IS THE ABDA HEADQUARTERS UNIT WORTH SAVING?

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: alanschu

Well, you acknowledge that there PP cost of the withdrawl is not severe enough. Perhaps your issue with the DEI withdrawls is that the cost of converting a unit off of ABDA is too cheap as well.

That is part of the problem. I've said it frequently....including this thread about the weakness of the PP cost system.

IMO there is nothing wrong with the PP system. In fact, if anything I find the cost of switching combat LCU to a different command too high (it's the cost of the guns). If I want to switch an LCU from Southwest Pac to SouthPac the PP cost should be much lower than say the cost of evacuating a unit from Java during the critical hours of its defense. However, who would want to code such a complex PP system, much less explain it to the masses.

There is nothing "wrong" with switching the command of a unit, it just depends on how historical a game you want. In an absolute lunacy game you could do anything the game allows. Switching the command of ABDA isn't absolute lunacy, but it is more to that end of the spectrum than not. Then again, Bruce is playing Terminus's mod, which is sort of a "what if" scenario anyway, so maybe it fits within the realm of that games "history".

[Andy Mac]

For me its kinda simple if I have the opportunity to get an HQ I will take it I always need more Corps HQ's especially for my Aussie Troops as you only get 1st Aus Corps so if I rescue and rebuild ABDA and or USAAFEE HQ i tend to use them as additional Corps HQ's in 44 operating out of north australia.
 
Now to many this is gamey but to me its a sensible compromise in the face of a game thats not overly flexible. If I am committing multiple Divisions I want Corps HQ's to control them and I dont get enough because of HQ slot restrictions give me the missing HQ's and I wont try to rescue other ones
 
Andy

[Andy Mac]

i.e. 2nd Aus Corps, 3rd Aus Corps, Northern Command etc etc

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

IMO there is nothing wrong with the PP system. In fact, if anything I find the cost of switching combat LCU to a different command too high (it's the cost of the guns). If I want to switch an LCU from Southwest Pac to SouthPac the PP cost should be much lower than say the cost of evacuating a unit from Java during the critical hours of its defense. However, who would want to code such a complex PP system, much less explain it to the masses.

Where i've felt the PP system breaks down is with the smaller, therefore far more inexpensive units. This includes depleated units that would normally be expensive to switch commands. So while full strength INF LCU's can't be switched without a good accumulation of PP's, units like base forces and depleated airgroups can be switched at very inexpensive cost. I agree that certain actions should be more expensive than others by default such as the examples you cited.

There is nothing "wrong" with switching the command of a unit, it just depends on how historical a game you want. In an absolute lunacy game you could do anything the game allows.

Right. Never said it was "wrong" though i personally would not do it because of level of historical play i prefer. If anything, an HQ like ABDA should disolve automatically once either it's territory is conquored and it's evacuated to another geographic location.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

For me its kinda simple if I have the opportunity to get an HQ I will take it I always need more Corps HQ's especially for my Aussie Troops as you only get 1st Aus Corps so if I rescue and rebuild ABDA and or USAAFEE HQ i tend to use them as additional Corps HQ's in 44 operating out of north australia.

Now to many this is gamey but to me its a sensible compromise in the face of a game thats not overly flexible. If I am committing multiple Divisions I want Corps HQ's to control them and I dont get enough because of HQ slot restrictions give me the missing HQ's and I wont try to rescue other ones

Andy

I have been thinking about this question, and here is how I view it.

I think the perception of what is gamey about withdrawing from the DEI (from an historical perspective), or saving the ABDA HQ and forces, all depends on how you view the situation.

If you conceive of (in this case) the DEI Forces as a national army, who's purpose is to protect Dutch possessions, then it would seem gamey in the extreme to watch them pack up and move off to Australia - where they now seem to be protecting someone else's property at the expense of their own - despite all the time, money, and training that the Dutch government spent over the years - just to save the British.
Viewed that way I am in complete agreement that - that would be unrealistic and gamey to evacuate the DEI Forces.

However, another point of view is; however true the above statement was - that premise no longer applies.

We do not have Japan vs the Netherlands. What we now have is Japan vs. the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, etc.
We now have coalition warfare.. the very name of the HQ in question ABDA states this clearly. The ABDA no more belongs to (and fights for) the interests of the Dutch - than any other nation in that coalition, and the same goes for the troops.
Otherwise, why on earth did America send its only available troops and aircraft to fight in the DEI for when its own men and territory so desperately needed them in the Philippines? The answer is - because the situation stopped being one of narrow national interests and became one of a broad coalition of common interests after Dec 7th, and the mission became stopping the common enemy - Japan...that is the entire point of the ABDA HQ in the first place, and by extension - the forces under its command.

If it is in the common best interests to place forces in a tenable position of relative strength, so as to have military success and defeat the enemy - rather than stay piecemeal and be easily destroyed in untenable isolated positions - then that is not only the best course to take, it becomes your duty to take that course.

So I do not view redeploying or otherwise saving Dutch forces from destruction as gamey, nor as an act of abandoning their country to protect someone else's country.

Now having said all that - I would still agree with anyone that moving the Dutch out of the DEI to protect India or Hawaii...before Japan even gets to Dutch territory - IS gamey.

[Feinder]

To answer the question, “Yes, it is useful to evac ABDA.” for many of the reasons listed previously.  Not the least of which
a.  You can never have too many HQs (or any other troops for that matter)
b.  Evac everything you can from DEI and PI.  Japan will score more points for Allied LCU losses than any other type of losses.  Evac’ing LCUs will drop the points from about 8k to 5k.  That can be a big difference if you’re staring at the 4:1 auto-victory.  While I do fight for DEI & PI (my PBEMs, Sing falls end of Feb, Java falls end of April, and Philipines falls early May), I run a very active campaign to evacuate everything I can.
 
I don’t have a problem with the Allied player spending PPs to evacuate DEI or PI, because
a.  There are lots of units in WitP that are missing altogether, and several units assigned to the wrong command (one ex. 41 Inf Div assigned to West Coast, it should in fact be SWPac, and it’s EXPENSIVE to activate her).
b.  It’s extremely unlikely that either player will be keeping her own LCUs within their own their historical commands.  What’s the difference between using a SoPac LCU in SwPac, or ABDA LCU in SwPac if you paid the points?
 
 

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: Big B
We do not have Japan vs the Netherlands. What we now have is Japan vs. the Netherlands, the Great Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, etc.
We now have coalition warfare.. the very name of the HQ in question ABDA states this clearly. The ABDA no more belongs to (and fights for) the interests of the Dutch - than any other nation in that coalition, and the same goes for the troops.
Otherwise, why on earth did America send its only available troops and aircraft to fight in the DEI for when its own men and territory so desperately needed them in the Philippines? The answer is - because the situation stopped being one of narrow national interests and became one of a broad coalition of common interests after Dec 7th, and the mission became stopping the common enemy - Japan...that is the entire point of the ABDA HQ in the first place, and by extension - the forces under its command.

Big B I think you bring up a good point in that it does depend on how you look at the situation. I don't know this for certain, but based on my general knowledge of history, I imagine the forces that made up the DEI armed services saw themselves as Dutch first, colonists second, and part of some larger conflict third. I imagine many of the garrison ground forces were made up of colonist militias. As such I would expect them to fight to the last to save their homesteads.

In terms of operating as a coalition, a single player game does not lend itself well to simulating one (in a multiplayer game one could easily simulate coalition politics). A true coalition would be full of political wrangling as each side persues what represents its own interest. The idea of standing "shoulder to shoulder" was something that the UK and US could barely pull off (and there was still a lot of back room politicking going on), much less nations with less strong ties.

There is precendent for relatively small numbers of foriegn troops being absorbed into Allied commands, such as the Polish, Dutch, Danes and so on, but these were small numbers of troops for the most part (Bde or smaller).

If in a WitP game one were to save just a few base forces, etc. Then I would see them operating as part of a coalition. However, if large numbers of Dutch forces are saved, I don't see them operating as part of some other nations command, like Southwest Pac, supporting the invasion of the Philipines, at least not until their homeland has also been secured.

Just my two cents worth.

[qgaliana]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

There is precendent for relatively small numbers of foriegn troops being absorbed into Allied commands, such as the Polish, Dutch, Danes and so on, but these were small numbers of troops for the most part (Bde or smaller).

Poles is probably a poor example of this. Something like 200 thousand served with the Western allies alone by the end of the war. And they had no hope of ever personally reconquering their homeland, just that it would be free in an eventual allied victory. Most of the countries conquered in WWII sent their governments into exile and formed up armies as fast as they could be manned and equipped (Belgium and France may have been the only ones to surrender formally IIRC which didn't stop free forces from formimng in Britain).

The PP system I find is a very good way of dealing with this. As some said it probably undervalues base units. A multiplier based on unit type would probably make sense. I kind of wish the PP system was more tied into production and victory points. I.e. expend political points for modifying production, gain political points depending on how the war is going. As long as you have to choose between the NZ brigade in Noumea or a DAF unit or two in Australia it seems fine to me.

Some poor dutch fellow (I believe) has been regularly pointing out that Dutch HQ facilities did evacuate to Australia historically. So evacing ABDA seems a fair compromise given that you can't reform it's components.

[Feinder]

“I imagine many of the garrison ground forces were made up of colonist militias. As such I would expect them to fight to the last to save their homesteads.”

Actually, I expect the Dutch were much in the same boat the British in Malaya and Burma. I recently finished reading the “Forgotten Armies : The Fall of British Asia 1941 - 1945”. Frankly, it goes into more detail about the politics than I had hoped, but it’s fairly revealing about a conflict that is rarely addressed.

1. Historically, there were plenty of militia-type units (pre capitulation, and post as guerrillas). These are not really represented in WitP.
2. Part of the problem that both sides (colonial British & Dutch, and empire as Japan) encountered, was that neither fully appreciated the complexity (and diversity) of the populations that they were attempting to rule.
3. The native populations basically wanted to be independent to begin with. There was already a strong independence movement before the war across all of the colonies. But when you have no military or means of sustaining one, you’re stuck (or in Ghandi’s case, you start the Quit India movement with the whole “passive resistance” thing).
4. However, the native politicians (in-power) pretty much understood they PERSONALLY had a pretty good thing going, because the colonial British (and Dutch) afforded THEM a pretty good life-style as long as they played along.
5. The native worker-bees weren’t particularly happy with the situation, but frankly, they’d been passed among colonial masters for the last 50 years. They knew they weren’t in a position to militarily usurp, so they didn’t. If you’re the guy working on the rubber plantation before the insurrection, you’re still going to be the guy working on the rubber plantation after the insurrection, so why risk your life over it.
6. The native populations were also very fragmented to begin with. There were a dozen kings in Malaya alone, that served the British crown, but they each had separate populations and agendas (which is partly why independence movements were always frustrated).
7. The European colonials were a mixed lot as well. You had some that –did- see themselves first as Asians, then as Brits (indeed, many were mixed descent). You also had Europeans colonials who saw it as adventurous or as opportunity. And you had colonials that were literally “stuck” out to the Indies, because they had p1ssed somebody else off. However, very few European colonials (political or military) were actually native to Malaya. Very few of the colonials saw things as “defending their homesteads”.
8. Many of the military formations were native soldiers, led by European colonial leaders. So yes, quite a few units were somewhat “defending their homeland”. However, the soldiers were just as likely to have been pulled from every other corner of the empire. And many of them were of the perspective that they were serving in an “occupying army” to begin with.
9. During the evacuations of Malaya, Sumatra, and Java, the conduct of the colonials, as viewed by the natives and integrated formations, was deplorable. Native integrated formations were often considered expendable to cover the retreat of non-integrated formations; fighting all the while with substandard equipment. Evacuation on transports was largely reserved for whites (so colonials of mixed heritage with darker skin were screwed). The loyalty of many serving in mixed formations was greatly tested, when you know you’re a second class citizen.
10. There were many desertions among the integrated units. Famine killed about 10% of the civilian population during the war years. That’s a LOT of people. Means that life for the survivors still wasn’t easy, and if you’re in an integrated unit, thinking of your family starving because you can’t work the rice paddy is a pretty solid motivator.
11. Still, many (indeed most) integrated formations served admirably, many individuals maintaining the attitude of, “We serve now because we know Japan isn’t the answer, but we’re really expecting some concessions when this war is over.”
12. It’s not to say that the native populations welcomed the Japanese, but they often saw them as, “Well, you kicked out the colonials which is a good thing. We’re not that naïve to think you’re actually going to give us real independence, but we’ll take what you give us, if it’s more than the Brits.”
13. There was a sizable number that actually Joined the Japanese (BIA –Burma Independence Army – numbered about 12,000, were generally ill-trained and poorly equipped, but the allegence of the region was certainly “conflicted”.
14. Basically, the Japanese eventually traded out the native politicals under the Brits, for a new group.
15. Meanwhile, those who would actually become the post war politicals remained active, and when the war ended they were able to lead revolts (no more Japanese, British/French/Dutch military weakness, and US not willing to assist colonial governments anyway), they were able take advantage of the situation of seize power.
16. Interesting side-note I hadn’t thought about until reading the book. Esp with Ben Kingsly and our own history books portray Ghandi very favorably. Sweet little guy who prays a lot and avocates independence thru non-violance (again, it’s pretty hard to advocate military insurrection without guns). However, Quit India produced –massive- strikes throughout India in 08-42. While it certainly worked to get the attention of the British, it coincided with a VERY BAD time for Britian to have to deal with her largest colony not producing anything for the war effort. Then consider the perspective of the colonial officers deployed to India, risking your life in famished malaria infested hole, by a population who doesn’t even want you there. Needless to say, things were often “tense”.
17. It really helps to understand the region in pre-WW2 terms, to see the developing conflicts that continued after the war for then next 40 years.

Whatever. Was an interesting read.
-F-

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: qgaliana
Poles is probably a poor example of this.

I was thinking that as I typed it, so probably a good thing someone called me on it.