AMERICANLESS WAR IN THE PACIFIC!!

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

If the Japanese don't attack the Dutch, they don't get the oil. And the US and the Dutch embargoed them well before they war. True, it was over taking French Indochina..., but if the Japanese don't take Indochina, they have no place to attack Malaya from... Wait, that means they have to attack France as well. The whole set of assumptions are idiotic.

I agree its an unlikely scenario. But I've never seen it as a reason not to explore a what if. hence i was simply going with the scenario parameters that state, "assume" that just the UK and Japan declare war on each other....how do you think it would go? Its a simple (well not so simple! [;)]) and fun exercise to me.

Now if someone includes the caveat...."how probable do you think it is?" then thats a different story. No, its a highly improbable. On the question of oil, I partially agree with you. The partial only coming from the fact that Japan would capture "Some" of the SRA's oil by attacking Britain's possessions only. If they want ALL of it, then yes, they must attack the Dutch. Another good argument would be that the Dutch might side with the British knowing that if the UK loses then its only a matter of time before they fall next and alone they have no prayer of beating Japan. Together though.....well they would at least have a better chance. Hence you now have total war in the SRA with the exception of the PI's.

[jwilkerson]

Two ways to look at the question:

(1) And exercise in mental "gymnastics" in which case any relation to probably actual events are ignored. In which case Japan attacks SRA and ignores and is ignored by USA then assuming War In Europe going as it did historically, pretty much game over - Japan takes SRA - beyond that who knows.

(2) Would USA provoke? Would Japan react to provocation? IRL answer, yes, yes. It was probably thinking down these lines that led Japan to decide that attacking first was better.

Hence case (1) is essentially a bean counting exercise and (2) means that it is a matter of weeks before USA and Japan are fighting even if USA not attacked by Japan.

However, it is possible, that in case (2) you would not see the same level of support - the "Rosie The Riveter" attitude in America during the war and that might matter - but who knows.

[mikemike]

I've looked at that thread. Yes, it's an exercise in "mental gymnastics", and not too probable. But intriguing all the same. The parameters seem to be
- that nothing much is happening in Europe, certainly no shooting war.
- that under those circumstances, the isolationist tendencies in US politics at the time might keep the USA out of it, especially when the Brits and the Japs are going at each other far away in the Far East, with not the slightest threat to Britain proper. The position of the USA in this case is assumed to be neutrality as long as no US territory is threatened or attacked. And "don't sell anything to anybody".

As to Mike Scholl's objection concerning oil from the DEI, with the Dutch staying uninvolved, the Japanese might simply have bought that oil. The Dutch always had the reputation of being rather mercenary,and I can see them adopting a similar policy as that adopted by the USA early in the real WW2 (we sell you everything you want, as long as you collect it using your own ships, at your risk).

Just a match British Empire vs. Imperial Japan, come as you are.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: mikemike
As to Mike Scholl's objection concerning oil from the DEI, with the Dutch staying uninvolved, the Japanese might simply have bought that oil. The Dutch always had the reputation of being rather mercenary,and I can see them adopting a similar policy as that adopted by the USA early in the real WW2 (we sell you everything you want, as long as you collect it using your own ships, at your risk).

Just a match British Empire vs. Imperial Japan, come as you are.

Another problem..., FRANCE. No war in Europe, and the Japanese need to sieze French Indo-China just to get in range to attack British Malaya. To get it, they'd have to declare war on France (Allied with Britian) and sieze it before they could bring air power in range of Malaya...., giving Britian time to build up. And it was the Japanese siezure of Vichy French Indo-China that triggered the oil embargo by BOTH the US and the Dutch. OK, I'll accept that it's a very far-fetched scenario..., but France HAS to be involved somehow or it doesn't happen at all.

[Bombsight]

I agree that this is an "academic" discussion. If there was no war in Europe, Japan would not have believed that it had a sufficient advantage and would not have attacked.

The japanese felt that no invasion of the DEI could take place with the USA re-arming and possessed a territory covering the main supply line of the invasion forces (i.e. the Phillipine Islands).

Therfore, the japanese invaded the DEI and secured their eastern flank by eliminating the US forces in the Phillipines.

This reminds me of a FDR political statement concerning the rearmament program in 1941....by establishing the world's largest concentration of four engine bombers in the Phillipines (100 ac) the US would keep Japan under control!

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
The only way I can see this as making sense is if history played out as it did in real life until 7 Dec 41 when Japan attacks everything it historically did except for US territory. This would force the US to make the decision to declare war on Japan without a direct attack upon itself and that may not be politically viable for weeks or months given the relatively pacifist stance of Congress.

Should it have happened that way, I think that British and Dutch forces in the Pacific would have found themselves quickly overwhelmed with the full weight of the IJN and IJA available for the job. In other words, the war would have proceeded against their colonial interests and forces in the same manner in which it historically did only quicker as Japan would not have suffered the diversion of its forces that fought the US. India and Australia would surely have become viable targets. US bases in the PI and central Pacific would remain a potential thorn in the Japanese sides but without substantial reinforcement they would constitute but a relatively minor threat.

A key point is that if and when the US did decide to enter the war, it would be at a time and place of their choosing and we could possibly have effected a reverse Pearl Harbor so to speak. Of course, that is assuming that Japan did not respond to the military buildup in the Pacific that the US was sure to begin with a later preemptive attack. Substantial US reinforcement of the Philippines would be sure to raise some eyebrows and possible lead to a direct attack on US forces early in 1942. And of course, the effectiveness of the thinly veiled AVG would likely have contributed to increasing Japanese resentment of the US. By then, the Japanese would probably have accomplished most of their objectives with the exception of India and Australia.

Any other scenario just doesn't make sense IMO.

I agree. This scenario was briefly considered by the Japanese high command. Some believed that the isolationists in the US would hold sway if no US territory was attacked, but would do a 180 if the US was attacked. Yammamoto's faction believed that the isolationsists would continue to hold sway and would create "political drag" during a war with Japan that would result in the US suing for peace if hit hard enough.

The former faction was more right. US isolationists mostly did a 180 and started backing the war effort 100% after Pearl Harbor.

If the Philippines and Guam ended up surrounded by the Japanese after only a few months of war, sentiment about isolationism probably would have changed in the US. The US always held different ideas about Asia than Europe. Before WW I, the US traditionally stayed out of European squabbles, but was heavily involved in Asian politics. The US had a constant military presence in China for most of the 1st half of the 20th century and for the last decade or so of the 19th. The US was instrumental in opening up Japan to the rest of the world. The US's largest overseas military commitment was in the Philippines. The US also had resentment over Asian immigrants, especially on the West Coast.

The US had more of a sense of ownership with regards to Japanese affairs than it did with anything going on in Europe. Roosevelt was trying to figure out how to get into the war in Europe before Pealr Harbor and getting into a conflict in the Pacific might have been the opening he needed.

If Japan went to war without directly drawing in the US, it's a political gamble. The isloationis might have weakened if Japan ran roughshod over the Europeans in the Pacific, but it was not guaranteed either way.

That would be the ultimate "what if" scenario. If the US waited to get into the war, they could have fortified the Philippines and Guam. Troops there would be aware of how brutal the Japanese could be from refugees fleeing in from the other conquered territories in the region. The Phillipine troops would have a stronger resolve and be better prepared. US airpower there would certainly be built up.

Who knows if the US Navy would have learned any lessons from observing the IJN, but they would likely have been prepared for the Zero. US war production was already ramping up before Pearl Harbor. A longer period of peace would have helped organize and build up the military.

Without attacking the US and taking the Philippines, Japan risked leaving a strong US base of operations in the Philippines that could have interrupted their resource shipments from the DEI whenever the US decided to jump into the war. Japan would have been unable to take a fortified and prepared Philippines. The war would have likely been shorter.

All that hinges on the question of if the US could overcome the isolationists.

Bill