What WW2 Scenario Would We Like?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: nelmsm

I'd like to see a hypothetical where by some miracle the Germans achieve their goals during the Bulge and the Americans/Brits/French sign a separate peace agreement and the Germans redeploy most of their forces to face the Russians alone.

I think that's very unlikely. The German goal was to reach Antwerp- and the Allies were aware of this. Ignoring the immense difficulty the Germans would have had in attaining this goal in the prevailing conditions, Roosevelt historically stated that if the Germans took Antwerp, the United States would raise 200 divisions.

A more reasonable possibility is one in which the July plot is successful and, with Normandy still looking fairly indecisive, the Germans offer some deal which is very generous in the west but is unacceptable to Russia.

[nelmsm1]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: nelmsm

I'd like to see a hypothetical where by some miracle the Germans achieve their goals during the Bulge and the Americans/Brits/French sign a separate peace agreement and the Germans redeploy most of their forces to face the Russians alone.

I think that's very unlikely. The German goal was to reach Antwerp- and the Allies were aware of this. Ignoring the immense difficulty the Germans would have had in attaining this goal in the prevailing conditions, Roosevelt historically stated that if the Germans took Antwerp, the United States would raise 200 divisions.

A more reasonable possibility is one in which the July plot is successful and, with Normandy still looking fairly indecisive, the Germans offer some deal which is very generous in the west but is unacceptable to Russia.

I've got to agree that this might be a more plausible scenario base, or even making it that that the Germans drove the Allies back into the sea, giving them a year's breathing space to pull troops from France to send to Russia. Something along these lines would be what I would like to see.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: nelmsm

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: nelmsm

I'd like to see a hypothetical where by some miracle the Germans achieve their goals during the Bulge and the Americans/Brits/French sign a separate peace agreement and the Germans redeploy most of their forces to face the Russians alone.

I think that's very unlikely. The German goal was to reach Antwerp- and the Allies were aware of this. Ignoring the immense difficulty the Germans would have had in attaining this goal in the prevailing conditions, Roosevelt historically stated that if the Germans took Antwerp, the United States would raise 200 divisions.

A more reasonable possibility is one in which the July plot is successful and, with Normandy still looking fairly indecisive, the Germans offer some deal which is very generous in the west but is unacceptable to Russia.

I've got to agree that this might be a more plausible scenario base, or even making it that that the Germans drove the Allies back into the sea, giving them a year's breathing space to pull troops from France to send to Russia. Something along these lines would be what I would like to see.

I think a more reasonable way to get to where I assume you want to go is to figure a 1943 D-Day that is smashed back into the sea. Hitler calls off Kursk, trades space for time in the East, deals a death blow to the invasion, and then races back to face the advancing Russians on more equal terms than he did historically.

Ironically, a June 1943 D-Day might have forced Hitler to implement what was in fact a promising 'backhand' strategy in the East: let the Russians advance, then catch them disorganized and out of supply with a powerful counterattack.

If he can then deal a crushing blow to the Russians, he might be able to force them to accept a negotiated peace -- in which case the Western Allies have really got a challenge on their hands. It probably goes to nukes in 1945 -- and in turn to a much less subdued modern Germany that sees itself as having lost the war solely because the Allies 'cheated.' Also, presumably a non-Communist Eastern Europe -- but then, we got there eventually anyway. Poland certainly would have a different shape.

[KoenigMKII]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think that the thing about Seelowe is that while one can plausibly rearrange history to give it a fair chance of success, it remains a hair-raisingly risky proposition from the German point of view almost no matter how one stacks the deck.

This was in fact more or less Hitler's take on it. It would be an operation to be undertaken if Germany was in a desperate situation, and Germany was not in a desperate situation. That was the gist of what he had to say on the subject.

Rationally, the thing to do upon the fall of France was not to attempt Seelowe, but to methodically isolate England and render her position untenable. Bring Spain in, eliminate Gibraltar, and use Ferrol to increase the threat to her sea routes. Make concessions to the French to gain the use of Dakar and Syria. Encourage Japan to attack her holdings in the Far East. All these powers were quite willing to cooperate with Germany in the early summer of 1940 -- Hitler all but ignored them. The most extreme example would be his reply to Japan's overtures along these lines: 'harvest help not needed.'

Hitler didn't need or even want to conquer Britain -- just to force her to acquiesce in his plans. I think a solid case can be made that all the steps I have mentioned above were eminently achievable -- and I think the pressure on Britain could have been racheted up to the point where it would have been unbearable. Moreover, note that the actual resources Germany needs to commit to follow the above course are minimal.

However, Hitler didn't even do this much. Rather, he halted in puzzlement when Britain failed to agree he had won the war, hemmed and hawed, tried to scare her with the threat of invasion, and then turned to the more congenial task of plotting the destruction of Russia. Largely, he thereafter simply ignored Britain as much as possible -- never pursued a coherent policy with regards to her at all.

Of course, none of this means Seelowe is an operation that never could have happened. Hitler was not famously rational, and given a different attitude on his part towards Britain, simply invading her would have been very appealling. After all, if successful, an invasion would certainly deliver quick results, and there'd be no nonsense about negotiating a settlement. Moreover, after the fall of France, German morale and self-confidence was sky-high. They might have had a go.

Colin, I agree with your post above. A question for you, if I may, one thing that bothered me is that the Luftwaffe air bases in the Historical battle of Britain seemed to be deployed quite far back, to make surprise counter-air attack impossible for the RAF.

If Seelowe had been launched, possibly pinning the RAF above the channel to defend the RN, that makes the two sides more equal in combat endurance/range. The Luftwaffe had more experienced pilots, thats going to hurt the RAF. If the RAF loses air superiority to the Luftwaffe over the channel, then its down to the RN to go on alone, is there a period of days of moonlight in early september that could have been used to uncloak the RN?

In Bright moonlight with perfectly clear skies its even possible to hit ships. The Dambusters raid was conducted in strong moonlight at low level, making it a double surprise. I don't have the moonlight tables for that period - do you know where such information could be found?

Manstein really was a clever and highly skilled commander he must of considered these factors, thats the only reason I can think of for him to say "we should have tried it."

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: KoenigMKII

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I think that the thing about Seelowe is that while one can plausibly rearrange history to give it a fair chance of success, it remains a hair-raisingly risky proposition from the German point of view almost no matter how one stacks the deck.

This was in fact more or less Hitler's take on it. It would be an operation to be undertaken if Germany was in a desperate situation, and Germany was not in a desperate situation. That was the gist of what he had to say on the subject.

Rationally, the thing to do upon the fall of France was not to attempt Seelowe, but to methodically isolate England and render her position untenable. Bring Spain in, eliminate Gibraltar, and use Ferrol to increase the threat to her sea routes. Make concessions to the French to gain the use of Dakar and Syria. Encourage Japan to attack her holdings in the Far East. All these powers were quite willing to cooperate with Germany in the early summer of 1940 -- Hitler all but ignored them. The most extreme example would be his reply to Japan's overtures along these lines: 'harvest help not needed.'

Hitler didn't need or even want to conquer Britain -- just to force her to acquiesce in his plans. I think a solid case can be made that all the steps I have mentioned above were eminently achievable -- and I think the pressure on Britain could have been racheted up to the point where it would have been unbearable. Moreover, note that the actual resources Germany needs to commit to follow the above course are minimal.

However, Hitler didn't even do this much. Rather, he halted in puzzlement when Britain failed to agree he had won the war, hemmed and hawed, tried to scare her with the threat of invasion, and then turned to the more congenial task of plotting the destruction of Russia. Largely, he thereafter simply ignored Britain as much as possible -- never pursued a coherent policy with regards to her at all.

Of course, none of this means Seelowe is an operation that never could have happened. Hitler was not famously rational, and given a different attitude on his part towards Britain, simply invading her would have been very appealling. After all, if successful, an invasion would certainly deliver quick results, and there'd be no nonsense about negotiating a settlement. Moreover, after the fall of France, German morale and self-confidence was sky-high. They might have had a go.

Colin, I agree with your post above. A question for you, if I may, one thing that bothered me is that the Luftwaffe air bases in the Historical battle of Britain seemed to be deployed quite far back, to make surprise counter-air attack impossible for the RAF.

Well, by the height of the Battle of Britain, most of the Luftwaffe's Bf-109's were jammed into the Pas de Calais. The bombers had sufficent range so that they could just use the various major airfields already in existence in France and the Low Countries.

The British did try some night bombing of German airfields during the Battle of Britain. These raids had little effect. The results of their attempts at daylight bombing were so uniformly disastrous in 1940-41 that I'm not sure the Luftwaffe would have exactly objected to a more serious effort. One strike lost all eleven of eleven bombers sent out.

If Seelowe had been launched, possibly pinning the RAF above the channel to defend the RN, that makes the two sides more equal in combat endurance/range. The Luftwaffe had more experienced pilots, thats going to hurt the RAF. If the RAF loses air superiority to the Luftwaffe over the channel, then its down to the RN to go on alone, is there a period of days of moonlight in early september that could have been used to uncloak the RN?

In Bright moonlight with perfectly clear skies its even possible to hit ships. The Dambusters raid was conducted in strong moonlight at low level, making it a double surprise. I don't have the moonlight tables for that period - do you know where such information could be found?

Manstein really was a clever and highly skilled commander he must of considered these factors, thats the only reason I can think of for him to say "we should have tried it."

First, I'm not sure a full moon would be a guarantee of much of anything: even at the height of Summer, about half of all days were cloudy, and so, presumably, would be the nights.

Then there are the demands that high tide fall at the right time for a dawn attack, and of course, that the Germans have completed their preparations, gained the requisite air superiority, etc. As it was, you're talking about two-three conceivable five-day windows in the period August-September. Add a requirement for a full moon and you may have just talked yourself out of making the attack at all.

Manstein did indeed say Seelowe should have been attempted: but it's important to realize that he never conducted an amphibious operation in his life. I'm not sure he qualifies as an expert. The army in general had a nasty habit of approaching the whole operation with the attiude that their responsibility began only once all the troops were safely ashore in Britain: getting them there was the navy's problem. Given that, of course Seelowe should have been attempted. The navy does its job, and it's all a snap.

[KoenigMKII]

Colin, thank you for the correction about the Forward Luftwaffe bases in the Pas de calais.

Found the moon table for 1940. May need to correct times for UK as these may be US times, unless universal time= Zulu time=GMT??

1940 Phases of the Moon
Universal Time

New Moon-----First Quarter-------Full Moon------Last Quarter

---------d h m -----------d h m------------d h m------------d h m

---Jul --5 11:28---Jul 12 06:35-----Jul 19 9:55----Jul 27 11:29
---Aug--3 20:09--Aug 10 12:00---Aug 17 23:02---Aug 26 03:33
---Sep--2 04:15--Sept 8 19:32----Sep 16 14:41---Sep 24 17:47
---Oct--1 12:41---Oct 8 06:18----Oct 16 08:15---Oct 24 06:04

As for air superiority, I say it can't be achieved unless and untilSeelowe begins, in fact if the moonlight were matched by fair skys [big if, but if forcast was favorable...] telegraphing the invasion 24hrs before might induce British RAF attacks because of political pressure. Anyway, as soon as the Kriegsmarine begins loading troops and towing barges all hell will brake loose.

I am playing devils advocate here, but the germans planned to beach barges at high tide and let the falling tide make it possible to unload the men and equipment in shallow water. Those barges need flat sea to make it across - so clear skies with low wind - thats asking for a hell of a lot.

I think the crossing has to be attempted in daylight, but the barges are slow. 6-8 hours to cross, midday is 8 hours from dawn in the summer. The real Hitler would never have risked it, but it is curious to take his place as CIC and give the order. Is there a high tide on the south coast just before miday on any of the day following August 17, for example, ?

Did the Germans even have enough air-sowable sea mines to form even one side of the protective minefields required to allow the follow up waves and supplies? Not enough surely, so it would have to be a patchy barrier.

I think all ships up to battleships are vulnerable to the stuka HE bombs. The only part of a battleship that would be vulnerable is the Parallax gun director - that is a very lucky hit indeed though, and it is essential to the accuracy of the main guns only - secondary/tertiary could use adhoc meens to lay the guns. The only hope to stop the British battlewagons are torpedos (not many U-boats this early in the war.) and mines.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: KoenigMKII

Colin, thank you for the correction about the Forward Luftwaffe bases in the Pas de calais.

Found the moon table for 1940. May need to correct times for UK as these may be US times, unless universal time= Zulu time=GMT??

1940 Phases of the Moon
Universal Time

New Moon-----First Quarter-------Full Moon------Last Quarter

---------d h m -----------d h m------------d h m------------d h m

---Jul --5 11:28---Jul 12 06:35-----Jul 19 9:55----Jul 27 11:29
---Aug--3 20:09--Aug 10 12:00---Aug 17 23:02---Aug 26 03:33
---Sep--2 04:15--Sept 8 19:32----Sep 16 14:41---Sep 24 17:47
---Oct--1 12:41---Oct 8 06:18----Oct 16 08:15---Oct 24 06:04

As for air superiority, I say it can't be achieved unless and untilSeelowe begins,

It could be argued that the Luftwaffe did obtain air superiority -- briefly, and of only the most limited kind -- over Southeast England in the first week of September.

In any case, wether they historically did or not or could or not, in my view, the Germans have to gain air superiority prior to Seelowe. They need to drive the British Navy far enough away so that it cannot interfere with the crossing. That boils down to making it prohibitively expensive for the British to continue basing destroyers and light cruisers at Portsmouth, Sheerness, and Harwich. This in turn pretty much demands substantially greater success in the Battle of Britain than was historically achieved.

in fact if the moonlight were matched by fair skys [big if, but if forcast was favorable...] telegraphing the invasion 24hrs before might induce British RAF attacks because of political pressure.


Anyway, as soon as the Kriegsmarine begins loading troops and towing barges all hell will brake loose.

The RAF was bombing the invasion ports already. I'm not sure what they would have started doing that they weren't already engaged in.

I am playing devils advocate here, but the germans planned to beach barges at high tide and let the falling tide make it possible to unload the men and equipment in shallow water. Those barges need flat sea to make it across - so clear skies with low wind - thats asking for a hell of a lot.

I think the crossing has to be attempted in daylight, but the barges are slow. 6-8 hours to cross, midday is 8 hours from dawn in the summer.

What with loading up, clearing the ports, marshalling the tow formations, etc, it was going to be more like a 36 hour operation.

The real Hitler would never have risked it, but it is curious to take his place as CIC and give the order. Is there a high tide on the south coast just before miday on any of the day following August 17, for example, ?

I forget the exact dates, but the Germans wanted to land around dawn, about two hours after high tide (the barges have to be refloated -- you don't want to land at high tide). That pretty much put them into two five day windows: August 20-25 or something and September 17-22 or something.

Did the Germans even have enough air-sowable sea mines to form even one side of the protective minefields required to allow the follow up waves and supplies? Not enough surely, so it would have to be a patchy barrier.

No minefield forms an absolute barrier. They merely impose risk and delay. That is all they were expected to do.

I think all ships up to battleships are vulnerable to the stuka HE bombs. The only part of a battleship that would be vulnerable is the Parallax gun director - that is a very lucky hit indeed though, and it is essential to the accuracy of the main guns only - secondary/tertiary could use adhoc meens to lay the guns. The only hope to stop the British battlewagons are torpedos (not many U-boats this early in the war.) and mines.

The battleships only have to be stopped if they come, and in fact, the British were unwilling to risk their battleships in the Channel -- at least in their initial response. They'd had a nasty experience off the Norwegian coast when HMS Barham was hit by a bomb from an HE 111. While the damage was minor, it made them averse to employing battleships in areas where the enemy enjoyed air superiority.

Later on of course, if it began to look like the Germans were going to hold their beach head, the British might well have sent the battleships in. However, at that point their intervention wouldn't have been decisive. They could briefly interrupt the flow of supplies and reinforcements, but they couldn't just anchor in the Channel, and once they've left, the Germans can resume crossing.