The Great McClellan debate from jchatain's thread

[RERomine]

Since you said basically the same thing over and over again (maybe I did too [:)]) I'll just respond without the quotes.

Yes, McClellan did seem a touch on the slow side. [8|] Keep in mind he was constantly being told he was badly out numbered by Allan Pinkerton. I know McClellan wasn't, you know he wasn't and the spider in the corner of the room knows he wasn't, but McClellan thought he was. The information was coming from someone (Pinkerton) who had some credibility with the White House and thought to be an expert. At the same time, the Confederates are acting like they have all the men McClellan has been told they had. Maybe they were getting information from somewhere (newspapers?) and knew what to do. The end result, McClellan sat and waited for reinforcements he felt he needed. I can't say McClellan would have moved any faster if he had gotten his reinforcements (McDowell) or accurate information. There is just no way to know. One way or the other is just speculation.

Jackson's Valley campaign should have been squashed. This had nothing to do with McClellan (other than inactivity allowing them to temporarily detach from Johnston's force) and everything to do with Halleck. With the troops previously mentioned availible, Halleck should have cooridinated the action against Jackson, but failed to do so. Halleck rarely gave orders, but more strongly worded suggestions. The situation should have been a strategic disaster for the Confederacy.

As far as supplies for a move by McClellan to Petersburg, the James river would have done nicely. Unless trains are used, ships are much faster than overland routes. Also, shipping routes are safe from cavalry raids. Although I haven't checked, Grant's supplies probably came up the James river as well.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: jjjanos
Failure to properly estimate the CSA force rests with McClellan who discounted any evidence or indications that the CSA force was smaller than the size McClellan already determined. It was McClellan's job to understand the strengths/weaknesses of his opponent - Lee did it very easily regarding McClellan. Whether Johnston was near or far does not excuse the one month delay in beginning siege operations.

I could argue this point, but I won't because I agree with you. McClellan should have been able to figure the Confederate numbers out for himself. Why he placed so much credence in what he got from Allan Pinkerton is beyond me, but I believe McClellan reacted to what he believed to be correct information.

You say interference. I call it enforcing the agreed upon deployment of troops. Grant let it be known he was stripping the Washington defenses.

That might be a miscommunication between McClellan and Lincoln and/or Halleck. Obviously, McClellan believed the troops were coming, didn't get them and was in no position to really discuss the issue. In reality, McDowell's men weren't needed in Washington. There were still enough troops around and the Confederacy was just as concerned about losing Richmond as the Union was to losing Washington. We know that now, but Lincoln and Halleck probably didn't at the time.

Virginia's ability to steam up the Potomac was neutralized the day after the vessel first engaged Union forces by the Monitor. I believe the 'phib operation was cancelled because, while the Monitor could keep the Virginia from steaming to Washington, there was no guarantee the Monitor could stop the Virginia before it raised holy heck with any 'phibs trying the by-sea flanking movement.

The CSS Virginia messed with the planning, but it's level of success was due to surprise more than anything. It should have been easy to deal with once the shock wore off. There were many events during the war that got more attention than they really deserved. The Virginia's threat to Washington was one.

Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.

Siege of Petersburg lasted 9 months. Inactivity lasted from November 1864 through end of March 1865 - months in which both armies would have been inactive due to mud.

I'm not talking about how long the siege was, but the fact McClellan might [8|] have been able to get there in September, 1862, as opposed to Grant in November, 1864.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

Since you said basically the same thing over and over again (maybe I did too [:)]) I'll just respond without the quotes.

Yes, McClellan did seem a touch on the slow side. [8|] Keep in mind he was constantly being told he was badly out numbered by Allan Pinkerton. I know McClellan wasn't, you know he wasn't and the spider in the corner of the room knows he wasn't, but McClellan thought he was. The information was coming from someone (Pinkerton) who had some credibility with the White House and thought to be an expert. At the same time, the Confederates are acting like they have all the men McClellan has been told they had. Maybe they were getting information from somewhere (newspapers?) and knew what to do. The end result, McClellan sat and waited for reinforcements he felt he needed. I can't say McClellan would have moved any faster if he had gotten his reinforcements (McDowell) or accurate information. There is just no way to know. One way or the other is just speculation. Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Jackson's Valley campaign should have been squashed. This had nothing to do with McClellan (other than inactivity allowing them to temporarily detach from Johnston's force) and everything to do with Halleck. With the troops previously mentioned availible, Halleck should have cooridinated the action against Jackson, but failed to do so. Halleck rarely gave orders, but more strongly worded suggestions. The situation should have been a strategic disaster for the Confederacy. Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

As far as supplies for a move by McClellan to Petersburg, the James river would have done nicely. Unless trains are used, ships are much faster than overland routes. Also, shipping routes are safe from cavalry raids. Although I haven't checked, Grant's supplies probably came up the James river as well.
I know all this. Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

[regularbird]

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

 
Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

I'm not suprised the Ranger at Antietam didn't mention it..., that's a later Campaign. The "numbers inflation" began in November of 1861 when McClellan insisted on sitting in Washington giving his 175,000+ troops additional training and parades even though he himself had described them as "largest, best-trained, and best-equipped Army in the world." After he had opened his mouth, the press and the politicians began wondering why he didn't take this wonderful military machine out to Manassas and beat the stuffing out of the 50,000 ragged Rebs known to be there. So he hired his old friend Alan Pinkerton as his new "Chief of Intelligence", and "lo and behold" there were soon 200,000 Rebels at Manassas! Which gave "Little Mac" the perfect excuse to sit around and do nothing. Then in early March of 1862 when Johnson abandon his works at Manassas and everyone could "go and have a look", it became obvious that the numbers as well as the guns had been "quaker". Which didn't prevent McClellan from taking Pinkerton with him to the Penninsula..., where the numbers were soon growing again.

You've caught me out. I can't say for sure where I got that data from. I'd thought it was in Cullen's THE PENNINSULA CAMPAIGN, but I don't see it there. Might have been in a class or seminar (I studied Military History under Allen R Millett at Mizzou in the 60's before he left for Ohio State.) or in something I read in the 40 years since. Give me a week to root through books and notes and I can probably turn it up for you.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon.

Confederate strength estimates before Antietam:

Stanton 100,000
Ft. Monroe commander 75,000
" 30,000-50,000
New York Herald 150,000
Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD
" 250,000 in VA
Gen. Banks 150,000
Pinkerton 100,000
McClellan 100,000

Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bulleye.

Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. When was Jackson reinforced when? If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not.

Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: RERomine

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon.

Confederate strength estimates before Antietam:

Stanton 100,000
Ft. Monroe commander 75,000
" 30,000-50,000
New York Herald 150,000
Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD
" 250,000 in VA
Gen. Banks 150,000
Pinkerton 100,000
McClellan 100,000

Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bullseye. It wasn't exactly a "science", but professional military men could get reasonably close. The "Fortress Monroe Commander" is certainly pretty accurate. Lee had about 75,000 going into the fighting with Pope that ended at Second Manassas. But in Maryland he could muster only around 40,000 because of massive straggling and a certain reluctance among some of the troops to "invade" the North. Banks, of course, is one of the War's more complete idiots...., the New York Herald was trying to sell newspapers..., and the Governor of Pennsylvania obviously knew more about stuffing ballot boxes than estimating military strength. Everybody else just seems to like "round numbers".

Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. No arguement. But he wasn't much of a Field Commander either. Which is why Pope was eventually brought East to command the forces that had made such a mess facing Jackson in May. When was Jackson reinforced when? In early May, while McClellan was still putzing around at the base of the Penninsula. His entire command was brought south in early June and participated in the Seven Days Battles. If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not.

Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. How was it General Patton put it? "I favor a good plan executed violently RIGHT NOW over a perfect plan next week!" McClellan had a number of exellent plans, and did fine as long as he didn't have to execute them at all. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans. Depends on when you quote the figures. MacDowell had the largest Corps in the Army at the Campaign's start..., over 50,000 men. McClellan demanded and recieved Franklin's Division (12,000) very early on...., and later (after Seven Pines) recieved McCall's Division (12,000) as well.

[regularbird]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Don't worry about it I was just curious. If you stumble across I would like to know though.


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

I'm not suprised the Ranger at Antietam didn't mention it..., that's a later Campaign. The "numbers inflation" began in November of 1861 when McClellan insisted on sitting in Washington giving his 175,000+ troops additional training and parades even though he himself had described them as "largest, best-trained, and best-equipped Army in the world." After he had opened his mouth, the press and the politicians began wondering why he didn't take this wonderful military machine out to Manassas and beat the stuffing out of the 50,000 ragged Rebs known to be there. So he hired his old friend Alan Pinkerton as his new "Chief of Intelligence", and "lo and behold" there were soon 200,000 Rebels at Manassas! Which gave "Little Mac" the perfect excuse to sit around and do nothing. Then in early March of 1862 when Johnson abandon his works at Manassas and everyone could "go and have a look", it became obvious that the numbers as well as the guns had been "quaker". Which didn't prevent McClellan from taking Pinkerton with him to the Penninsula..., where the numbers were soon growing again.

You've caught me out. I can't say for sure where I got that data from. I'd thought it was in Cullen's THE PENNINSULA CAMPAIGN, but I don't see it there. Might have been in a class or seminar (I studied Military History under Allen R Millett at Mizzou in the 60's before he left for Ohio State.) or in something I read in the 40 years since. Give me a week to root through books and notes and I can probably turn it up for you.

[Mike Scholl]

"Don't worry about it I was just curious. If you stumble across I would like to know though."


I almost missed this in all the rest of the post. I'll try and see if I can hunt up the source. Sure hope it wasn't in my College Notes..., after a lifetime of moves they'll be a "bear" just to find. The books are at least on one of the shelves somewhere. The problem with a good memory is that you know you "know" something..., but your not always sure why you know it.

[keystone]

If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. Estimates were tabulated according to Regiment and Brigade strengths. An up to strength Regiment would have 10 companies of 100 men each. OOB would be in the papers all the time, it was not hard to come up with a number pretty easily. The regiments were not up to strength though. Union kept raising new Regiments and not filling the ranks of the old. The Confederacy would recruit into the same units and Pinkerton thought that they were keeping their units up to strength. The South just didn't have the manpower to do so. That's where he went wrong. Also unless you study the Civil War you will be shoulda, coulda, woulda all day long. McClellen was not a great Genl, he was not a bad Genl either. With the dearth of brain power in the North he rose pretty quickly because of prior experience, training and connections. His personality would not allow him to think outside the lines. One would call him today a concrete-sequential. He was not a thinker he was a do'er. He was always trying not to lose instead of trying to win. Also his plans on the future weighed on his plans in the present. If he lost a battle his future plans might be compromised. That's why during the Pen. campaign he was found on a gunboat scared #$%%less and not knowing what to do. His world was crumbling around him and he didn't have a clue what to do.

[Mike Scholl]

"If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. "


It certainly would be. And that's not what I said. I said his "first estimates" of Rebel Strength at Manassas WERE accurate and gave Johnson's strength around Manassas as approximately 50,000..., the same thing everyone else was estimating. And his "employer" wasn't happy. And when those "estimates" were revised upward, his employer's contentment with them rose as well. Pinkerton was selling a service, and the first rule of "sales" is "Keep the customer happy". He was also an old friend of McClellan's from "Little Mac's" RR days, and knew him well; so it wouldn't take him long to figure out what he had been "hired to provide". The "story" is in the "numbers".

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. "


It certainly would be. And that's not what I said. I said his "first estimates" of Rebel Strength at Manassas WERE accurate and gave Johnson's strength around Manassas as approximately 50,000..., the same thing everyone else was estimating. And his "employer" wasn't happy. And when those "estimates" were revised upward, his employer's contentment with them rose as well. Pinkerton was selling a service, and the first rule of "sales" is "Keep the customer happy". He was also an old friend of McClellan's from "Little Mac's" RR days, and knew him well; so it wouldn't take him long to figure out what he had been "hired to provide". The "story" is in the "numbers".

Finding any of his Civil War notes at all probably would be a find, unless someone else had them. Pinkerton lost most of his personal notes in a fire in 1871.

Mike, has nothing to do with the numbers, but just a general side note to history. Where did you get the information about Pinkerton. I know there is a book out that evaluates the estimates he provided. Can't remember what it was called, but it wasn't by Pinkerton. All the sources I find say Pinkerton inflated his numbers, something you say also, but you further point out that he did so because that was what McClellan expected. It makes logical sense, but I haven't found any source that confirms that. Is there any such source other than Pinkerton? Obviously, he had a business to run after the war and would want to protect his reputation.

[Mike Scholl]

"Mike, has nothing to do with the numbers, but just a general side note to history. Where did you get the information about Pinkerton. I know there is a book out that evaluates the estimates he provided. Can't remember what it was called, but it wasn't by Pinkerton. All the sources I find say Pinkerton inflated his numbers, something you say also, but you further point out that he did so because that was what McClellan expected. It makes logical sense, but I haven't found any source that confirms that. Is there any such source other than Pinkerton? Obviously, he had a business to run after the war and would want to protect his reputation.


I wish I could tell you. If I could remember where I picked up this information it would be a lot easier to find it for others. Frustraiting part is I can almost remember/visualize the wording..., but not where I was reading it.

[RERomine]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
I wish I could tell you. If I could remember where I picked up this information it would be a lot easier to find it for others. Frustraiting part is I can almost remember/visualize the wording..., but not where I was reading it.

Like I said, everything says Pinkerton inflated the numbers and stops there. What you've said makes sense about Pinkerton. All the more reason such estimates needed to be provided by the military because they are the ones who have to put their lives on the line. I've got a lot of books I read, but often have to consider the source as to whether or not it's valid. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War is interesting because it comes from participants of the war, but I always think each one has an agenda. They seemed to be rewriting history just 20 years after the war ended.