Because that is the way the allied pilots, in particular the RAF, but also the USAAF were trained to fight in the early days of the war. Remember in Europe the RAF fighters could often out turn the Germans...this is to a large extent what the zero bonus is about, which is why witp represents this aspect pretty well.
I have yet to see any documentation that American ed pilots were indoctrinated to continue to pursue enemy a.c. in a turning engagement to the degree that their aircraft were sluggish. if you wish to argue that UK/Cwealth veterans were at an actual disadvantage because they were used to outmaneuvering ME110s and ME 109s, maybe there is something to that. But Japanese pilots had much experience with Chinese pilots that lead them to take risks in front of Allied pilots, and that experience too weighed negatively against the Japanese.
The big Japanese victories over slow speed enemies seem to have occurred when the Japanese had a huge positional advantage. In stand up meeting engagements, the allies held their own. The lesson I derive from this, from a CONSIM perspective, is that the burden should be on the Japanese player to achieve positional advantage, which in turn tends to derive from good operational planning, a fast operational tempo, and cutting enemy lines of supply and communication, or surprise carrier raids. It should not be a "freebie" as is the ZB.
However, once again US pilots took it on the chin when they tried to turn with the nimble Japanese fighters.
Once again, that is incorrect. At high speeds, F4Fs could out-turn zeros. That is how they were able to get good deflection shots in zoom-climbing zeros. And that is why the admonition was to keep airspeed high, rather than to try to turn with zeros. In a sustained fight the energy burning characteristics of the F4F required mutual support or disengagement. But for meeting engagements at high speed, generally it was the Zero that took it on the chin. That is why from the outset (Coral Sea for example) F4Fs generally shot down more zeroes than they lost to zeroes.
On the one hand you argue that specific characteristics aren't important, such as the Zeros ability to out turn any early war allied fighter, yet then you talk about specific turning characteristics of the Wildcat.
It was an example of how one single attribute of the zero in one narrow range of its flight envelope had become the sole criterion for assessment of the plane.
The record of engagements between the P-39 and the Zero were few...the P-39 just simply couldn't catch them most of the time.
It's not true. At altitudes below 10,000 feet a P-39 could handily outrun a zero. So it all came down to the margin of distance between the two. With a 5 minute warning a Zero could get away. The same could be said of the P-39. In a meeting engagement at 8000 feet, it was anyone's fight with the P-39 owning the initial advantage.
