Early war air power

[Nikademus]

A "Pete" actually managed to down a Wildcat during the latter stages of the Lunga campaign. They were very tough to hit [the Petes] but usually ended up on the losing side when facing fighter planes. The pilot who got burned was p$$$d too. [;)]

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Lundstrom Vol I gives a detailed account. IIRC (at work) it was typically indecisive given the force levels. One A5M was downed at point blank range where i think that the F4F actually hit it physically. Another F4F got peppered good by an A5M but fortunately the makeshift armor plate held and the F4F was able to accelerate away from the attacker.

Neither side commented very nicely about the other's skill sets afterward (read: trash talk) [:D]

IIRC the Wildcat nearly had its rudder cables shot to pieces...

[Nikademus]

yep...the pilot had to hunker down behind his back seat armor and firewall the engine. it was a "rattling" experience. (pun!)

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: herwinDuring 1943-44 in sustained air combat between American and Japanese fighters in the Pacific, the exchange ratio was ten Japanese fighters lost for every American fighter lost. This ratio was insensitive to the number of fighters from each side involved in each engagement. The percentage of Japanese fighters lost in an engagement was approximately constant, while the percentage of American fighters lost depended on the number of Japanese fighters per American fighter. Ref: Morse and Kimball, 45-46.

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I did say, in most cases. However i should have clarified it by saying "in cases where the men had similar levels of training and the equipment was comperable. "

I'm well aware of the lopsided ratios achieved by the Allies latewar once the Axis airforce(s) started running out of qualified pilots.

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

If I might channel mdiehl (without his permission), how could one claim that the Japanese pilots were significantly better trained and flew a markedly superior aircraft when the combat results as a whole don’t bear that out?

Was the Zero better than the P-40 and F4F, perhaps. Were the Japanese pilot better trained than the American pilot, maybe. What we do know is that when the US had marked advantages in both categories it lead to a huge disparity in combat losses something not seen overall during the early part of the war when the Japanese held an advantage.

If the Zero/pilots did hold an advantage early war verses P-40/F4F early in the war it seems to have been minor.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

Lack of targets ... engagements between A6m p40&F4f were rare early war .. nothing like target rich environment US fighters faced late war ...

If I might channel mdiehl (without his permission), how could one claim that the Japanese pilots were significantly better trained and flew a markedly superior aircraft when the combat results as a whole don’t bear that out?

Not sure what you mean by "channel" ... not sure anyone made such a claim ...

[ChezDaJez]

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

Was the Zero better than the P-40 and F4F, perhaps. Were the Japanese pilot better trained than the American pilot, maybe. What we do know is that when the US had marked advantages in both categories it lead to a huge disparity in combat losses something not seen overall during the early part of the war when the Japanese held an advantage.

Well, the truth is that the US did not achieve a 10:1 ratio until late 1944. By that time, the quality of the average Japanese pilot was so dismal that they relatively easy targets. You also have to remember that the US was flying Corsairs, Hellcats, Mustangs and Jugs that were far superior to most Japanese aircraft at the time. Those newer Japanese models that were able to compete with US aircraft were too few, plagued by too many manufacturing problems and had too few experienced pilots to fly them.

That said, the P-40 could be considered an equal to the Zero in many ways. In some ways, such as roll rate and speed, even superior. And because the P-40 was considerably faster than the Zero, it could dictate the terms of the fight as an interceptor when beginning with an altitude advantage. If it was at an altitude disadvantage, it could dive and run away. That's one of the reasons the Flying Tigers were successful. They knew when to hit and when to run. Chennault drilled that into them. The P-40 was a very good bomber interceptor but it wasn't so great when escorting bombers due to restricted freedom.

The Wildcat, on the other hand, had serious deficiencies when encountering the Zero, especially in the escort role. Except for armament (F4F-3) and protection (after late Jan 42), the only advantage the Wildcat had was its roll rate. It could not outrun, outclimb or outturn a Zero. And it couldn't outdive the Zero either as it suffered from the same dive speed limitation that the Zero did. The Wildcat's ammo trays also had a very nasty habit of becoming jammed while maneuvering. During the Marshall Islands raids, many pilots attmepted to fight with only one or two operational guns.

During the first 5 months of the war, only the AVG enjoyed any significant success against the Japanese and its opponent was the KI-15 Nate primarily. Indeed if the inspect the kills claimed by the 19 "top acoring" AVG pilots, you'll find they claimed 78 Nates but only 11 Oscars and NO Zeros. The Nate was hardly a modern aircraft yet it still enjoyed some success in the Burma campaign.

The disparity in pilot training was hardly enough to matter, especially between the highly trained and "elite" USN and IJN pilots. USAAF and IJAAF pilots were not as well trained as their Navy counterparts (takes a special breed to land onboard a ship) but were still good. The primary difference betwteen US and Japanese pilots was that a good portion of Japanese pilots at war's start had already seen combat and that is the greatest trainer of all.

If I might channel mdiehl (without his permission), how could one claim that the Japanese pilots were significantly better trained and flew a markedly superior aircraft when the combat results as a whole don’t bear that out?

One reason that may be germane is that after the initial Japanese successes in the PI, SRA and Malaya, the allies had very little air force left to combat the Zero. And its probable that many of the best Allied pilots were killed during the early combats. It was hardly what you could call a target rich environment for the Japanese after the first few weeks. The allies withdrew many of their mangled fighter units for rebuilding.

Another reason is that the Japanese pilots did not tend to fly as a team in the same way the US did. Once engaged, it was basically every man for himself. The notion of a wingman flying solely to protect the leader was quite foreign to them and did not suit their "samurai" spirit.

If the Zero/pilots did hold an advantage early war verses P-40/F4F early in the war it seems to have been minor.

It was more than minor but it also goes far beyond the technical merits of the aircraft or the level of pilot training. Other factors were involved. Today we call them force multipliers. Communications and tactics were huge force multipliers and played a very significant role in allowing the US to remain in the fight unitl newer and better aircraft appeared. The US had a considerable advantage with radar and better naval fighter direction than did the Japanese. And US pilots also weren't afraid to throw away what didn't work and experiment with tactics until they got it right. The Thach Weave is a good example of a tactic that minimized US losses. Chennault's Boom and Zoom tactics maximized enemy losses and minimized our own. The Japanese never developed an effective counter to Chennault's or Thach's tactics.

The Japanese rigidly stuck to their outdated tactics even when proven they didn't work. They continually tried the same formations and tactics and got spanked hard for it, especially at Guadalcanal and later battles. Outside of a handful of Japanese pilots such as Sakai, there was little if any innovation in fighter tactics. Sakai at least recognized that the VIC formation spelled doom and insisted that his pilots fly as pairs. His wounding and subsequent extended hospitalization on the first day of Guadalcanal left a great void.

The Japanese planned for a short war and in so doing, handicapped themselves. They had a very talented, but small, pool of aviators that were arguably better than any opponent they faced but they could not produce enough of them fast enough to make up for their ever increasing losses.

The US, on the other, began planning for a long, protracted war from the very start and their greatly expanded pilot training programs really began to pay off in 1943.

Chez

[bradfordkay]

I can't imagine WHY anyone would want to channel MDiehl. Picture all the endless arguments going on inside the head of anyone who did so.... [;)]






I know... I know... bad joke. Please don't ban me for it...

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

So tempting, yet so little time...

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I don't doubt it from what i've read. We could try an experiment though. You and I can get 10 hours of training and then go face off against TheElf and see how far we'd get.

[:)]

At this point I’d accept that challenge. Anything to get away from this F’ing desk job. It’s sucking the life out of me…

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Well according to Lundstrom the first meeting between Zeros and F4F's (the -3 iirc) took place at Coral Sea. So I would be most ineterested in what other data exists documenting this matchup in the first 5 months of the war?

It was at Wake on 22 December 41 (Lundstrom, "the First Team" page 41). See my post above. IIRC, the first Zero shot down by an F4F was at Coral Sea.

Yup, at Coral Sea. Lundstrom, First Team, page 203-204. Ltjg Haas downed WO Imamura during the attack on the Shoho. No Wildcats were lost in this action.

Chez

My bad...On page 300 Lundstrom states- "Coral Sea provided the US naval fighter pilots with their introduction to the vaunted japanese Zero fighter."

Which is different than saying it was the first meeting ofthe F4f and the Zero..

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico
If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

If I might channel mdiehl (without his permission), how could one claim that the Japanese pilots were significantly better trained and flew a markedly superior aircraft when the combat results as a whole don’t bear that out?

I'm pretty sure that no one has made this particular claim, at least not on this thread or the thread that started it.

[qupte
Was the Zero better than the P-40 and F4F, perhaps.
[/quote]
The zero was better at somethings, but not quite as good at others.

Were the Japanese pilot better trained than the American pilot, maybe.

Perhaps, my guess would be better trained than Army pilots, about equal in training to Navy pilots...that's a personal assessment so take it for what its worth.

However, what is an important distinction to make is that training does not equal experience. The Japanese pilots had experience putting their training and tactics to work. This is something the Allies lacked, except for the few RAF and RAAF pilots who had seen action in Europe and Africa.

The Allied pilots, lacking experience with the nimble Japanese fighters had training and tactics that led them to make poor decisions in how to engage the enemy. As the first weeks of the war passed and the Allies gained experienc, they learned their lessons and adapted new tactics. These tactics were ultimately adopted into the pilot training programs and the playing field was leveled.

If the Zero/pilots did hold an advantage early war verses P-40/F4F early in the war it seems to have been minor.

It was considerable until the allies changed their tactics.

[niceguy2005]

As an addendum to the above post...

Even after the Allied pilots learned that they couldn't dogfight with the much more manueverable Zeros, some were slow to really accept that they must change tactics. The battle of Coral Sea was an excellent example.

I read an account, I can't recall where (probably Aviation History Magazine), that the Navy pilots had already been briefed on the weaknesses and strengths of their Wildcats compared to the Zero. They were told not to get into turning fights. However, their training was to dogfight. Even knowing they were at a serious disadvantage in such an engagement many Wildcat pilots fell back on their training when the battle actually occured. The result was predictable.

This same account talked about why this happened. Perhaps not surprisingly part of the issue was inter service rivalry. There was a belief among the pilots and commanders in the battle that while the Japanese fighters were nimble, the majority of previous engagements were between Army pilots and Japan. Since the Navy viewed the Army as being of inferior quality they thought that they could compensate for the airplanes deficiencies with superior piloting ability. Needless to say after Coral Sea the Navy became much more serious about its pilots using these new and different tactics. The pilots themselves became believers in the Zeros maneuverability.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

IMO, mdiehl's reference to Coral Sea and Midway are irrelevant when talking about the zero bonus since those battles occured well into 1942, after the zero bonus would have expired. If Wildcat pilots had encountered Zeros, say around PH in the opening days of the war the outcome could very well have been much different. The lessons learned by the army pilots in the PI had already been shared with the Navy by the time those battles happened.

Navy pilots were already looking at ways to deal with the Zero in 1941.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
I read an account, I can't recall where (probably Aviation History Magazine), that the Navy pilots had already been briefed on the weaknesses and strengths of their Wildcats compared to the Zero. They were told not to get into turning fights. However, their training was to dogfight. Even knowing they were at a serious disadvantage in such an engagement many Wildcat pilots fell back on their training when the battle actually occured. The result was predictable.

This same account talked about why this happened. Perhaps not surprisingly part of the issue was inter service rivalry. There was a belief among the pilots and commanders in the battle that while the Japanese fighters were nimble, the majority of previous engagements were between Army pilots and Japan. Since the Navy viewed the Army as being of inferior quality they thought that they could compensate for the airplanes deficiencies with superior piloting ability. Needless to say after Coral Sea the Navy became much more serious about its pilots using these new and different tactics. The pilots themselves became believers in the Zeros maneuverability.

This was pretty much the point of my first post in this thread (which was described as "baloney"). Pilots, especially fighter pilots, tend to have big egos. They need them to face the dangers of their profession. It also means they aren't quick to believe that the other side's pilots and planes might be "better" than they and theirs. The Japs might have beat up on some Army putzs, or some dumb Jarheads, or some Dutchmen and Limeys..., but that doesn't mean they can take ME and MY crate! No matter what they were told, almost all Allied pilots (perhaps excepting the "Tigers") seem to have had to survive trying it "their way" before accepting that they needed to unlearn their old tactics....

[mdiehl]

I still don't see any evidence that Japanese pilots substantially "beat up" ANY allied pilots except where Allied pilots were flying truly outdated aircraft (the F2A3) or when Japanese pilots had tactical surprise. In stand up meeting engagements the Japanese victory ratio, even when they WON engagements in Burma and Malaya, came nowhere near 10:1. Indeed, in fights with large number of a.c., rarely greater than 1.5:1.

A steady grinding attrition of early war Allied pilots initially favored the Japanese, even though they were not winning by strong margins. It worked for the Japanese in the short term because the Allied bases they were attacking were strategically isolated. A few combats and lack of spare parts was often enough to do for any Allied unit deployed to Indonesia. Under such circumstances, withdrawal (regardless of losses) was the only reasonable Allied option.

It wasn't the 'lack of a target rich environment that prevented the Japanese from running up a great ratio.' It was the fact that the Japanese weren't sufficiently superior in either training, tactics, experience, or a.c. specifications, to get anywhere near that kill ratio.

And I reject a priori the inference that the absence of data from the period from Dec 1941-March 1942 vis a vis F4Fs vs A6Ms therefore logically implies that the A6Ms would have held some sort of qualitative advantage during that interval. The claim seems derived from a perceptio of the merits of A6M vs USAAF/RAF/RAAF pilots -- and yet even there one cannot find compelling evidence for the alleged qualitative superiority held by A6M drivers.

You can only get horrid loss ratios of the sort that the Japanese Supremacy Club imagines to have existed when you have the Japanese ambushing aicraft during landings, taking off and so forth. Better IMO to analyze the reasons why they were able to successfully set up those sorts of occasions than to blindly attribute it to some other cause.

The Zero, for all its flaws, had outstanding range. And Allied bases, in the early war, pretty much universally lacked radar (in the PTO). Since it was logistically not feasible to keep a CAP going constantly at the primitive bases in SE Asia/ N. Australia. Absent radar, and given the very fast Japanese operational tempo, surprise raids were reasonably common.

One can note that the same disadvantages plagued the Japanese as the war progressed. The major Truk Raid was an engagement where the Japanese actually had a reasonable body of reasonably well trained pilots to hand. But absent sufficient early warning, they were vulnerable to massed USN CV strikes.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl


....The Allied front line planes were overwhelmingly superior to the Oscar and an even trade on the Zero. The Oscar was a flying deathbox. The AVG ate those things for lunch and dinner regularly. Not because the AVG was full of special hotshot pilots. They were ordinary pre-war US pilots looking for something different. But rather because the P-40 was so vastly superior to the Oscar, that the only way an Oscar could be called a match for a P-40 was to nail one on the ground or taking off or landing.

The A6M had *some* superior characteristics. Better low speed acceleration. Better low speed maneuverability. Better low altitiude to speed, by a narrow marging, than the F4F, and really great climb. But its top speed was lower than that of the P-40, P-39 (low altitude) and Spit. And at high speed it was less maneuverable than the F4F, the Spit, the P-40. It was truly very fragile and armed with the worst exploding-shell cannon of the war (ballistically & load out terms). Ultimately while the A6M was a good industrial solution (saving materials and fuel in operation) it was a poor fighter for survival.

....Even the most experienced Japanese pilots made rookie mistakes. One lesson they seemed never to learn was to not pull up too close to an F4F. The overtaking tail pass, followed by a sharp climb (apparently intended to lure an American aircraft into an energy-burning stall climb) often resulted in death for the Japanese pilot, because 4 or more .50 call could dissassemble and flame any A6M faster than you can say "Banzai" and American deflection shooting was generally superior to anything the Japanese ever imagined.

Add to this the fact that many frontline units were not equipped with front line fighters at the outbreak of the war. The Brewster, P-36, P-35, P-26 and Wirraway were all horrible fighters.

Agreed on most of those. Funny you should laud the Oscar however and yet call the P-36 and P-35 horrible. As planes go they were the equal of the oscar in almost every respect except firepower (in which area these were superior to the Oscar). At PH, those P-36s that became airborne seem to have acquitted themselves well against Zeroes.

...Yes. But that is the key point. The Allies "front line" planes and pilots were, for the most part, man for man and plane for plane, as good as any pilot or plane the Japanese could muster. You are of course right that the P-26s (which were extremely uncommon), the Wirraways, and a couple others weren't up to measure. But AFAIC the Allies never really considered these "front line" planes. The only really inferior plane that seems to have been treated as a "front line" plane, briefly, was the F2A3 Buffalo. If you want to call it a hopeless aircraft that seems fair.

The whole reason for this thread...

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

Lack of targets ... engagements between A6m p40&F4f were rare early war .. nothing like target rich environment US fighters faced late war ...

Possibly, but I don’t see US F4F being slaughtered during carrier engagements. If seems that near parity overall in these engagements… at least in relationship to when the US held the major advantage.

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico


If I might channel mdiehl (without his permission), how could one claim that the Japanese pilots were significantly better trained and flew a markedly superior aircraft when the combat results as a whole don’t bear that out?

Not sure what you mean by "channel" ... not sure anyone made such a claim ...

Do you agree or disagree?

Mdiehl - “But that is the key point. The Allies "front line" planes and pilots were, for the most part, man for man and plane for plane, as good as any pilot or plane the Japanese could muster.”


"channel" = Devil's Advocate. [;)]

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I can't imagine WHY anyone would want to channel MDiehl. Picture all the endless arguments going on inside the head of anyone who did so.... [;)]






I know... I know... bad joke. Please don't ban me for it...

[:D]

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

If the US could score a 10-1 kill ratio when they arguably had superior r aircraft flown by better trained pilots, why didn’t the Japanese achieve the same results earlier in the war (1941-42) against P-40s and F4Fs?

So tempting, yet so little time...

Take the time. [:)]

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Perhaps, my guess would be better trained than Army pilots, about equal in training to Navy pilots...that's a personal assessment so take it for what its worth.

However, what is an important distinction to make is that training does not equal experience. The Japanese pilots had experience putting their training and tactics to work. This is something the Allies lacked, except for the few RAF and RAAF pilots who had seen action in Europe and Africa.

The Allied pilots, lacking experience with the nimble Japanese fighters had training and tactics that led them to make poor decisions in how to engage the enemy. As the first weeks of the war passed and the Allies gained experienc, they learned their lessons and adapted new tactics. These tactics were ultimately adopted into the pilot training programs and the playing field was leveled.


It was considerable until the allies changed their tactics.

Then it isn’t really a question of the technical superiority of the Zero, but the lack of training needed to defeat it? Is this correct?


When did this training occur and at what point did the balance shift? Pre-Coral Sea, Pre-Midway, etc. Your opinion.





“As early as September 1941 Chennault was teaching the AVG to
hit and run, requiring speed, which was the P-40's forte against
the Japanese. When properly used, the P-40 outclassed the Japanese
Zero. It took the military 2 more years before they stumbling on
the secret of successfully fighting the Japanese in the air. In the
meantime hundreds of American pilots lost their lives. This is a
matter of record.”

“The so called "Thatch weave," was supposedly used for the
first time in the battle of Midway. According to Commander Thatch,
this was a contributing factor in winning this decisive battle.”

“This weave was mentioned, and used by the AVG, and part of the
AVG's combat report in the AVG's War Diary for Dec 20, 1941, yet
Daniel Ford called it the "Thatch Weave" and gave him credit for
inventing it, saying it was first used in the Battle of Midway.
Even though Commander Thatch said he had heard this tactic had come
out of China.”

Regards,
Erik Shilling