WitP as history lesson: Are the Solomons relevant?

[TommyG]

Every story you read or documentary you see about Guadalcanal starts with the premise that the allies had to stop the constuction of an airfield at Lunga Point in order to protect the sea lanes to Oz. Well, after about two dozen WitP games, I now believe that the Solomons are darn near irrelevant. In most games the Jap player has the whole chain by mid February and the road back usually goes either up from northern Oz or west from the central Pacific. The extra miles in avoiding Bettys on the way to Brisbane is an annoyance but not a serious interference. Unless the map seriously scewers the geography, the Japs would have been better off taking Canton Isle.
I don't question that the campaign was successful and brilliant (after all, my father had an SBD squadron on Henderson and went ashore in August), I do question whether it was as essential as history now proclaims. IMHO, the whole campaign came about because we drew an almost arbitrary line in the sand.

[tsimmonds]

I now believe that the Solomons are darn near irrelevant

Actually they are pretty darn far from me[;)]

I think any geographic spot can be relevant, if you can convince your opponent that he should fight you for it.

[Caliban]

Well stated IRRELEVANT !

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: TommyG

Every story you read or documentary you see about Guadalcanal starts with the premise that the allies had to stop the constuction of an airfield at Lunga Point in order to protect the sea lanes to Oz. Well, after about two dozen WitP games, I now believe that the Solomons are darn near irrelevant. In most games the Jap player has the whole chain by mid February and the road back usually goes either up from northern Oz or west from the central Pacific. The extra miles in avoiding Bettys on the way to Brisbane is an annoyance but not a serious interference. Unless the map seriously scewers the geography, the Japs would have been better off taking Canton Isle.
I don't question that the campaign was successful and brilliant (after all, my father had an SBD squadron on Henderson and went ashore in August), I do question whether it was as essential as history now proclaims. IMHO, the whole campaign came about because we drew an almost arbitrary line in the sand.

A base at Lunga IS probably irrelevant for stopping the Australia Merchant Pipeline..., but as a "stepping stone" it was seen as "a potentially dangerous" advance towards New Caledonia. What made it inviting to the Allies was it was a location to counter-attack which would be as difficult for the Japanese to support as it would be for the US. A place to "draw a line in the sand" that wouldn't just be washed away with the next tide.

[wdolson]

By August 1942, the US was getting desperate for some good news.  The Japanese advance had largely halted in June, but there was a lot of political pressure to go over onto the offensive.  Guadalcanal provided that opportunity.  Intelligence indicated that it was poorly defended and a great location for an air base, which Japan was building.

Before the war, the plans called for a Central Pacific strategy.  Having air bases in the Marshalls, Marianas, and the Philippines would have cut off all Japanese bases to the south.  As the lessons of the firs tyear proved, such a strategy would require quite a few carriers.  The US didn't have the carrier strength to do this strategy in 1942, so something less well defended and closer to other bases was necessary. 

Guadalcanal was at the extreme range of Japanese air from Rabaul.  Though it was also at extreme range from Noumea too.  It was a good launching point for a campaign up the Solomons.  The Allies ended up marching up the Solomons to do something on the offensive while the carrier force rebuilt. 

Irrelevant made the key point, anyplace can be the site of a decisive campaign if you can get the enemy to cooperate.  Guadalcanal became a fight far bigger than either side anticipated.  The Allies weren't quite strong enough yet to have complete control over the area and Japan hadn't yet come to terms with the fact they were fighting a war they couldn't win.

Many of the tipping point battles or campaigns in the real war were like that.  El Alamein was a significant spot geographically.  A natural choke point.  However, Stalingrad was one of those battles that happened because the Russians finally got enough strength in one place to stop the German advance.  The name was symbolic, and the legendary Russian winter helped, but if Germany had been faster or slower in their conquests, the turning point battle might have been at any city on a river in the region.

Guadalcanal happened because circumstances made it a good place to start an offensive and both sides fought like hell for it.

Bill

[TommyG]

We could have raided Guadalcanal, put the under construction base out of comission, then built our own bases outside of fighter range on San Cristobal and/or Rennel. That's what the Japs thought we were going to do, which was one of the reasons they underestimated USMC strength. And, any such bases would have been much easier to supply, reinforce and mount invasions from. But, it did seem to turn out OK the way Halsey did it.

[Yamato hugger]

The main thing was to get within range of a major Jap base to engage them in a war of attrition. In that regard, the Solomons are indeed the best place for it. We spent a year getting experience and the Japs spent a year losing pilots.

[m10bob]

It must be remembered Guadalcanal was a satellite of the real target:Rabaul.
The Japanese had captured this excellent naval/airbase and it recieved all of THEIR attention, re-supplying and headquartering both the Solomons and New Guinea from Rabaul.
Their intent was to create several satellite *defensive* air bases in a ring around Rabaul.
Long-range seaplanes roaming from the Solomons were a hinderance, and would have been much worse had they been allowed to base freely as far south as the 'Canal.
In game, the place does seem somewhat further north (and out of the range) of important sea lanes, but remembering the map is actually starting a banana shaped curve with the Solomons appearing more "out of way" than they really were might make a more noticeable difference for both offense and an aerial defense?
Japanese ambitions were to capture Fija and American Samoa as well. With this in mind, it should be seen the Solomons were also a step to Fiji and Samoa.
Therein lies the real convoy interdiction threat..

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: TommyG

Every story you read or documentary you see about Guadalcanal starts with the premise that the allies had to stop the constuction of an airfield at Lunga Point in order to protect the sea lanes to Oz. Well, after about two dozen WitP games, I now believe that the Solomons are darn near irrelevant. In most games the Jap player has the whole chain by mid February and the road back usually goes either up from northern Oz or west from the central Pacific. The extra miles in avoiding Bettys on the way to Brisbane is an annoyance but not a serious interference. Unless the map seriously scewers the geography, the Japs would have been better off taking Canton Isle.
I don't question that the campaign was successful and brilliant (after all, my father had an SBD squadron on Henderson and went ashore in August), I do question whether it was as essential as history now proclaims. IMHO, the whole campaign came about because we drew an almost arbitrary line in the sand.

Basically accurate. We fought the Japanese in the Solomons because that was where we could reach them. The goal was attrition.

[denisonh]

With the IJN CV force intact and control of the Solomons, supporting major offensive opertions in NG can be a bit tricky. Having the KB show up in the Coral Sea unnanounced can be a bit of a problem.

Also, it can be useful for engaging the Japanese is a battle of attrition in late 42 in the Pacific, especially if the Japanese have taken PM. The Allies need to get thier strengthening forces engaged in late 42, and either NG or the Solomons are the best place to get into a fight that allows the use of the short legged Allied fighters.

As irrelevant said, it can be made important, and the reverse is true.

[panda124c]

Now let me see, if I am the Japanese which do I go for, the Canal or PM....... I can't ignore either one but I don't really have the resources to stop both.... The invasion of GC also had the effect of diverting Japanese resource away from PM.
Death by a thousand pinpricks is still death even though no one pinprick is sign cant.

My two cents for what it's worth.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: pbear

Now let me see, if I am the Japanese which do I go for, the Canal or PM....... I can't ignore either one but I don't really have the resources to stop both.... The invasion of GC also had the effect of diverting Japanese resource away from PM.
Death by a thousand pinpricks is still death even though no one pinprick is sign cant.

My two cents for what it's worth.

Rabaul was a major fortified position (large natural harbour, six major airfields, good communications), and the US eventually bypassed it (Operation Cartwheel) rather than taking it. What the Japanese player needs to do is capture and fortify positions around it that prevent it from being bypassed. Allied air control is deadly, so nearby airbase positions have to be taken and held. The entire complex has to be easy to defend, or else the IJN will be attritioned to death. Work from that.

[Rafael Warsaw]

Heh,

People will fight for what they think is important.

Ie: In my current PBEM my opponent was hiding all of his navy assets for a long long time. I just had to make him come out of the cave - you know, IJN have to buy 3-6 months more to build defences. Several trials faild but one....

I took this and that and I even took Hawaii - nothing really worked till the moment I have made a "looking serious" but small invasion of Christmas. Christmas BEFORE Plamyra. Palmyra is in range of Zeroes from Johnston You know. Next step was to wait a bit and then I sent "Looking serious" but small invasion force to Palmyra.

This was just too much for my allied bud. I think that his emotions told him to draw a line in the sand. He sent what he had, killing some APs but he paid in Sara plus 2 BBs are very havy damaged. Plus his convoy was destroyed, plus he got planes with nowhere to go from palmyra.
Subs plus lots of LBs from Johnston made him pay.

and You know what? I never wanted to have those islands. I dont need them and I never did.

about Solomons: It was after Midway and I can recall that I have read for several times that it was all about a line in the sand.

[JeffroK]

The same can be a good tactic for the Allies, grab a piece of land the Jap is willing to fight over and force him intot a battle of attrition. Equally to grab their attention then hit them after their reserves have been drawn in.
 
PS.. Guadalcanal, believe it or not, was the best Island in the sthn end of the Solomons to fight on and create a base, San Cristobal, Tulagi & Malaita are far more mountainous and lack the natural anchorage that Lunga provides (Of course Tulagi is part of this.)

[Rafael Warsaw]

True about Guadalcanal. Best piece of land to give a fight.

I think that only a ww2 german Army (Army – not political forces) and Modern US (Army plus political think tanks) were able to shake down – “land feature” disease.

Germans were focused on capturing land but only by and thanks to elimination of enemy land assets (You can take what You want when theres nobody left to defend it)
Modern US is focused to blow a political/administrative nerve of a country and sociological break even point (Gore and Awe campaign)

[TommyG]

The point of my initial posting is not that Guadalcanal was a bad place to force the fight; the point was that almost every book, movie, or documentary repeats the fiction that Guadalcanal was essential to the protection of the sea lanes to Australia. WitP disproves that overly simplified explanation. Guadalcanal was a good enough place to draw the line and force the fight, for all of the reasons posted above; the sea lanes were a minor point at best.

[mjk428]

ORIGINAL: TommyG

The point of my initial posting is not that Guadalcanal was a bad place to force the fight; the point was that almost every book, movie, or documentary repeats the fiction that Guadalcanal was essential to the protection of the sea lanes to Australia. WitP disproves that overly simplified explanation. Guadalcanal was a good enough place to draw the line and force the fight, for all of the reasons posted above; the sea lanes were a minor point at best.

I don't think WitP should be used as the proof for your conclusion. The map is artificially skewed, the base sizes are arbitrary*, and supply is heavily abstracted. To name just a few reasons.

It may have been a "line in the sand" but it was a rational decision to not allow the enemy to build up a forward base of that size in that location. It not only further threatened the sea lanes but it would also threaten the bases being built up to use as a springboard.

After Guadalcanal, the Allies generally made smaller jumps so they could move under land based air. So I would agree that building up in Santa Cruz prior to invading Guadalcanal would have been preferable. But sometimes you have to take advantage of a passing opportunity. Waiting until Santa Cruz was built up to leap from would probably have also meant invading a much more difficult objective.


* My pet peeve is bases like Canton Island that equal New Caledonia for max AF size.

[Yamato hugger]

If the Japs had taken it all down to include New Zealand, they still wouldnt have cut the supply line to Oz. It just would have come in from the other side.

[spence]

The increased distance to ship supplies, troops, resources, and oil might very well have stretched the Allied merchant marine past the breaking point. There were only so many bottoms to ship the stuff on and the requirements of fighting a war all over the earth were astronomical. If 100000 tons of shipping takes 60 days to complete a voyage to OZ instead of 30 days you have in essence halved the amount of supplies that can be sent. In 1942 up to early 43 "The Shipping War" was in a state of crisis and reserve shipping was nil. Something somewhere would have had to give had the Japanese "cut" the sea lanes to OZ. Maybe it would have been the Guadalcanal Campaign but maybe it would have been the North Africa landings or the Alemein Offensive: the decision as to what got cut would have been political but based on the logistical realities. Whatever it was it would have been of benefit to the Axis.

[Yamato hugger]

Oz is pretty self suffient. If nothing at all ever got there it wouldnt make Australia surrender. Japs couldnt realistically hope to invade and conquer it. Would only make the build up for counter attack take slightly longer. Net effect: No difference.