Dream Features

[CynicAl]

RE: the P-51 - Exactly. NA already had the preliminary design. And even with the near-miraculous 120 days from paper to prototype, how long did it take to get the things into front-line squadrons on the opposite side of the planet? By the time the crashed Zero was found, recovered, repaired, and evaluated, Grumman would have had little more than 120 days to go from paper to combat.

RE: Lessons learned - I never said Grumman didn't incorporate "lessons learned" from the Pacific. I believe my exact words were "tweak the design a little." I'm just saying that the often-repeated story that the F6F was a purpose-designed Zero Killer is pure myth. What the captured Zero did help with was in developing tactics, and in demonstrating that the new generation of US fighters could beat the Zero handily - a terrific morale booster for new US pilots going into combat.

[Ranger-75]

Think we can get the A-1 SkyRaider (Originally called the AD1 SkyRaider) into the mix, in place of a superflous aircraft? It was beilg built in late '44


That was a wild plane, 4 hours endurance over the target area, it was used up until the 1970. It woulld have been the ultimate killer of IJN ships.

[mdiehl]

I hope this will be the last thing I have to say about a/c technical specs for a while. My point, which I will repeat at the end of the post, is that mid/late war Allied a/c were much more dangerous, when properly used, than mid/late war Japanese a/c, when properly used. This post covers the top models produced by the US and Japan, including the mediocre Ki-84. No disrespect to GB who also had some outstanding entries, particularly the Tempest and Typhoon, and late model Spitfires.

The F6F was ordered in 1941. The first prototype was delivered 26 June 1942. Its design was indeed tweaked to combat the A6M, although when designed it was intended as a competitor for
both the A6M and the ME 109. Both the A6M and the ME109 were known in June 1941, by general flying characteristics (the A6M) and from captured/rebuilt a/c (ME109s.. recovered in Great Britain). With a top speed of 380 mph at 23000 feet, it was amply equipped to deal with those and, in addition, the Ki-61. Top speeds: A6M2:331 @ 15000; A6M5 (the fastest Zeke):351 @ 20,000. ME109E:348 @ 15000. ME109G (here the a/c become closely matched): 386 mph @ 23000 feet. Note I’ve rounded off the elevations. I’ve not talked about climb rates (where the A6M series and the ME109 series had the F6F beat) or dive rates (where the F6F smoked the Axis) or durability (where the F6F was better because the A6M series were flimsy and the ME109 had a water-cooled in-line engine). Now the Tony (Kawasaki Ki-61-1: 368 mph @ 16000.

Other fabulous Japanese wannabees:

Kawasaki Ki-100-1, arguably the best Japanese fighter of WW2. Initially designed with an unservicable engine (the Kawasaki HA140 V12 in-line), it was given a Ha112 radial that worked decently, giving the a/c 360 mph @ 20,000 feet. The “best fighter” addresses the addition of a good turbosupercharger in two protoypes in mid 1945, with deliveries scheduled for late 1945. A tcs would have upped the max airpseed to around 400 mph and increased its high-altitude performance (which was horrible, otherwise, 332 mph @ 33,000 feet). It was arguably the only plane that could reliably climb to the altitudes of very high B29s, had the latter chosen to stay there.

Mitsubishi J2M2/3: 363 mph@18,000. Initiated in 1938 as a high altitude interceptor, anticipating its need against B17s apparently. First prototype delivered 20 March 1942 because of production priorities given to the A6M series. The first engine was the 1430 hp Kasai 13, which was a bust. The second engine was a water-methanol boosted Kasai 23a radial, installed in late 1942, also a failed engine. By March 1943 only 11 aircraft had been delivered, of 141 airframes built, because of design and production problems involving high power engines. Later engines included the Kasai 23c and the Kasai 16a (a 3-stage supercharged radial used in the J2M5). Problems with the later radials virtually shut down production, with only 34 J2M5s delivered. Roughly 479 air frames built from start to finish.
Nakajima Ki-84-1a. 392 mph @ 20,000 feet. The other “best Japanese fighter” candidate, IMO. As usual, there were performance and design problems with the high power engine, in this case the direct injection (a very advanced concept) Ha-45 radial. I will let a typical author’s comments handle the rest (from Aircraft of WW2 ed by Stewart Wilson, Aerospace Publications, Fyshwick, Australia, 1998): “.. the Hayate sufferd from the use of poor-quality materials and progressively deteriorating quality control levels, accidents and underserviceabilities from these being quite common. The engine also required extensive and skilled maintenance, but this was often not available during the last year of the war.”

Now, a few Allied star performers, in brief:

P51-D: 437 @ 25,000. P51H, a stunning 487 mph @ 25,000, 463 @ 15000, giving this plane the best all-altitude speed of any piston engined fighter in the war. Vought-Sikorski F4U-1: 417 @ 20,000. F4U4: 446 @ 26,000. My nominee for best fighter (all combatants, all theaters) because it was more durable than the P51 and carried a much wider armament platform, including subvariants of the F4U-4 that carried 4x20mm and plenty of ammo for same. P38D: 389 @ 20,000 feet. P38H: 402 @ 25,000 feet. All variants of the P38 suffered a bit from low top speed at ltitudes less than 10,000 feet, which is why I in a previous post gave the Tony credit for being the equal of the P38D. The P38J solved this problem and was generally superior to all Japanese fighters. I will rescind my earlier comment about the Tony being the equal of the F6F. It wasn’t.

So that, in a nutshell, is that. The best Japanese a/c fall 20-90 mph short of the best Allied a/c, even on their best days. Of course, initial conditions of combat, climb rate and acceleration and maneuverability affect the outcome, so all military a/c were very dangerous when properly used. In general, acceleration and climb are a function of horsepower, weight, and propeller pitch. The late war Allied a/c generally had better acceleration and better climb at all altitudes than the Japanese a/c, and better maneuverability at high speeds. On the whole, however, late-war Allied a/c were far more dangerous, when properly used, than late-war Japanese a/c, when properly used.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"The Flying Tigers were made up mostly senor carreer military pilots. Some were even flight instructors."

Mmm. Not sure what you mean by "senior." Not high rank I'm guessing. Most USAAF squadrons were, in late 1941, heavily staffed with pilots with lots of experience. The AVG guys pretty much new how to fly boom and zoom without Chenault telling them the same. Chenault's constant harangue was more along the lines of telling pilots to keep their heads and work as teams. A chronic problem among all combatant powers.

"In the Philipines the USAFFE lost 49 out 104 P-40s on the ground that first raid. Most of the remaining 55 were lost in combat, becuase the pre-war trained US army pilots tried to turn and dogfight with the zero."

Most of the remainder were lost, not in combat, but rather operationally because the PI were at the end of a nonexistant logistical rope. A heavily damaged P40 in the PI became an immediate source of spare parts because no new supplies were forthcoming. Since battle damage is fairly common even among aircraft that aren't flamed out and crashed, it does not take long for a good unit to get used up. Many of the prewar trained pilots did not try to turn with the Zero. Some did. Japanese accounts recall the latter fondly. Along the way the Japanese lost a lot of good planes and pilots in the PI campaign.

"There inability to dogfight with the zero on equal terms fostered the belief that their P-40s were greatly inferior to the zero."

P40 pilots diverged in their opinion on the P40. Some reviled it. Some loved it. It gets to your point about "inability to dogfight on equal terms." For an A6M the superiority was at really low airspeeds... 90-250 mph or thereabouts. Above 250 and the Zero loses its acceleration and climb advantage. Above 300 and the P40 is rolling (and initiating a change in direction) faster. Above 325-350 and the Zeke loses its ability to turn, so the P40 is actually completing, for example, a 180 change of direction *faster* than a Zero. At 350 mph the Zero became a brick. At 375 or so the control surfaces began to shred. Meanwhile at 325 a P40 is feeling like a really great fighter plane.

"When in reality they were just useing them in the wrong way."

Some. My point being that some did not. This had more to do with maintaining one's concentration and alertness in the engagement, rather than training. Again, this is something that all the combatants had trouble with in pilots who were first experiencing live ammo combat.

"If the US army studied the results of the BOB then they would have learn the only way to defeat a 109 was to get into a turning fight with it because any spitfire or hurrican trying to dive and climb with a 109 would have been toast."

True for the Hurricrate. Not true for the Spitfire vis top speed. Diving was a separate problem. The ME109 could dive better because it had a fuel-injected engine. The Crates and Spits had to roll prior to diving because the early variants lacked fuel injection. It's very difficult to build up optimal dive speed when inverted. Fuel injection solved the problem for the Spit. The crate was still, well, a crate.

"Are you saying the US army and navy were training their pilots to defeat an enemy aircraft they had little if any idea existed?"

I'm saying several things:

1. In the Spanish Civil war, it became apparent that speed beats maneuverability. In the BOB, it became apparent that 2-plane elements in 4 plane sections were better than a 6 plane line abreast formation. The USAAF learned both, and the US (and UK and Germany and the French and even the poor Italians) all designed new models to achive speed. Maneuverability was a secondary consideration. The Japanese, for a combination of very good economic reasons and probably for some cultural ones as well, designed fighters to be cheap, fuel efficient and maneuverable. They were behind the 8-ball from the get go and never came close to catching up.

2. There *are* such things as optimal designs and good theory. One does not need to have fought a Zero (or any other plane) to know what the best qualities of a p40 (or any other plane) are. I think maybe here is where you and I are differing philosophically. You seem to think that a person only knows air combat well if he knows both his plane own plane and his opponent's. I do not agree.

3. Regarding the Zero *specifically.* Thach knew about the Zeke's maneuverability and was designing tactics to compensate for it in 1941. We seem to agree on that. He employed those tactics from the get go with two carrier groups. Chennault knew about the Zero long before the AVG/23rd PG saw combat. Other allied nations knew about the Zeke and were evaluating its general characteristics (they did not have an actual one to test, of course) and the implications for their units. Beyond that, both USAAF and P40 pilots had studied the energy vs. maneuver problem because they routinely held interservice simulations. The P40s were manifestly more maneuverable than the F4Fs and faster too. So there was fertile ground for working out the problem without any need for direct knowledge of the Zekes

"It sounds like you are saying that US pilots were completely prepared and trained to fight the zero, knew exactly how best use their aircraft to take advantage of the enemies weaknesses, from the get go."

No. What I'm saying is that failing to fly a P40 to its strengths more or less means that the plane is being flown at speeds that are friendly to the Zero. Not because you know that's what the Zero likes but rather because the best performance from the P40 comes in the higher energy ranges, and combat of any kind bleeds energy. The tendency for air combat with piston egined a/c is to slow aircraft down. A USAAF pilot who loses situational awareness and lets the natural tendency of combat maneuvers take him below 250 mph will find himself in trouble when a Zeke is in position to take advantage. ** He's also vulnerable to any other plane that has much more energy, regardless of the plane's mfr. ** On the other hand, a pilot who sees his airspeed indicator sitting at 220 mph puts the nose down and opens the throttle will likely escape a Zeke if he has the time.

You make it sound like my argument is that folks knew all about the Zeke. That's not it. Folks did know all about the P40. The experience gained by the early P40 squadrons heavily reinforced the need for situational awareness and to fly the P40 to its strengths. I wonder how many Zekes were shot down trying to turn with a P40 at 325 mph? Probably there was a situational awareness learning curve *there* as well. This had nothing to do with training or tactics. It had to do, statistically, with the fact that in every aerial engagement, regardless of teh fact that you train pilots like mad to avoid losing siutaional awareness, some are going to do it anyhow. They're the ones that go first and fastest, and make up the examples in the basic tactics manuals.

"You mentioned PH. How many of those planes shot down in airiel combat fighters?"

Don't know offhand. Does it matter? I find it important that Zekes were present and heavily outnumbered the USAAF in the air. The P40s got their licks in without losing a pilot. IIRC one plane was forced to land from battle damage. To me that shows that the Zeke was inadequate to the basic reason why they were thrown into the fight at all. Whatever advantages the Zekes allegedly had by plane or by training, the P40s performed better that day.

Mdeihl,

Uhhggg!!!.................Enough with the performance stats already, no one is debating them, so please; I beg you stop reciteing the "Encyclopidia of WWII Fighter Aircaft".

The debat was the significance of combat expirence and the resulting learning curve gleened from it early in the war.

You really have been quite hypocritical on this point. On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training.

Wasnt it the Luftwaffes combat expirence in Spain that led to the adoption of the 4 plane rotte formation?

Wasnt it the RAF combat expirence in France 40 that led to droping the 3 plane Vic formation?

Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?

You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts.

You say pilots knew how to use their P-40s against zeros in the PI and that it was "situational awarness" that was blame.
Where are your sources for such a claim?I have read several sources on the subject;
Including:

"The Bataan Airforce"
"Samurai"
"The Fall of the Philipines"
"Philipine War Diary"

That categorically state otherwise.

You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique. In all my readings; Chenault is giving credit for this. Even "Pappy" Boyington; who was no fan of Chenault, credits Chenault for training the AVG in these tactics. Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?

You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" ie; the performance capabilities of your opponent. The US pilots initially did not know the zero's; max speed, its climb rate, its dive rate, its turn rate. Cosequently the US P-40 pilots comming up against the zero for the first time didnt know they could always out dive them, but couldnt out climb them. They didnt know they couldnt turn with them, but could out run them. This is where first hand combat expirence comes in or at least information learned from other's experience comes in.

Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality.

Finally RE: PH attack, its important to know how many air cobat losses were zekes, because Kates and Vals are cosiderably easier targets. The fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time.

[Ranger-75]

mehiel,

My vote goes to the P-51 Mustang, because it could do all its great stuff with a range of over 1,000 miles longer than the F4U. The F4U was a great plane though, despite the initial difficulties in getting it into full production.

[mdiehl]

Timjot -

The a/c stats are necessary because other posters have suggested that the Japanese fielded a/c that were comparable or better in performance than allied a/c. Those stats were not directed at you in particular, as I am sure you are somewhat aware of them. I'll post a/c performance stats whenever someone makes a claim that I can verify is false. I'm sure it is commonly the case that such folks are working from memory, or from one source. I typically use 4 a/c sources as general references, the one I cited above being the most portable.

As to the rest of your post.

"You really have been quite hypocritical on this point."

Let's not get "personal," shall we.

"On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training."

I think we have a failure to communicate. "Experience" in the broadest sense has consistently driven the design *goals* of aircraft designers. Experience has shown repeatedly that, all other things being equal, speed wins. Increasing aircraft speed was the principle design goal of designers in WW1, and again starting in the mid 1930s. It was the design goal of the major post WW2 superpowers, and it remains a desirable advantage today, although there are some problematic structural limitations to the maximum sustainable airspeed for a/c currently in production. The advent of the a-a missile also has changed combat towards a more balanced equation of speed and maneuverability, IMO, because a-a missiles are generally faster than the targets at which they get launched.

Over the years, even in the 1930s, some a/c tactics were consistently worked on to give pilots with speedy a/c the advantage. So, when I say "boom and zoom" was a premium starting in the late 1930s, I'm saying that pilots knew (and were trained to know) where the main strengths of their a/c lay. These points were debated beginning about the time of teh Spanish Civil War, when it became apparent that high speed interceptors were catching up to the speeds of mulit-engined bombers. Some other tactical considerations were worked out in combat, and fairly quickly I might add, for example the change from the 3-plane Vic resulting from the BOB that you and I agree occurred.

USAAF guys studied the BOB with the advise and consent of the UK. That's why the USAAF and USN were flying 4-plane two element sections prior to US entry. Other tactics that specifically gave the F4F a distinct advantage over the A6M, specifically the weave that came to be called the "Thach Weave" were developed situationally. But weaves in general and weaves in support of wingmen were generally known from WW1. (*A note on the Thach Weave. First really implemented in a widespread fashion at Santa Cruz, the F4Fs ate veteran A6M pilots for lunch. Prior to that tactic, the F4F+pilot was the Zeke's equal. Afterwards, Japanese attrition rates soared, and the F4F+pilot became a better instrument of aerial warfare than the A6M+pilot).

"Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?"

No it was not. The AVG did not see combat until 1942. Chennault and other army instructors were talking about mutually supporting wingmen and boom and zoom tactics in 1941, long before the first engagement between any Allied and Japanese pilot happened.

"You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts. "

See: Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud that includes brief discussions of the relative merits of the early war a/c, and also includes "personal accounts" of P40 drivers that support almost everything I've said in this forum. See also Frank's Guadalcanal, and look at a/c losses. I posted an analysis of the losses a long long time ago in the GGPW forum and it has probably been archived. At Guadalcanal, USMC/USN pilots achieved the following: 1.6:1 Japanese losses to US losses, all a/c, all types, all missions. 1.2:1 American losses to Japanese losses including only fighters (reasonably, since bombers were apt to be shot down in surface attack). 1.1:1 Japanese losses to American losses when only F4Fs are counted (because there are *no* accounts of a P39 shooting down a Zeke over the canal in 1942 and because P39s were used primarily in ground support mode and because I would never argue that the P39+pilot combination was a better *fighter* than the A6M+pilot. It's a technical specs thing.)

"You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique."

Mmm. You seem to be saying that a person does not train to fly their a/c to its strengths until after they've seen some of their friends shot down in combat as a result of not flying their a/c to their strengths. Until they've been in combat, they tend to fly their a/c according to what rules, then? Either I'm not following your argument (probably), or your argument is, uh, reducible to the statement that 'pilots train to fly their a/c to maximize their opponent's abilities.' This can't be what you mean.

"Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?"

The circumstances and odds were not remotely comparable. The vast majority of AVG fighter opponents were Oscars, and planes that were even less airworthy, and the vast majority of AVG kills were bombers, who were on many occasions unescorted. The PI pilots in late '41 and early '42 had no logistical support, very little early warning, and faced an opponent that had more airbases and more aircraft in easy range of their airfield than they had. As to the NEI groups, I'm still waiting for your OOB listing the P40 a/c groups stationed tehre, and a detailed breakdown of their losses. Like I said, Sakai's recollection on the matter is pretty worthless to me with respect to allied losses.

"You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" "

It comes down to this. From a P40 driver's perspective in 1941, the best tactic is to keep the airspeed up. Period. Whether your opponent is an ME109, an A6M2, an F4F in interservice wargames, a Hurricane, a P36, or a rumoured aircraft with high maneuverability and low speed, the answer is the same. Speed and safety and the ability to control an air combat go hand in hand. Less speed means less safety and less ability to control the combat. Period.

Since air to air combat bleeds energy, it is easy for a fellow in the heat of battle to lose situational awareness. One aspect of the latter is airspeed. If a P40 pilot, or any other pilot of a speed-maximized plane (like the ME109, or even a lowly Crate) lets his airspeed drop, he cedes control of the battle to any opponent who has not let his airspeed drop. It tended to happen to all combatants in all theaters that new pilots were more likely to lose airspeed in this way and to neglect it, often, to unfortunate ends. Vis the A6M *specifically* this was very bad, because losing airspeed played to the A6Ms strengths to a greater degree than say, losing airspeed in combat with a slowly turning ME109.

The point in all cases remains the same. Against any opponent it is always better to have a speed advantage if you can get it. US pilots did not need to be trained specifically to fight the Zero and they did not have to have fought Zeros to know what the right thing to do with a P40 was. The Zeros simply made the same lessons that were instilled in training "more real" if you will.

The Zeke guys had the same relatinoship between doctrine and combat experience. Their plane was *not* a speed demon. They were trained to fly to its strengths, principally low-speed maneuverability. The Zeke pilots learned that it was unwise to try to turn with a fast moving P40, or a diving F4F, and that in a face-to-face head on approach run, the enemy planes were better. Unfortunately for the Japanese, knowing not to try to keep pace with a P40 does not solve the immediate problem of winning (or even escaping) an air to air combat. If you let the P40 outrun you, the P40 can return at will in circumstances that favor the P40. It happened all the time. (See, again, Fire in the Sky for some of those pilot accounts). The faster plane controls the fight. Period.

"Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality."

Japanese pilot quality dropped because Japan could not train pilots fast enough. Even if it could have done so, it could not build capable a/c fast enough. That the Japanese failed to rotate their veterans contributed to the decline, both by failing to move front line "wisdom" to rear areas, as you suggest, and because all pilots needed to be rotated or their flying skills deteriorated.

"he fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time."

IIRC. Welsh was credited with 1 Zeke and two bombers confirmed at PH. You can do your own web poking (I don't mean that negatively) to verify. The P40s fought with Zekes and around Zekes at PH. It's hard to see how much more detail you want, or how much effort is really justified in dismissing results because circumstances were momentarily exceptional. In most a/a combat, circumstances are momentarily exceptional.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Hm, now we knew it.... the american planes were superior, followed by the brits.

The trainig of the american pilots was superior too (even in 1940-41) and normaly a amercan shot down 3 enemy planes in only one mission.

Wait


wait

something sounds strange for me....

If this is so, why had the axis the successfuller pilots (by great numbers) with the inferior planes ?

Okay, lets look a little bit deeper....

Hartman, 361 kills ...mostly russians, but in one mission, (his last combat mission) he killed out of 25 2 or 3 Mustangs and escaped easily... in a ME109G-14, a inferior plane... why ? because in that time you will find no other pilot with his combat experience and combat knowledge.... and you can train your p51 pilot as long as you want, the experience in combat rules.... sure the new german pilots (for that), nearly loosing their planes by flying straight on, are a different thing.

But without a war , the americans allways would be inferior against the military harded japs....

Lets talk about american aces.... (well, i think below 50 kills it is baby ace, but that is maybe a different opinion) wich planes flew they and in witch time (after starting their war career) they had their kills...?

So i think, forget the reviosinistic phrases, and be honest. The american airforces had not the quality of the japs, but they worked hard, had later the much better planes and a good advantage in numbers, like 10:1 or better....

But you are right in one point.... even Hartmann could have been killed by the pilot of a Mig 1 or a Rata, with a pilot with 10 hours knowledge, because of the factor LUCK..... think about it...


And if you think Hartmann dosen´t count (well it is unfair), we take the Star of Africa, Marsillies, he had only brits.

Or we take one other of the more then 500 germans, wich had better war records then your best aces..... but they were so inferior

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Timjot -

The a/c stats are necessary because other posters have suggested that the Japanese fielded a/c that were comparable or better in performance than allied a/c. Those stats were not directed at you in particular, as I am sure you are somewhat aware of them. I'll post a/c performance stats whenever someone makes a claim that I can verify is false. I'm sure it is commonly the case that such folks are working from memory, or from one source. I typically use 4 a/c sources as general references, the one I cited above being the most portable.

As to the rest of your post.

"You really have been quite hypocritical on this point."

Let's not get "personal," shall we.

"On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training."

I think we have a failure to communicate. "Experience" in the broadest sense has consistently driven the design *goals* of aircraft designers. Experience has shown repeatedly that, all other things being equal, speed wins. Increasing aircraft speed was the principle design goal of designers in WW1, and again starting in the mid 1930s. It was the design goal of the major post WW2 superpowers, and it remains a desirable advantage today, although there are some problematic structural limitations to the maximum sustainable airspeed for a/c currently in production. The advent of the a-a missile also has changed combat towards a more balanced equation of speed and maneuverability, IMO, because a-a missiles are generally faster than the targets at which they get launched.

Over the years, even in the 1930s, some a/c tactics were consistently worked on to give pilots with speedy a/c the advantage. So, when I say "boom and zoom" was a premium starting in the late 1930s, I'm saying that pilots knew (and were trained to know) where the main strengths of their a/c lay. These points were debated beginning about the time of teh Spanish Civil War, when it became apparent that high speed interceptors were catching up to the speeds of mulit-engined bombers. Some other tactical considerations were worked out in combat, and fairly quickly I might add, for example the change from the 3-plane Vic resulting from the BOB that you and I agree occurred.

USAAF guys studied the BOB with the advise and consent of the UK. That's why the USAAF and USN were flying 4-plane two element sections prior to US entry. Other tactics that specifically gave the F4F a distinct advantage over the A6M, specifically the weave that came to be called the "Thach Weave" were developed situationally. But weaves in general and weaves in support of wingmen were generally known from WW1. (*A note on the Thach Weave. First really implemented in a widespread fashion at Santa Cruz, the F4Fs ate veteran A6M pilots for lunch. Prior to that tactic, the F4F+pilot was the Zeke's equal. Afterwards, Japanese attrition rates soared, and the F4F+pilot became a better instrument of aerial warfare than the A6M+pilot).

"Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?"

No it was not. The AVG did not see combat until 1942. Chennault and other army instructors were talking about mutually supporting wingmen and boom and zoom tactics in 1941, long before the first engagement between any Allied and Japanese pilot happened.

"You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts. "

See: Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud that includes brief discussions of the relative merits of the early war a/c, and also includes "personal accounts" of P40 drivers that support almost everything I've said in this forum. See also Frank's Guadalcanal, and look at a/c losses. I posted an analysis of the losses a long long time ago in the GGPW forum and it has probably been archived. At Guadalcanal, USMC/USN pilots achieved the following: 1.6:1 Japanese losses to US losses, all a/c, all types, all missions. 1.2:1 American losses to Japanese losses including only fighters (reasonably, since bombers were apt to be shot down in surface attack). 1.1:1 Japanese losses to American losses when only F4Fs are counted (because there are *no* accounts of a P39 shooting down a Zeke over the canal in 1942 and because P39s were used primarily in ground support mode and because I would never argue that the P39+pilot combination was a better *fighter* than the A6M+pilot. It's a technical specs thing.)

"You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique."

Mmm. You seem to be saying that a person does not train to fly their a/c to its strengths until after they've seen some of their friends shot down in combat as a result of not flying their a/c to their strengths. Until they've been in combat, they tend to fly their a/c according to what rules, then? Either I'm not following your argument (probably), or your argument is, uh, reducible to the statement that 'pilots train to fly their a/c to maximize their opponent's abilities.' This can't be what you mean.

"Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?"

The circumstances and odds were not remotely comparable. The vast majority of AVG fighter opponents were Oscars, and planes that were even less airworthy, and the vast majority of AVG kills were bombers, who were on many occasions unescorted. The PI pilots in late '41 and early '42 had no logistical support, very little early warning, and faced an opponent that had more airbases and more aircraft in easy range of their airfield than they had. As to the NEI groups, I'm still waiting for your OOB listing the P40 a/c groups stationed tehre, and a detailed breakdown of their losses. Like I said, Sakai's recollection on the matter is pretty worthless to me with respect to allied losses.

"You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" "

It comes down to this. From a P40 driver's perspective in 1941, the best tactic is to keep the airspeed up. Period. Whether your opponent is an ME109, an A6M2, an F4F in interservice wargames, a Hurricane, a P36, or a rumoured aircraft with high maneuverability and low speed, the answer is the same. Speed and safety and the ability to control an air combat go hand in hand. Less speed means less safety and less ability to control the combat. Period.

Since air to air combat bleeds energy, it is easy for a fellow in the heat of battle to lose situational awareness. One aspect of the latter is airspeed. If a P40 pilot, or any other pilot of a speed-maximized plane (like the ME109, or even a lowly Crate) lets his airspeed drop, he cedes control of the battle to any opponent who has not let his airspeed drop. It tended to happen to all combatants in all theaters that new pilots were more likely to lose airspeed in this way and to neglect it, often, to unfortunate ends. Vis the A6M *specifically* this was very bad, because losing airspeed played to the A6Ms strengths to a greater degree than say, losing airspeed in combat with a slowly turning ME109.

The point in all cases remains the same. Against any opponent it is always better to have a speed advantage if you can get it. US pilots did not need to be trained specifically to fight the Zero and they did not have to have fought Zeros to know what the right thing to do with a P40 was. The Zeros simply made the same lessons that were instilled in training "more real" if you will.

The Zeke guys had the same relatinoship between doctrine and combat experience. Their plane was *not* a speed demon. They were trained to fly to its strengths, principally low-speed maneuverability. The Zeke pilots learned that it was unwise to try to turn with a fast moving P40, or a diving F4F, and that in a face-to-face head on approach run, the enemy planes were better. Unfortunately for the Japanese, knowing not to try to keep pace with a P40 does not solve the immediate problem of winning (or even escaping) an air to air combat. If you let the P40 outrun you, the P40 can return at will in circumstances that favor the P40. It happened all the time. (See, again, Fire in the Sky for some of those pilot accounts). The faster plane controls the fight. Period.

"Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality."

Japanese pilot quality dropped because Japan could not train pilots fast enough. Even if it could have done so, it could not build capable a/c fast enough. That the Japanese failed to rotate their veterans contributed to the decline, both by failing to move front line "wisdom" to rear areas, as you suggest, and because all pilots needed to be rotated or their flying skills deteriorated.

"he fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time."

IIRC. Welsh was credited with 1 Zeke and two bombers confirmed at PH. You can do your own web poking (I don't mean that negatively) to verify. The P40s fought with Zekes and around Zekes at PH. It's hard to see how much more detail you want, or how much effort is really justified in dismissing results because circumstances were momentarily exceptional. In most a/a combat, circumstances are momentarily exceptional.

Hi Mdiehl

Sorry about the "hypocrite" remark. Nothing personal intended. Maybe "contridictory" would be a better word.

On the one hand you state that

A)The Germans gained invaluable combat experience in Spain, which helped them to develope superior tactical doctorine.

B)The British learned from their expiernces in France 40 and early BOB, that their tactical doctorine was flawed.

C)The US learned from studying both the Luftwaffe and RAF in the BOB.

All of which I agree with, but on the other hand you
Totally discount the value of combat expirence in the pacifiic theater. In regards to developing effective tactics and pilot efficiency.

Now down to business....

Mdeihl says: "All things being equal speed wins" ;

True but all things were not equal in 41 and would not be equal in 43 either if there is no war in 42. The Japanese army and navy rotated their pilots into the china theater to get combat expirence. So most of their pilots had at least some compat expirence in 41/42. Not to mention the combat expirence they would gain from their attack south in 42.


Mdeihl says: Hmm...you seem to saying that a pilot doesnt fly his a/c to its strengths until he flies in combat.......ect :

No Im saying that strengths are all relative to what your opponents strengths are. A p-40s strength against a zero wouldnt neccessarily be a strength against a 109. The US pilots didnt know what there strengths were relative to the zero initially. They had been told that their a/c were superior to anything the Japs had.

Mdeihl: "No it was not, the AVG didnt see combat until 1942"

Yes, Mdiehl, but Chenault had been in China as an intructor and observer for the Chinese Nationist AF, since 1937. He was responsible for the first combat reports on the zero and oscars and proceeded in developing combat tactics to fight them.

Qutoe: "Flying Tigers"pg76; "Chenault instructed us to forget what we had learned from the US services. He told us not to engaged the enemy unless you have altitude avangtage. Never try to turn with the Jap fighters or climb from it. Use your superior dive speed to make a pass then climb away to regain altitude and to make another pass. Most impotantly keep your air speed up at all times"

Mheihl says: "The circumstances were not even remotely similar"

Actually they were pretty similar. The AVG at least initially had little if any logistical support, Their only warning system were a bunch of chinese peasants looking in the sky. Where as the USAFFE had radar in the PI. They faced an oponent with more airbases and aircraft, in easy striking distance to there airfields; just like in the PI. True they faced mainly Oscars, but the truth is so did USAFFE in PI. The only Zeros were with the IJN 11th Air Flottila, which was withdrawn in January.

RE: allied OOB in Java; I posted it earlier, you must of missed it. Basically 48 RAF Hurricans Flown of HMS Indomitable. The US flew 4 flights of P-40s via Darwin,Timor,Bali,Java air route. The first flight of 13 made it without incident. The following 3 flights all suffered losses in transit. The numbers are a bit scetchy, but at the most an estimated 25-30 US P-40s were operational in Java at one point. Plus 3 squadrons of Dutch Buffalos, 12 Dutch Curtiss 75s(P-36s) and a small number of Dutch P-40s and Hurricans.

Mdiehl: "Read Fire in the Sky"

I did. First "Fire in the sky" covers the NG-Solomons campaign, roughtly July 42 and on, 8 months after the start of the war. But if you insist.
Quote: "Fire in the Sky" Pg.167; pp;US pilots PI tried to dogfight with the Zero with tragic results

Quote "Fire in the Sky"pp;cp5; "By July,allied pilots had pretty much thrown away the book on tactical doctorine and had developed tactics to deal with the circumstances that faced them".

Quote:"Fire in the Sky" The zero in capable hands remaind dangerous...... (example)pp. "The RAF sent a Spitfire wing to Australia,These were BOB vets and didnt want to listen to the advice of there American and Australain counter parts. Unfortuanely they tried to use the tactics that were effective for them in the BOB; they suffered heavy losses. Gradually they learned how best to fight the zero and the losses declined."

What ya know; Your own source kinda refutes your assertion that the US learned the tactics neccessary to combat the zero by studying the BOB.

Mdiehl: "See Also Franks Guadacanal losses"

Guadacanal was fully 10 months after the start of hostilities, Maybe thats where we differ. When I say early in the war I mean roughly the first 6 months of initial combat. During and after of which, it stands to reason that allied pilots through experence would have figured out how best to combat their enemy.

Mdiehl: "Welsh was credited with 1 zeke and 2 bombers."

One zeke hardly constitutes proof that the US knew how to combat the zero on equal terms. It just proves there are always aberations in the realm of combat.

Mdiehl: I respect your body of knowledge on this subject, particularly on the combat performance of WWII aircraft. However I dont really understand how you can continue to argue the insignificance of combat experence; when even your own sources and statements suggest otherwise.

[byron13]

Pardon the interruption, gentlemen. Good debate, though all of you are wrong.

This admittedly has no relevance to the discussion here, but many of you are well-read. There is a book that was published that focused on American armored operations in Western Europe during World War II and in particular on the Hedgerow campaign. It basically talked about how inferior the Sherman was, how the tankers were told they had the best tank in the world, and how we got our butts handed to us. I think the title was something like "Steel Coffins" or "Burning Coffins." I can't find it on Amazon. Anyone have a good title?

What reminded me of this book was the statements about U.S. pilots knowing that the P-40 had a speed advantage over the Zero and were trained to use it. I cannot debate the subject with those more knowledgeable here, but I am suspicious of that statement. I know for a fact that U.S. pilots in 1941 believed they were better than Japanese pilots - including those of the IJN. I would bet that they believed their aircraft were superior. Every account I can remember reading of the early war was the "shock" pilots had when they realized how maneuverable the Zero was. My unsubstantiated guess would be that U.S. pilots were trained in classic knife fight style dogfighting and felt they could win in a turning fight with whatever the Japanese had. This would have been the result of poor intelligence, ego, and a feeling of racial/national superiority. You have to remember that, back in the day, all nations were much more naive and ignorant. We honestly believed that Japanese couldn't see well because of their slanted eyes. And none of the European air forces to that time had used boom 'n zoom tactics; rather, air combat picked up where WWI left off: with classical maneuver. So why would the naive Americans train or believe differently? So I don't find it hard to believe that our guys were itching to turn with the Japanese and were not trained to boom 'n zoom. The tallies from the early months of the war would seem to bear that out. And, similarly, our tankers (god bless all tankers!) were itching to go nose to nose with Mark IV's and V's as late as Normandy despite the experiences of North Africa and Italy. The aggressiveness and cockiness that every soldier and pilot needs has an inertia of its own that is often fatal until tempered by experience.

Let's face it: fighter pilots are not trained to make a high speed run on a formation, shoot down one plane, and exit the fight. They are trained, perhaps because it is more difficult to master and therefore training in this is more critical, to maneuver with the enemy. If nothing else, fighter pilot ego alone almost dictates that each pilot believes he can outfly the opponent. Even in the 1960's when we were supposedly so much smarter and knew that our Crusaders and Phantoms could not turn with Vietnamese Migs, our guys were still trying. Surely there is not better place for boom 'n zoom than in Vietnam where you had better long range weapons and much faster but much less maneuverable aircraft, but we still tried to turn. The results were 1) high loss rates and 2) the topgun school.

With that, I depart to watch the scrap from a distance. Long live the Philippine Empire!

[Raverdave]

I think that it was Chuck Yeager who said something along the lines of " Its not the plane that counts but the pliot in it" or words to that effect. Just my 2 cents worth.

[RevRick]

But another question. The sherman was ****, the t26 could have produced much faster (well even the t26 was in a balanced fight no match against a panther or tiger, but the germans had quite a lot mark IV and a better tank is a better tank) but the industry/generals/politicans let die the poor
soldiers for their arrogance... On the one side (looking as a german) this was good, but on the other side, why the hell did the us gov. do that ???

I remember reading many years ago, and do not recall which source it was, that the real reason that so many Shermans were employed, even when the brass knew it was inferior to the best German tanks (and barely a match for the Mk IV's) was because of the lack of shipping capacity to ship the heavier tanks over to the ETO. In late 43 and early 44, there was a push for, I believe, the M26, to be sent to Britain for ops in Northern Europe, but it would have overtaxed the shipping of other materials necessary. In this case, it looks like the failure to prepare for adequate convoy escorts led to the use on inferior equipment on the battlefield.. the fewer ships sunk in the early stages of the war - the greater the shipping capacity for transAtlantic buildup - the better the possibility for heavier USA tanks to be employed. And they were in design or production. Saw that book on armor designs some twelve-fifteen years ago.

[Ranger-75]

Shipping was a factor in the standardization of US tanks on the M4 design, but it wasn't the only reason. After all, when the US decided to ship M26's over to Europe they got there didn't they?

There were 2 more insidious reasons.
1: the US doctrine called to tanks NOT to fight other tenks, hence since (by doctrine) US tanks would NEVER meet up with enemy tanks, they didn't neeed the high power guns and thick armor. Tank Destroyers were supposed to hunt and engage enemy tanks, but even here, the US dallied over putting a 90mm gun in a TD until late 1944. This was after reports from the field came in screaming for a better armament on both tanks & TDs.

2: The Army Ground forces (AGF) insisted through late 1944 that no successor to the M4 was needed, even though the US Ordance board highly recommended the new T26E3 (the M26). It only after the field commands in europe went screaming again for better tanks (during the Ardennes fighting), that Esienhower overruled the AGF and all available M26s were immediately shipped to the ETO. If Ordance had received the go ahead, more M26s would have been ready earlier. As it was 705 M26's were built by the end of the war (less than half got to the ETO).

The Army really screwed itself with this one.

I think the book is death traps or something. Get off your computer screen and look in Barnes & Noble or Borders stores. They carry it. I didn't buy it last time, I already have almost a dozen books on allied & german tanks of WWII, including the very detailed "British and American Tanks of WWII" by Peter Chamberlain. Arco Publishing, NY. I got that used, so good lick finding it.

[RevRick]

Admittedly my area of expertise is not in armor - at least unless it's at sea - in which case I know a little more. But didn't the USA have a critter that was absolutely huge - about the armor of a Pzkw VI and a 90 mm main gun and 50 tons or so weight? I also recall something that seemd to have double tracks. Is my old enfeebled mind playing tricks on me - or did I really see a picture of that thing? The fact to me is that we had the capability to produce better tanks, but not the wisdom or foresight to go ahead and do so - or, possibly more unhappily - not the congressional support. Or is this another case like the Battleship vs. Carrier Admirals in the USN - a case of turf protection mixed in with congressional dithering?

[byron13]

Yup, you're talking about the Pershing. No double tracks, though. Just a heavy tank. A handfull made it to Europe in the spring of '45 in time to see service.

I placed another post on this thread, but it seems to have gone away. There's a book that I'm trying to find on American armor operations in Europe with an emphasis on Normandy. I understand its view is, like you all have said, that the tanker got screwed by having inferior equipment and being lied to. I guess it's a detailed account of guys riding into battle on their fifth tank after hosing out the remains of the previous crew.

I think the book is something like "Steel Coffins" or "Burning Coffins" or something like that. I'd really like to buy the book, but can't find it on Amazon. Anyone know the name of the book?

[Kikka]

Gee, the maps look great on the screen shots, but I hope the icons are better than the UV proto-types. With today's advanced graphics it really ought to be possible to have stunning representations of the aircraft and ships a la WIF or other type games.
-Kikka

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Well, the Tanks.... sorry guys, but even the pershing wasn´t a "good" tank, like the americans had never a good tank until the M1A Abrahams... i don´t think the american industry couldn´t build good tanks, but the combination of politics, arrogance, nationalism and industrial cheating (i speak about corruption of the military lobby) had the result of only bad, worse or even shitty tanks, compared with the tanks of other nations (until M1A)

The sherman, hm, the good thing was his easy maintanence, but as a tanker, this isn´t a important point to suvive. Even the standard Mark IV was under fair circumstances to dangerous, because of the excellent optics and gun. Against a t34-85, oh oh, what would be very bad...

The pershing, hm, if i remember correct, a "better" tank, but no match for a panther, tiger or (after war) Stalintank.

The tank destroyers, well, with the huge superiority this works - and i agree, with this, the tank destroyers are dangerous, but against strong defence lines and only weak air support to soften up the infantry lines, the american versions of tank destroyers, are dead meat. With no protection even a 20mm cannon could kill such "cars".

So, we have the dillema, that the main battle tanks, the shermans, were ****, even with the 76mm cannon, compared with the panther or t34-85. Against the tank destroyers of the germans or russians, the same. Dead meat. The pershing is much better, but for real combat scenarios (tank battles) not better than a sherman - no match against a panther or t34-85. Sure, it was a different strategy behind it, but i look for the quality of numbers. I mean, as a german i must be happy for the stupid decisions of the politics, 5 shermans advancing against one panther (no airforde to support),result: 5 killed shermans. BUT i think about the people, dying in that tanks... that is sad.

It is history, but the story is very actual. The politicans and the industry kill people to save money.

Now (my personal) ranking of nations in ww2 (by tanks)

1. Germany: They had the panthers, jagdpanther, and for super heavy battles, the tigers (both). Also, they had the best tank tactics and the best crews (untill very late)
2. Russia: Best mass produced tank, the t34, esp. the 85er was very great. Also, they understood that even a bad crew can kill a superior tank if it is one of 50 against 5. The heavy stalins, well, they were a combination of panther and tiger, but as a tank not very great (to slow fire rate, poor visibility, bad hit change because of a terrible optics), but the super heavy tank killers were perfect mobile mortars and for breaktrough actions.
3. The americans: A average tank (sherman) was produced so often, that it wasn´t important that it had in a single battle no chance... the tactic of tank battles was very bad, but it dosen´t matter cause of air superiority and a very weaken enemy.
The Chaffee, that was a good light tank, a finger tip for the future, but to late. The tank killers were quite succesfull cause of the way of battles, but the loss rate was allways bad. No good idea to be sitting in a sherman...
4. the brits: well, they tried, but didn´t succeeded. If i remember correct, they never build a tank that was worth the money, but like the americans, cause of the situation it wasn´t really dangerous
5. the rest: err, only old rusty metal...

Maybe someone has a different opionion ?

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Actually the British, Australians and Canadians built some very good and versitile tanks.

Matilda II, The only problem about this tank was duration of construction time, plus the inability to upgrade the turret. It was still used in the Front line even as late as 1945 (With Australian use in New Guinea and Borneo), since no other tank had such heavy armour. The Japanese could not knock the thing out!

Churchill series. This was a very good tank, since it could be upgraded when new weapons were being introduced, it was heavy and reliable. A great Infantry support tank.

Cromwell series. The Cruiser tank series suffered from being rushed. The Crusader series suffered from an unreliable engine because it was rushed, but it was gradually tamed by their mechanics. The Cromwell was the equal to the Sherman (Armour, Speed, Weapon), except that it benefitted from a low profile and was not quite as prone to exploding.

The Australians created the Sentinal, which, if allowed to be finished (except for the realization it would be cheaper just to buy Shermans) would have been a battle tank, with heavier armour then the Sherman, armed with a 17pdr. The Canadian RAM tank was also an upgrade of the Sherman, but since the tank it was designed to replace inundated the market, it was changed into the first, and very sucessful APC.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Actually, the early war tanks of the French and Belgians were very advanced for their time, lacking only radio and large turrets.

If they survived into 1944, it would have been interesting to see what they would have developed, especially since their equipment was superior to anything else in the world at the time.


Also, you did forget about the Russians!

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Err, sorry, i set them on place two... so i didn´t forgot them.

[mdiehl]

"However I dont really understand how you can continue to argue the insignificance of combat experence; when even your own sources and statements suggest otherwise."

TIMJOT

Pardon my delay. I've been away.

I see that we are talking past each other. If that is what you *think* was my main point, then I have not made my main point well. Please bear in mind that the practical applicatioon here is how a person simulates WW2 results using a computer game which is why I've spent so much time talking about it here.

We have a model, GGPW, in which combat results are simulated based on "experience" and "dogfight." It is hoped that the GGPW model will not be used in WitP because that GGPW model produces very skewed results in which, for example, an A6M pilot exp 90 routinely trounces a P40 pilot exp 70. Exp gain is very slow in GGPW, so the "combat learning" effect does not produce rapid, uh, "paradigm shifts" in the way that combat routinely did. Moreover, I'm not sure what "EXP" in that game is supposed to be. It certainly does not account for flawed tactics (use of 3 plane section), or the effects of combat fatigue. It does not seem to have anything to do with the "learning curve" imposed by combat (which is a weak force in GGPW).

Back to history (rather than simulation): Furthermore, in the first six months of the war, not counting a/c lost operationally or destroyed on the ground, the historical attrition rate may have been very close to 1:1, particularly when P40s were used. It was certainly about 1:1 after June 1942. (Caveat: alot depended on the planes flown. In general the early models of the P39 and its export model, were inferior).

The first six months are harder to verify and study, which is why I was interested in your account of a big dogfight in Java. I've found at least one detailed web site that put the Dutch pilots in Hurricanes at roughly 1:1 and I mentioned that one before. Other detailed data would be nice. I point out that the loss ratio in a/c vs. a/c comes down to what is essentially a black box made of black boxes. That is, a bunch of combats (many of which might be viewed as a combination of fairly unusual initial starting conditions) involving pilots of very different planes with different amounts and kinds of training. One can view this from the side of "anecdotes," or from the side of a/c performance stats, or from actual combat losses, or all three. 99% of the time, the case gets argued by anecdotes and the other perspectives are ignored. This results in models in simulations that are based, primarily, on the mystique, myth-making, honorific-ennobling-of-former-opponent-now-turned-Cold-War-Ally histories.

If despite great amounts of airtime and training the Japanese plane+pilot combination (whether they were or not is not too important to me), achieved roughly 1:1 losses (or even, for arguments sake, 1.3:1 favorable to Japan) then: (1) The GGPW model has failed and (2) The general allegation that Japanese plane+pilot combination was *overwhelmingly* superior to the Allied plane+pilot combination, is in many simulations, and in the rhetoric used to describe these guys, overstated. At the very least, close combat loss ratios beg the question about how one produces a combat model or simulation that produces results that tend to match historical ones. GGPW failed miserably in that effort.

I can think of one systematic way to explain why the historical combat results in late 1941 early 1942 were close. If one allows that Allied pilots were less experienced and less well trained, then the only explanation that makes up for the very close early war combat loss ratios is that the "performance stats" made up the difference, or that the Japanese had some systemic problems which are strongly hinted in teh literature including the "pilots accounts" that you find very compelling. For example, Japanese land based a/c had very poor radios. Sakai had his tossed out because it was basically 50 lbs of dead weight. Japanese flights engaged in a great deal of rolling and looping (see the pilot accounts in FitS and Guadalcanal) to both observe enemy a/c and to communicate with each other visually. In combat, Japanese sections lost cohesion very quickly, and Japanese planes in a bad way had little recourse to call for help. They also used a 3-plane section through the end of 1943, IIRC, even thought that tactical formation hurt them. In a way this can be called a failure of training and doctrine. So what do you call that in a simulation? Do you credit the Japanese with, say, EXP of 90 then back off 20 for doctrinal inflexibility and for being 2-3 years behind the "news from Europe?"

I lean towards the "prefromance stats" explanation because people who know a heck of a lot more than us, or anyone on this forum, or anyone at Matrix games, the folks who design combat aircraft, have emphasized speed over every other factor since 1940. (*Emphasized* does not mean "disregarded others," so this is not an invitation to make straw men out of issues like avionics, stealth etc.) Moreover, the most successful designs have been fast designs.

The quips from Fire in the Sky that you mentioned about the learning curve are accurate. You have by now also read the mixed reviews, in the same book, of the P40 by the pilots who flew them and noted, for example, that the successful pilots routinely mention how "speed" controls the fight. So you see in part where I'm coming from. Of course pilots learn from experience vis a vis specific campaigns in which a bunch of pilots using primarily one a/c type fight pilots using primarily one other type. Despite that, superior a/c performance characteristics rotuinely give a pilot a huge advantage, even if the pilot is a rookie and his victim is a triple ace.

How one models the interaction between the non-combat training, experience gained through combat, and performance stats is the the thing that game designers have to solve.


Adenan Meshoggi

I was not trashing the Axis in general, Japan in particular, or asserting that every Allied pilot shot down 3 a/c. If your future contribution to the discussion is to pretend I said something that I did not say, or to spin it in some really wierd illogical way, I will assume license to ignore *everything* that you say henceforth.