Slowing Allied ground idea

[satisfaction]

First I play as Allied vs AI and 50/50 in PBEM. It seems the ability of the Allies to mount their counteroffensives far outstrips the ability of planners and the guys in the rear to plan and prepare for these moves. Currently you can simply move and invade anywhere even with no planning, even though you won't get the preparation bonus. This got me thinking...could we use this preparation bonus to slow the advance to realistic levels? My idea would be to change this bonus so that a level of 50 really equals zero, meaning this is the minimum level of planning that would need to go on before an invasion. If planning levels are below this it would result in a penalty for each point below 50 and the reverse true for numbers above 50. I've never modded the game, but is it possible to do this...I'd love to do it and experiment then report back. Or any other ideas?

[Nikademus]

Preperation points and their impact on the game are hard-coded. The editor allows you to adjust preperation point levels and the target base, but not how they function within the engine.

[JeffroK]

Satisfaction,
 
The same goes for the Jap which allows them to expand in the early days far beyond their capabilities IRL.
 
I agree that a certain level of Pre must be done before an amphib assault, but fear it would have to be a house rule.

[satisfaction]

Oh well if it's hard coded. I'm starting to use it as a house rule vs ai. Any thoughts on whether this would stick as a house rule? As Japan I would drag my feet, but with careful planning i think it could work. Are there any other ideas going round as to how to deal with this issue?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Satisfaction,

The same goes for the Jap which allows them to expand in the early days far beyond their capabilities IRL.

I agree that a certain level of Pre must be done before an amphib assault, but fear it would have to be a house rule.

Actually - Japan was slowed down by its own lack of understanding of what it could do. The Japanese expected much higher losses and were not planned up for the contingency of sweeping success. What might have been is hinted at where a fine (and joint) planning effort was done: Malaya. Here a Japanese force outnumbered 2:1 in every important respect (tanks, planes, ships, artillery, name it) never lost the initiative - and took Singapore in 100 days - using only 3 of the 5 divisions offered to the staff. There are many ways to study this sort of thing. At the US Naval War College - they game Midway every year - and last I heard Japan has NEVER lost the battle! The assets available could have been used far more effectively than they were. Imagine if Japan had moved to Rabaul and Port Moresby in December or January instead of late spring? Very small forces could have achieved much - and that is in the US Navy's official history.

[JeffroK]

Sid,
 
I'm sure that if the Japanese had the ability to have 100%  knowledge of Allied setup, reinforcement and production ability they could have done a lot better as well.
 
 
PS. Could you explain how the Jap was outnumbered 2-1 in Malaya in TANKS, AIRCRAFT & SHIPS. I would also dispute your claim about the number of COMBAT TROOPS & ARTILLERY, but will have to look harder at these??
 
And to wargame a known battle, with the knowledge of known mistakes is more an exercise in Command than Strategy. (Lets refight Normandy, we know there are extra Germans at Omaha!!)

[Hipper]

No British tanks in malaya.... the A&SH (12 brigade) did have some beaverette type civilian cars with improvised armour but thats it I think
 
Agreed though Japanese operation planing and execution for malay was excelent.
 
 

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: Hipper

No British tanks in malaya.... the A&SH (12 brigade) did have some beaverette type civilian cars with improvised armour but thats it I think

Agreed though Japanese operation planing and execution for malay was excelent.

3rd Indian Cavalry was in Malaya with 30 Marmon-Harrington armoured cars (served as recce unit for 11th Indian Division/III. Corps), had arrived from India by 28th Nov 1941.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Satisfaction,

The same goes for the Jap which allows them to expand in the early days far beyond their capabilities IRL.

I agree that a certain level of Pre must be done before an amphib assault, but fear it would have to be a house rule.

I agree here although I think that 50 might be too high, somewhere around 20-30 (making it 20-30 turns) would work towards slowing each side down. This would require at least a modicum of long range planning. I would also take it one step further and require that every unit in the assault force be assigned to the same HQ's.

[JeffroK]

The 30 pts/1 month sounds OK, along with having all units assigned to the same HQ sounds OK. I also toyed with the landing having to be within a certain level of Fighter Cover, either Land based or Carrier borne. This is a bit harder to quantify although, if playing historically another House Rule could suffice. I would see either 50 LB Fighters or 3 CV's, having the ability to CAP, as sufficient.
 
I suppose the difference are between those wanting to use the game mechanics to their greatest advantage and those who want to recreate historical situations. As Cid says the Japanese didnt use their Armed Forces to their max ability. But there were other "frictions" which caused this, many which cannot be rexreated. Likewise the Allies are restricted, as they were historically, in the movement of their LCU, the forced withdrawals of RN surface craft, the assume "Germany First" and total inability to manage their Aircraft/Shipping production.
 
 
 

[jolly_pillager]

I am finding in my game against wneumman that simply disallowing units to stray outside their command zones is a serious impediment to my advance.

Burma Area Army has all of three Divisions attached to it (CHS). Invading India is a flat impossiblitiy with this force level. Also Southeast Fleet and 4th Fleet are pretty thin.

Couple this with not allowing Japan to "train" their pilots by bombing empty bases (so the Japanese have to worry about attrition of their aircrews), and I find myself pretty well slowed down as is.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Sid,

I'm sure that if the Japanese had the ability to have 100%  knowledge of Allied setup, reinforcement and production ability they could have done a lot better as well.

REPLY: Actually - Japanese intelligence in a number of places was very good. See Malaya, Hawaii, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Japan was hampered much more by its lack of joint mindedness (with notable exceptions among individuals) and by its structurally complex culture/society - which made it far more divided than ever outsiders believe or understand. Integration of planning and intelligence and operations was not impossible - see Malaya and the ad hoc planning group assembled under (hated in the West) Col Tsuji. But it was not the rule. As scenario designers we should not impose this lack of cooperation/organization on players - at least not in all scenarios.

PS. Could you explain how the Jap was outnumbered 2-1 in Malaya in TANKS, AIRCRAFT & SHIPS. I would also dispute your claim about the number of COMBAT TROOPS & ARTILLERY, but will have to look harder at these??

REPLY: See Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Greatest Defeat (by the IJA Chief of Operations for Malaya, Col Tsuji - with a forward by the Australian Army Chief of Staff why this is such a seminal work). There is a fine set of comparison data tables included. Note that such reputable authors as Churchill grossly overstate Japanese resources in this campaign even writing long after the war.

And to wargame a known battle, with the knowledge of known mistakes is more an exercise in Command than Strategy. (Lets refight Normandy, we know there are extra Germans at Omaha!!)

REPLY: Hopefully we are not going to game a known battle at all. The idea of changing strategy is to get a different battle IMHO.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Hipper

No British tanks in malaya.... the A&SH (12 brigade) did have some beaverette type civilian cars with improvised armour but thats it I think

Agreed though Japanese operation planing and execution for malay was excelent.

Well - what the British called tanks in 1941 are pitiful - to be sure. In fact - see our game database. Bloody awful. Like Japanese "light tanks" they might better be called armored cars.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Satisfaction,

The same goes for the Jap which allows them to expand in the early days far beyond their capabilities IRL.

I agree that a certain level of Pre must be done before an amphib assault, but fear it would have to be a house rule.

I agree here although I think that 50 might be too high, somewhere around 20-30 (making it 20-30 turns) would work towards slowing each side down. This would require at least a modicum of long range planning. I would also take it one step further and require that every unit in the assault force be assigned to the same HQ's.

The problem with this is it is a theater wide restriction - not a unit restriction. One can be planning up many units - in completely different areas of operation - and properly so. Further - more than a few units went in with very low planning times. I myself think the decision to invade Guadalcanal as done was far too hasty - it is the only time we sent troops in that had not been trained at regimental level - and it is the only time we sent troops in out of range of land based air cover of some sort. We may have learned from that I suppose. But shooting oneself in the foot should always be permitted to players. And sometimes gambling works out - which should also be allowed.

A division is 1000 to 2000 political points - and I believe we should be talking about how many DIVIONS can be issued orders per day. One ? Two ? Not per month. For me PP are single point decision concepts - point at a unit - assign an area of operations - and then it starts planning up for that - taking 99 days to reach max potential - and to get there.

[JeffroK]

Sid,
 
REPLY: Hopefully we are not going to game a known battle at all. The idea of changing strategy is to get a different battle IMHO
 
You conveniently forgot your comment about the USN War College gaming Midway every year!
 
"There are many ways to study this sort of thing. At the US Naval War College - they game Midway every year - and last I heard Japan has NEVER lost the battle!"
 
Yes, Japanese intel at the beginning was excellent, seems to be a habit with aggresive nations attacking those at peace. BUt later in the game the Jap can know EXACTLY when ships/LCU's arrive and when newer aircraft arrive. The Allies can only know of LCU arrival, every thing else can be variable.
 
As to Japanese tank numbers 3 Tank Group was part of the attack with 1,2,6Med & 14Lt Rgts, I believe the strangth was 79 Medium Tks, 100 Light Tanks and 238 other vehicles.
Far more than what 3 Ind Cavalry & 100 Lt Tk Sqn could put in the field.

[JeffroK]

Sid,

Does the book by known war criminal Tsuji have a forward by "The Australian Army Chief of Staff" or an introduction by Lt Gen H Gordon Bennett, GOC 8th Australian Div, later GOC III Corps (Western Australia)??

From Stone & Stone Books

"Nor is this the most balanced, even-handed account of the campaign. The author is unrepentant, self-serving, and disingenuous."

Still rated as a good read for a Japanese view of the campaign.

The State Library has it as Singapore 1941-1942 : the Japanese version of the Malayan Campaign of World War II , I'll hava look

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Satisfaction,

The same goes for the Jap which allows them to expand in the early days far beyond their capabilities IRL.

I agree that a certain level of Pre must be done before an amphib assault, but fear it would have to be a house rule.

I agree here although I think that 50 might be too high, somewhere around 20-30 (making it 20-30 turns) would work towards slowing each side down. This would require at least a modicum of long range planning. I would also take it one step further and require that every unit in the assault force be assigned to the same HQ's.

The problem with this is it is a theater wide restriction - not a unit restriction. One can be planning up many units - in completely different areas of operation - and properly so. Further - more than a few units went in with very low planning times. I myself think the decision to invade Guadalcanal as done was far too hasty - it is the only time we sent troops in that had not been trained at regimental level - and it is the only time we sent troops in out of range of land based air cover of some sort. We may have learned from that I suppose. But shooting oneself in the foot should always be permitted to players. And sometimes gambling works out - which should also be allowed.

A division is 1000 to 2000 political points - and I believe we should be talking about how many DIVIONS can be issued orders per day. One ? Two ? Not per month. For me PP are single point decision concepts - point at a unit - assign an area of operations - and then it starts planning up for that - taking 99 days to reach max potential - and to get there.

While that may work for you and is one possible solution, other solutions make more sense when applied to others.

[m10bob]

[quote]ORIGINAL: JeffK

Sid,

Does the book by known war criminal Tsuji have a forward by "The Australian Army Chief of Staff" or an introduction by Lt Gen H Gordon Bennett, GOC 8th Australian Div, later GOC III Corps (Western Australia)??


"Nor is this the most balanced, even-handed account of the campaign. The author is unrepentant, self-serving, and disingenuous."

**************************************************************************

Jeffk..I too know it is O.K. to hate our enemies, I have never fooled myself to think "political-correctness" is better than good old-fashioned honesty, but being unrepentent should have no bearing on what a former enemy has to relate.
Hans Ulrich Rudel was a Hitler loving ardent,goose-stepping nazi of the lowest form till the day he died and went to hell, but he was still the most successful Stuka flying tank-busting pilot who ever lived.

BTW, "political-correctness " is right out of the Communist Manifesto..Might read it some day.
It's best to know ones enemies?

Trivia, the Japanese commander in Malaya was so confident of a victory IF he could get his troops to move quickly, he arranged for them to have bicycles for transportation.
The bikes allowed the troops to move so quickly they were able to over-run retreating enemy before adequate defenses might be built.
This may be the most successful wartime use of bikes?

**************************************************************************

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Sid,

REPLY: Hopefully we are not going to game a known battle at all. The idea of changing strategy is to get a different battle IMHO

You conveniently forgot your comment about the USN War College gaming Midway every year!


REPLY: No I did not. It is the most important naval battle in USN history - and it properly is reviewed by senior naval officer students. That does not mean anyone expects to refight that battle again. According to Morison, the IJN violated every one of the laws of war: do you think we should require players adopt strategies doing that? If they do ANYTHING different the battle will turn out differently - which is exactly what happens at the Naval War College. In US replays the US never wins - in spite of 20-20 hindsight on their side. The balance of forces is too lopsided - and had the enemy not had his mail read so well - or been so spread out - we almost surely would have lost. Replay does not change that - it just demonstrates that - regardless of details - it was a one sided affair with the deck stacked against USN by the sheer size of the forces involved. [It isn't unusual to run out of USN aircraft before the battle is decided - having done everything right you still must retire. The ONLY strategy I have found that uniformly works is to seek out and attack targets USN would not have done: tankers and transports. Get enough of them, they go home. And they are not defended well enough to ruin your air groups.]

"There are many ways to study this sort of thing. At the US Naval War College - they game Midway every year - and last I heard Japan has NEVER lost the battle!"

Yes, Japanese intel at the beginning was excellent, seems to be a habit with aggresive nations attacking those at peace. BUt later in the game the Jap can know EXACTLY when ships/LCU's arrive and when newer aircraft arrive. The Allies can only know of LCU arrival, every thing else can be variable.

REPLY: This is close to IRL. Germany maintained - wholly undetected at any time - a WWI vintage submarine at the entrance to the shipping channel of Colon, Panama. Sitting on the bottom in shallow water, it observed ships coming and going, reporting these by burst wireless. Japan had an excellent - and never broken - ring of barbers in Panama City listening to the conversation of US officers. Japan also had a "black chamber" (radio listening station) at Guaymas Mexico which monitored USN radio traffic in the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. Integrating these sources, Japan had a very good sense of when what ship arrived where?

Tangentally - I am a student (and technical advisor to the foremost author on the subject) of Japanese atomic science - working mainly with official documents of both sides. I note that Japanese intel was able to advise the Prime Minister on the status of the US atomic program - accurately - at every stage of WWII. When we got our first atomic pile running at the University of Chicago, Japan (not Germany or Russia) was able to get a sample of the soil from the site - and spirited that to Mexico - where two scientists were able to measure the residual radiation - and determine that the pile had never operated at any significant power level. The first Japanese atomic bomb design (and the only one we have detailed plans for) was so close to the Little Boy in concept the first three US scientists to examine it exclaimed "It is just like ours." [It isn't quite - it is much simpler, more reliable - what we would call weaponized today - but the basic concept was identical - right down to using a cut off 76mm AA gun. So close it may have been a copy: it is a principle of engineering when you reverse engineer you can always do better than the original.] Japan - not Russia or Germany - penetrated Los Alamos and got details of at least one - and probably all four - US bomb designs. Not a whole lot wrong with Japanese strategic intelligence. Japan failed to listen to its Nakano School English experts more often than not - and that cost them dearly.

As to Japanese tank numbers 3 Tank Group was part of the attack with 1,2,6Med & 14Lt Rgts, I believe the strangth was 79 Medium Tks, 100 Light Tanks and 238 other vehicles.
Far more than what 3 Ind Cavalry & 100 Lt Tk Sqn could put in the field.

REPLY: There were only three regiments in the Tank Brigade - the other regiment was an independent battalion.
And the "medium tanks" were really light tanks, while the "light tanks" were really armored cars in terms of the terminology we usually use. The numbers were different - but they always are: one would have to know the exact date of the data - and what the data counts? (for example, your data might be "runners" - rather than total inventory - and IJA was unique in that TO&E included tanks in numbers which were spares - complete with crews and maintenance - in every regiment. Do they count? Dupuy would say yes - but the IJA system was to use them only as replacements - and many scholars do not count them at all.) For the official TO&E count see the RHS database. For Tsuji's version, see his book.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Sid,

Does the book by known war criminal Tsuji have a forward by "The Australian Army Chief of Staff" or an introduction by Lt Gen H Gordon Bennett, GOC 8th Australian Div, later GOC III Corps (Western Australia)??

REPLY: Possibly so - I didn't look it up. However, I must object to the use of the term "war criminal" with a man who was never convicted of anything. That is not our system, nor our usage. Tsuji was a very unusual man - and radical is not too strong a term to use. But he was a deciple of a General who opposed invading China - and had his faction not lost out - WWII (never mind the War of Resistence in China that led to it) in the Pacific might never have occurred.
Tsuji is alleged to have done many things - and he admits to many things in his rare first book (an account of his years underground from 1945 to 1948). Ordered to go into hiding by IJA HQ, he joined the KMT !!! Not something a truly hated enemy could normally do - but possibly his opposition to war with China paid dividends? Note KMT was nominally our ally at the time too. The book contains references to many things he did in WWII - including mistakes he made in Thailand and at Guadalcanal - for the latter he told the theater commander "he diserved a thousand deaths" - not for war crimes - but for sending Japanese troops into impossible conditions. We have opinions of things that may not be kosher - but neither confession nor documentary evidence. The worst IMHO was (if a Japanese general is not speculating - he didn't know for sure either) the execution of Chief Justice Santos of the Philippines.
In Tsuji's view - serving a colonial regime was treason for an Asiatic - and it did not matter a whit that Santos was PRO Japanese! Tsuji's conduct in Malaya suggests he had much higher standards about treating civilians than was common at that time (but which had once been the IJA's claim to fame: it was the very best at honoring the law of war when 8 armies marched on Beijing and it won the acclaim of the Russian Red Cross during the Russo Japanese War). He had the commander of the Imperial Guards Division dressed down IN FRONT of the ENTIRE division - by the army commander (Yamashita) - not somethign that is likely to have occurred if he didn't have principles. All because he found three men trying to loot a shop in Singapore. Tsuji wanted to SHOOT the would be looters - and was overruled - they were just broken. Not your typical war criminal, in any case.


From Stone & Stone Books

"Nor is this the most balanced, even-handed account of the campaign. The author is unrepentant, self-serving, and disingenuous."

Still rated as a good read for a Japanese view of the campaign.


REPLY: I find it far more useful than Churchill (The Hinge of Fate if I remember the volume right). SLAM taught never trust any single source, and in particular discount sources from your own side. You cannot know what things looked like on the other side unless you inform yourself from those who do know.

The State Library has it as Singapore 1941-1942 : the Japanese version of the Malayan Campaign of World War II , I'll hava look