Tank-Infantry Coordination

[KG Erwin]

I've found that when it comes down it, this is the key to winning in ground combat. All other arms (engineers, recon , artillery, air-support, communications) revolve around this basic combo.

The irony is this : in real-life, the US has had to relearn this repeatedly post -WWII.

This conclusion is readily apparent to players of games like SPWaW.

Some of us (this gamer included), have preached the value of combined-arms, but it really boils down to a squad or more of ground troops trudging just behind or beside that armored vehicle.

In the US Army, in the latter stages of WWII, it became common for tank units to serve with particular infantry units on a permament basis -- the "Combat Group", as such, was kept intact.

I tend to institute this process earlier in the construction of my long-campaign core forces, with independent tank platoons attached to each rifle company. This works particularly well with the USMC. As such, then, I discard the concept of an independent tank company -- the tank company HQ becomes superfluous.

Some of you guys may dislike this concept -- the "blitzkrieg" fans in particular.

What I am arguing is that tank-infantry coordination is mutually supportive -- neither dominates in the combat role.

[vahauser]

One of the most difficult challenges in single-player vs. computer is to design an "all-arms" battlegroup capable of fighting in any terrain in any weather against any opponent.  And trying to do this with a starting core between 2500 and 3000 initial points makes the challenge even greater.
 
If enemy air superiority is thrown in, then the challenge becomes greater still.
 
Allied battlegroups have to contend with Axis airpower early in a campaign, and Axis battlegroups have to contend with Allied airpower later in a campaign.  Hard to say which is worse.
 
Without trying to create a flame war, I believe that the ETO is the most challenging theater, especially if the player plays a Generated Campaign against multiple enemies and in varied terrain.  In that kind of campaign environment, the player is called upon to be extremely creative and adaptive and flexible in the organization and re-organization of his core over the course of the campaign. 
 
All arms are needed to succeed.  I have found that 25%-33% armor, 25%-33% infantry, and 33%-50% supporting units (AA, artillery, ammo, transport, recon, etc.) can be successful.  In a core of 90-100 units and around 2750 initial core points, that translates to around 20-30 tanks, 20-30 infantry, and 30-50 supporting units.

[KG Erwin]

Yeah, I know what you prefer, and I will eventually get back to my own "combat world". My force has 17 AFV, 4 81mm mortars, two LVTs and three reinforced rifle companies -- total cost 2079 points. I thought about expanding the force, but decided against doing so. BLT 1/5 WILL return to action soon.

[Kevin E. Duguay]

Erwin,

Your blowing wind!
Infantry should always support tanks.
When Russia did not do this in WWII they had their butts handed to them.
The Germans on the other hand seemed to allways have some kind of infantry support for their tanks.

[vahauser]

KED,
 
Erwin isn't necessarily blowing wind.  In the PTO a player can be more successful with an infantry-heavy force than he would be in the ETO. 
 
In the ETO, I commonly face 100-300 enemy tanks in my battles (100+ when I'm advancing and assaulting, 200-300 when I'm delaying and defending).  A player in the PTO will rarely have to deal with that kind of enemy tank density.  Since the battles in the PTO are less intense, the player can rely more on his infantry.
 
Another factor to consider is that Erwin plays Long Campaigns.  Long Campaign battles are typically 5-10 turns longer than Generated Campaign battles.  Those extra 5-10 turns means that Erwin can adopt a more leisurely playing style.  And that also means that he can employ an infantry-heavy force more effectively.
 
So, no, I don't think Erwin is blowing wind.  He knows what works for him in the PTO.
 
--V

[Kevin E. Duguay]

vahauser,

Now that I see its a game problem and not a historical problem, then I agree![;)]

[KG Erwin]

A specfic game problem may lie in the AI purchase routines, but the Enhanced team tried to get the AI-purchased forces closer to a proper combined-arms mix. The AI tends to buys lots of what's cheap. Now, in the case of the Japanese, it's lots of infantry, arty and mortars. In the long campaigns (at least in the jungle phase), it seldom if ever buys any armor. That's fine. This automatically gives the USMC player an advantage, even with the light tanks they are restricted to buying.

However, these light tanks are subject to close-assault and quick destruction at the hands of Japanese infantry and the early-war tank hunter teams. It took the real-life Marines a while to realize the obvious lesson of keeping the tanks protected by infantry.

Historically, it wasn't until mid-1944 (at Saipan) that the techniques of tank-infantry coordination began to be perfected in the PTO.

Until that time, it was barely mentioned or taught in basic-training or the advanced-training schools. The tankers and the riflemen worked these out on their own, learning on the battlefield.

Even at the time of Tarawa, with the introduction of the Shermans into the Pacific, when these tanks lumbered ashore was the first time the men of 2nd MarDiv had even SEEN a Sherman, much less getting a chance to work with their crews in any sort of coordinated action.

This point is often overlooked. Tarawa itself was in actuality a test. The concept of amphibious assault against a pepared beach defense had never been tried by the US, much less attempting to establish doctrine for combined-arms coordination in this mission. They were literally making it up as it happened.

[azraelck]

Really, I think it should be said that Tanks and Infantry should be supporting each other. While infantry was fighting and winning battles for far longer than tanks were around, they need the tank, and aircraft, and artillery, to breach fortified positions, silence machine guns and infatry guns, and shut down enemy artillery. However, the Artillery would be overrun without the infantry out in front protecting it, the aircraft cannot occupy territory, and the tank will become isolated and destroyed.

The German Blitzkrieg was not just a bunch of tanks en masse striking hither and yon. Those tanks were combined with a mobile infantry and artillery support, and with Luftwaffe giving them support from above. They then used the classic Sun Tzu teachings of striking where your enemy is weak, using mased firepower (not just tanks, but total firepower) to break through quickly, and using their mobility to cut behind the enemy. This severed their supply lines, and allowed for a slower force to come in and mop up the weakened, isolated elements. Their entire early victory over the BEF and France didn't come because they had the best tanks. In fact, they mostly had light and nearly useless Panzer I and IIs, mixed with smaller numbers of Panzer III and IVs. It was due to France and Britain's holding to WWI ideas and tactics, and the suprise of Germany striking through the Ardennes, where the Allies were weaker due to popular misconception.

The early Russian campaign also shows this to be fact. The Germans used the same tactics, punch through, encircle and isolate, then destroy. They were stopped because of Hitler's ego, lack of foresight, and incompetence more than anything, which led them to being stalled at Stalingrad, when they should have struck straight at Moscow, and concentrated on cutting the head off the snake. Stalingrad was an expensive and fatal mistake that only happened because Hitler wanted to bruise Stalin's ego.

Infantry and Tanks must support each other. In WWII and more modern warfare, it has been proven time and time again. The lone tank is vulnerable, and modern weapons have made it so that the infantry charges of the Medieval era are more foolish than heroic. This has come at one hell of a price. Just look at the losses sustained during WWI.

[KG Erwin]

Azraelck, the point that I was trying to emphasize is that the US Armed Forces kept having to relearn this lesson over and over, even until the time of the Iraq War. Amazingly, no official tank-infantry SOPs existed until recently (2003). The mind-set of the latter 20th century was strictly in terms of an armor battle vs the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Central Europe. I would argue that this mindset also affected earlier iterations of Steel Panthers, but that's another topic.

[azraelck]

No arguments there, Gunny. To me, it seems our armed forces' upper echelon just can't seem to read. Sadly, while I have all respect for the actual soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen in our military, I have very little for the high up officers. I know most are probably competent, but throughout the years there's been a lot of mistakes made that were unneccesary, and could have been avoided if they'd paid attention to what prior conflicts had taught. It's not just the US Military though. Great Britain, France, most of the major powers show the same repeating of the mistakes.

[Krec]

from my personal experience,  i go with inf heavy with armor support.  the main reason is the amount of points gained when armor or actually any high point unit (anything over say 150) ,  which typically is armor  ie tanks / tds.   is killed .    the game gives alot of points for those high priced units when they are destroyed/crews killed .    so would i rather have say a tiger or 8 -12 platoons of rangers.   the tiger may kill 1-3 platoons but believe me i will kill that beast and be greatly rewarded .  so for me its a matter of what the game gives.  i used to play the opposite ,  that is armor with inf support and the fact is,  it just was not consistantly successful in its outcome.   the darn inf is so hard to spot and is so deadly to AFV that to play any other way is to put yourself at a disadvantage.  just my thought on the topic.
 
Krec[8D]

[Kuokkanen]

ORIGINAL: Krec

the darn inf is so hard to spot and is so deadly to AFV that to play any other way is to put yourself at a disadvantage. just my thought on the topic.

When I started Long Campaign (haven't played it for month), I had plenty of points (default amount, I didn't know it can be changed) to buy core force. I ended with two Sherman companies, Stuart company, couple pairs of Jeeps, some TDs and two mechanized infantry companies. I had plenty of points to get another mechanized company (or artillery or AA which I didn't think at the time), but I thought that this amount of stuff gives plenty to do for one turn. Hell, I may spend over hour with ONE turn! Now imagine if I had half number of tanks but lots more of infantry! Too much time!

[vahauser]

Matti,
 
I think Krec is talking about his online games against other humans. 
 
In single-player against the computer, a tank-heavy force supported by infantry can be much more successful, especially in the ETO.