the South that they give in.

I think Option #1, however, was their only true chance at victory in that war.


"Noooooo, not the both of us, not all of us!" - Armistead at Gettysburg

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Texican

//Did the South have any chance of victory?//

Maybe. Just like in gaming, if the other side out-produces you, then your only chances are to act fast. I'd say the South had two viable options:

1) Go hyper aggressive in the Eastern theater. Maybe strip the entire Confederate Navy of its guns and use these as concentrated artillery batteries for their land army, then perform a "Sherman's-type march" up through the New England states, burning factories, farms, and cities; just a swath of destruction.

OR

2) Advance to sniper/guerilla tactics, sort of like North Vietnam did in the 1960's. Just make it so darned miserable for the Union Army to operate in the South that they give in.

I think Option #1, however, was their only true chance at victory in that war.

I think capturing Washington would have worked. Even if the Union didn't give up at that point, foreign recognition was sure to follow. To me, Southern victory would be if they continued to exist, which could have been achieved by maintaining a battlefield stalemate. This seemed to be a very attainable goal.

[Grifman]

The South should have used the strategy Johnston used in defending Atlanta and Lee in defending Richmond in 1864, but for the entire war. Fight a slow bloody delaying battle. The South was too obsessed with the cult of the offensive, a strategy for which they did not have the manpower. They needed a strategy of Fabian delay, fighting on the defensive only, inflicting casualties to make the North weary of the war. It's arguable that given Grant's casualties and lack of progress in the East, that if the South had held Atlanta until the Northern elections, the defeatist Democrats might have won, and the South would have gained its independence.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Grifman

The South should have used the strategy Johnston used in defending Atlanta and Lee in defending Richmond in 1864, but for the entire war. Fight a slow bloody delaying battle. The South was too obsessed with the cult of the offensive, a strategy for which they did not have the manpower. They needed a strategy of Fabian delay, fighting on the defensive only, inflicting casualties to make the North weary of the war. It's arguable that given Grant's casualties and lack of progress in the East, that if the South had held Atlanta until the Northern elections, the defeatist Democrats might have won, and the South would have gained its independence.

The problem is I don't know that the South had a strategy other than working towards foreign recognition and holding on until that happened. If the Confederacy could have moved troops to the East to get regional superiority, just think of what Lee could have done. [8|]

They hoped McClellan would pursue peace if he won the election in 1864, but I've read McClellan had no such plan. I could hunt the source of this down if anyone is interested. That actually caught me by surprise, because the official platform for the Democrats was peace. McClellan evidently didn't adhere to this official platform.

[Jonathan Palfrey]

ORIGINAL: Grifman
The South should have used the strategy Johnston used in defending Atlanta and Lee in defending Richmond in 1864, but for the entire war. Fight a slow bloody delaying battle. The South was too obsessed with the cult of the offensive, a strategy for which they did not have the manpower. They needed a strategy of Fabian delay, fighting on the defensive only, inflicting casualties to make the North weary of the war. It's arguable that given Grant's casualties and lack of progress in the East, that if the South had held Atlanta until the Northern elections, the defeatist Democrats might have won, and the South would have gained its independence.

I've thought this too for a long time. Lee's victories were impressive but they mostly cost men that the South couldn't afford to lose. Only at Fredericksburg was the attrition ratio acceptable to the South. They needed to fight more battles on the defensive in prepared positions. Admittedly, to do this consistently probably requires some cooperation from your opponent.

ORIGINAL: RERomine
If the Confederacy could have moved troops to the East to get regional superiority, just think of what Lee could have done.

But getting regional superiority in the East would have required abandoning the West completely -- perhaps politically impossible as well as strategically alarming. And supporting so many troops in the East could have been a logistical nightmare for the South (the North was better equipped for that sort of thing).

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Jonathan Palfrey
I've thought this too for a long time. Lee's victories were impressive but they mostly cost men that the South couldn't afford to lose. Only at Fredericksburg was the attrition ratio acceptable to the South. They needed to fight more battles on the defensive in prepared positions. Admittedly, to do this consistently probably requires some cooperation from your opponent. In Lee's defense, he faced a tough strategic situation. He didn't have much "strategic depth" to work with, and Richmond was not only the Capitol, but also a major industrial center. Sometimes "giving ground" wasn't the optimal solution. Once he had no choice but to fight defensively (1864 vs. Grant) he still performed "prodigies", but was winning his way to defeat. In 1862 and 1863 his manuevers and attacks had been able to keep the Union from gaining any ground at all.

But getting regional superiority in the East would have required abandoning the West completely -- perhaps politically impossible as well as strategically alarming. And supporting so many troops in the East could have been a logistical nightmare for the South (the North was better equipped for that sort of thing).
Dead On. Perfect example is Chancellorsville, where Lee's army had two full divisions detached to where they could be fed, and unavailable for the fight. Logistics is the bane and demise of lots of good "paper plans".

[Texican]

Let me make one thing clear: Lee's victories correlate mostly with Stonewall Jackson's victories. Lee was largely victorious when he had Stonewall Jackson around. After ol' Stonewall passed on, Lee started losing.

I wonder just how much of Lee's success can be attributed to having someone like General Jackson as a subordinate.