ORIGINAL: niceguy2005
Perhaps, my guess would be better trained than Army pilots, about equal in training to Navy pilots...that's a personal assessment so take it for what its worth.
However, what is an important distinction to make is that training does not equal experience. The Japanese pilots had experience putting their training and tactics to work. This is something the Allies lacked, except for the few RAF and RAAF pilots who had seen action in Europe and Africa.
The Allied pilots, lacking experience with the nimble Japanese fighters had training and tactics that led them to make poor decisions in how to engage the enemy. As the first weeks of the war passed and the Allies gained experienc, they learned their lessons and adapted new tactics. These tactics were ultimately adopted into the pilot training programs and the playing field was leveled.
It was considerable until the allies changed their tactics.
Then it isn’t really a question of the technical superiority of the Zero, but the lack of training needed to defeat it? Is this correct?
When did this training occur and at what point did the balance shift? Pre-Coral Sea, Pre-Midway, etc. Your opinion.
It's never really as simple as all that. It is a matter of technical superiourity of the zero IN SOME AREAS and the ability of Japanese pilots to capitalize on that.
As to when the switch in tactics became "doctrine", that also is hard to say. Certainly more experienced units adopted earlier. For the RAF the switch seemed to occur somtime during the Burma campaign, for the Navy after Coral Sea, for the Army...not really sure. The AVG being a highly experienced unit certainly was advanced in its tactics compared to units just being assembled and trained on the West Coast.
Hmm. I am under the impression that the OP was more along the lines of "If the A2A game model was accurate enough, is the Zero bonus justified?"
It seems to me that the Zero bonus sort of highlights a weakness in the overall air 2 air combat model.
1. A6M successfull because the early war Allied pilots attempt to dogfight it, playing into the Zero's strengths. The Zero bonus is justified by the supporters of it on these grounds. However, to me, this sounds like something that the experience rating should be addressing. Experienced pilots (e.g. Thatch) are able to develope appropriate counter tactics, even before meeting the foe in combat.
I do agree that the quality of the pilots is very important in determining how they can adapt to different aircraft in combat, but I also think there was a certain ‘shock’ value that caused the Allies to perform below their abilities early on.
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Im not an expert in this area. At all. Im just going to add my one comment..maybe two.
If you have to develop a particular tactic to use, and it is this one particular tactic that is responsible for generally keeping your plane competitive...then your plane isnt equal or superior to the other..its in the ballpark but inferior.
I don't think the tactics adopted were a trick of any sort designed to try and make the planes competitive. The boom and zoom tactic needs to be thought of as a paradigm shift, but a paradigm equal to that of the turning dogfight. The problem with paradigm shifts is that they are big and difficult for people to grasp.
A good analogy is the carrier in WWII. Although a few leaders grasped the power and role carriers would play in the war, at the outset most leaders were still convinved that the battleship was the ultimate weapon. Same goes for high speed air combat. Many leaders felt that you couldn't adequately engage the enemy in a series of high speed passes.
Once the effectiveness of the new high-speed combat was revealed and widely adopted the tables were somewhat turned on the Zero. The plane could not manage the high speed turns as well as the sturdier allied fighters. It now came down to pilot skill and situation, who could be whom in a position to fight the wrong kind of fight for their aircraft...at this point the engagements were roughly equal, might even have gone to the F4F and P-40s advantage as they were more durable.
Hmm. I am under the impression that the OP was more along the lines of "If the A2A game model was accurate enough, is the Zero bonus justified?"
It seems to me that the Zero bonus sort of highlights a weakness in the overall air 2 air combat model.
1. A6M successfull because the early war Allied pilots attempt to dogfight it, playing into the Zero's strengths. The Zero bonus is justified by the supporters of it on these grounds. However, to me, this sounds like something that the experience rating should be addressing. Experienced pilots (e.g. Thatch) are able to develope appropriate counter tactics, even before meeting the foe in combat.
I do agree that the quality of the pilots is very important in determining how they can adapt to different aircraft in combat, but I also think there was a certain ‘shock’ value that caused the Allies to perform below their abilities early on.
Except the AVG is immune. IRL, the AVG did not engage the Japanese in actual combat until 20 December...
Why would Thatch be "shocked", but Boyington not?
Weren't Chennault and Thatch working along the same train of thought, based on older Chinese vs Japanese air combats?
That's why I think the rather experienced Thatch would be immune to the Zero bonus, but other (less experienced) pilots in the USN and elsewhere, not so much.
In other words, maneuverability (dogfighting) is more important to an inexperienced pilot, because he is falling back on his basic combat training. He is told "this is what works". So, with a given pilots experience level being below a certain threshold, the MVR value is bumped up to a higher tier of importance in the A2A combat model.
The more experienced pilots (like Thatch) will be able to know why "this is what works", and be smart enough to realise that "what works" doesn't apply a new set of circumstances. (Like the discovery of the unexpected, exceptional manueverability of the Japanese aircraft.) In this case, the MVR value is relegated to a lower tier in the A2A model...
The "experimental" version of the CHS (scen 159-160), handles the situation differently. It gets rid fo teh Zero bonus, and makes up for it with adjusted pilot experience. No pilots are given extra experience, instead all pilots have their experience ratings reduced, the allied pilots more so than the Japanese (and USN pilots have theirs reduced by a lower amount as well). So far, this seems to be working fairly well...
The Zero bonus is a decreasing value (5 pts-Dec 41, 4 pts-Jan 42, etc) and ostensibly reflects the increasing knowledge the allies gained about the Zero while observing it in combat. By the time of Midway, tactics to counter it were in place (at least in some US units). I actually think that the Zero bonus is a good way of reflecting this period though I also think it does not have that great an effect on combat past February 42.
I think it really is the zero bonus that we're talking about. And if it really does not make much of a difference (as some claim) then no one should object to eliminating it.
The problem with the "shock and awe" and "learning curve" claims is that they are illogical. Thach & Flatley certainly had no shock or awe and no learning curve to overcome, since they'd already solved the Wildcat vs Zero problem before the war even started. There were plenty of people in the USN VF units that had heard of their work in 1941, and even rookies could be taught the tactic literally on the fly (as at Midway). So at the least, the ZB if hardcoded not to apply to the AVG should likewise never apply when the Allied opfor consists of US carrier planes. Not even in Dec 1941.
The other reason why it strikes me as a fundamentally flawed concept is that it presumes that there was no Japanese learning curve inherent in fighting various first line allied aircraft. The destruction meted out by .50cal was outside of their experience, as was *any* form of combat against reasonably well trained pilots.
The third reason it strikes me as a flawed concept is because it presumes that the expiration of the Zero bonus represents a state in which both sides are now learning equally from their experience with enemy aircraft. In point of fact, the Japanese were so slow to innovate, despite loss rates of obvious concern, that one could argue for a "Japanese penalty" pretty much throughout the interval from April 1942-Dec 1943 -- an interval in which combat was frequent, loss rates were under the best of circumstances at rough parity with the Allied loss rates, and in which attrition rates among Japanese pilots were soaring, and yet during same interval NO effort was made to change tactics, change doctrine, or substantially increase aircraft capability. Yet no such downgrade (for resistence to adaptation) exists.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Hey, we are only supposed to cite examples where there was no operational or tactical surprise... remember?
Clark Field on 8 Dec comes to mind... they only had several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor to get ready...
Let's not forget the air raids on Singapore on 8 Dec. They also only had a few hours to prepare after the invasion at Kota Bharu...
You know like during the Ceylon raids where the Japanese forces were spotted by a Catalina long before the attack occurred. Plus the Japanese had the audacity to fly in full view of the coast on the way to their target.... Of course, this was only 3 months after the war started...
These are all straw man arguments as you well knew when you wrote them. Tactical surprise is different from whether or not one is at war. If it is your claim that instances of tactical surprise reflect pilot capabilities, then it would be as well to knock 20 points off of the EXP of all Japanese naval pilots because they were indeed surprised by RAF tactical bombers in the Indian Ocean (which bombers simply missed) and again at Midway, and when the Japanese lost light carriers in both the Coral Sea and Eastern Solomons engagements.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
I think it really is the zero bonus that we're talking about. And if it really does not make much of a difference (as some claim) then no one should object to eliminating it.
I think one of the reasons this forum doesn't get nearly as excited about this topic as has been the case in the past, is because so fairly extensive testing results were posted a while back which surprised us - but also showed that the "zero bonus" did not in fact have much of an effect. Prior to that, I think most of us though the "bonus" provided significant, if temporary, advantage. But now I would be surprised if any experienced Japanese PBEM players would care much either way.
I for one have played several thousand PBEM turns (stopped counting) as Japanese and would gladly trade my "zero bonus" for oh say 10xB17s ... for me the "tactics" that are used in the game make far more difference than a point or so of manuever advantage.
WITP Admiral's Edition - Project Lead
War In Spain - Project Lead
but also showed that the "zero bonus" did not in fact have much of an effect.
How many allied players would commit an American CV against an equal number of Japanese CVs in March 1942? In January 1942?
I for one have played several thousand PBEM turns (stopped counting) as Japanese and would gladly trade my "zero bonus" for oh say 10xB17s
Hardly the point. Probably the Allied player would trade those 10B17s if he could get an equal number engines attached to torpedo armed Betties in exchange.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
but also showed that the "zero bonus" did not in fact have much of an effect.
How many allied players would commit an American CV against an equal number of Japanese CVs in March 1942? In January 1942?
I for one have played several thousand PBEM turns (stopped counting) as Japanese and would gladly trade my "zero bonus" for oh say 10xB17s
Hardly the point. Probably the Allied player would trade those 10B17s if he could get an equal number engines attached to torpedo armed Betties in exchange.
If I am Allied - I would purposefully seek opportunities to engage CVs in equal numbers. Again, tactics are the key to success in the game.
WITP Admiral's Edition - Project Lead
War In Spain - Project Lead
I do agree that the quality of the pilots is very important in determining how they can adapt to different aircraft in combat, but I also think there was a certain ‘shock’ value that caused the Allies to perform below their abilities early on.
That was well said. And is probably the real gist of the debate. Maybe a better way to model this would have been to give an experience penalty to US pilots during this period instead of a Zero bonus.
Chez
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
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I just got Lundstrom's book on Fletcher. I'll report back in two weeks...
Harry Erwin
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
This is not a reply to any particular post - and it's a post of many parts - just my thoughts to this thread.
1. I think something like the Zero bonus should apply to all planes whose characteristics took the other side by surprise. That means Zero and Oscar would get it for their maneuverability, Tony for turning zoom-and-boom into a bad luck move etc. I recognize that the thread trying to ascertain which type should get this bonus for what reason might easily rival THE THREAD for length ...
2. The original zoom-and-boom merchants in WWII seem to have been the BF110 drivers. Worked well early in the war, until they met the RAF.
3. P39, P40, F4F, Oscar, Zero, Buffalo, Hurricane all belonged to an interim generation whose designers tried to come to grips with rapid progress in structures, aerodynamics, and engines, and more or less failed. All these designs were to some degree unbalanced which IMHO rendered most of them ultimately mediocre. The main exceptions were the Bf109 and the Spitfire, albeit only by major efforts in updating the designs. Spits/109s as built in 1945 had only a superficial similarity to their 1938 ancestors.
4. P39s/P40s are being described as great fighters because they were the best US designs available when WWII exploded in the PTO. I think US citizens have a knee-jerk reflex to value their weapons systems above those of other countries. I remember reading an article in a 1942 issue of the journal of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. They commented on a list of the best warplanes of the war compiled by the British magazine "The Aeroplane" which had a mixture of British, US, and German types at the top of the categories. The ASME authors countered with a list of their own in which every single category was won by a US type, including "Interceptor" which was won by the P39. Understandable and patriotic, but it clouds the issue. (I concede that the same mechanism is likely at work with other nationalities as well, but most of the loudest anti-Zero/Oscar voices in this discussion seem to be US based).
5. Let's examine performance in the ETO, where those aircraft met a different adversary, with different tactics and a different style of fighters. The RAF quickly got rid of their P39s, while the Soviets liked them as ground-attack aircraft. No surprise here. The P40 family met German fighters first in North Africa, and it is IMHO significant that British/Commonwealth fighter units flying Tomahawks/Kittyhawks/Warhawks apparently tended to go into defensive circles when they saw '109s approaching, not a vote of confidence in the fighting qualities of their mounts. The P40s, just like the Hurricanes, migrated into use as fighter-bombers and other army co-op roles, like Tac Recce, as soon as the opposition was no longer Italians in open-cockpit fighters. At about the same time in the PTO, those same aircraft were still deemed just as good as the best the IJA/IJN could field.
6. It is often said that the Oscar was a POS because it was armed with just two MGs, one of them rifle calibre, and thus couldn't really have done a lot of damage in A2A combat against those well-protected P40s with their 4-6 .50 Brownings. I refer to the North African Theatre, where one Hans-Joachim Marseille got into the habit of killing 3-7 P40 family aircraft at one sitting. Edward H. Sims. in "The Fighter Pilots", describes a particular combat, against Tomahawks of No.5(SAAF) Sqn., where Marseille shot down six Tomahawks in less than ten minutes. When he returned to base, it was discovered that his cannon had jammed after firing just ten rounds, so he must have "killed" five Tomahawks just using his two 7.92mm MG17s. I submit that combat experience and skill can render fighters with seemingly ineffective armament surprisingly effective, especially when those two MG's are installed close to the pilot's line of sight in the engine cowling.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
The problem with the "shock and awe" and "learning curve" claims is that they are illogical. Thach & Flatley certainly had no shock or awe and no learning curve to overcome, since they'd already solved the Wildcat vs Zero problem before the war even started. There were plenty of people in the USN VF units that had heard of their work in 1941, and even rookies could be taught the tactic literally on the fly (as at Midway). So at the least, the ZB if hardcoded not to apply to the AVG should likewise never apply when the Allied opfor consists of US carrier planes. Not even in Dec 1941.
The other reason why it strikes me as a fundamentally flawed concept is that it presumes that there was no Japanese learning curve inherent in fighting various first line allied aircraft. The destruction meted out by .50cal was outside of their experience, as was *any* form of combat against reasonably well trained pilots.
Actually the learning curve is quite logical as every army in the world has always had to learn to adapt to its opponents tactics. Hearing of tactics and implementing them under fire are two totally different things. The average man under fire falls back on the training that and behaviors that he has repeated time and time again.
Further, if you take the time to look at the zero bonus in some detail it is reasonable to assume that the Japanese learing curve, which did exist, is factored in to the bonus already. Had Japan not had lessons to learn the bonus would need to be much larger than it already is.
but also showed that the "zero bonus" did not in fact have much of an effect.
How many allied players would commit an American CV against an equal number of Japanese CVs in March 1942? In January 1942?
I would gladly as long as I was fighting in relatively nuetral air space.
I did numerous tests on this and have the data to back it up (see my AAR). The USN F4Fs did reasonably well in March 42. Flumars didn't even do that badly.
"P39s/P40s are being described as great fighters because they were the best US designs available when WWII exploded in the PTO."
While the P-40 was generally liked by those who flew it for it's toughness, I don't think you'll find many people who claimed the P-39 was a "great fighter". Most pilots issued them couldn't wait to get out of them. Not because it wasn't good at what it could do (ground support and shooting up shipping), but because they wanted a "fighter"..., and with no supercharging the P-39 just couldn't "cut the mustard" in that regard.
In retrospect, I doubt many even considered the P-40 to be "great" either. It was rugged, dependable, well-armed and available --- and "held the line" until better A/C came along.
The problem here is that most of the shock, awe, and "behind the learning curve" cases in the war were cases where Japanese pilots were shocked, awed, and using flawed tactics.
Sqn., where Marseille shot down six Tomahawks
Isn't that the Luftwaffe "confirmed kill" estimate? In general, the only records of any value for these sorts of analyses are records of losses based on the losing units documents.
If one goes to the illogical extreme as to suggesting that the Tony warrants some sort of bonus, then the only reasonable suggestion is that each time a new model is introduced the player bringing it to the combat gets a "bonus."
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
I do agree that the quality of the pilots is very important in determining how they can adapt to different aircraft in combat, but I also think there was a certain ‘shock’ value that caused the Allies to perform below their abilities early on.
That was well said. And is probably the real gist of the debate. Maybe a better way to model this would have been to give an experience penalty to US pilots during this period instead of a Zero bonus.
Chez
I agree Chez, well said. I think you are right to say that it might have made more sense to give an experience penalty to the US pilot, but a bonus to the Zero has the exact same effect and from a programming standpoint would be more straight forward to implment.
The real tragedy is that they called it the Zero bonus as opposed to the Zero PILOT bonus.
"Edward H. Sims. in "The Fighter Pilots", describes a particular combat, against Tomahawks of No.5(SAAF) Sqn., where Marseille shot down six Tomahawks in less than ten minutes. When he returned to base, it was discovered that his cannon had jammed after firing just ten rounds, so he must have "killed" five Tomahawks just using his two 7.92mm MG17s. I submit that combat experience and skill can render fighters with seemingly ineffective armament surprisingly effective, especially when those two MG's are installed close to the pilot's line of sight in the engine cowling."
Not sure I'd pick Marseilles as an example. Post-war accounting called many of his "claims" into account..., on account of British records not showing any planes lost during a number of his "big days".
Actually the learning curve is quite logical as every army in the world has always had to learn to adapt to its opponents tactics. Hearing of tactics and implementing them under fire are two totally different things. The average man under fire falls back on the training that and behaviors that he has repeated time and time again.
Sure but is this something that warrants modeling in a game of this scale and if it is someone needs to rationalize the model. It does not seem rationalized to any real world data, and it seems illogically applied if the only side needing to learn is the Allies.
Further, if you take the time to look at the zero bonus in some detail it is reasonable to assume that the Japanese learing curve, which did exist, is factored in to the bonus already. Had Japan not had lessons to learn the bonus would need to be much larger than it already is.
I disagree. There is no up front reason for putting in the ZB at all. Indeed, there is more compelling argument for putting in an Allied bonus around April 1942 and increasing that bonus as the Allies introduce new types.
And there is no reason to assume the ZB would apply against USN pilots as they had substantially studied the problem in 1941. Many of them had, anyhow. The USN pilots had better a priori intel on Zero capabilities than the IJN pilots had on F4F capabilities, which is why the .50 came on the Japanese as a rude shock.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
