ABDA & Malaya commands in CHS

[spence]

quote:

ORIGINAL: ctangus

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

IRL the British could and did reinforce Malaya (18th Div which arrived without serious damage in mid Jan 42). IRL those reinforcements came arguably close to seriously affecting
the whole Japanese timetable for the conquest of the SRA.

My experience is that the "all torpedo all the time" Bettys and Nells can, by the time any significant reinforcements become available, close Singapore to anything other than very minor reinforcement and resupply. The system has pretty much removed the option of trying to hold in Malaya or even make it ahistorically expensive. It almost seems to me that this idea just locks up the Allied Player from having/making any strategic choice and just guarantees the Japanese Player a bigger bag of prisoners (handicapping him with more Victory Points for no particularly good reason).


Even without shipping in the 18th UK Div (I never have but I'm tempted to sometime just for kicks) I've never lost Singers before the historical date. Though it's also true my suggestion was originally for Treespider CHS where there isn't such a great Betty/Nell threat.

Random thought - even if CHS doesn't adopt my suggestion or all of tree's changes I think if Kuching was a level 3 AF at start it could make for a much more interesting game in the first few months. It would make reinforcing Malaya, as happened IRL, a more viable choice in the game, though still dangerous.


Not losing Singapore before the historical date may imply something is wrong with the model itself. While the campaign was admittedly a close one - Yamashita was within a day or so of suspending offensive operations for lack of supply when the British surrendered - if it really is well modeled it SHOULD be falling regularly - if not every time - by the historical date. Worse than that - because virtually no one is sending historical reinforcements - it should be falling sooner. So maybe something is way too hard in the mod/scenario being played?

Not often that I agree with Cid. Singers should fall faster than IRL if unreinforced. But as things stand in the game (Stock and CHS (un-spidered) any division shipped into Singapore would arrive with 10 squads and a 2-pdr (if at all) after 3 turns of visits by the Bettys and Nells from Kuching (and elsewhere) barring incredibly awful weather.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: spence


Not often that I agree with Cid. Singers should fall faster than IRL if unreinforced. But as things stand in the game (Stock and CHS (un-spidered) any division shipped into Singapore would arrive with 10 squads and a 2-pdr (if at all) after 3 turns of visits by the Bettys and Nells from Kuching (and elsewhere) barring incredibly awful weather.

"spidered" vs. "un-spidered" - I like it.

Part of the problem in Malaya may stem from the level of fortification further up the Peninsula. Reduce the forts at Georgetown and Alor Star and we may see a very different campaign.

Although in (spidered) CHS Kates flying from Kuching may produce the same results as Betty's and Nells maybe not... I haven't checked the range to the North coast of Sumatra.

[spence]

Although in (spidered) CHS Kates flying from Kuching may produce the same results as Betty's and Nells maybe not... I haven't checked the range to the North coast of Sumatra.

From Kuching - no but from Singkawang yes.

[Bliztk]

Well, I`m planning to do a "spidered" [;)] version of RHS RAO in a few days (after RHS is frozen) so we can test every approach to see what happens

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: herwin




My experience as well. Giving your generic Nell or Betty unit the equivalent of unlimited nukes results in the Allies not operating AKs in areas where they did operate. I'm willing to take historical losses, but not the losses that occur when every inter-island schooner attracts an attack by a dozen torp-armed Betties. (This has happened more than one in the current PBEM.)

BTW, the Phit for those Japanese torpedoes is excessive, too. Throughout the war, it was about 2 hits per nine aircraft surviving to drop.

Methinks you must not be playing RHS. I don't see such hit rates very often. And note that we have numbers of Betty and Nell units (not to mention others later on) which do not carry torpedoes at all.

On the other hand, I don't think your schooner is going to survive massive numbers of 50 kg bomb hits (for JAAF) or 60 kg bomb hits (for JNAF) either. Note these were standard bombs for many early Japanese bombers. Another loadout is 100 kg bombs. But the torpedo carriers tend to substitute 250 kg bombs - partly due to code - partly due to the way weapons actually mounted.

The probability of hitting a ship with a bomb from a level bomber was quite low (about 3%) and fairly low from a dive bomber (11% generic pilot, 22% naval aviator pilot with lots of training in the role).

As a general rule - without endorsing those specific numbers - this is true. But you omit how MANY bombs are dropped! Instead of a single torpedo, you face typically 8 bombs, and sometimes 16 or 32. For EACH plane. Start multiplying whatever value by those kinds of numbers - and you are going to get hit.

Hit probability for a level bomber is a function of altitude. Early war bombers - mainly on the Allied side - almost never hit a target - due to dropping from great altitudes. When we learned to get down low - it became almost impossible to miss. Glide bombing is as accurate as dive bombing, and skip bombing changes the nature of the target / bomb trajectory problem from hitting a point (or very short line) to hitting a line of great length.

Hit probability for all types of bombing is also related to things like target size, target speed and maneuvering: a stationary target of great size (e.g. USS Arizona) is much easier to hit! Vs such a target Capt Fujida got Kates up to a 85% hit probability per element (that is, 17% per bomb) from medium altitude - dropping single 800 kg "bombs" (converted 16 inch naval shells).

Hit probability cannot well be summerized without considering all these factors IMHO. You must consider the altitude of the bomber, the approach profile of the bomber, the training of the bomber (Army crews untrained in naval recognition or maneuvering will not score much), the size of the target, the target aspect, the target speed and any maneuvers it may make - which cannot be known prior to the bomb release (but may be accurately predicted - e.g. if the enemy always circles to port you can assume that - and only if you are wrong will you miss).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Bliztk

Well, I`m planning to do a "spidered" [;)] version of RHS RAO in a few days (after RHS is frozen) so we can test every approach to see what happens

I don't know what that means? But note that we have a similar problem for a different reason in RHS:

air power may not be nuclear - but certain points are hard to take quickly due to supply sinks. We have mitigated this - and it can be done - but if you want quick you must make a major effort - bigger than history. Since most players throw in far more than 3 divisions - that isn't too bad - but it isn't exactly right either.

[Bliztk]

A "spidered" version is the same thing that Treespider has done to his CHS-bases scenario.

A drastically reduction of all SPS and airbase levels all around the map.  So bases capable of hosting 4 engine bombers are far more scarce

[spence]

I guess I coined the term "spidered" (just kidding around since I'm playing him in CHS). It refers to Treespider's resizing of alot of bases on the map to generally smaller sizes. It sorta alleviates the "all torpedos all the time" thing because alot of the "Betty bases" aren't L4 in the beginning and many of them can only be built using the supply and engineering for oversizing a base.

[Fletcher]

I don´t know if this can help, but I post if could be usefull.
In table 1, bomb strikes during the Battle of the Bismark Sea with percentage of hits at Medium Altitude. In table 2, the same for masthead altitude.

[Fletcher]

Table 2

With 137 bombs dropped at masthead altitude, allied bombers get 35% hits vs 7,5% at medium altitude.


Ref: Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area, "Battle of the Bismarks Sea and Developmet of Masthead Attacks", 1 July 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL
"A War on Their Own, Bombers over the South Pacific" by Mathhew K. Rodman, Capt USAF, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 2005

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

I guess I coined the term "spidered" (just kidding around since I'm playing him in CHS). It refers to Treespider's resizing of alot of bases on the map to generally smaller sizes. It sorta alleviates the "all torpedos all the time" thing because alot of the "Betty bases" aren't L4 in the beginning and many of them can only be built using the supply and engineering for oversizing a base.

I guess I do not recommend doing this with RHS. In general, base sizes, and air base sizes in particular, were reviewed (or often created where they did not exist at all in CHS). We went both ways - increasing and decreasing initial base sizes - but we found a pattern of grossly understating infrastructures on a global basis for significant points. Since we eliminated many "dot" bases altogether - so omitted important points could be added - there are fewer points that should be out of sync in terms of either potential size or start of war size. Another factor you may be overlooking is the effect of COMBINED port and air field size on logistics - it is a signal to code about what is an important location. As an economic oriented mod, RHS depends on the sum being 7 (or whatever it is) - and tampering with that will have adverse impact on the economic model intended for the mod.

IF you disagree with this at any specific point for some real reason (not to modify when a Betty can attack but because the rating is actually wrong) - I will revise it for all RHS - and it still won't need revision after that. I never worry about things like "can a Betty attack" - I worry about "is it right in terms of the actual infrastructure" - and let the game code work out the rest. If I DID worry about bombers I would revise their max load rating - which itself defines the required base size.

[el cid again]

Fletch: if you built similar tables for December 1941 - or even for June 1942 - you would get depressingly different results. Of couse, you would probably find no masthead altitude attacks to tabulate, and many high altitude attacks - which seem absent in your data - but which were SOP when the war began. The "bomber mafia" believed it was far easier to hit a ship than it really was - and they also didn't like flying in range of AA guns - so a typical attack was run in very high. They also had little experience identifying what they were bombing - and might even attack a friendly ship - or a coral reef or some such thing! [Nothing much changed by Viet Nam: the US and Allied navies took far more casualties to USAF attack than to all other causes combined. When someone complained that I was training lookouts using the F-4 in USAF markings as the "most likely aircraft you may see attacking our ship" the captain backed me up: "let him teach them how to recognize em - if it is USAF we might be able to get someone to recall em"]

For the record, both my parents served in USAAF, and in bombers - my father as a gunner and my mother as a trainer for gunners and bombradiers. She trained to be an emergency photo recon specialist - assuming we might lose the war badly they trained an unused body of women in how to make cameras, film and developer from chemicals found in any normal house! But these women actually mounted cameras on guns and bomb sights to help determine if the trainees were aiming properly. I didn't grow up in an anti-USAF environment - so my remarks should not be read in that context. If we cannot tell the truth, we cannot learn from it.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

I guess I coined the term "spidered" (just kidding around since I'm playing him in CHS). It refers to Treespider's resizing of alot of bases on the map to generally smaller sizes. It sorta alleviates the "all torpedos all the time" thing because alot of the "Betty bases" aren't L4 in the beginning and many of them can only be built using the supply and engineering for oversizing a base.

I guess I do not recommend doing this with RHS. In general, base sizes, and air base sizes in particular, were reviewed (or often created where they did not exist at all in CHS). We went both ways - increasing and decreasing initial base sizes - but we found a pattern of grossly understating infrastructures on a global basis for significant points. Since we eliminated many "dot" bases altogether - so omitted important points could be added - there are fewer points that should be out of sync in terms of either potential size or start of war size. Another factor you may be overlooking is the effect of COMBINED port and air field size on logistics - it is a signal to code about what is an important location. As an economic oriented mod, RHS depends on the sum being 7 (or whatever it is) - and tampering with that will have adverse impact on the economic model intended for the mod.

IF you disagree with this at any specific point for some real reason (not to modify when a Betty can attack but because the rating is actually wrong) - I will revise it for all RHS - and it still won't need revision after that. I never worry about things like "can a Betty attack" - I worry about "is it right in terms of the actual infrastructure" - and let the game code work out the rest. If I DID worry about bombers I would revise their max load rating - which itself defines the required base size.

So you would like to see Betties with the load capacity of a B-17?

Actually the downsizing of the bases has other "good" effects. The smaller bases will not allow as much supply to be housed before spoilage occurs...and IMO the spoilage needs to be increased anyway....this results in more ships needing to move supply to the smaller bases... and the supplies are now being consumed trying to expand the airfields to a size beyond their SPS which has been reduced....resulting in the consumption of even more supplies...In addition the smaller airfields result in airgroups being spread out because most bases cannot accomodate more than 100-150 aircraft without penalty.

[herwin]

The figures I was quoting were over the full war against warships.

[Fletcher]

I absolutely agree with you el cid again about no meet air-to-ship at masthead altitute before last months 1942.
General Kenney (5th Air Force) expanded the possibility of using even the heavy bombers in low level roles on his way to Australia in July 1942....The first unit in SWPac to adopt low level tactics was 63rd BS (Major William Benn). Benn´s crews developed low-altitude bombing and skip bombing  in the fall of 1942. The distinction between low altitude and skip bombing is important. Low-altitude bombing involved a bomb run at 2,000 feet or less and at about 200 nautical mph, dropping two to four bombs over the ship. Low-altitud attacks afforded better accuracy with samller formations -typically just two bombers-. As initially developed in the SW Pac, skip-bombing called for B-17s to approach the target at between 200 and 250 feet and about 200 knots. The aircraft released bombs with delay fuses of four to five seconds so that they would hit 60 to 100 feet short of the shp. A perfect skip would take them the remaining distance and either send the bombs  into de side of the ship or up against it, sinking and detonating underwater. Both outcomes proved effective, and the percentage of hits  turned out substantially better than those from high altitude atttacks.
 
Cheers!

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

I guess I coined the term "spidered" (just kidding around since I'm playing him in CHS). It refers to Treespider's resizing of alot of bases on the map to generally smaller sizes. It sorta alleviates the "all torpedos all the time" thing because alot of the "Betty bases" aren't L4 in the beginning and many of them can only be built using the supply and engineering for oversizing a base.

I guess I do not recommend doing this with RHS. In general, base sizes, and air base sizes in particular, were reviewed (or often created where they did not exist at all in CHS). We went both ways - increasing and decreasing initial base sizes - but we found a pattern of grossly understating infrastructures on a global basis for significant points. Since we eliminated many "dot" bases altogether - so omitted important points could be added - there are fewer points that should be out of sync in terms of either potential size or start of war size. Another factor you may be overlooking is the effect of COMBINED port and air field size on logistics - it is a signal to code about what is an important location. As an economic oriented mod, RHS depends on the sum being 7 (or whatever it is) - and tampering with that will have adverse impact on the economic model intended for the mod.

IF you disagree with this at any specific point for some real reason (not to modify when a Betty can attack but because the rating is actually wrong) - I will revise it for all RHS - and it still won't need revision after that. I never worry about things like "can a Betty attack" - I worry about "is it right in terms of the actual infrastructure" - and let the game code work out the rest. If I DID worry about bombers I would revise their max load rating - which itself defines the required base size.

So you would like to see Betties with the load capacity of a B-17?

I don't think I said that nor do I want that. But - Betties should not have to have the same runway as a four engine bomber - and if you are making that happen I think that is in some sense "wrong" as well.

Further - you COULD do EXACTLY that with NO impact EXCEPT to increase the base size requirement. Max Load has NOTHING WHATEVER to do with load - curiously enough. Strange but true - and official - unless code does something programmers don't understand at this time.

What I meant was that if I wanted to ONLY impact base size requirement for a plane I would adjust the max load so it was one level higher. I don't see what that has to do with implying making it be several levels higher - because I assume you are not trying to do anything so radical.

The truth is - sorry folks if it is inconvenient - that a Betty is a pretty light plane - it does not need anything like the runway of a very heavy bomber - regardless of load. I would prefer we had a different model -

a) Players determine load per mission (up to the plane load limit - the load then forcing range to decrease as it increases
OR defined loads for normal range, extended range and even a new category short range - what I call max load range)

b) The torpedoes are tracked at least in total - maybe total per base - and consumed as used - so when there aren't any - or arn't any at the base - you cannot use them.

But this is not the game we have - and nothing we can do changes that. Forcing Betty's and Nells (and lots of later planes) not to use torpedoes when they could have done is not historical or good or fair either. So I am working up mechanisms to limit this issue in other ways - pending a version where we get loadout control (dreaming). I have forced land bomber units, anti-submarine units and a number of other units not to use torpedoes. I suggest you try some of this before you reject it out of hand as a bad solution.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

Actually the downsizing of the bases has other "good" effects. The smaller bases will not allow as much supply to be housed before spoilage occurs...and IMO the spoilage needs to be increased anyway....this results in more ships needing to move supply to the smaller bases... and the supplies are now being consumed trying to expand the airfields to a size beyond their SPS which has been reduced....resulting in the consumption of even more supplies...In addition the smaller airfields result in airgroups being spread out because most bases cannot accomodate more than 100-150 aircraft without penalty.

This needs to be addressed separately.

Here I both agree and disagree. Yes - spoilage could be greater - and perhaps should even be general.

More to the point, here I have thought about it. I have "calibrated" the values at each location to the situation at that location - things like storage tanks, warehouses, maintenance infrastructures, name it. [This is why it took over a year to get the bases right - which is not to say they are all right - because one could spend a lifetime running this stuff down. But at least I have lots of information to mine in my own library, and I have actually been to a majority of the points on our map - usually collecting any historical material available locally - like say maps - which might not be easy to find at a distance.] In more than a few cases - where values were changed from CHS (the rest of the time they were new locations or not changed) I found there was some REASON to change the rating. As always in WITP it was a mixed bag - but things like grossly downrating Manila were more common that overrating places. One Forum member complained that there was a sort of residual imperial attitude in places like the US which could not accept that third world countries/colonies of that era had significant local economies or infrastructures. Thus - for example - Thailand was greatly underrated. Indeed - it is STILL significantly underrated in RHS - because we lack the slots to put in all the really meaningful economic and infrastructure points. We just did the really important or potentially important points on the map. If you down rate because of something operational - like you don't like Betty's and torpedoes - you are missing the point of the ratings - at least in RHS - which is what he proposed to mod in this way. It is throwing out the baby with the bathwater - destroying 1.5 man years of work by me alone - and doing so without regard to the actual infrastructure at that point.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Fletcher

I absolutely agree with you el cid again about no meet air-to-ship at masthead altitute before last months 1942.
General Kenney (5th Air Force) expanded the possibility of using even the heavy bombers in low level roles on his way to Australia in July 1942....The first unit in SWPac to adopt low level tactics was 63rd BS (Major William Benn). Benn´s crews developed low-altitude bombing and skip bombing  in the fall of 1942. The distinction between low altitude and skip bombing is important. Low-altitude bombing involved a bomb run at 2,000 feet or less and at about 200 nautical mph, dropping two to four bombs over the ship. Low-altitud attacks afforded better accuracy with samller formations -typically just two bombers-. As initially developed in the SW Pac, skip-bombing called for B-17s to approach the target at between 200 and 250 feet and about 200 knots. The aircraft released bombs with delay fuses of four to five seconds so that they would hit 60 to 100 feet short of the shp. A perfect skip would take them the remaining distance and either send the bombs  into de side of the ship or up against it, sinking and detonating underwater. Both outcomes proved effective, and the percentage of hits  turned out substantially better than those from high altitude atttacks.

Cheers!

Turns out that a miss is better than a hit - generally - and counterintuitively. Water is incompressable - so the shock wave bursts seams - often many and long - and a ship has lots of problems with even a small hole. The main pumps of the Nuclear Powered USS Enterprise cannot keep up with a single 12 inch hole 10 feet below the waterline: ships defend from flooding with compartmentation - not with pumps. But burst enough seams - you flood too many compartments - and the ship gets too heavy on one side too fast - so it capsizes - regardless of the total floatation remaining or other damage or lack thereof.

The chance of a hit goes up dramatically with altitude (that is, as altitude decreases). But also target aspect matters. An attack from astern presents a long target - moving in the same direction as the bombs - and is more likely to work than an attack from abeam - which presents a very "short" target moving out of the bomb pattern. Skip bombing is different - in that the attack will be from the beam but at an angle - such that the bomb trajectory is calibrated to reach the ship at the point it will be at when the bomb gets there. Small errors don't matter because the bomb is too low to miss the ship at all - unless it falls short - and if it is close - short still works. If the bomb would be long - it merely HITS the ship - which is presenting a long side as a "block" to the bomb trajectory. Brilliant really - but

the catch is you are vulnerable to lighter AA guns than staying up high. Going low is dangerous. Look at the Args at San Carlos Water. It is hard to sell USAF on going in low today - and for good reason. But unpopular though it may be - for good ground support - you should be low and slow. If you cannot see what the situation is you are going to hurt nothing - or your own - or not hurt the enemy as much as you would if you can see the situation. This is doctrinal in USMC.

[spence]

But this is not the game we have - and nothing we can do changes that. Forcing Betty's and Nells (and lots of later planes) not to use torpedoes when they could have done is not historical or good or fair either. So I am working up mechanisms to limit this issue in other ways - pending a version where we get loadout control (dreaming). I have forced land bomber units, anti-submarine units and a number of other units not to use torpedoes. I suggest you try some of this before you reject it out of hand as a bad solution.

The gross exaggeration of the sea control ability of torpedo armed Bettys and Nells is IMHO the single most egregious historical error in the whole game with the possible exception of the map. They had ONE GOOD DAY!!!! They hit a grand slam on their first at bat then didn't get into a game for the next 6 months (and then they struck out) and in the final analysis their "lifetime" batting average would have put them in the minors.

[el cid again]

This is plain too much focus on too little: the game has much worse systemic problems. Consider land combat: you can ignore an entire front densely packed with enemy divisions - walk right through it. Nor does firepower have much meaning at all. A host of other items conspire to make it a good candidate for the worst problem we have.

The map was indeed a big problem - for me at least a game stopper - but we were able to address that. That is, Andrew Brown addressed that, and building on his foundation Cobra and I have been able to go significantly farther. I no longer regard the map as a big problem. And Matrix is about to come out with an enhancement permitting off map movement - (not sure what "about" means - but it probably means soon - since I was told it might happen before I could finish level 7 - so maybe I should not bother ?) At least we can fix the map - we even can change the scale if we want to.

Combine that with an air model that is considered by one professional "the finest ever published" - and you have to be very narrowly focused to get upset by the torpedo warfare. Truth to tell, the effectiveness of this weapon IRL was enough to make the Soviets bet on it. They devised a rocket propelled torpedo (delivered by their first jet bomber) that moved at fantastic speeds - and it has derivitives we are very concerned about to this day (not always open source, but much of this concern is now available for detailed technical review and simulation).

One big problem Spence has is too much worshipping of too little data: we do not have anything approaching a total weapons count. We do not know why any vessel we never heard from was lost - unless we trust data from the other side - and most of that was destroyed - so it only fills in a few blanks. We do not know how many torpedoes were expended in every battle - although we do for the Prince of Wales encounter. Compiling statistics from partial events is less reliable than from simulation - where we can run thousands of tests in controlled conditions. [This is why we never design planes, missiles - or torpedoes - that fail to fly any more; the problem with modern torpedoes is guidance failure - not that they won't swim - only that they may come after the guy that fired them!] Anyway - if you want a reasonable sense of what was possible - simulate it - or ask a programmer to do so. If you do that - or if you look at the USNI database - you will conclude GG was not out of the ball park after all. What is absent - and it is absent in everything in the game - is a sense of logistic constraints. He tracked every pilot - I would rather have tracked every torpedo.