Early war air power

[Culiacan Mexico]

When did this training occur... before Midway, before Coral Sea? While it is really hard to base conclusions a such a single small set of data what does the results of Midway say? Parity?




"A total pf 11 Zeros were shot down, 5 by other than F4Fs. That leaves a maximum of 6 that can be attributed to the F4Fs. Its also probable that SBDs may have accounted for a couple but for the sake of argument we'll leave it at 6 Zeros shot down by fighters."

"Lundstrom states that the US lost 6 F4Fs shot down by Zeros during this action, 5 of them from Thach's outfit, VF-3 and 1 from VF-8. At best this is a draw and one can argue till the cow's come home is to who bested whom. Lundstrom also says that Thach was credited with 3 of these, 50% of the total. If true that leaves 3 Zeros shot down by the remaining Wildcats. So was it the man or the machine?"


ChezDaJez

[mdiehl]

I wouldn't put too much faith in Erik Shilling's claim as to the origins. I think he was saying that mutual support was well known in the USAAF and USN prior to the "Thach Weave."

Certainly Chennault had no reason to a priori decide that mutual support by section was the key for dealing with a more maneuverable enemy. His solution was the one ultimately used by most Allied fighters. High energy attacks. After all, the P-40 was considerably faster.

Thach himself never said he got the maneuver from China. He said he'd heard about highly maneuverable Japanese a.c. from accounts of fights in China. One supposes it was one of the hard lessons learned by the CNAF before the AVG showed up, because Thach was working on a solution in early 1941, before any American or Brit/C'wealth or AVG pilot had fought any Japanese plane.

Thach credits himself and Flatley for coming up with the maneuver (which they called the "beam defense") and testing it first in combats between F4Fs with one team of F4Fs using a limited power setting (so they would be slower than the other F4Fs). When that seemed to work they tried it in army-navy wargames in summer 1941 pitting F4Fs against P-40s.

This is not a knock on Shilling by the way. He did his part in the fights and is a perfectly good source for tactics used by the AVG and for his recollections of AVG losses. I'm just saying he's not a good source as to where and how the particular maneuver invented by Thach & Flatley was invented.

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

citing to me where all these "landing pattern" attacks that accounted for all the Japanese successes occurred

Nik, I'm surprised at you.... didn't you know that all these landing pattern attacks occurred at Darwin? It was the sole reason why the Japanese succeeded there.

Chez

There wernt any allied fighters at Darwin! It says so right here....no, wait, here...no...I'll get back to you on that....

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Ah geez do I have to? [:'(]

Edit: so what if we change that from troll to...continues to post inaccurate and possibly intentionally inflammatory statements for the purpose of...[8|]

Yes you have to, or I'll wash your mouth out with soap. [:-]

I suppose you could change it to that, but you'll wear your fingers down to the bone within a page.

[m10bob]

The Thach weave is after all, a variation of the Lufbery circle.
The latter had 2 major flaws.
1.All planes in the circle were required to stay pretty much where they were, (and not leave the area nor escape.)
2. All planes in constant turns will lose both altitude and speed.
The weave allowed the planes to leave the area (to escape), and could put some strait-line haul-ass running between their turns.

Too, in a "circle", the side with the most planes eventually won.

As for the absolutely ignorant assertion (belief?) that the A6m2 only gained success over inferior planes like the Buffalo, I suggest the study of the air battles over Darwin and Port Moresby and New Guinea in which the Allies were using P40e's and Hurricanes, and in early '43 Spitfires, (just recently arrived from GB with veteran combat pilots.)

BTW, "ignorance" is not a slur, but a condition of an uneducated novice.
To remain ignorant is stupid.

[ChezDaJez]

I still don't see any evidence that Japanese pilots substantially "beat up" ANY allied pilots except where Allied pilots were flying truly outdated aircraft (the F2A3) or when Japanese pilots had tactical surprise. In stand up meeting engagements the Japanese victory ratio, even when they WON engagements in Burma and Malaya, came nowhere near 10:1. Indeed, in fights with large number of a.c., rarely greater than 1.5:1.

So it doesn't count unless the allied pilots are fresh, at altitude, ready and waiting, with modern equipment and tons of supplies? Does that mean we should also throw out all the statistics from battles where surprise, logistics, et al benefitted the Allies.

You seem to want to define their success by only one measurement: kill ratio. The problem with kill ratios is that it includes all types of aircraft, not just fighters. Now if you can offer a detailed listing of fighter vs fighter combats and their results. Obviously, the best way would be to stage a 1 on 1 contest between each of the types. Maybe we could coax Sakai, Thach, Hill and others back from the dead and place them in an aerial coliseum and really see a ture result.

You seem to forget that the Japanese also had many supply issues during this time. Their rate of advance was so fast in many areas that the Japanese quartermaster forces couldn't keep up particularly in Burma.

It wasn't the 'lack of a target rich environment that prevented the Japanese from running up a great ratio.' It was the fact that the Japanese weren't sufficiently superior in either training, tactics, experience, or a.c. specifications, to get anywhere near that kill ratio.

I agree with you on tactics. In fact, I have said all along it was the development of new tactics that allowed US pilots to do as well as they did in mid-late 42. Early in the war, the allies had no clue and no counter.

The rest is pure hogwash. Look at Burma and the vaunted AVG.

When you consider that the 64th and 77th Sentais in Burma had only transitioned to the Ki-43 Oscars just prior to the campaign, they did remarkably well. Considering that the P-40 had a huge speed and firepower advantage over the Oscar and the Nate, why didn't the P-40 achieve a better kill ratio against both? The P-40s were on the defence, over friendly territory and more likely to be returned to their units if shot down.

Oh, that's right... you say the alllies didn't have the gas, the bullets, spare parts or fancy airfields that the Japanese did. Forget the fact that the AVG and Brits forces in Burma flew from one of the most modern airbases in the theater, Mingaladon airbase. Forget, that at the time of Rangoon's capture that the retreating allied forces destroyed over 900 trucks, 19000 tons of lendlease stocks, over a million rounds of ammo and a several allied fighters still in their crates.

Consider the following from Dan Ford's collection:

In early February the operational strength of the 5th Air Group was about twice as strong as the Allied force in Burma. Fighter strength was more closely matched with the 77th and 50th mustering only 43 operational fighters against Allied operational figures of 20 Tomahawks, 11 Hurricanes, and four Buffaloes. The Allies had several advantages, however. They had numerous all-weather airfields in Burma and these were well stocked with fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. The Japanese were hundreds of miles from their nearest depot and sometimes had to borrow supplies from the Thai Air Force to continue in operations. The British also had an early warning radar station at Rangoon....snip

This was the climax of the 77th FR's first Burma campaign. Rangoon soon fell and equally as important so did the Netherlands East Indies. Fighters and bombers from that front quickly joined the 5th Air Group (soon to become the 5th Flying Division or Hikoshidan). The 77th FR was replenished and by March 20th had built up its strength to 35 Type 97 fighters. In the following days it flew escort missions during the raids on Magwe that crippled the remaining Allied air power in central Burma. After the Japanese occupied Magwe in April the 77th FR provided air defense for the base. Most of the air combat during this period fell to the Type 1 fighters of the 64th FR and the Type 97 fighters of the 1st and 11th FRs....snip

The 77th FR suffered heavy losses (12 pilots) but it stood up to the highly successful (legendary) Flying Tigers and competent RAF opposition. Indeed, it had on several occasions bested them; and, overall, destroyed more enemy aircraft than it lost.

This hardly represents an overwhelming advantage in airstrength and supplies for the Japanese as you claim. In fact, the original number of fighters available on both sides was pretty close through out the campaign.

And as I posted yesterday, the AVG, by their own accounting, claimed 78 Nates and 11 Oscars during the entire campaign. However, Ford says the 77th lost only 12 pilots during the entire campaign to all causes. The AVG lost 5 pilots in air-air combat. That makes a ratio of about 2.5:1 in fighter to fighter combat if all losses are attributed to fighters. That doesn't sound so impressive when you consider that the AVG was fighting over friendly territory, had an early warning net, and often picked the time and circumstance of their interception. I'm also sure that the Brits probably accounted for a few of the 77th losses.

Also from Dan Ford:

In August 1943 the 77th FR gave up its aging Type 97 fighters and received a new aircraft - the Type 1 fighter model II (Ki 43-II).

That means the 77th fought the entire Burma campaign flying old, obsolete Ki-27s... Nates!!!

You can continue to mouth national-centric views but the fact is that the Japanese were successful against the best the allies had to throw at them at the time. And if that makes you want to denigrate their victories as undeserved because the allies were in disarray and possessed obsolete aircraft, go ahead. People can say anything they want. Just don't forget that the Nate could hardly be considered "modern."

And I reject a priori the inference that the absence of data from the period from Dec 1941-March 1942 vis a vis F4Fs vs A6Ms therefore logically implies that the A6Ms would have held some sort of qualitative advantage during that interval. The claim seems derived from a perceptio of the merits of A6M vs USAAF/RAF/RAAF pilots -- and yet even there one cannot find compelling evidence for the alleged qualitative superiority held by A6M drivers.

Yawn... Your illogical argumentation attempts to apply data from a later time period to an early time period and only produces a theory... an unsubstantied, unprovable and highly biased theory. One that ignores several salient facts such as the allies flying new, markedly superior aircraft with overwhelming majority of numbers and replacements in the latter half of the war against a bunch of half-trained pilots flying mostly obsolete aircraft in comparison.

You can only get horrid loss ratios of the sort that the Japanese Supremacy Club imagines to have existed when you have the Japanese ambushing aicraft during landings, taking off and so forth. Better IMO to analyze the reasons why they were able to successfully set up those sorts of occasions than to blindly attribute it to some other cause.

That's right. I keep forgetting that the Japanese could only achieve an aerial victory if their opponent was taking off or landing. I believe that you are "blindly" attributing Japanese successes to anything except the what the Japanese had and did.

The Zero, for all its flaws, had outstanding range. And Allied bases, in the early war, pretty much universally lacked radar (in the PTO). Since it was logistically not feasible to keep a CAP going constantly at the primitive bases in SE Asia/ N. Australia. Absent radar, and given the very fast Japanese operational tempo, surprise raids were reasonably common.

A reasonable argument... Its ability to show up where it wasn't expected created quite the consternation for the allies. However I disagree as to the state of allied airfields. Most allied airfields that were operational at the start of the war were pretty well established all-weather fields and Rangoon at least had radar. I would expect Singapore to have had it also though I haven't found a confirming source. It was only as the allies were forced to retreat did material shortages become an issue. The list of supplies that were destroyed or captured at Rangoon is simply amazing. There was enough there to fully support flight operations for months to come.

One can note that the same disadvantages plagued the Japanese as the war progressed. The major Truk Raid was an engagement where the Japanese actually had a reasonable body of reasonably well trained pilots to hand. But absent sufficient early warning, they were vulnerable to massed USN CV strikes.

My god... I think hell has frozen over. We actually agree on something here. Surprise does tend to produce much better results. I would have to say that the "body of reasonably well-trained pilots" is overstating the case. They had some pilots with considerable experience but the majority were replacements with little if any combat experience.

Surprise was crucial for success in many battles and both sides sought to employ it at every opportunity. That loss ratios were higher when surprised is a fact of life but you can not just arbitrarily remove a significant tactical advantage because it doesn't fit your view of things.

Success in combat is not often the result of a single entity. It is comprised of far more factors than we could ever relate. Surprise, luck, training experience, doctrine, tactics and equipment are just small parts of the equation. The Japanese airforces were superior quantitatively and qualititatively by virtue of their combat experience at the start. They got the job done. You can't say that because they didn't have a such and such kill ratio that they weren't either effective of superior to their opposition.

When I say that the Zero was superior to the Wildcat, its because it was. In a 1 on 1 combat, my money would be on the Zero every time. What made the difference wasn't the Wildcat itself, it was the development of tactics that allowed it to maximize its strong points and increase its chances of survival. Being on the defensive also helped. But more importantly, it was men like Flatley, Thach and Chennault that refused to adopt a defeatist attitude that so many other leaders did. They found ways to win.

Chez

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I wouldn't put too much faith in Erik Shilling's claim as to the origins. I think he was saying that mutual support was well known in the USAAF and USN prior to the "Thach Weave."

Many rhetorical questions following…

Didn’t Chennault teach at the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, Va? Didn’t he also clash with pursuit instructor Clayton Bissell… “I was dismayed to find that pursuit instructor Clayton Bissell still taught the dawn patrol and fighter sweep tactics of 1918”.

Wasn’t Chennault's impressed with the teachings of German ace Oswald Boelcke: "Two planes could be maneuvered to fight together as a team."

Didn’t Chennault spurn all tactics of individual dogfight pilots seeking kills at the expense of tactical success for the whole formation?

Wasn’t the teaching of pursuit tactics was of Chennault's job from his arrival in 1930 at ACTS through 1935.

Non rhetorical.
The real question is… was this ‘training’ that seems to have occurred after the war started (but before there was an actual clash o between F4Fs and Zero), official training or was it simply part of the tactics/ideas that had always been there… perhaps not being used?

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Certainly Chennault had no reason to a priori decide that mutual support by section was the key for dealing with a more maneuverable enemy. His solution was the one ultimately used by most Allied fighters. High energy attacks. After all, the P-40 was considerably faster.

I don’t know. Supposedly Chennault went to China saw the results of the air to air and concluded what was needed. Did he invent it on the spot… maybe, but I wonder if the idea/teaching weren’t always there. How does one defeat an enemy fighter with different characteristics was hardly new, so…


During WW1, “Both SPAD and SE 5a pilots knew that they should climb or dive away from an attack. None of the German airplanes could out-climb or out-dive these airplanes. It was a foolish pilot in these airplanes that attempted to stick around and fight in a tight dogfight for the Fokker D.VII could out-turn both allied airplanes”.


http://home.comcast.net/~clipper-108/AI ... 05-119.pdf

[ChezDaJez]

Then it isn’t really a question of the technical superiority of the Zero, but the lack of training needed to defeat it? Is this correct?

Yes. The Zero, while having superior flying characterisitics was not omnipotent. It could be defeated or at least nullified when confronted with the correct tactics and that's exactly what happened at Midway.

“As early as September 1941 Chennault was teaching the AVG to
hit and run, requiring speed, which was the P-40's forte against
the Japanese. When properly used, the P-40 outclassed the Japanese
Zero. It took the military 2 more years before they stumbling on
the secret of successfully fighting the Japanese in the air. In the
meantime hundreds of American pilots lost their lives. This is a
matter of record.”

“The so called "Thatch weave," was supposedly used for the
first time in the battle of Midway. According to Commander Thatch,
this was a contributing factor in winning this decisive battle.”

“This weave was mentioned, and used by the AVG, and part of the
AVG's combat report in the AVG's War Diary for Dec 20, 1941, yet
Daniel Ford called it the "Thatch Weave" and gave him credit for
inventing it, saying it was first used in the Battle of Midway.
Even though Commander Thatch said he had heard this tactic had come
out of China.”

Regards,
Erik Shilling

And be careful about anything Erik Schilling says... he was a egotistical blowhard that Chennault removed from fighter duties and assigned him to fly the recon P-40. His victory total with the AVG is 0.75 kills. After the dissolution of the AVG, he flew transports for the remainder of the war.

The AVG never, repeat, never met the Zero in combat. The vast majority of AVG kills came against the Ki-27 Nate, a fact that Erik Schilling absolutely denied for years and years.

Chez

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: m10bob
As for the absolutely ignorant assertion (belief?) that the A6m2 only gained success over inferior planes like the Buffalo, I suggest the study of the air battles over Darwin and Port Moresby and New Guinea in which the Allies were using P40e's, Hurricanes, and in March '42, Spitfires, (just recently arrived from GB with veteran combat pilots.)

BTW, "ignorance" is not a slur, but a condition of an uneducated novice.
To remain ignorant is stupid.

Was it the planes or the training? When Chennault was teaching tactics to the AVG, they were quickly dismissed by the British… they had a different view based on their experience/beliefs. Chennault remarked that while the British tactics were sound against the Germans or Italians, they were not going to succeed against the Japanese.

A veteran soldier with the wrong training doesn’t perform at the optimal level. Yes? No? Maybe?

What was inherently wrong with the ‘P40e's, Hurricanes, and in March '42, Spitfires’?

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJezAnd be careful about anything Erik Schilling says... he was a egotistical blowhard that Chennault removed from fighter duties and assigned him to fly the recon P-40. His victory total with the AVG is 0.75 kills. After the dissolution of the AVG, he flew transports for the remainder of the war.

The AVG never, repeat, never met the Zero in combat. The vast majority of AVG kills came against the Ki-27 Nate, a fact that Erik Schilling absolutely denied for years and years.

Chez

I never claimed they did. The question is... you ever play the game Red Baron?

[ChezDaJez]

This is not a knock on Shilling by the way. He did his part in the fights and is a perfectly good source for tactics used by the AVG and for his recollections of AVG losses. I'm just saying he's not a good source as to where and how the particular maneuver invented by Thach & Flatley was invented.

Ok, I'll provide the knock... Schilling has been proven wrong time and time again. And not just by Ford but by most other historians that have investigated AVG operations. Chennault himself said the AVG never used any type of weaving tactic for defense. They primarily used hit and run tactics with plenty of speed to get out of Dodge before the Japanese forces could react. And when confronted with fighters, they were taught to roll and dive away if in trouble.

Chez

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Then it isn’t really a question of the technical superiority of the Zero, but the lack of training needed to defeat it? Is this correct?

Yes. The Zero, while having superior flying characterisitics was not omnipotent. It could be defeated or at least nullified when confronted with the correct tactics and that's exactly what happened at Midway.

Where did these tactics come from?

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: m10bob
As for the absolutely ignorant assertion (belief?) that the A6m2 only gained success over inferior planes like the Buffalo, I suggest the study of the air battles over Darwin and Port Moresby and New Guinea in which the Allies were using P40e's, Hurricanes, and in March '42, Spitfires, (just recently arrived from GB with veteran combat pilots.)

BTW, "ignorance" is not a slur, but a condition of an uneducated novice.
To remain ignorant is stupid.

Was it the planes or the training? When Chennault was teaching tactics to the AVG, they were quickly dismissed by the British… they had a different view based on their experience/beliefs. Chennault remarked that while the British tactics were sound against the Germans or Italians, they were not going to succeed against the Japanese.

A veteran soldier with the wrong training doesn’t perform at the optimal level. Yes? No? Maybe?

What was inherently wrong with the ‘P40e's, Hurricanes, and in March '42, Spitfires’?

Exactly my point. The statement was made the A6m2's only won over junk planes.
They won over anything flying early on because nobody listened to Chennault (an old WW1 ace), after he had personally observed the Japanese tactics since 1936.....

[ChezDaJez]

I never claimed the did. The question is... you ever play the game Red Baron?

Didn't sya you did... said Schilling claimed to have defeated the Zero in combat.

Red Baron [&:] Uh, yes...

Chez

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: m10bob
Exactly my point. The statement was made the A6m2's only won over junk planes.
They won over anything flying early on because nobody listened to Chennault (an old WW1 ace), after he had personally observed the Japanese tactics since 1936.....

I think the Zero dominated many models of Allied fighters... technically, but I don’t think the P-40, F4F, Spitfire, etc fall in to that category.

If the question is training, when and how did it take effect? I would like to know if it was official training or word of mouth… does one have a good reference?

I would like to note that Chennault did have a following inside the Army even when he was in China… did any of his observations make it back to them? Any possibility?

[mdiehl]

The statement was made the A6m2's only won over junk planes.

No one has made that claim in this thread or in any other thread in which I have participated. If that statement (that I quoted above) refers to anything I have posted here I strongly recommend that you reread the thread.

Short summary. The Zero was never qualitatively superior to normal first line allied fighters & their pilots. Making that statement does not imply that no zero could beat a first line allied fighter or pilot. Likewise, making that statement does not imply that no group of zeros could ever shoot down more allied 1st line fighters in any engagement.

It does imply that the sustained loss ratios of the actual war do not warrant any special bump to the japanese specifically for pilot ability or aircraft.

You might want to read about the action at Darwin before you invoke it as a case study. The only action at Darwin occurred when Japanese aircraft conducted a surprise raid there. The P-40s shot down were literally shot down as they were taking off, or very shortly thereafter. I do not see how any reasonable person could construe cases where enemy aircraft were shot up as they were taking off are good data points for understanding much about the relative merits of the aircraft types or their pilots. The Darwin Raid combat certainly does not qualify as a "meeting engagement."

There are good explanations for Japanese early successes that do not involve pilot quality or a.c. quality. But I can only have an interesting debate about it if people are honest enough to respond to what I write, rather than some straw man version that someone wishes I would write.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

I never claimed the did. The question is... you ever play the game Red Baron?

Didn't sya you did... said Schilling claimed to have defeated the Zero in combat.

Red Baron [&:] Uh, yes...

Chez

Schilling claimed tactics were being used in the AVG to defeat Japanese style fighter designs, Thatch developed tactics to defeat Japanese style fighter designs, Chenault says he developed them from observations in China.

You ever go up against a Fokker D.VII with a less maneuverable plane? You can do many things to destroy it, but turning with it is not the best option.

[brisd]

As an old timer but infrequent poster (the past few years), I remember the old threads on this subject. They were certainly hot. And very revealing of the ignorance of one individual in particular. I think that was the first time I ever used the IGNORE feature. Nothing I've seen from this new series of posts has changed my mind. [8|]

Back to the discussion...

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: brisd

As an old timer but infrequent poster (the past few years), I remember the old threads on this subject. They were certainly hot. And very revealing of the ignorance of one individual in particular. I think that was the first time I ever used the IGNORE feature. Nothing I've seen from this new series of posts has changed my mind. [8|]

Back to the discussion...

[&:] I am not sure how that contributed anything to the discussion?


Of course if I am the one being ignored... [;)]

[ChezDaJez]

Where did these tactics come from?

Primarily from Thach. Flately did not initially like the tactic... though he came to recognize it as necessary. He thought it was too defensive and indeed it was but it was one of the few tools available that also allowed for a significant chance of success, not to mention survival. He did not know of it at Coral Sea but Thach used it for the first time at Midway.

This is from Wikipedia... (I know, I know, Wikipedia isn't always correct but this rings true.)

Flatley--with John S. Thach and Butch O'Hare--was instrumental in communicating tactical advice throughout naval aviation and changing the perception that the supposedly inferior F4F Wildcat fighter was actually superior to the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero when properly utilized. Comment of Flatley about the Grumman F4F Wildcat: "Let us not be too critical of our equipment. It shoots the enemy down in flames and brings most of us home." Flatley was not overly impressed by the Japanese Zero fighter, but noted the high quality of Japanese pilots. His writeup on enemy capabilities received high marks at senior levels.

The expression Thach Weave did not come into the lexicon until Flatley named it in his after action report for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. He recounted how LCDR John S. Thach’s "Beam Defense tactic" had allowed him a successful defense in an almost sure destruction situation during the battle. Flatley wrote: ". . . the four plane division is the only thing that will work and, I am calling it the Thach Weave."

Anyways, as I've said before, superior tactics can make up for inferior equipment. And in the case of the Wildcat, the tactics made all the difference. Still, the tactic only allowed the Wildcat to remain competitive in combat. It was by no means going to ensure success against the Zero.

Chez