Dream Features

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"Not at all. Its just IMHO that the author first had a theory and then went about an analysis to support this theory. Rather than anaylisng data to come up with a theory."

Well. Science is a recursive thing. Testing a theory with data is part of the process, and usually regarded (by scientists, at any rate) as a better way to approach a problem than to look for patterns in data and come up with an explanation. But both approaches are in fact used and complementary.

"Regarding fitting the Scenerio. Cynacal and I were discussing the the hypothetical engagement of the decisive naval battle envisioned by both sides in their pre-war plans useing pre-war ships. "

Ah. I missed that. So if the battles happen in 1940-1941, radar is not a big phenom.

"RE. "Sunda Strait."

I agree that it is surprising that the IJn scored any hits. Less so, however, when you consider that Perth and Houston were boxed in. IMO the biggest tactical mistake, given Perth/Houston's objective (run away) was when Perth challenged the shadowing Japanese DD. The Allies should have played mum and seen how far they could get. But then, inaggressive skippers aren't necessarily the best guys to have running your bridges. Still, a crappy hit rate for the IJN torpedoes coupled with some really wild-axxed lousy gunnery on both sides.

"Re: "Balikapan"

My point wasn't about the torpedoes. It was about the doctrine. US DD skippers knew that if one could get the enemy in torpedo water, especially if one was undetected, then the best tactic was to volley torpedoes until you had all the hits you could claim. US DD skippers knew this as a matter of routine. Now, if you're talking the pre-1941 war, it is unclear whether the USN skippers would have been given license to operate without being tethered to the battle line. If you're talking a start after June 1942 it is more likely, IMO, that DD flotillas are given greater flexibility on when and how to engage.

"The US DDs attacked a virtually defenceless conoy at anchor. The transports where perfectly silouetted by Burning oil wells and protected by only 3 patrol craft."

And an they were also protected by an IJN CL-DD group, at least until it went roaring into the darkness looking for submarines. Again: "So much for superior night optics."

"Hardly the resounding aclimation of USN night tactics that you claimed it to be."

Not a resounding acclaimation. Just an observation that the right doctrine was in place as a result of training prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Hence, no need to invoke the mystique of "learning curve."

"The effect of close range LL torp attack as demostrated in the Solomons is undeniable."

It's completely deniable, or at least disputable. Type 93a was demonstrably quite effective at Savo and Tassafaronga. Virtually absent at 1st and 2nd Guadalcanal, particularly wherein at the latter engagement the best weapon at teh IJN's disposal for use against USN fast battleships (the Type 93a) was completely ineffective.

"Re "Suriago Staight anology" Yes I agree, but I wasnt discussing 43 and on , I was discussing mid 30s up to mid 42."

Bueno. I missed that earlier. But if you get much prior to 1941 then you have no real Kido Butai, and the a/c in use are fixed-gear biplanes or something, not Zeros. I'd take an F2 or even an F3 (retractable carriage biplane version of the F4) against one of the Japanese stringbags any day. In those circumstances, you also have the TBD, Wind-indicator, and the first "Helldiver" (also a biplane) looking like pretty good tactical bombers because the IJN opposition to them would have been far less effective than Zekes.

"I'm saying that in the DBS the IJN mission would be solely to press the attack against the opposing surface force. That was not the case in most of the examples."

You're entitled to your opinion, of course. Still seems to me like a lot of rationalizations aimed at dismissing key data points. Unless, of course, your DBS-pre-1941 scenario doesn't actually involve the IJN *invading* anywhere.

I never said the USN skippers didnt know how to use torps. They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps fireings. The reason the first volly of ten torps all missed was becuase they made ther run at too high speed. That will happen with enexpirence. You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. It wasnt a factor at Balikapan becuase of those oil fires. All in all under the circumstances though I think those old US four stackers did a bang up job throughout the DEI campaign. They certainly outperformed ther RN and Dutch Navy counterparts and stood up credibly to more modern IJN counterparts.

Re: IJN screening force: You can blame the Japanese commander for sending off the whole screen to chase after a sub, but you cant blame the optics. Their optics were good, but they couldnt see into the futrue!

Re"Long Lance deneabiltly". I guess we can agree to disagree, In 1st Guadacanal the artical states that IJN scored 6 hits. Damaging the Atlanta, Portand and Junea and sinkin 2 US DDs Vs. no IJN ships being hit by torps. A 12.5% success rate. Whcih supports the IJN DBS.

Re:Aircraft; I dont think Wildcats were deployed on carriers until 41 either. F2s were never fully deployed on carriers. Just a few transitional squadtons I think. So pre 40 USN basically got biplane fighters too. They do have TBDs and "Vibrators" though. Not sure when vals and kates joined the Kido Bhutai. Basically I agree that pre 1941 niether carrier force would be decisive.

No my DBS doesnt entail the IJN to be in the process of invading anywhere. The decisive engagement was to be a Jutland clash of fleets not some a series of disconnected peicemeal sorties trying to dislogde or resupply ground forces. This is a debate of the outcome of the two combined fleets meeting in a single battle.

[CynicAl]

Correct, F4Fs were not deployed to CVs before 1941, nor were F2As. A 1940 war would have seen USN VF squadrons flying F3F biplanes against the IJN's A5M monoplanes. Sounds like a mismatch at first, but it turns out that it's not so much. The US plane had an enclosed cockpit and retractable undercarriage, both of which the A5M lacked. The A5M was only just faster than the F3F in level flight (a difference of <10 kts, IIRC), and had a higher wing loading, a lower power-to-weight ratio, and considerably less range than the Grumman. Both are lightly armed by WW2 standards, and neither would have armor plating or self-sealing tanks, at least not for a while. The A5Ms only advantages are a marginal level speed advantage, and maybe an advantage in diving speed. The two sides are pretty evenly matched, at least until the A6M reaches the fleet. As for attack aircraft... The IJN will have the B5N (a 1937 type) and the D3A (a 1939 type) in service for a 1940 war, though the D3A in particular may be in short supply at first. Intercepting these types will probably be a headache for the F3Fs; the good news for the US is that the A5M lacks the range of the A6M, so they're likely to be unescorted. The USN will be relying on SB2Us and TBDs; less capable than the SBDs and TBFs of 1942, certainly, but they won't be going up against A6Ms, either. The A5M will have its own problems trying to intercept these types, especially since the F3F does have the range for the escort mission.

It's also worth noting that the massed-CV formation known as the First Air Fleet wasn't formed until April, 1941; prior to that date, IJN CV doctrine was much more like that of the US. The number of flight decks available to each side was also a little closer in 1940 than it was in December 1941; the IJN had 4 fleet and 2 light CVs (one of which was Hosho, hardly even worth counting;)), while the USN had four fleet CVs, plus Ranger; with Wasp coming on-line mid-year. Some of these would be detailed to the Atlantic, but in the event of a shooting war with Japan it's likely that both Lexingtons and both Yorktowns would be made available for Pacific service, making the odds pretty even in the CV department. The CVs, prior to 1941, probably will cancel each other out - a net win for the US in terms of the DBS.

Neither the Japanese nor the Americans envisaged the DBS occurring in response to a Japanese invasion of anywhere. On the contrary, both sides expected that it would take place in the course of a US attack on Japanese-held territory. Over time, planners on both sides looked at scenarios focused around the Bonins, Ryukus, Marianas, and Marshalls. By 1940, US planners had long accepted that the Japanese, being on the defensive, would choose the time and place for the DB. And yes, the US did know about the IJN's DB fixation. Not all the details - the LLs would have (and indeed did) come as a bit of a shock in their first engagements, for example - but enough to have a pretty good idea of how the Japanese meant the scenario to play out.

[CynicAl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT


Hi Cynaical

I will agree that the extreme long range torp. aspect of the plan was probalbly not get the results envisioned. Particularly against the light forces. Might have had a better chance against the slow pre-war BBs though. In any case IJN planed to follow up the Longrange attack with to quote your source "suicidal" close in engagement. Again the IJN were perfectly willing to sacrifice the light forces in order to widdle down the USN Battle line. I think you are right in that the Long range attacked probabley wouldnt score many hits but I think it would have at least disrupted the the battleline. Its hard to keep in formation while avoiding even long range torp attacks. The US BBs in disarray the IJN BBs would be able to get the superior position and get in the all important first salvos.

This is where the IJN DBS really comes off the rails, though. The extreme-range LL shots at the USN light forces were supposed to clear the path to the US main force, but they're not going to succeed in that. The IJN light forces would salvo their LLs, draw off and reload their tubes, then press in expecting the way to be mostly clear all the way in to the BBs; they'd hit the largely undamaged US screen and chaos would ensue. Now the Japanese would have had three options: fire off more LLs at the screen from long range; close the range and then fire off more LLs at the screen; or try to get by the screen on guns and guts, saving the remaining LLs for the US battle line. The third is the doctrinally correct choice, and at least some skippers would undoubtedly have tried to do just that; but just as certainly some of the precious LLs (probably many, possibly most) would be expended in the tangle with the US screen. Odds are that relatively few torpedos will actually be launched at the US main force during the night battle. As for disrupting the formation, the Japanese night attack forces were also supposed to take part in the daylight phase of the DBS. If they have time to extract themselves, get organized, and rejoin Combined Fleet after making their attacks, then it's probably safe to assume that the surviving USN ships would have time to resume formation. The Night Battle phase was supposed to attrite the US main force, not disrupt it.

Edited for clarity.

[mdiehl]

"They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps firings. .... [and] .... You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. "

Agreed. Of course, the thing about *alternate* history is that it's *alternate.* Meaning that I'm game to try the alt history that you propose but expect that such a game gives the Allies the option of fiddling with the initial conditions.

"Even so the US DD was sunk and a US CA was hit by torps. No IJN ship was hit by torps."

None was sunk. There were IIRC three non-detonating hits fired by one US DD that passed within a few hundred yards of a Japanese CB (Kirishima was it?). The run was too short from the launching DD to the target. Did not matter though. The big guns fired at night by USN ships crushed the opposition that night. Point to allies. Failure of DBS noted.

Let me ask a rhetorical question. How many of the actions listed on that web site do you dismiss as invalid data points because they do not meet the assumptions of the DBS? What does that tell you about the fragility of the DBS doctrine in the face of real world operating conditions? What does it say about the DBS if the only circumstances in which its assumptions apply are circumstances where there is a set-piece engagement, where the Allied ships are known as to number and type, and where every Japanese weapon system works to expectations rather than to their actual historical reliability and accuracy?

Since you have to have a war for the attempted implementation of DBS, how does Japan get that war without invading somewhere? Once the war starts, what stops the US from leveraging an oil embargo and just resting for about 8 months while Japan's economy tanks? IMO the DBS was flawed at the strategic level because no matter how the war starts, it automatically becomes about places rather than ships.

Re:Aircraft.

Agreed about generally indecisive. But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by CynicAl


This is where the IJN DBS really comes off the rails, though. The extreme-range LL shots at the USN light forces were supposed to clear the path to the US main force, but they're not going to succeed in that. The IJN light forces would salvo their LLs, draw off and reload their tubes, then press in expecting the way to be mostly clear all the way in to the BBs; they'd hit the largely undamaged US screen and chaos would ensue. Now the Japanese would have had three options: fire off more LLs at the screen from long range; close the range and then fire off more LLs at the screen; or try to get by the screen on guns and guts, saving the remaining LLs for the US battle line. The third is the doctrinally correct choice, and at least some skippers would undoubtedly have tried to do just that; but just as certainly some of the precious LLs (probably many, possibly most) would be expended in the tangle with the US screen. Odds are that relatively few torpedos will actually be launched at the US main force during the night battle. As for disrupting the formation, the Japanese night attack forces were also supposed to take part in the daylight phase of the DBS. If they have time to extract themselves, get organized, and rejoin Combined Fleet after making their attacks, then it's probably safe to assume that the surviving USN ships would have time to resume formation. The Night Battle phase was supposed to attrite the US main force, not disrupt it.

Edited for clarity.

Yes, in retrospect the IJN would have been better off scrapping the daylight action all together. They would be better off captializing on the confusion on the night action. Come to think of it. Do you know if the artical represents the lastest final version of the IJN DBS? I seem to remember reading somewhere I think it was "Yamamoto, the Reluctant Admiral" that the IJN DBS had evolved into being an all night action. Thats why they put so much enfences in developing night fighting tactics, night optics, and flashless powder. Not totally positive though.

I think the plan to use the Kongos to break through would also be foolhardy. history shows that they lacked the armor to withstand even 5" and 8" shells never mind 14" and 16" shells. They would be better off and more useful sticking with the main battle fleet. Keeping the USN light forces at bay while the BBs slugged it out.

One problem I have with the articals examples is that none of them demonstrate the effect of a long range Torp attack on a Slow BB battline. All the examples save one, involve relatively fast manueverable light forces. Which as demonstrated had little trouble avoiding long range torp attacks. The one example against BBs were against two of the USN fast modern BBs under circumstances where the IJN was the defender not the attacker.

Where I see the IJN plan working (albeit unexpectedly) is that even if the Long range LL attack doesnt score the hits envisioned. It would have undoubtly disrupted the Battleline. The slow USN BB line would have a choice of keeping formation and takeing some hits or breaking formation to avoid hits. If its the former than the IJN starts getting the attrition it needs. If its the latter then the IJN battline can start pounding the dispersed USN BBs. It is unlikely that the USN could similarly disrupt the IJN battleline due the relatively short range and unreliabilty of the US torps.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"They were considerably less practiced at it due to pre-war bugetry retraints that didnt even allow for much dummy torps firings. .... [and] .... You cant deny the pre-war USN certainly trained far less extensively for night action than did there IJN counterparts. "

Agreed. Of course, the thing about *alternate* history is that it's *alternate.* Meaning that I'm game to try the alt history that you propose but expect that such a game gives the Allies the option of fiddling with the initial conditions.

"Even so the US DD was sunk and a US CA was hit by torps. No IJN ship was hit by torps."

None was sunk. There were IIRC three non-detonating hits fired by one US DD that passed within a few hundred yards of a Japanese CB (Kirishima was it?). The run was too short from the launching DD to the target. Did not matter though. The big guns fired at night by USN ships crushed the opposition that night. Point to allies. Failure of DBS noted.

Let me ask a rhetorical question. How many of the actions listed on that web site do you dismiss as invalid data points because they do not meet the assumptions of the DBS? What does that tell you about the fragility of the DBS doctrine in the face of real world operating conditions? What does it say about the DBS if the only circumstances in which its assumptions apply are circumstances where there is a set-piece engagement, where the Allied ships are known as to number and type, and where every Japanese weapon system works to expectations rather than to their actual historical reliability and accuracy?

Since you have to have a war for the attempted implementation of DBS, how does Japan get that war without invading somewhere? Once the war starts, what stops the US from leveraging an oil embargo and just resting for about 8 months while Japan's economy tanks? IMO the DBS was flawed at the strategic level because no matter how the war starts, it automatically becomes about places rather than ships.

Re:Aircraft.

Agreed about generally indecisive. But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.

Hi Mdiehl

Well Re: Alternate history. This particular alternate history simply entails a earlier starting time for the war and no Pearl harbor. Two completely plausible Alternate history parameters. When you start going back and start to fiddle around with things such as unhistorical bugetary retraints; ship building capacities and priorities; tactical doctrines and training. The scenerio starts to loose pluasibility and hence credibility. It may be fun but it would not be realistic. IMHO

I hardly think the 1st Guadacanal was a crushing victory for the allies. It has been historically considered an allied tactical defeat. Putting the entire US cruiser force out of action. Hence the need to dispatch the carrier TF BBs for 2nd Guadacanal. Admittedly it is considered a strategic victory because it stop the bombardment of Henderson field. I think the IJN lost only one DD that night. The Hie was damaged, but it took the cactus airforce to actually sink her.

RE; "Your rhetorical question" I dont dismiss any on those grounds. But is it too much to ask that you exclude scenerios that have IJN BBs loaded with HE shells on their decks? Or the ones were the IJN ships are either escorting or carrying troops? Or the fact that the very definition of the DBS means the IJN would choose where its fought. ( Read Cynacals post for clarificaion)

The F2s were rejected because their landing gear were too weak for carrier operations. The need to add more armor and self sealing fuel tanks severely dimished their performance. And like you said the inability of Brewter to fufill orders. Only the Saratoga and Lexingtons temporarily deployed F2s. The Enterprise and Yorktown went straight from F3s to F4s. No matter what similarities of the F3s and F4s, you still are not going to magically have F4s deployed on carriers 40/41.

[mdiehl]

"It is unlikely that the USN could similarly disrupt the IJN battleline due the relatively short range and unreliabilty of the US torps."

The disruption and significant damage to the IJN battleline is quite likely and results directly from the lopsided (in favor of the US) number of heavy shells falling on the IJN battle line at long range.

Japan's chances improve if the action can be made to occur at close range and at night, but the DBS still requires that the USN play by the IJN's script. If the USN refuses to commit the main battle line at night (which they'd be reluctant to do, because visual ranging is much easier in daylight and the USN has the advantage by virtue of the number of heavy guns -- so why would they throw away such an obvious advantage for the much riskier and less controllable prospect of a night engagement), then DBS does not have a prayer of working.

If the Japanese CA battle line attempts to close at night I see them running into the USN DD/CA battle line while the USN BBs refuse. If the combat is a meeting engagement with prepared, alerted forces, something like 1st Guadalcanal results (lots of badly damaged ships all around) with neither side's CA/DD elements in a strong position to carry on the fight the next day.

Hey, here's a better way maybe to make the DBS work. Let the main battle lines slug it out in a meeting engagement at daylight. The IJN BB line gets crushed, the USN BB battle line gets badly hurt. *Then* the IJN rushes in with the CA-DD elements and mops up what it can.

"Putting the entire US cruiser force out of action. [at 1st Guadalcanal]"

Yeah. Both of them [damaged.] In exchange for a CB [sunk]. I'd call that an Allied strategic victory and a tactical victory since the Japanese mission was thwarted and they lost alot of tonnage in the process.

And yes. I do think that discounting battles that do not meet the assumptions of the DBS is a trivial reduction of the historical evidence. It reduces to the statement that "Japan successfully implements the DBS if they successfully implement the DBS." Discounting these battles allows one to pretend that the Japanese assumption that the US will engage when, where and how the Japanese want them to, and that IJN equipment will work as hoped-for, are correct. It's similar to the Japanese war-games before Midway. We'll pretend that the USN carries won't ambush us at Midway because that's not what we want or expect them to do.

"When you start going back and start to fiddle around with things such as unhistorical bugetary retraints; ship building capacities and priorities; tactical doctrines and training. The scenerio starts to loose pluasibility and hence credibility. It may be fun but it would not be realistic. IMHO"

I haven't posited anything ahistorical or incredible. The F4 was in design in 1939. The US production capacity was available. US Industry was way over capacity and underused. Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war. Or the fulfillment of the Japanese desire for a series of set piece engagements all occur under conditions favorable to Japan with results that favor Japan. Or the assumption that Japan gets a war without attacking anything (your non-invasion scenario). Or the USN rushing willy-nilly into a set of engagements when the historical oil-embargo can simply be allowed to radically deteriorate Japan's war making potential while US potential simultaneously grows. Embargoeing Japan and letting their economy collapse is, after all, just the old "Anaconda Strategy" resurrected for a new place and time.

[CynicAl]

MDiehl:
But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.

Brewster Aircraft was fundamentally mismanaged, with a horribly inefficient plant layout and serious quality control problems. There was basically no chance that they could ever supply the USN with enough fighters; they were over-committed and over-extended and "as fast as they could" wasn't nearly fast enough to meet their contractual obligations to their various customers. Perhaps some of the foreign-ordered aircraft could be impressed into US service in a PacWar 1940 scenario, in fact that's likely; but it's still never going to be enough. Also, as has been pointed out, weight growth caused by fitting the kit needed to make the F2A combat-worthy fatally reduced the F2A-3s flight performance and overstressed the landing gear. So even if you could get F2As, you wouldn't want them.

As for the F4F: The F3F biplane was developed into the XF4F-1 biplane, which was rejected. After a major redesign, resulting in essentially a completely different aircraft, Grumman produced the XF4F-2 monoplane. That also was rejected, but the Navy encouraged Grumman to keep trying because they wanted a fallback position in case Brewster turned out not to be able to deliver as promised (very wise, as it turned out). After yet another significant revision of the design, Grumman submitted the XF4F-3 for the Navy's approval - the first version of the F4F to offer a performance advantage over the Buffalo. But there were still several more and less serious teething issues to be worked out, especially in the areas of stability and engine cooling. The earliest the Navy could have taken delivery would have been late July or August of 1940, assuming that they appropriated the aircraft originally ordered by France. Even so, they wouldn't likely have F4Fs in frontline service until early 1941.

Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war.

No and yes. The development of the F4F-3 was not as smooth as you seem to think; it was actually fairly torturous for that time. By the time all necessary modifications were in place and you actually set up the assembly line(s) to start mass-producing the things, you can't get these aircraft out to the fleet much faster than was done historically, no matter how much money you throw at the problem. The big US production advantage didn't start kicking in until 6 months or more into the war; the first stage of the war was spent geraring up - and this despite the extended "short of war" period available for preparation historically, a period which our AH is curtailing or even eliminating. Eventually, the US production advantage is going to become overwhelming. But it 's not going to happen in the first six months of war, and probably not in the first year.

TimJO'T:
Yes, in retrospect the IJN would have been better off scrapping the daylight action all together. They would be better off captializing on the confusion on the night action. Come to think of it. Do you know if the artical represents the lastest final version of the IJN DBS? I seem to remember reading somewhere I think it was "Yamamoto, the Reluctant Admiral" that the IJN DBS had evolved into being an all night action. Thats why they put so much enfences in developing night fighting tactics, night optics, and flashless powder. Not totally positive though.


I can't be certain of course, but I believe the main event - the cataclysmic clash of the opposing battle lines - was still set to occur during daylight the morning after the Night Battle Phase. I haven't read Reluctant Admiral, though - I'm going (as I believe the author of the article was) mostly from the plans discussed in Evans and Peattie's Kaigun. (A terrific book, btw, and I highly recommend it to anyone with an interest in the subject of pre- and early-war IJN planning.)

Where I see the IJN plan working (albeit unexpectedly) is that even if the Long range LL attack doesnt score the hits envisioned. It would have undoubtly disrupted the Battleline. The slow USN BB line would have a choice of keeping formation and takeing some hits or breaking formation to avoid hits. If its the former than the IJN starts getting the attrition it needs. If its the latter then the IJN battline can start pounding the dispersed USN BBs.

The Japanese envisaged the battle line acton and the NBP as two entirely separate events, with sufficient time in between for their light forces to disengage and rejoin the main body before the main action could begin. So any disruption to the US formation during the NBP is not terribly relevant to the BB-vs-BB slugfest that would follow, because there would be plenty of time to regroup.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Production of the Wildcat would not be as fast to get into as the current game but not as slow as you think. A lot of F4F production went to England in 1941. If the US had gone to war in, say June 40, they would not have sent as much to England (early) if they experienced shortages. However, in 1941 the Marine Air Wings experienced a MAJOR spurt of growth. Before then they only really existed on paper (the 1st MAW was established, but the 2nd MAW was still forming). The men were there, but the equipment was not. VMF-211 was equipped with the most early version of the F4F (3) to see production, so early that it did not have folding wings.

Here is a quote from an F4F website, wich corresponds to others...

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ac-u ... es/f4f.htm

"Testing of the XF4F-3 led to an order for F4F-3 production models, the first of which was completed in February 1940"

"By the end of 1941 the Grumman F4F-3 (and similar F4F-3A) fighters, which had received the popular name "Wildcat" a few months earlier, had replaced the F2A in most U.S. Navy and Marine Corps fighting squadrons"

So, the F4F replaced most pre-war formations fighter aircraft by the end of 1941...

(here's another site that backs this information up)

http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/W ... d_info.htm

"Export orders for the Grumman G-36 had been placed in 1939, when France purchased 81 G-36As; this entire order was transferred to Britain in June 1940, and the first aircraft, with its British name of Martlet I, was delivered on July 27, 1940, ahead of F4F-3 deliveries to the USN. By December 1940, 22 F4F-3s had been accepted by the Navy, and initial deliveries were being made to VF-4 (USS Ranger) and VF-7 (USS Wasp) at Norfolk Naval Air Station in Virginia. During 1941, VF-42 and VF-71 were equipped with F4F-3s as well as Marine Squadrons VMF-121, 211 and 221. In addition to further contracts for the F4F-3, Grumman received a USN order for 95 F4F-3As, these being powered by R-1830-90 engines with single-stage superchargers. A prototype installation of this engine had been made in the single XF4F-6 late in 1940 when the two-stage blower was still giving trouble; production of the small batch of F4F-3A fighters was largely an insurance against failure of the newer engine. The F4F-3A was used by Navy Squadron VF-6 and Marine unit VNIF-l II."

So, by December 1940 the US had produced 100 F4F-3's (80 to the UK and 22 to the USN). The USMC VMF were not converted until 1941.

The production of the A6M was started earlier then the F4F, and reached the IJN in numbers faster then the F4F for the USN.

War with Japan was not suspected until mid 1942, and had it arrived in 1940 (most likely with the fall of France in June had the Japanese taken advantage like Italy) the USN would have been equipped with whatever fighter was available in numbers at the time, definitely not the F4F. Although the US did not go into war production until mid-late 1941 the production of the F4F could not have covered the needs of the navy for at least a few months in 1940 (and only if it cancelled the British orders).

HOWEVER, the development of the A6M lagged behind that of the F4F, but since the IJN did not have an "F2A fiasco" they were able to produce A6M's in larger numbers then the US producing F4F's.


So, had the war started in 1940 both the USN and IJN would be using aircraft at the end of their operational life (A5M for the IJN, and a few F2A's, along with some straggler F2F's). Both would start to produce modern F4F's and A6M's. The US would have a slight handicap (which would be quickly fixed) with the production of the F2A getting priority over the F4F (but due to manufacturing problems the war would have sorted this out quicky with Grumman getting the big contract). Theis would give the IJN a slight breather to produce A6M's to replace the A5M's, but eventually US production (like in 1941) would overcome.

Why would a 1940 alternate history game be overall better for the Japanese? It would be better because the Allies (Britain, India, Australia, Dutch) would be less then proportionately weaker then the Japanese. Malaya would not have a single fighter (the F2A's did not arrive until 1941!) and just some Blenheims and Vildebeest bombers, along with the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions in even poorer conditions (they were just formed in 1940).

The Dutch (which just reeled from the loss of their homeland a month earlier) would not have any F2A's (relying just on Hawk-75 and Martin 139w's), the Sumatra and Jacob Van Heemskerk would be month's from arrivng (having just escaped from Holland) and the land forces would still be alomst 100% in their colonialist form (just small formations, no Brigade or Divisions).

Burma would just have the divided Burma Division, India would have to rely on troops sent back from the Middle East.

Australian AIF divisions would start off with very little experience (having not been through 2 years of war in Africa).

The Philippines would be primarily just the Philippine Division (4th Marine Division would be trapped at Shanghai) with Philippine Units existing only on paper. P-26's would still be in the USAAFFE inventory (both Ki-27 and A5M's could have easily delat with these).


The IJN and USN would have been toe to toe in regards to Aircraft Carriers, the Essex class would appear historically (since the thing limiting their production earlier would be lack of design! This was the reason the USS Hornet was built). There would probably have been more Yorktown class carriers built in lieu of the Essex design.

The end result of the game would be the same, US production would overwhelm Japanese. Still, it would be better then just playing the 1941-45 scenario over and over, plus it would give historians some creative license!

[mdiehl]

Thanks for the clarifications CynicAl. I knew Brewster had management problems, and that the F2 series was not desired, but it always helps to provide details.

In the AH I had in mind that the immediate need for an a/c while the F4F was in the development stage might be satisfied by giving the Brewster design and contract to another vendor as a stop-gap waiting for the F4F in quantity. Part of the presumption is that the F2 is accepted as a stop-gap, warts and all, with the absent armor and self-sealing tanks. The performance stays barely-acceptable, but your pilots and planes are at risk in the same way as Japanese pilots and planes are at risk. Then again, an F2 is a crappy plane against a Zeke, but against an A5?? The Finns seem to have done well enough with F2A3s against better a/c than the Japanese were fielding on their carrier decks.

Don't ask me who the additional vendor(s) might be. Maybe Seversky, CW or even a license agreement with Polikarpov or someone. (And the Heavens Wept. But then, that's why it's called "alternate" history.)

I did not mean to imply that the transition to the F4 was seamless. Only that if you throw enough cash at a problem you can usually expedite the attainment of a (expensive) solution. I'm assuming that under wartime conditions, the pace of development, retooling and refit would have been greatly accelerated. Both in the production and the R&D arenas, & across the board into other areas (radar, powerplants, the whole ball of string).

I don't think you can assume under the proposed AH scenario that the US preparations that started in 1940 (vis, increased pilot training, getting industry prepared for a major rev-up) are prevented by an early war start. You still have to have some premise for your war, and that in turn means IMO a period of tension-escalating episodes similar to the ones that occurred historically. Maybe starting with the Panay incident and building (rather than easing off) accretionally from that point onward.

I still can't see how the proposed AH scenario gets past the need for invasions. If Japan goes to war with the US, Japan loses access to oil. That, in turn, mandates invasions... which disperses the Japanese fleet, &c ad nauseam. It's still WW2. It's still a strategic game and it's still one where the US is going to make darned sure that it's flexing its economic muscles along with the military ones.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"It is unlikely that the USN could similarly disrupt the IJN battleline due the relatively short range and unreliabilty of the US torps."

The disruption and significant damage to the IJN battleline is quite likely and results directly from the lopsided (in favor of the US) number of heavy shells falling on the IJN battle line at long range.

Japan's chances improve if the action can be made to occur at close range and at night, but the DBS still requires that the USN play by the IJN's script. If the USN refuses to commit the main battle line at night (which they'd be reluctant to do, because visual ranging is much easier in daylight and the USN has the advantage by virtue of the number of heavy guns -- so why would they throw away such an obvious advantage for the much riskier and less controllable prospect of a night engagement), then DBS does not have a prayer of working.

If the Japanese CA battle line attempts to close at night I see them running into the USN DD/CA battle line while the USN BBs refuse. If the combat is a meeting engagement with prepared, alerted forces, something like 1st Guadalcanal results (lots of badly damaged ships all around) with neither side's CA/DD elements in a strong position to carry on the fight the next day.

Hey, here's a better way maybe to make the DBS work. Let the main battle lines slug it out in a meeting engagement at daylight. The IJN BB line gets crushed, the USN BB battle line gets badly hurt. *Then* the IJN rushes in with the CA-DD elements and mops up what it can.

"Putting the entire US cruiser force out of action. [at 1st Guadalcanal]"

Yeah. Both of them [damaged.] In exchange for a CB [sunk]. I'd call that an Allied strategic victory and a tactical victory since the Japanese mission was thwarted and they lost alot of tonnage in the process.

And yes. I do think that discounting battles that do not meet the assumptions of the DBS is a trivial reduction of the historical evidence. It reduces to the statement that "Japan successfully implements the DBS if they successfully implement the DBS." Discounting these battles allows one to pretend that the Japanese assumption that the US will engage when, where and how the Japanese want them to, and that IJN equipment will work as hoped-for, are correct. It's similar to the Japanese war-games before Midway. We'll pretend that the USN carries won't ambush us at Midway because that's not what we want or expect them to do.

"When you start going back and start to fiddle around with things such as unhistorical bugetary retraints; ship building capacities and priorities; tactical doctrines and training. The scenerio starts to loose pluasibility and hence credibility. It may be fun but it would not be realistic. IMHO"

I haven't posited anything ahistorical or incredible. The F4 was in design in 1939. The US production capacity was available. US Industry was way over capacity and underused. Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war. Or the fulfillment of the Japanese desire for a series of set piece engagements all occur under conditions favorable to Japan with results that favor Japan. Or the assumption that Japan gets a war without attacking anything (your non-invasion scenario). Or the USN rushing willy-nilly into a set of engagements when the historical oil-embargo can simply be allowed to radically deteriorate Japan's war making potential while US potential simultaneously grows. Embargoeing Japan and letting their economy collapse is, after all, just the old "Anaconda Strategy" resurrected for a new place and time.

Mdiehl

Again you seem to be losing site of the context of the discussion.regarding the DBS. We are not really discussing if the Decisive Surface Battle "COULD" or "WOULD" happen. We are discussing if the two combined fleets "DID" meet on the open seas to do battle . What "MIGHT" have happened. In this context the possibility of ships being engaged in shore bombardment and escort duty is irrevelent to the subject.

Of course when the war starts. the US could just sit back a year or two, wait for superior production capacity to come into play and just overwelm Japan. Again this totally irrelavant to the discussion. We are talking about fighting a battle with the weapons on hand.

[mdiehl]

"In this context the possibility of ships being engaged in shore bombardment and escort duty is irrevelent to the subject."

Well, inasmuch as the Type 93a torpedo and all other torpedoes are ineffective at shore bombardment, the failure of the Type 93a (and other torpedoes) to achieve the expected results in the engagements that you have dismissed are highly relevant to your 1-battle-in-a-bathtub-winner-takes-all scenario.

I'll allow that a Jutland type single-battle engagement would be fun to try out, even if I don't buy your assumption that the Japanese torpedoes would have been more effective than they were. (I find that no more plausible than SJ radar throughout the Pacific fleet in 1941.) You might try AP's "War Plan Orange" and one of those PBEM utilities like cyberboard. The scenario you envision is probably gameable right now without waiting for WitP.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"In this context the possibility of ships being engaged in shore bombardment and escort duty is irrevelent to the subject."

Well, inasmuch as the Type 93a torpedo and all other torpedoes are ineffective at shore bombardment, the failure of the Type 93a (and other torpedoes) to achieve the expected results in the engagements that you have dismissed are highly relevant to your 1-battle-in-a-bathtub-winner-takes-all scenario.

Basically, the Battleship Admirals of both fleets had this in plan, a decisive battle. It never really happened in WW2, as attrition took place, and Midway was decisive only in changing the initiative of the war (not an immediate war winner).

I do not think that a war in 1940 would have resulted in drastically different tactics then a war in 1941. Sure, the acts of the Carrier would be less influential (due to the lack of British experience in the Medeterranean for the US and IJN to follow). However, had the US Pacific battlefleet NOT have been put out of action in 1941 I do not think that the USN would have tried a decisive fleet action. When Atlantic battleships were brought in, in early 1942, and you add the slightly damaged battleships at Pearl Harbour that were quickly repaired (Tennesse, Maryland, Pennsylvania) the US Pacific Fleet was almost to 1941 size, yet, it was kept out of action and they did not try a major fleet engagement.

The main reason why this would not happen in 1940 (and did not in 1941/42) is because what would the fleet have done had it sailed out to the middle of the Pacific? Guam and Wake Island were NOT major bases that a battlefleet could work from. The Fleet would have to rely on a train of Oilers, plus be in the middle of Japanese territory (the IJNAF still had G3M and G4M bombers in 1940!). It would take a while for a US Army relief convoy to be put together for the Philippines, and without a reason to sail there, the Pacific Fleet could only act on the Japanese Periphery (South Pacific). Prettymuch the war would have progressed as in 1941, except aircraft types would be not 'quite' as efficient (since most will be starting off with A5M/Ki-27/P-26/F3F/F2A instead of A6M/Ki-43/F4F/Hurricane). Aircraft design would not have been sped up much (you will not be seeing 1945 designed aircraft in 1943 because the war started sooner).

Not only would there be less Japanese LCU's and Air Groups in the Pacific Operations, the Allied LCU's and Air Groups would be in even poorer condition (major Allied reinforcement of the Pacific did not take place until middle of 1941).


Why would there be war in 1940?

June 1940, Italy joins the war and France signs and armistice. As a part of the Armistice France gives Northern Indo-China to the Japanese. In Mid 1941 Japan occupies the southern half, this is what triggers US embargos.

What if...

1. In June 1940, along with Italy, Japan declares war on the weakened Allies (France on the brink of defeat and England's focus is on defending their home island). The US sees this as a threat to the Philippine Islands and declares war (or is declared war on by Japan to secure the Philippines before the US uses them as a base to cut off resources from the homeland).

2. In June 1940, Japan occupies the North (or All) of Indo-China, which starts a US emgargo in 1940 instead of 1941 (speeds ip the start of the war 1 year).

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by CynicAl
MDiehl:
But in the alternate history I do not think we have to assume that if the war starts in 1940 that the US fights only with F3s. F2s were, after all, accepted, (albeit with reluctance) because they were better than F3s. In a pinch their production would have increased. The chief concerns, IIRC, were that Brewster could not produce planes and parts fast enough if it came to a war (whereas Grumman could), and that the Grumman design was inherently more rugged. Moreover, as the F4 is basically a redesign of the F3, the lag-time between the F4 and F3 is likely to be very brief.

Brewster Aircraft was fundamentally mismanaged, with a horribly inefficient plant layout and serious quality control problems. There was basically no chance that they could ever supply the USN with enough fighters; they were over-committed and over-extended and "as fast as they could" wasn't nearly fast enough to meet their contractual obligations to their various customers. Perhaps some of the foreign-ordered aircraft could be impressed into US service in a PacWar 1940 scenario, in fact that's likely; but it's still never going to be enough. Also, as has been pointed out, weight growth caused by fitting the kit needed to make the F2A combat-worthy fatally reduced the F2A-3s flight performance and overstressed the landing gear. So even if you could get F2As, you wouldn't want them.

As for the F4F: The F3F biplane was developed into the XF4F-1 biplane, which was rejected. After a major redesign, resulting in essentially a completely different aircraft, Grumman produced the XF4F-2 monoplane. That also was rejected, but the Navy encouraged Grumman to keep trying because they wanted a fallback position in case Brewster turned out not to be able to deliver as promised (very wise, as it turned out). After yet another significant revision of the design, Grumman submitted the XF4F-3 for the Navy's approval - the first version of the F4F to offer a performance advantage over the Buffalo. But there were still several more and less serious teething issues to be worked out, especially in the areas of stability and engine cooling. The earliest the Navy could have taken delivery would have been late July or August of 1940, assuming that they appropriated the aircraft originally ordered by France. Even so, they wouldn't likely have F4Fs in frontline service until early 1941.

Regardless of the year that the war starts, you get the US historical production superiority over Japan. The budgets automatically get changed the moment you posit the existence of a war between Japan and the US. So yes, indeedy, you get F4s on most of the US flat-tops in 1940 if you start the war in 1939.

What really stretches credulity is the assumption that US production and budgets for same would *not* increase in response to a war, or that ship production schedules in the US would *not* be advanced in response to a war.

No and yes. The development of the F4F-3 was not as smooth as you seem to think; it was actually fairly torturous for that time. By the time all necessary modifications were in place and you actually set up the assembly line(s) to start mass-producing the things, you can't get these aircraft out to the fleet much faster than was done historically, no matter how much money you throw at the problem. The big US production advantage didn't start kicking in until 6 months or more into the war; the first stage of the war was spent geraring up - and this despite the extended "short of war" period available for preparation historically, a period which our AH is curtailing or even eliminating. Eventually, the US production advantage is going to become overwhelming. But it 's not going to happen in the first six months of war, and probably not in the first year.

TimJO'T:
Yes, in retrospect the IJN would have been better off scrapping the daylight action all together. They would be better off captializing on the confusion on the night action. Come to think of it. Do you know if the artical represents the lastest final version of the IJN DBS? I seem to remember reading somewhere I think it was "Yamamoto, the Reluctant Admiral" that the IJN DBS had evolved into being an all night action. Thats why they put so much enfences in developing night fighting tactics, night optics, and flashless powder. Not totally positive though.


I can't be certain of course, but I believe the main event - the cataclysmic clash of the opposing battle lines - was still set to occur during daylight the morning after the Night Battle Phase. I haven't read Reluctant Admiral, though - I'm going (as I believe the author of the article was) mostly from the plans discussed in Evans and Peattie's Kaigun. (A terrific book, btw, and I highly recommend it to anyone with an interest in the subject of pre- and early-war IJN planning.)

Where I see the IJN plan working (albeit unexpectedly) is that even if the Long range LL attack doesnt score the hits envisioned. It would have undoubtly disrupted the Battleline. The slow USN BB line would have a choice of keeping formation and takeing some hits or breaking formation to avoid hits. If its the former than the IJN starts getting the attrition it needs. If its the latter then the IJN battline can start pounding the dispersed USN BBs.

The Japanese envisaged the battle line acton and the NBP as two entirely separate events, with sufficient time in between for their light forces to disengage and rejoin the main body before the main action could begin. So any disruption to the US formation during the NBP is not terribly relevant to the BB-vs-BB slugfest that would follow, because there would be plenty of time to regroup.

CynicAl

True but, according to the article the IJN planed to press a second even bigger torp attack. Again, "suicidal if neccessary" at the opening of the daylight surface action.

[TIMJOT]

The Daylight torp attack, again according to the article; was to be a spread of 280 torps expected to hitting and crippling ten capital ships. I dont know what constitutes crippling but lets say an average of two torp hits per ship, more or less. That would mean only a 7% hit rate was needed for at least the second attack. Well within the range of the articles analysis.

This attack was to be followedfollowed up by a charge of 48 DDs and 3 CLs to mount a close range torp attack. The total torp potential of this attack would have been 411. Lets say half of the attackers are destroyed or disable before they can launch. That still leaves aprox. 200 torps potentially launched at close range. The article's examples demonstrate that a close range the the IJN achieved aprox 12-13% hit rate. That would translate into a least an additional 24 hits. A potentially devasting blow, considering the leathalness of the Long Lance's warheads.

Now I just want to clarify that am not a big fan of the IJN plans either. I also think is way too complicated (ala Midway), calling for the needless dispersion of force and over reiliance of long range torp attacks.

Ive already stated that in a theoretical straight-up , head to head clash between USN pre-war BBs against IJN pre-war BBs that IMO the USN wins. My only caveat is that the Long lance could have tiped the scale enough in Japans favor, inspite of their plan not becuase of it.

[CynicAl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
CynicAl

True but, according to the article the IJN planed to press a second even bigger torp attack. Again, "suicidal if neccessary" at the opening of the daylight surface action.

-------------------------------------

The Daylight torp attack, again according to the article; was to be a spread of 280 torps expected to hitting and crippling ten capital ships. I dont know what constitutes crippling but lets say an average of two torp hits per ship, more or less. That would mean only a 7% hit rate was needed for at least the second attack. Well within the range of the articles analysis.

This attack was to be followedfollowed up by a charge of 48 DDs and 3 CLs to mount a close range torp attack. The total torp potential of this attack would have been 411. Lets say half of the attackers are destroyed or disable before they can launch. That still leaves aprox. 200 torps potentially launched at close range. The article's examples demonstrate that a close range the the IJN achieved aprox 12-13% hit rate. That would translate into a least an additional 24 hits. A potentially devasting blow, considering the leathalness of the Long Lance's warheads.

Now I just want to clarify that am not a big fan of the IJN plans either. I also think is way too complicated (ala Midway), calling for the needless dispersion of force and over reiliance of long range torp attacks.

Ive already stated that in a theoretical straight-up , head to head clash between USN pre-war BBs against IJN pre-war BBs that IMO the USN wins. My only caveat is that the Long lance could have tiped the scale enough in Japans favor, inspite of their plan not becuase of it.

But get this - the forces that Japan planned to use in the daylight torpedo attacks? Exactly the same ships previously used in the "suicidal if necessary" night attack a few hours before. NO accounting for attrition. NO accounting for units that get turned around in the dark and the chaos and fail to rejoin. NO accounting for ammunition expenditure - even though the plan was that they should shoot off all their torps during the NBP! The Japanese assumed that their forces would suffer ZERO losses in the NBP - and would be entirely immune to the inevitable confusion of a large-scale night surface battle - and would magically have their ships restocked with torpedos by dawn! The IJN planners came up with the perfect plan - if their objective was the destruction in detail of their own fleet.

[mdiehl]

"The Daylight torp attack, again according to the article; was to be a spread of 280 torps expected to hitting and crippling ten capital ships. I dont know what constitutes crippling but lets say an average of two torp hits per ship, more or less. That would mean only a 7% hit rate was needed for at least the second attack. Well within the range of the articles analysis."

*Not* within the 7% hit rate. All but one of the hit rates that exceeded 6% occurred in night attacks launched at short range to medium range (out to about 7500 yards). The one exception was also a night attack in which 1 torpedo of four launched hit at extreme range. Taking the mean hit rates from *daylight* attacks only, the most likely outcome of a daylight torpedo attack is no hits: mode = 0, median = 0; mean (a.k.a. "average") = 1%, standard deviation 1.6%. Assuming that the Japanese are *extremely* lucky and hit the right hand side of the distribution *3 standard deviations better than the mean* (a probability of about 7% rounding up, if you want to roll percentile dice on it), the Japanese achieve six (well, 5.8) hits. Since hits tend to occur in clusters (that is, a spread that gets a hit is likely to get more than one hit), the result is one US capitol ship heavily damaged or sunk.

To answer the obvious follow-up question, "what are the stats for a night torpedo attack?":

Assuming that the IJN launches a night torpedo attack from medium to short range (stipulated above) the results are: mean=7.4%, mode 0 *or* 12-13% (I'm playing loose with "mode" here), median 8.3%, standard deviation 6.0.

So the night torpedo attack is a very strange phenomenon, statistically speaking. The distribution is sxxt, with a cluster at zero hits and a cluster around 12-13% (excluding the one-off 25% aforementioned as an obvious outlier). At least half of the *salvoes* launched can be expected to miss entirely. The other half can be expected to hit at an accumulated rate of 12-13%. Since, again, one hit in a salvo probably predicts a second hit from the same salvo, with an 8 torp spread you're looking at 2-4 hits. I'm not sure how to model this now because stats aren't very helpful for such wacky distribution curves. You'd have to look at the number of ships launching and the number of torps per salvo.

It comes out something like nine of ten ships that survive long enough to launch salvoes at medium to short range miss completely. If they dump off at medium range (say, 2500-7500 yards for the Type 93a, admittedly based on historical effects not theoretical maximum range) it's probably more like 19 of 20 salvos miss. At short range closer to nine of ten. Of those that hit, you can expect multiple hits per salvo.

So if the DBS is to have a prayer of success it absolutely has to be a night torpedo attack at relatively close range. It would help an awful lot if the US fleet has, at the time of the attack, its collective thumb up its axx, as it did at Savo Island, or as the commanding admiral did at Tassafaronga, because those circumstances are the ones where Japan gets hits in the 13% range.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard


Basically, the Battleship Admirals of both fleets had this in plan, a decisive battle. It never really happened in WW2, as attrition took place, and Midway was decisive only in changing the initiative of the war (not an immediate war winner).

I do not think that a war in 1940 would have resulted in drastically different tactics then a war in 1941. Sure, the acts of the Carrier would be less influential (due to the lack of British experience in the Medeterranean for the US and IJN to follow). However, had the US Pacific battlefleet NOT have been put out of action in 1941 I do not think that the USN would have tried a decisive fleet action. When Atlantic battleships were brought in, in early 1942, and you add the slightly damaged battleships at Pearl Harbour that were quickly repaired (Tennesse, Maryland, Pennsylvania) the US Pacific Fleet was almost to 1941 size, yet, it was kept out of action and they did not try a major fleet engagement.

The main reason why this would not happen in 1940 (and did not in 1941/42) is because what would the fleet have done had it sailed out to the middle of the Pacific? Guam and Wake Island were NOT major bases that a battlefleet could work from. The Fleet would have to rely on a train of Oilers, plus be in the middle of Japanese territory (the IJNAF still had G3M and G4M bombers in 1940!). It would take a while for a US Army relief convoy to be put together for the Philippines, and without a reason to sail there, the Pacific Fleet could only act on the Japanese Periphery (South Pacific). Prettymuch the war would have progressed as in 1941, except aircraft types would be not 'quite' as efficient (since most will be starting off with A5M/Ki-27/P-26/F3F/F2A instead of A6M/Ki-43/F4F/Hurricane). Aircraft design would not have been sped up much (you will not be seeing 1945 designed aircraft in 1943 because the war started sooner).

Not only would there be less Japanese LCU's and Air Groups in the Pacific Operations, the Allied LCU's and Air Groups would be in even poorer condition (major Allied reinforcement of the Pacific did not take place until middle of 1941).


Why would there be war in 1940?

June 1940, Italy joins the war and France signs and armistice. As a part of the Armistice France gives Northern Indo-China to the Japanese. In Mid 1941 Japan occupies the southern half, this is what triggers US embargos.

What if...

1. In June 1940, along with Italy, Japan declares war on the weakened Allies (France on the brink of defeat and England's focus is on defending their home island). The US sees this as a threat to the Philippine Islands and declares war (or is declared war on by Japan to secure the Philippines before the US uses them as a base to cut off resources from the homeland).

2. In June 1940, Japan occupies the North (or All) of Indo-China, which starts a US emgargo in 1940 instead of 1941 (speeds ip the start of the war 1 year).

Jeremy

I agree by 1941, it wasnt the USN plan to seek a decisive sea battle. WPO3 called for the USN to go on the defensive. This is why IMHO, Pearl Harbor was Japans "first" and "worst" defeat. It achieved nothing of either strategic or tactical signifcance, while elimating any possibility, however remote for an eventual negotiated settlement. Which by the way, was the best Japan could ever hope for in a war with the US. All PH did was give the USN a convenient excuse to actually implement WPO3.

What would the USN have done differently if there was no PH? Probably nothing. WPO3 dictated that the PI would be abandoned and the fleet would not commit any major units to the defense of the Malaya barrier. Instead it would mount limited hit and run raids against Japanese bases in the central pacific in an attempt to draw off pressure from the British and the Dutch. Enventually a reinforced fleet would mount a methodical advance through the central Pacific. This is exactly what the USN ended up doing. PH didnt even delay WPO3. Within a month of PH US carrier TFs were already raiding the IJN central Pacific basis. As planned.

That being said, wars seldom follow pre-war plans. With that in mind, I do see a possibility (albeit remote) of a scenerio that results in a classic decisve fleet action. First lets assume there is no PH and the Japanese just attack the PI on Dec.8,1941. Now WPO3 calls for sacrificeing the PI. A desision somewhat palitable if the PI as expected falls quickly. But what if the PI doesnt fall quickly? It instead stubornly holds out as it historically did. One month, two months, then three months passes and still the garrison holds out. What then? On paper its easy to abandon the garrison to its fate. But war is not fought on paper. It might be Politically and emotionally impossible for an "intact" US Fleet to just stand by, while the garrison suffers. The honor and reputation of the Navy would be at stake. They would risk the ire of the army, not to mention the American people. The longer the PI held out the more probable the USN would have to act.

This being the case. The only possibility of relieving the PI would be to sorte the whole Pac Fleet in an attempt to overwelm the IJN with overpowering force. Thereby setting up the aforemention decisive fleet action. Most likely in the vacinity of the Marianas or Philipine Sea. IMHO of course.

[mdiehl]

"One month, two months, then three months passes and still the garrison holds out. What then? On paper its easy to abandon the garrison to its fate."

"The longer the PI held out the more probable the USN would have to act."

"The only possibility of relieving the PI would be to sorte the whole Pac Fleet in an attempt to overwelm the IJN with overpowering force."

I just don't agree with your view of things. Partly because your plan for the US response suffers from a lack of imagination, and partly because the adjectives that you use in a deterministic way ("The longer the PI.... the *more probable*... and "The *only* possibility...) aren't supported by anything quantified.

You have no basis for claiming that your scenario is more probable than any other scenario, and the lack of imagined alternatives suggest that the "only possibility" is merely the only one that you want to consider.

Since the PI (elements of it anyhow) held out until May 1942 you're talking about a historical example in which the PI garrison was written off even after 5 months of fighting. Moreover, WPO3 did not envision any relief to the PI for at least a year, contingent upon the availability of force (WPO3 did not envision a simultaneous war with Germany). In my view the PI gets written off until or unless the US Island hops its way back to Guam and has substantial air assets in the area anyhow. That means if Bataan and Corregidor somehow manage to hold out until 1944 and then fall because Mac Hasn't Returned Yet, that's just how it plays out. But Japan's pride IMo isn't going to let the PI live that long, even if it means postponing or canceling the Burma campaign.

But if you really want to mess with Japan's head, you force Kaigun to face you on your own terms. Reinforce the Indonesian barrier and begin bombing the crap out of every Japanese economic installation within range of a B24 or B17. Force the IJN to sortie into Allied-held waters where B25s, tactical single engined bombers, and P40s can be made available in abundance, and pull off a reverse-DBS on the IJN by attriting them with bombs, air and sub-launched torpedoes, and mines. When the Big Fight happens off the Celebes, Kaigun sorties with about half of the light elements that the IJN DBS battle plan calls for, and 2/3 of the treaty and non-treaty CAs. Once Kaigun has been crushed, advance back into the PI via Davao and Borneo using air supremacy to adcantage the whole way.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by CynicAl


But get this - the forces that Japan planned to use in the daylight torpedo attacks? Exactly the same ships previously used in the "suicidal if necessary" night attack a few hours before. NO accounting for attrition. NO accounting for units that get turned around in the dark and the chaos and fail to rejoin. NO accounting for ammunition expenditure - even though the plan was that they should shoot off all their torps during the NBP! The Japanese assumed that their forces would suffer ZERO losses in the NBP - and would be entirely immune to the inevitable confusion of a large-scale night surface battle - and would magically have their ships restocked with torpedos by dawn! The IJN planners came up with the perfect plan - if their objective was the destruction in detail of their own fleet.

Well if that was there plan .............

"IT SUCKS!!!!!!!!!!!!!"