The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

[Texican]

I know folks always bash the Northern leaders, but there is an argument that by holding back many times when there was an opportunity to seize the initiative and be more aggressive, the early Northern generals preserved the army which Grant would later use to win the war.

Meade at Gettysburg, for example.

Remember, in a gaming or war situation with time and resources on your side, sometimes all you have to do to ensure a victory is just to wait it out.

Had the Northern generals (the early ones) been as aggressive as Lincoln had wanted them to be, they could have gambled and lost.

[ravinhood]

I'll betcha 5 to 1 that when Mac blundered at the battle of Antietam, President Lincoln when first hearing about it replied: THAT IDIOT!

[Riva Ridge]

"I know folks always bash the Northern leaders"
 
Oh, trust me, I can find a lot to bash the Southern Leaders about as well.  Braxton Bragg, Joe Johnston, Robert Lee at Gettysburg, Pickett, etcetera...of course, probably have to start a new thread for that!
 
C

[ravinhood]

Oh I agree Riva, Lee was an idiot at the battle of Gettysburg. Why didn't he move to the right or even move towards Washington? Why the hell fight a battle against an entrenched opponent high on a ridge and rocky terrain? Totally idiotic. Pickets charge had to be the most idiotic...across and open field at least a mile from the foe, no cover to speak of. If only I could go back in time once again and shoot LEE. BTW who was 2nd in command to Lee should he have been killed? How far down the chain was Longstreet. Would the war have ended if Lee had been killed?

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: ravinhood

Oh I agree Riva, Lee was an idiot at the battle of Gettysburg. Why didn't he move to the right or even move towards Washington? Why the hell fight a battle against an entrenched opponent high on a ridge and rocky terrain? Totally idiotic. Pickets charge had to be the most idiotic...across and open field at least a mile from the foe, no cover to speak of. If only I could go back in time once again and shoot LEE. BTW who was 2nd in command to Lee should he have been killed? How far down the chain was Longstreet. Would the war have ended if Lee had been killed?

It amazes me how often someone is branded an idiot because a plan fails. There are more military geniuses in this forum than I thought. It's easy to sit back, read books and formulate an opinion about something that already failed. Try sitting out there from a mile away, looking at the position, knowing you hit the right and left flanks the previous day and failed and then formulate a plan.

At Gettysburg, they threw up some low brestworks on Cemitary Ridge, but they were hardly entrenched. Pickett's charge was only part of the attack and that part didn't come off as planned. All the units were suppose to converge on the cospe of trees, but that didn't happen. Some units were late getting off. Artillery that was suppose to move forward for support didn't go because someone else ordered them moved and they couldn't be found. The preliminary bombardment didn't have the effect that was desired. Stuart's cavalry was suppose to attack the rear of the area at the same time. The Union cavalry thwarted that attack. Finally, a fence found to be sturdier than expected. Despite all of this, some of the Confederates managed to get there. If it went according to plan, they might have succeded in taking the position. I'm not sure they could have held it, but that is based on what I know from books. Lee didn't know what was behind the ridge, so he can't be faulted for that.

Why is it the attacker that seems to always gets labeled? Meade did a fantastic job shifting units on the 2nd day against an attack, that again, didn't go off according to plan. Ewell was suppose to attack at the sound of the guns of Longstreet's attack. He said he didn't hear the attack, so I can't dispute his reasons for attacking near dark. If Lee's plan had gone off properly, many of the units Meade moved to stop Longstreet's attack would have been otherwise occupied fighting Ewell. It wasn't in the cards.

[Twotribes]

The attacker gets faulted because he has the initiative, it is in fact HIS plan or there would be NO attack, no battle to fault. The defender gets credit when he does miraculous things against overwhelming odds or thwarts bad luck with good defense plans.

One does have to wonder though about Gettysburg and that attack across a flat open field a mile wide against a defender in place and well positioned. They had had more than enough time by then to understand the effect of massed infantry advancing against massed infnatry firing. Not to mention the Confederates didnt have the ammunition to sustain the prebombardment and it was pretty clear the prebombardment had failed before the Infantry set off.

Not Lee's best day to be sure. More in line with the Northern General's failed plans before and after that battle while in the attack.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

The attacker gets faulted because he has the initiative, it is in fact HIS plan or there would be NO attack, no battle to fault. The defender gets credit when he does miraculous things against overwhelming odds or thwarts bad luck with good defense plans.

One does have to wonder though about Gettysburg and that attack across a flat open field a mile wide against a defender in place and well positioned. They had had more than enough time by then to understand the effect of massed infantry advancing against massed infnatry firing. Not to mention the Confederates didnt have the ammunition to sustain the prebombardment and it was pretty clear the prebombardment had failed before the Infantry set off.

Not Lee's best day to be sure. More in line with the Northern General's failed plans before and after that battle while in the attack.

E. Porter Alexander was left with determining when the bombardment had been as effective. Too much responsibility for the commander of corps artillery. Longstreet was passing the buck too much on an attack he didn't believe in. Artillery withdrawing for resupply was construed as just withdrawing. Many of these guns were replaced by other batteries. Inaccurate damage assessment since most of the shots were high. Now, if Stuart had made it to the rear, he would have found it really beat up. [:D]

The infantry weapons are a different story. They are quite deadly out at a good range. Lee felt the position was weakly held and thus could be taken. Compared to other areas, it was weakly held. Meade, while initially believing Lee would hit the middle changed his mind and reinforced the flanks. Still, I do understand the age of the frontal assault was past. The only instance I can think of where a major frontal assault worked was at Missionary Ridge and that attack wasn't suppose to happen at all.

The terrain at Gettysburg did have it's low spots providing some concealment. This is something Lee wouldn't know, however. He probably felt it was completely open all the way. Cemetery Ridge just isn't that high. When I saw it personally, I wasn't that impressed. None the less, I believe the Confederates could have taken their objectives if the plan had worked properly. This is speculation since the plan didn't work properly. Also speculation is they wouldn't be able to keep the position. The Union 6th Corps wasn't too far away and would have more than likely been moved to counter attack. With the assumption that everything goes according to plan, the biggest flaw seemed to be no provision to move in units when and if the position was taken. He could have issued move orders had they succeded, but it takes time to do that without advance warning.

[Twotribes]

Too many what if's, to many if only's. It was a weak plan at best. It depended to much on things going just the right way. And it depended to much on unsupported assumptions. To boot it was poorly lead and poorly executed. All hallmarks not of the South but the North. Lee made a mistake, a BIG mistake. One that doesnt fit well with all his previous good decisions and proceeding ones.

Everyone eventually makes mistakes. In the case of Lee he didnt make many, but this one was a BIG one. Granted his Cavalry was off playing games and he had no eyes, but he KNEW that.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Too many what if's, to many if only's. It was a weak plan at best. It depended to much on things going just the right way. And it depended to much on unsupported assumptions. To boot it was poorly lead and poorly executed. All hallmarks not of the South but the North. Lee made a mistake, a BIG mistake. One that doesnt fit well with all his previous good decisions and proceeding ones.

Everyone eventually makes mistakes. In the case of Lee he didnt make many, but this one was a BIG one. Granted his Cavalry was off playing games and he had no eyes, but he KNEW that.

I can't argue that a plan that requires the planets all be in alignment is on the risky side. On top of that, it was a time period where kicking the daylights out of the other side and then leaving them on the with control of the battlefield was considered a loss. I'm sure that played a factor in everything and that's one concept that never will make sense to me. If Lee attacked as he did on the 3rd day and failed, withdrew without fighting, either to return to Virginia or go around the right flank of the AoP, it would be considered a loss because they fought and the Union still held the ground they wanted to hold. The Union held ground that meant nothing before the battle and nothing afterwards except to history.

Lee knew he needed a victory and more than one that involved holding ground. The war for the Confederacy could be lost in the West, but couldn't be won there. He had to win it in the East by destroying the AoP and/or capturing Washington (if this would win the war). To get that victory, he had to attack the AoP where they sat. The left flank wasn't a good option because he didn't have many fresh troops there. It would have been difficult to support with other units as well. The right flank would have been better, but should have been preceded with pulling Ewell back to the Seminary Ridge line. This would have given him more men to support such an attack and concentrated his men. Such a move would have had to take place after dark because Meade would have seen it and redeployed accordingly. I'm not sure a right flank attack would work, after the failure of the 2nd day, but it seems to be the least risky option.

Given the situation, what would you do? Greene and men of the 12th Corps were actually entrenched on Culps hill and the elements of the 5th Corps occupying Big Round Top with the 6th Corps within supporting distance (Lee probably didn't know this). And you have to attack. Just leaving was probably the best option, but I don't think Lee felt that was viable.

[Riva Ridge]

"Given the situation, what would you do? Greene and men of the 12th Corps were actually entrenched on Culps hill and the elements of the 5th Corps occupying Big Round Top with the 6th Corps within supporting distance (Lee probably didn't know this). And you have to attack. Just leaving was probably the best option, but I don't think Lee felt that was viable. "
 
It is as you said, he should have withdrawn at the end of the second day.  He had taken a sharp knock that day and the Federals had won the Battle by that point, but not decisively so.  Longstreet advised him to disengage and head for Washington where he felt they would have to abandon their strong position and they could bring the Federal Army to battle at a position of their choosing.  Lee pushing the issue at that point over the advice of the General that he had come to rely on after Jackson dying was very unwise.  It was essentially Fredricksburg in reverse and he paid for it.  I don't think Lee was a fool or a horrible General (that would be Johnston).  I mean, the man was the CG for over three years and he was bound to lose a battle and make a mistake at some point, I just believe knowing what he did at the point he did it, he really made a terrible call.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Riva Ridge

It is as you said, he should have withdrawn at the end of the second day.  He had taken a sharp knock that day and the Federals had won the Battle by that point, but not decisively so.  Longstreet advised him to disengage and head for Washington where he felt they would have to abandon their strong position and they could bring the Federal Army to battle at a position of their choosing.  Lee pushing the issue at that point over the advice of the General that he had come to rely on after Jackson dying was very unwise.  It was essentially Fredricksburg in reverse and he paid for it.  I don't think Lee was a fool or a horrible General (that would be Johnston).  I mean, the man was the CG for over three years and he was bound to lose a battle and make a mistake at some point, I just believe knowing what he did at the point he did it, he really made a terrible call.

I agree withdrawing at the end of the 2nd day probably was the most sound option. It seems sliding past the Union right needed to happen on the 2nd day, while the AoP was still concentrating. After that, any such move might invite getting hit in the flank, if Meade had was quick enough. Hindsight indicates Meade probably wasn't quick enough, but Lee wouldn't have known that then.

There probably was a lot going on it Lee's head we don't know about. His reasoning for attacking the center (as opposed to either flank) is pretty well documented, but we can only guess why he felt he had to attack at all. The AoNV feed well off of Pennsylvannia and gave Virginia a break for a while. Lee certainly wanted a victory in the North, but for lack of ammunition, he didn't have time to sit and wait for weeks on end. He should have quit while he was ahead. I don't think the Confederate troops lost the 3rd day of Gettysburg shortened the war by one day. In the end, they couldn't feed the ones they had. However many more that were lost would have just made that situation worse.

[Texican]

Years ago, I sat down and spent half a day reading a condensed history of the Civil War (which I had not really studied this topic up until then). Sometimes it takes a fresh look at the "20,000 foot level" to sort things out.

I came to one conclusion: the South lost the war mostly in the West and at sea.

The South's victories in the East were mostly tactical in nature and while they boosted morale, had little outcome on the war. With half their nation (the Western portion) in disarray and ports blockaded, there was not much the South could do.

Maybe Lee should have sent Stonewall Jackson westward to take control of the situation. Maybe the South should have sent their first ironclad on a death mission to trash as many Union ships in port as possible (instead of retreating after a few engagements). Maybe, maybe, maybe....

[Williamb]

How much of Grants good comand statis have to do that Bragg was the west commander and not another Lee ? Lincoln could afford to give grant time as thee was no Lee howling at the outskirts of Chicago.
 
To say that McClellan got a rough ride while Grant was left alone is more in the nature that Lincoln saw Lee as a far greater danger than he had distrust in McClellan. One has to wonder if it wasnt Lee in command in the east if McClellan would have been in such dire straights as a commander

[chris0827]

ORIGINAL: William Amos

How much of Grants good comand statis have to do that Bragg was the west commander and not another Lee ? Lincoln could afford to give grant time as thee was no Lee howling at the outskirts of Chicago.

To say that McClellan got a rough ride while Grant was left alone is more in the nature that Lincoln saw Lee as a far greater danger than he had distrust in McClellan. One has to wonder if it wasnt Lee in command in the east if McClellan would have been in such dire straights as a commander

Grant didn't make his reputation against Bragg. They only faced each other as army commanders once. At Chattanooga.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

This is just plain wrong. Lincoln DID allow McClellan not just to "manuever", but to load up the Army of the Potomac and sail it around to the Penninsula..., effectively placing Richmond BETWEEN the Army and Washington! Of COURSE he was required to leave some troops to "cover" the nation's capitol! But he was promised that those 40,000 men would be moving to join him overland as soon as he had closed up to Richmond. And he still had more men with him than the Rebs had in the Virginia theatre. Lincoln not only didn't "have McClellan on a leash", he was often reduced to "begging" Mac to tell him what he and the Army were doing.

McClellan's army moved to the Peninsula in pieces, so Washington had troops in and was thus covered. Plus, while farther from Washington than the Confederate army, it could get there quicker via transports. This was proven by the fact some of the McClellan's troops withdrawn from the Peninsula participated in 2nd Bull Run. Still, Lincoln didn't allow the move until the Confederate forces withdrew from Manassas Junction. And Lincoln intervened, preventing some troops from being moved to the Peninsula. McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

What happened? McClellan was so increadable slow that the Confederates were able to send more men to Jackson in the Valley and raise a huge stink while bluffing "Mac" with "smoke and mirrors". He had no-one to blame but himself that MacDowell's corps wound up being sent West to deal with Jackson instead of South to join him. All he had to do was get up off his ass and move and the Rebels would have had no choice but to unite to meet him---ending Jackson's campaign and allowing the rest of the Union Armies to join "Mac". Instead he spent weeks doing nothing, bawling for more of everything, and blaiming Lincoln and the Government for all his imagined problems. Show me a single instance of Grant pulling such a bunch of B.S. and I'll shut up. Grant took what he was given, and set out to do his job. No wonder Lincoln loved him..., he might get beat, but he usually won. And he never wasted a minute bitching and moaning about what he didn't have!

Yes, smoke and mirrors kept McClellan from moving when he should have, and a ship named the CSS Virginia, but he did end up moving. There was a series of major battles where the casualties were fairly equal on both sides, but Lee didn't have as many men and consequently the troop differential was greater. McClellan wanted to move against Petersburg but wasn't permitted to do so. Pope, with fewer troops than he had at 2nd Bull Run could have still proceded South. The could have accomplished in 1862 what Grant accomplished in '64-65, if he was allowed to execute the plan. Maybe Lincoln wasn't holding the leash all the time, but McClellan was on one. Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Grant usually won? I will say he was certainly tenacious, but I would hardly say he usually won when you look at his battles against Lee. He managed to get the siege that he was after, but was only able to after getting pummelled at Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotsylvannia Court House. The AoP suffered casualties almost double that of the AoNV with estimates of Union loses being over 50,000. This is little more than a month! These were tolerable in 1864 considering the Mississippi was under Union control and Sherman was moving on Atlanta. In what world would those casualties have been acceptable in 1862? The war was ready for Grant in 1864, but not in 1862. It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

I can't argue the personality differences between Grant and McClellan. Grant was a no nonsense type of person, which is what you need as an army commander. McClellan might have been given more latitude if he had checked his savior of the Union act at the door. Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"

[chris0827]

Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"

 
Lincoln said that in response to Hooker, not McClellan. Hooker has suggested that the country needed a dictator. Lincoln said "I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it,that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators.What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship."
 
That Lincoln sure had a way with words.

[Mike Scholl]

I stand corrected. Thank you. Should have looked it up..... Sure sounded like one of "Little Mac's" fantasies. Maybe he was holding out for "Emperor"....

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

Yes, McClellan did eventually have all but McDowell's Corps available. The point is they didn't all get there instantly. I believe you pointed out there was a limited number of Union transports. While the move was in progress, it could have been countermanded if a threat to Washington developed. Most of the Confederate troops at this time were south of the Rappahannock, while the rest were in the Shenandoah Valley. And Johnston wasn't Lee.

Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Pope was moving forward by August 7, 1862 with 54,000 men (McDowell, 33,000; Sigel, 13,000 from the Valley; Banks, 11,000 near Culpeper, VA). The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, 1862, before any of McClellan's army had reached Pope. The order to begin the withdraw was issued August 3. Part of the Confederate force near McClellan started moving north once the Union stated withdrawing from Harrison's Landing. Had movements of McClellan and Pope been coordinated by Halleck, the Confederacy would have had problems. There wasn't much available to stop Pope if McClellan had been allowed to move against Petersburg.

It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

The casualties of the Union and Confederacy during Grant's drive to Richmond are subject to debate, even amoung historians. I've seen numbers that list Union casualties as high as 52,000 and Confederate casualties as high as 33,000. Taking Antietam out of the mix because it has nothing to do with McClellan being allowed to move against Petersburg during the Peninsula Campaign, Union casualties approximately 22,000 and Confederate casualties 25,000. Halleck should coordinated the move of Pope and McClellan because such a move would have forced the Confederates to split their army. Lee could have been pushed back to Petersburg in 1862 and McClellan would have had something to show for his move. This wasn't allowed. Grant had the luxery of having control over all of the Union forces, everywhere. If McClellan didn't have anything to show for the Peninsula Campaign, it was because someone called it to an end before the payoff could be reaped.

I know this is speculation on my part. Lee could have cobbered both Pope and McClellan, but it seems like a sound strategy to me. Halleck was a weak commander for all the Union forces in the field. He should have seen the situation for what it was. Halleck tended to offer strongly worded suggestions and not orders. There was no proper control at the highest levels.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

Yes, McClellan did eventually have all but McDowell's Corps available. The point is they didn't all get there instantly. I believe you pointed out there was a limited number of Union transports. While the move was in progress, it could have been countermanded if a threat to Washington developed. Most of the Confederate troops at this time were south of the Rappahannock, while the rest were in the Shenandoah Valley. And Johnston wasn't Lee. Are you reading what I'm writing? I said that Mac had ALL THE FORCES his own plan called for to be moved by sea..., and he still "crawled" up the Penninsula at the pace of a dead snail. Which allowed the Confederates to detach forces from Richmond to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, making it possible for "Stonewall" to raise merry Hell and "suck" MacDowell's forces West toward the Shenandoah. The point being McClellan had no-one to blaim but himself for MacDowell not joining him. All he had to do was push towards Richmond with even modest speed and Jackson couldn't have been reinforced.

Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Pope was moving forward by August 7, 1862 with 54,000 men (McDowell, 33,000; Sigel, 13,000 from the Valley; Banks, 11,000 near Culpeper, VA). The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, 1862, before any of McClellan's army had reached Pope. The order to begin the withdraw was issued August 3. Part of the Confederate force near McClellan started moving north once the Union stated withdrawing from Harrison's Landing. Had movements of McClellan and Pope been coordinated by Halleck, the Confederacy would have had problems. There wasn't much available to stop Pope if McClellan had been allowed to move against Petersburg. Which as I said was LONG AFTER the Seven Days Battle in June. "Little Mac" had been sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing for over a month DOING NOTHING! Meanwhile Lee, ever bold, had split his army at Richmond and sent Jackson's wing North towards Washington again. McClellan was called back because he wouldn't move forward. McClellan "moving to Petersburg" would only put him farther away from Washington and make his Army harder to supply. And as shown in 1864, Lee and Longstreet would have been there to meet him if he ACTUALLY did move and not just come up with another excuse. How could Halleck "coordinate" anything when McClellan ignored every order he recieved?

It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

The casualties of the Union and Confederacy during Grant's drive to Richmond are subject to debate, even amoung historians. I've seen numbers that list Union casualties as high as 52,000 and Confederate casualties as high as 33,000. Taking Antietam out of the mix because it has nothing to do with McClellan being allowed to move against Petersburg during the Peninsula Campaign, Union casualties approximately 22,000 and Confederate casualties 25,000. Halleck should coordinated the move of Pope and McClellan because such a move would have forced the Confederates to split their army. Lee could have been pushed back to Petersburg in 1862 and McClellan would have had something to show for his move. This wasn't allowed. Grant had the luxery of having control over all of the Union forces, everywhere. If McClellan didn't have anything to show for the Peninsula Campaign, it was because someone called it to an end before the payoff could be reaped. And as I pointed out above, that SOMEONE was George B. McClellan. He sat on the James for FIVE WEEKS with his thumb up his butt doing absolutely NOTHING but complaining and screaming for every soldier in a blue coat on the Continent to be shipped to him. If he wanted to move against Petersburg or Richmond or anyplace else all he had to do was pull his thumb out and do it. He wouldn't. So Lincoln told him to bring the Army back to Washington.

I know this is speculation on my part. Lee could have cobbered both Pope and McClellan, but it seems like a sound strategy to me. Halleck was a weak commander for all the Union forces in the field. He should have seen the situation for what it was. Halleck tended to offer strongly worded suggestions and not orders. There was no proper control at the highest levels. All McClellan EVER had to do to have Lincoln's full backing, support, and confidence was move forward, find the Confederate Army, and attack it. Lincoln had given him "Supreme Command" in hopes that might get him moving, but he took it back when it was obvious that no matter what or how much McClellan had, the only thing he did was demand MORE.

[jjjanos]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

Be that as it may, Washington was covered due to the staggered arrival.

Your implication that this was a consequence of micromanagement on the part of the War Department.

We know that now. Did McClellan? Obviously, the Confederates did an outstanding job of making it look like they were stronger than they were. How about a hurrah for an outstanding deception? While there were roughly 13K around Ft. Monroe, Johnston wasn't far away. McClellan probably didn't realize Johnston was as slow at moving as he was.

Failure to properly estimate the CSA force rests with McClellan who discounted any evidence or indications that the CSA force was smaller than the size McClellan already determined. It was McClellan's job to understand the strengths/weaknesses of his opponent - Lee did it very easily regarding McClellan. Whether Johnston was near or far does not excuse the one month delay in beginning siege operations.

This is still interference. Grant stripped all the defenses around Washington and almost got burned by Early's Campaign.

You say interference. I call it enforcing the agreed upon deployment of troops. Grant let it be known he was stripping the Washington defenses.

re:Virginia
This still effected the planning. To me, the threat of the CSS Virginia was probably given more credence then than it should have been given. It was going to cruise up the Potomac and bombard Washington, when the reality was a strong tide probably would have carried it out to sea.

Virginia's ability to steam up the Potomac was neutralized the day after the vessel first engaged Union forces by the Monitor. I believe the 'phib operation was cancelled because, while the Monitor could keep the Virginia from steaming to Washington, there was no guarantee the Monitor could stop the Virginia before it raised holy heck with any 'phibs trying the by-sea flanking movement.

After how many months delay getting things to his satisfaction?

Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.

Siege of Petersburg lasted 9 months. Inactivity lasted from November 1864 through end of March 1865 - months in which both armies would have been inactive due to mud.