Slowing Allied ground idea

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior


While that may work for you and is one possible solution, other solutions make more sense when applied to others.

For the record, I have offered various solutions in different scenarios. Only in PPO (Political Point Option) and EOS do I use what I think is the correct solution - where staff can do what staff really did do - decide today to send the xth division to Singapore (or whatever) - and then planning up begins for that unit. In other scenarios, staff needs to wait before enough PP are available to do that. The RHS philosophy is to offer options - not just one option - and let players choose among them. Further - we deliberately have integrated with CHS in the sense you can elect to use RHS maps with CHS or CHS maps with RHS - in case you like one data set and the other map set. We also are integrated in the sense that - if we find a possible error with the other - we notify each other. Same for possible changes - and sometimes changes are adopted almost simultaneously by both.

[JeffroK]

[:)]
 
Eating US Fighter Pilot Kidneys doesnt rate as a war crime?, I suppose the same view was taken of von Braun and others in the Nazi rocket programme when taken on . Whereas David Hicks is a terrorist even though he hasnt been to trial.
 
I'll read his book with interest, and open eyes.
 
I've read too many "Other side of the hill" memoirs which have only served to lessen thier atrocities and improve on perceptions of their valour. IE Only count my Combat Troops while including the Water Behsti's as the opponents available troops.

[m10bob]

"SLAM taught never trust any single source, and in particular discount sources from your own side."

SLAM...............Truly a fiction writer of the first order.
Interesting that he may have stated the above?

[DuckofTindalos]

SLAM?

[m10bob]

S.L.A.Marshall
Military historian (from within as a commissioned officer).
His original works adhered closer to facts after he interviewed the personell involved, but before 1943 ended, his credibility was shot with the front-line troops as embellishments to satisfy political considerations began to take over.
See the memoirs of Maj Richard L Winters, and Col David Hackworth for examples/observations.

[DuckofTindalos]

Ah, him... Heard the name, of course, but never read any of his writings...

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

[:)]

Eating US Fighter Pilot Kidneys doesnt rate as a war crime?, I suppose the same view was taken of von Braun and others in the Nazi rocket programme when taken on . Whereas David Hicks is a terrorist even though he hasnt been to trial.

REPLY: I am not aware of this charge - but I am aware that no charge was ever filed against Tsuji - never mind a trial held or a conviction offered. And - for the record - if we had not granted a general amnisty for war crimes to Japanese military participants in WWII I personally would have filed charges against those responsible for US firebombing and atomic bombing raids over Japan. [Note that we never believed they were legal - and charged war crimes tribunals ONLY to investigate and deal with Axis crimes - both for our sake and to avoid run ins with the Russians and British] I regard this as close to innuendo: it is very likely Tsuji would have arrested anyone he caught doing such a thing. He was an idealist in his own right - just not an Allied one. If you think in anti-colonial terms, you might come close.

I'll read his book with interest, and open eyes.

I've read too many "Other side of the hill" memoirs which have only served to lessen thier atrocities and improve on perceptions of their valour. IE Only count my Combat Troops while including the Water Behsti's as the opponents available troops.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

"SLAM taught never trust any single source, and in particular discount sources from your own side."

SLAM...............Truly a fiction writer of the first order.
Interesting that he may have stated the above?

Oddly enough - SLAM is a very controversial US Army historian - but the charges against him are wholly false. He was forced to retire by Defense Secretary MacNamara because he refused to particate in politically correct requirements which came in with the Kennedy Administration - and retired near my childhood home in SE Michigan - where he was a neighbor of my aunt (herself a former US teacher sent to Japan post WWII). I became something like an unofficial graduate student (something I didn't realize until decades later when a historian at UCAL told me I was a graduate student of his because "I have no student I spend more time on nor who does such important work"). At the time - nominally in high school (and an experimental university student in a program that no longer exists). Anyway - I got to work with (not just see) his records - and learn his methods.

What SLAM did was interview soldiers on condition they could say ANYTHING - and their identity would not be disclosed. He took his files with him - but he in fact had identified every person. He also interviewed enemy soldiers.
If you want to understand the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army of Korea's offensive launched on Thanksgiving Eve 1950 along the Chong Chong River - on the very same day the UN Eighth Army planned to launch an offensive going the other direction - you need to read The River and the Gauntlet - a platoon level history of that epic event. The modern mechanized, substantially US Allied force was forced into the longest retreat in US history "and only such a retreat could have preserved the army or its cause." Enemy forces advanced at a rate similar to the greatest armor advances in history - about 100 miles a day - in spite of being unmotorized - and a US division was destroyed in toto.
Not much of what SLAM found was different than what the incoming commander of the Eighth Army found: the army reflected its leadership and was lacking in most of the basics. Platoon positions were not in sight of each other and unable to support each other. Soldiers were not carrying their allotted weapons and equipment - often including not carrying hand grenades. The list is endless. The Army became far more effective when the new commander issued orders that SOPs must be honored. But for some reason it is not popular to write about times we did not do well.

What SLAM really did to anger many US Army ultra-conservatives was study who fights in combat. He found - and these findings are independently verified by German and Soviet studies of a similar sort - that the vast majority of soldiers do not fire their weapons in battle. Members of crew served weapons crews were different - but ordinary infantry often were more "spare parts" who didn't do very much until and unless they were told to join a heavy weapons team (usually as a loader). These studies resulted in a new generation of Army weapons - globally - including the US Army - the M-16 is our version of the "baby machine gun" introduced so soldiers would feel they were effective. [I personally prefer a bolt action rifle on a battlefield - and I personally - who claim a very high body count in combat - have also never fired a shot in anger on a battlefield - although I have in a bank robbery. When you are in charge of tactical combat under USMC doctrine you are supposed to be observing and directing your teams - not playing some Hollywood movie hero shooting up things yourself. But morally I am responsible for what my team does - and in just one action my squad - landing party - had to bury well over 100 bodies. One can be in tactical combat - and participating even - without shooting. In USMC doctrine you are not supposed to shoot unless directed to shoot - or unless there is an ambush.] Anyway - since I have a broad exposure to military history - and I know that multiple sources have similar findings - I have never understood why they are controversial? We DID have problems with soldiers who would not fight in Viet Nam - even in an ambush - and I hear in the Army they would warn such a person that he would be shot if he repeated that practice. In the Navy we were trained to USMC standards - and this is a generally higher standard. Even though we had obsolescent WWII vintage weapons, we were always effective - because we were taught "it isn't how modern the weapon is that matters, it is how well you use it." In general, the Army practice of shorter training and lower standards of induction has a lot to do with troop performance. If we cannot face that honestly we cannot come to terms with it and do better. Giving troops a weapon they feel effective with may be a wise move (although I much prefer a .30 caliber to a .223 even after they got the M-16 not to jam all the time with the A1 mod - and in my regiment of state guard troops we are allowed to use .30 weapons if we want to). But saying our troops are above criticism is not something I am willing to do. I personally encountered US Army troops committing atrocities in combat - and also one sailor - and I so don't believe such things only are done by the enemy. I am intolerant of such things as dilitarious to good order and discipline as well as not generating political points for our side: if we are not winning the war politically - why bother to fight?

[el cid again]

Cobra is worried that monsoon (and maybe Winter) maps may slow down land operations too much.
Winter surely will prevent naval operations in ice bound ports and rivers North of Vladivostok in Asia (Alaska is warmed by the Japan current and the Aleutians and Southern Alaska never freeze over).

But Monsoon does badly mess with land operations - and I wish only that we could slow air ops as well as land movement. Our maps probably will only confine combat to major LOC - not prevent it altogether.

Nevertheless - offensives in Monsoon and Winter - with their major impacts on land LOC - probably will slow offensives by both sides.

FYI Winter is Dec-Mar; Monsoon is Jun-Sep; Spring and Fall are the two months in between at both ends of Winter or Monsoon. Only Spring and Fall use the "normal" maps. Thus you have three different maps/pwhex files - each applies for 4 months of the year. Since Magadan is ice free 8 months of the year - this is almost perfect.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Actually - Japan was slowed down by its own lack of understanding of what it could do. The Japanese expected much higher losses and were not planned up for the contingency of sweeping success. What might have been is hinted at where a fine (and joint) planning effort was done: Malaya. Here a Japanese force outnumbered 2:1 in every important respect (tanks, planes, ships, artillery, name it) never lost the initiative - and took Singapore in 100 days - using only 3 of the 5 divisions offered to the staff. There are many ways to study this sort of thing.

Your analysis overlooks one key factor. The British in Malaya could hardly have been more innefectually commanded and prepared if the Japanese had been issuing their orders. The Malayan Campaign was a magnificent Japanese achievement...., but it took a Percival as well as a Yamashita to make it happen.

[JeffroK]

Not just Percival, but the whole advantage of an agressor attacking an Army that isnt at war.
 
Choose your time & place,
Have excellent intel on forces and a plan to follow through.
Gain Air superiority by having the best Fighter in theatre.
 
Get your enemy to station partly trained & poorly led troops, and have most of that training in a motorised/desert theme.
Have them defend everywhere, the defender rarely chooses the ground they fight on. Add reinforcements adhoc & too late, a couple of Indian Bdes tacked on to various Divs, 18 Br Div arrive in pieces.
 
Percival was just a victim of the above.

[el cid again]

I cannot disagree that the British commander was very poor. However

a) Players can change him

b) The STRUCTURE of colonial Malaya and Singapore (technically not the same thing) was fatally flawed - and no matter who was in command it was going to turn out badly.

Japanese troops of 5th Division went in with LMG and rifles. I mean EVERY MAN in the line had both! He also had a bike to carry the extra gear. The idea was pick what you need for this firefight, go back for the rest after. But they did not have to go back. Malays brought the bikes and guns forward - and didn't steal. It was so obvious they were on the same side the Japanese trusted them. This extended to local intel. This is a function of the very system itself - not the guy in charge.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

SLAM?

S. L. A. Marshall. Wrote Men Against Fire. Not a great operational analyst, and only nicknamed SLAM by people who didn't know him.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Terminus

SLAM?

S. L. A. Marshall. Wrote Men Against Fire. Not a great operational analyst, and only nicknamed SLAM by people who didn't know him.

Actually, the "SLAM" nickname came form people who did know him. Or more correctly those who attempted any form of dissagreement with him. Conversations with a couple of folks who knew him tend to confirm that like many innovators, he was unforgiving of criticism. But his pioneering attempt to get at "what it was really like" through after action interviews with the participants changed the way much of military history has been written since.

[JeffroK]

The art to using personal memoirs is tying them in with real life. Many combatants "honestly believe" an action took place, but ask 10 men and you will get 10 versions of it. ( I had 2 Uncles in 2/8 Bn, 6th Divvy, they have a strange "warp" on their actions, but unless you keep a strict diary its hard to align dates and actions) I'm reading the "Letters of Pvt Wheeler". 51st Light Infantry Rgt who served with Wellington in Spain. His letters, written soon after the actions they describe, are riddled with small errors of date and detail (B. Liddel-Hart has corrected them)
 
However they are great at setting the scene and adding "colour" to what would otherwise have been bland recitals of facts. Its about getting the balance right.
 

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Many combatants "honestly believe" an action took place, but ask 10 men and you will get 10 versions of it.

Personal accounts many times are flawed. I work in law enforcement...on one occassion one of our agents working undercover was involved in a deal gone bad. He and the bad guy had an exchange of gunfire. Afterward the agent swore that he had fired six or seven rounds at the bad guy during the exchange. A post-shooting review revealed that the agent had in fact only fired a single round, the round in the chamber of of his semi-automatic pistol. He had been carrying the pistol in the front pocket of a large jacket and at some point the pistol's magaizne had become dislodged. When he discharged the firearm the round in the chamber was fired, however due to the dislodged magazine the fiream failed to cycle in a new round. In the heat of the moment he continued to pull his trigger and hearing additional rounds being fired he assumed they must have been from his firearm.


EDIT: I would had that looking at any one personal account will demonstrate it is probably flawed, however when looking at it as part of a collection the collection would probably present a better picture of the events as a whole...

[el cid again]

Eyewitnesses indeed get confused - and in lots of ways.

It is SOP in teaching investigation to have the class interrupted by an intruder who "shoots" the instructor right in front of it. After he runs away, the teacher "miraculously" recovers, gets up and says "everyone write down what they just witnessed." It is amazing the variations they will record - different clothing - physical description - number of shots - words said not said - or not remembered that were said.

Communications theory says that even saying what you want to say is hard - even if you are not confused. And interpreting what was said is equally tricky. "There are six versions of what is said: what the speaker intended to say, what the speaker really said, and what the speaker remembers saying; what the listener expected to hear, what the listener actually heard and what the listener remembers hearing later."

This does not change the basic matter that you cannot know what happened absent material from those present. I remember being in actions later reported by major media (Time Magazine usually - as we could not get broadcast stories) - and wondering "were we there at all? This is completely wrong!" It may or may not have been the fault of reporters - a flawed bunch out to sell newspapers first of all to be sure: often they were fed data by official spin masters as well. But what is significant for me is that NEITHER the reporters NOR the spin masters actually knew the truth - nor bothered to get it from those who witnessed it - as a general rule. That isn't going to work well.

One needs to begin with what the participants say and integrate that with other information to the extent you can.
It is a difficult process and it can NEVER be done well if you have (unprofessional) bias toward your nation or against another nation (or race, or religion, or whatever).

I have been on the other end of Treespider's situation - the one sending in the reports. But using professional standards, I diligently send in follow up reports saying "I was wrong about xyz" when I figure out that report was wrong. I also take notes, make voice recordings, and take pictures, unless I am afraid of being cought with them by bad guys. And I turn in my raw notes with my reports. It all helps investigators figure out the truth - and they have other sources besides me - direct or indirect - and know things I do not to integrate into the picture. I never care about what they do with the data: that isn't my mission. Mine is to get the best data I can - and it must always be from one point of view at one angle. More often I am at the other end - trying to figure out what happened later.
Neither task is easy and it is only when a lot of things come together you can be certain what happened? Often total certainty is not possible.

[JeffroK]

Very interestingly, this is the only place I've heard of the japanese 5th Div burdening their troops with both an LMG and a rifle, ammo use must have been horrendous, or the reference is wrong.

[el cid again]

Well, we have Tsjui as a primary source. As both leader of the special planning committee for Malaya, and then the Chief of Operations for the army that did it, he surely knew. This is a very unusual practice - and not just for IJA. It is the only instance I am aware of where a non-SOF unit had more than one primary weapon per line troop - and those right up front. Without bikes to carry the weight it would not have been feasible. Without the paved roads of Malaya it would not have been feasible either. [South Seas Regiment was another bicycle infantry unit, but they abandoned the bikes on the Kokoda Trail - because they were not helpful] It implies a kind of tactical flexability we don't often attribute to IJA troops. 5th Division was, however, the very best of the best - the only Class A Semi-Motorized Division committed to the SRA operations, the only thing similar was 48th Division - a Semi-Motorized Class B Division. We didn't do well against that one either - and it was outnumbered a whole lot more than 2:1.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Well, we have Tsjui as a primary source. As both leader of the special planning committee for Malaya, and then the Chief of Operations for the army that did it, he surely knew. This is a very unusual practice - and not just for IJA. It is the only instance I am aware of where a non-SOF unit had more than one primary weapon per line troop - and those right up front. Without bikes to carry the weight it would not have been feasible. Without the paved roads of Malaya it would not have been feasible either. [South Seas Regiment was another bicycle infantry unit, but they abandoned the bikes on the Kokoda Trail - because they were not helpful] It implies a kind of tactical flexability we don't often attribute to IJA troops. 5th Division was, however, the very best of the best - the only Class A Semi-Motorized Division committed to the SRA operations, the only thing similar was 48th Division - a Semi-Motorized Class B Division. We didn't do well against that one either - and it was outnumbered a whole lot more than 2:1.

Several of the guys in my team carried multiple weapons in the field.
I personally carried an M 16, an M 79 "thumpgun", and an M 1911a1.
(The M 203 was considered crap).
Expedient alteration of weapons carried devient from any manual/TOE certainly started prior to the Roman Legions, I'm sure.