Yamamoto's Plan; The Execution

[JWE]

Yamamoto’s Plan to invade Hawaii has been hashed and rehashed as to its feasibility, effect on the US response, and its ultimate outcome. However, nothing has been discussed as to its viability and its effect on the Dec. 7 Surprise feature of the game.

Now, much has been written, and conspiracy theorized (on both sides), about the surprise at PH; and there’s not much that can be said further, either in defense or to controvert, either side, that hasn’t been exhaustively trotted out, examined, and furiously urinated on. But this new scenario does not have the same characteristics as Bro. Isoroku’s implemented PH attack plan. Thus, it needs to be analyzed in toto, as a separate operation.

Forget breaking JN-25, just looking at ordinary signals intelligence, we had a very good idea as to the existence of the various invasion fleets. Didn’t know their specific objectives, but knew they were around. Now, accepting the signals discipline of the IJN KB, one wonders what would be the effect of the formation of a Hawaiian invasion TF, made up of hastily mobilized merchant vessels, crewed by merchant seamen, skippered by their commercial captains, who were notoriously talkative (that’s one reason how we knew of the existence of all the other groupings).

My take is that there is less than a 10% likelihood that this gaggle of slow, talkative, independent, vessels could sneak up on PH. So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

[ctangus]

ORIGINAL: JWE

So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'd also like to see the inner-Hawaiian islands included in the West Coast invasion rule where reinforcements are speeded up. Short of a code change one could house rule it & land a sub invasion near Seattle 2-3 weeks (how long does it take to sail from Norfolk to Panama?) after the intial landings in Hawaii.

[ny59giants]

Another thing should be an increase in Allied Political Points per day.
How much??

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: ctangus

ORIGINAL: JWE

So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Agree.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'm skeptical about this one - the intel noted above indicates an earlier sailing. Especially if there is time for the US to act on the intel.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Another thing should be an increase in Allied Political Points per day.
How much??

If you are talking about the RHS EOS scenario, it's already done. In that scenario the command of units introduced are either Western US or Pacific Fleet, and you get lots of PP. The idea being that you must spend points to get things out of the restricted Western US command. As you do not know where the main Japanese thrusts will be, pre-assigning units to South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, etc. is unrealistic (except for a small number that would be politically necessary regardless of where Japan attacked).

[el cid again]

This is correct - and it is ALSO correct for AIO - which has the same start - but AI runs Japan. Note, however, this (AIO)is a lopsided scenario - in that ONLY the Allies get the extra political points - Japan does not. [Japan gets to spend its initial points on the invasion, and otherwise is forced to live with CVO pp - not because that is right - but because AI won't use more]

The question might, however, be meant for OIO - which does not exist - but could exist - how fast and easy depends on how much needs changing. I proposed to do it based on CVO or RAO - just shifting the Japanese TFs. Changing pp is a fairly big deal - it means hundreds - maybe well over a thousand - units change commands. It is like those proposals to greatly increase Allied units - it would take a long time to implement - if it even can be done slot wise. But it can be done. It was done for PPO and EOS - and AIO has the EOS scale of pp for the Allies only. PP changes are integrated - you don't really get "more pp" - you get to CHOOSE how those that exist are spent. Thus - units that historically went to the South Pacific start in Western Command (say) - and you now have them to spend to send where you wish. But that means we need to change the commands to fit. I think pp games are far more valid - how can we know that a unit should go to SE Asia in 1944 when we don't know what will happen in 1942 or 1943? Better to let the players decide. In RHS we adopted the standard that you should be able to make a decision for a division (rounded up) or equal to that per day. That works out to be 1500 pp per day.

On the matter of orders, I don't favor limited orders for the Allies in any scenario. I am with Halsey's advice to Nimitz: "when you are in command, command." The ONLY rule I advocate is that the player must honest believe the orders are really ones the commander would have issued IRL. If YOU believe they would not have been issued - do not do it. But this way the other side does not know for sure what you will think/do - and that creates one of my favorite things in simulation: uncertainty. I have no problem with unrestricted orders. I also have no problem with restricted orders - but do not TELL the enemy about it. On the other hand, I don't think the US would really believe the Japanese were invading Hawaii until some major force was spotted in the Central Pacific. It was astounding even to know there was a carrier raiding force - after all. Most didn't believe they were up to it - logistically speaking - either. However many indications there might be - they would be rationalized - or under study - right up until someone saw something very indisputably warlike. Nagumo feared that might be in the form of a submarine sighting - and while unlikely - as in improbable - it is very possible. I think this sort of thing is very well left to the game engine to figure out. There were ideas and plans and exercises of several kinds. The fleet could anchor as a whole at Lahaina Roads - and only the threat of submarine attack made it unattractive to Kimmel. If there were more tankers, Kimmel felt keeping half at sea was a good idea. There are a number of options - and I believe they properly should be decided by the Allied player(s) - not by us as modders.

One way to speed things up is to do AIO only for Level 7.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: ctangus

ORIGINAL: JWE

So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Agree.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'm skeptical about this one - the intel noted above indicates an earlier sailing. Especially if there is time for the US to act on the intel.

I’m skeptical about that, too. It would have been more likely that we would be aware of the existence of an invasion TF, but not its objective. Lot’s of available alternatives.

Alert status would have increased, patrols increased, etc, but we, most likely, wouldn’t have dispersed, sortied and manned the defensive positions till indications showed the TF passing about 175 – 180 degrees East. That would have given us only a couple days, to prepare, but …

I agree, allow orders, I also like upping the initial pool of PPs, by sufficient to activate 7 Div, 2 MarDiv, some addl arty, and eng troops. Would be nice and not unreasonable to accelerate arrival of 1 MarDiv, so need PPs for that one too.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: ctangus

ORIGINAL: JWE

So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'd also like to see the inner-Hawaiian islands included in the West Coast invasion rule where reinforcements are speeded up. Short of a code change one could house rule it & land a sub invasion near Seattle 2-3 weeks (how long does it take to sail from Norfolk to Panama?) after the intial landings in Hawaii.

If we had had warning, the Battle Fleet would have been at sea--perhaps at Lahaina Roads, but initially out of air search range in any case. The tactics used at Midway (ships deployed behind the base, relying on PBY search for early warning) were standard. Aircraft would have been dispersed and LCUs at wartime stations. American carrier TFs would have been operating against the flanks and rear of the Japanese fleet, and it's likely Sara would have been present.

[witpqs]

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

Not if there were a three hundred or more Japanese transports and landing craft headed towards the Hawaiian Islands. That can't be hidden. (I'm speaking professionally here.) Sara could steam at three to four times the speed of the invasion force. The distance from mainland Japan to Hawaii is about 500 hours steaming for a troop convoy. The *entire* US Navy could reach Pearl Harbor in 700 hours. The IJN would have at most a week from the first attacks until the USN would be in reliable control of Hawaiian waters.

[ctangus]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: ctangus

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'm skeptical about this one - the intel noted above indicates an earlier sailing. Especially if there is time for the US to act on the intel.

I’m skeptical about that, too. It would have been more likely that we would be aware of the existence of an invasion TF, but not its objective. Lot’s of available alternatives.

Alert status would have increased, patrols increased, etc, but we, most likely, wouldn’t have dispersed, sortied and manned the defensive positions till indications showed the TF passing about 175 – 180 degrees East. That would have given us only a couple days, to prepare, but …

My thinking is this - IRL the US was aware of transports massing at Hainan, Taiwan & Shanghai. That didn't increase Hawaii's alertness - it was assumed that the Japanese were going south. I agree that the existence of another invasion TF or two in Japanese waters most likely would have been noticed, but it seems most likely to me that the assumption would still be: Japan's heading south. I consider it possible, but not likely, that Hawaii would be more alert in such a scenario.

If there also wasn't a build-up of shipping in the Marshalls, which was prevailing view of where a threat to Hawaii would come from, I think it would be justified for the Japanese to have surprise turn one.

In game terms the Japanese player would have a better shot at neutralizing the US Fleet, but would still have to sail several weeks before their first landings in Hawaii, giving the Allied player some time to respond. It's certainly an assumption on my part, but I'd be willing to play under it.

I agree, allow orders, I also like upping the initial pool of PPs, by sufficient to activate 7 Div, 2 MarDiv, some addl arty, and eng troops. Would be nice and not unreasonable to accelerate arrival of 1 MarDiv, so need PPs for that one too.

An alternate could be a modded start, if a neutral modder would agree to help. One could assume a heads up of 7? 10? days and issue orders based on that. E.g. Sara is in hex x,y and CruDiv 6 and DesRon 5 have sailed from Hawaii to form her screen. The battleline is in hex xx, yy composed in such and such a way. 100K supply is in a TF at xxx, yyy in transports a, b & c screened by a division of flush deckers. Marine Defense battalions have been rushed to Palmyra & Hilo from Pearl. Etc.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

Very likely so. As I see it, the scenario would maybe go as follows:

Dec. 3, 4, or 5 (increasing probability with day) somebody, somewhere, says ‘Holy Shimoly! Convoy JN-12 is taking a course for the (Central) (Northern) Pacific’. Human nature being what it is, the first target list would include Midway, the Aleutians, and (at the bottom) the Hawaiians. Wake might be on the list, but source and routing would preclude that. The time calculation, to whatever objective, is a 2 – 3 minute exercise.

So you might get a better, faster, beefier reinforcement to Midway (maybe Wake), and the carriers would be put into relevant positions. If it were me, I would accelerate Sara’s load out but keep her in hand, to see which way the banzai bounces. I would probably have her on course to PH, on the northern track, on the 5th, no later than the 6th. So Sara might show up only a day or two ahead of historical schedule.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: ctangus



I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Agree.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'm skeptical about this one - the intel noted above indicates an earlier sailing. Especially if there is time for the US to act on the intel.

I’m skeptical about that, too. It would have been more likely that we would be aware of the existence of an invasion TF, but not its objective. Lot’s of available alternatives.

Alert status would have increased, patrols increased, etc, but we, most likely, wouldn’t have dispersed, sortied and manned the defensive positions till indications showed the TF passing about 175 – 180 degrees East. That would have given us only a couple days, to prepare, but …

I agree, allow orders, I also like upping the initial pool of PPs, by sufficient to activate 7 Div, 2 MarDiv, some addl arty, and eng troops. Would be nice and not unreasonable to accelerate arrival of 1 MarDiv, so need PPs for that one too.

Problem with the 1 MarDiv is that it had been broken up - that is its vets were forming up all sorts of Marine units all over the place (and mainly not PTO). The unit was very green - and IF it was sent forward sooner - it should be rated that way. Also it was short of weapons - and so many heavy weapons should be disabled (which only means they have half value) - while there were plenty of rifles.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Problem with the 1 MarDiv is that it had been broken up - that is its vets were forming up all sorts of Marine units all over the place (and mainly not PTO). The unit was very green - and IF it was sent forward sooner - it should be rated that way. Also it was short of weapons - and so many heavy weapons should be disabled (which only means they have half value) - while there were plenty of rifles.

Only 1 regiment was substantially picked over, and not till after Jan. 1942. The remainder were Marines. Only difference was they had Springfields instead of Garrands, rest of the kit was full. Had full complement of heavy weapons and extras in Special Weaps Bn.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: ctangus

ORIGINAL: JWE

So, if you wanna go for a Hawaiian invasion, you gotta go for no Dec. surprise, just to start.

I agree with that & I'd add: unlimited orders for the allies turn one. You could: disperse some of the air forces. Up the CAP. Maybe sail the battle line somewhere. Get the turn 1 bonus for loading any reinforcements or supplies you might want to bring to the area.

Alternatively, a house rule that the Japanese forces assigned to the Hawaii Op can load on turn one, but can only sail one day's worth of movement - 4 hexes for most of them - but keep surprise on & limited/no orders for the allies.

I'd also like to see the inner-Hawaiian islands included in the West Coast invasion rule where reinforcements are speeded up. Short of a code change one could house rule it & land a sub invasion near Seattle 2-3 weeks (how long does it take to sail from Norfolk to Panama?) after the intial landings in Hawaii.

If we had had warning, the Battle Fleet would have been at sea--perhaps at Lahaina Roads, but initially out of air search range in any case. The tactics used at Midway (ships deployed behind the base, relying on PBY search for early warning) were standard. Aircraft would have been dispersed and LCUs at wartime stations. American carrier TFs would have been operating against the flanks and rear of the Japanese fleet, and it's likely Sara would have been present.

It all depends on how much warning, and how firm it was. Much more likely is that it isn't clear until pretty late in the day. I favor letting the approach of the main invasion forces occur DURING the game - so the players make their own interpretation of game generated detections. Let the engine figure out what you know - when. For the start - let the fleet move - to where-ever (game player) Kimmel thinks is best - and Lahaina is not horrible - neither is dividing the fleet into divisions (2 at four different ports none of which are Level 1) - nor is putting half at sea - nor even is withdrawing to San Francisco (which Kimmel would have done long ago - had he permission: he could have done it WITHOUT permission to save it in the face of clear threat data - USN permits you to save your ships at the expense of your mission). Sara can be sent to sea - but it takes TWO WEEKS to sail from the West Coast to PH at normal speeds - and so being "present" assumes STRATEGIC warning - which I doubt. Let the players start sending her forward before the war begins - with their initial orders - if they want. Let them have the Central Pacific carriers moving to meet her too. Let them have replenishment groups fueling up and set to follow them - all reasonable I think. Almost all major defensive operations catch you somewhat out of position and staging up to react to events. Don't tie the Allied player's hands in terms of what orders he can give - but also don't assume he had perfect strategic warning either. To the extent you want more warning, we can put restrictions on the mod itself - where Japanese forces start. But in the present form, this scenario does not start the big transport groups forward. The 1941 plan was like the 1942 (Midway) plan insofar as initial invasion groups were small and aimed at islands - like Midway and Johnston - not at Oahu.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

Another thing should be an increase in Allied Political Points per day.
How much??

This is more or less a two edged sword: IF you increase Allied pp, you need to increase Japanese pp as well.
If the Allies can change theater assignments more flexably, then the Japanese will need to do the same sort of thing.
I think a strictly historical Oahu Invasion Option scenario should remain restricted in pp - just as CVO, RAO, RPO and BBO are. For technical reasons, that means it won't take a long time to convert one of those scenarios - 2000 lines don't need to change. For another reason, we already HAVE this scenario with "extra Allied pp" - in EOS and AIO. But there is another possibility I had not thought about: we could do it as a variation of PPO. The problem with that is, it assumes the early war planning for both sides - and does not give the Allies that huge edge in Essex type carriers and CVEs later in the war. In many ways BBO (RPO and PPO) family scenarios are the very best RHS scenarios - and of that family PPO is my favorite because players have lots of political points - so THEY decide what makes sense into their game instead of being stuck with what was done IRL in a campaign very different from their game.

Also - be advised that CVO, RAO and probably OIO DO have "extra political points" in a relative sense: they have a lot more than CHS or stock. I felt the pp restrictions were far too severe - so my "strictly historical" scenarios still give you more to work with. Stock gives you 50 pp per day per side: RHS gives you 100. Stock starts the Allies with 100 pp - RHS starts them with 400.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

Sailing from Long Beach - took us two weeks to reach Hawaii. Yeah - she will be late - or the US has strategic warning.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

Not if there were a three hundred or more Japanese transports and landing craft headed towards the Hawaiian Islands. That can't be hidden. (I'm speaking professionally here.) Sara could steam at three to four times the speed of the invasion force. The distance from mainland Japan to Hawaii is about 500 hours steaming for a troop convoy. The *entire* US Navy could reach Pearl Harbor in 700 hours. The IJN would have at most a week from the first attacks until the USN would be in reliable control of Hawaiian waters.

This is confusing "ships" with "transports" - there are nothing like three hundred transports required (which is why "they cannot do it logistically is nonsense - Japan has over a thousand transports - and needs perhaps 10% for this op).

More significantly, most of them are not "headed for the Hawaiian islands" two weeks before the war begins. Only the Kiddo Butai and a few smaller invasion groups are headed toward places like Midway, Johnston and perhaps one of the lower islands. The big forces are not even loading yet - and all are in Japan. The historical Japanese plans called for phased operations spread over months of time - and the initial operations are only supposed to sieze forward bases (to be built up) and cause the enemy fleet to come out and die - so it cannot mess with the big task forces. And - both for game reasons real life considerations - a "major" invasion task group in 1941 is nothing like the US was fielding in 1944: these are task groups of 25 to 50 ships - including escorts - and there are not many of them (perhaps six - depending on how it is organized).

Oddly - the assertion the "entire US Navy could reach Pearl Harbor in 700 hours" is completely false - and one wonders why anyone would think so? Much of the US Navy is not in this theater. Many of the ships in the theater are not ready to sail - and in a true emergency USN divides its ships into three categories IN THEATER: (1) ships able to sail at once - always the smallest group - head toward the most logical forward base - there to refuel, pick up last minute replacements,
get orders; (2) ships which can sail tomorrow - after recalling their crews and loading some critical parts/ammunition and topping off fuel - these ships are said to be on "24 hour sailing notice"; and (3) ships which cannot do either (1) or (2) - so they are either put on "72 hour sailing notice" or told "complete your major maintenance requirements". This latter is always a significant fraction - usually the largest fraction - and fully SOP for USN - which expects to SUSTAIN operations - and so it will need ships later as well as sooner - and it deliberately rotates ships into deep maintenance situations - so some will always be unavialable - but they will be able to replace those sent forward later if they are lost or damaged - otherwise to reinforce them.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Sara was in San Diego - what - a week's journey? She would be late.

Sailing from Long Beach - took us two weeks to reach Hawaii. Yeah - she will be late - or the US has strategic warning.

Must have been a dog. 2 years ago we sailed the Transpac on a Santa Cruz 52 in 11 days. Out of LA, though, not SD.

Anyway, nobody suggested Sara would be available at pearl. Yes, she would not have been in time for the party. So ??

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: ctangus

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: witpqs



I'm skeptical about this one - the intel noted above indicates an earlier sailing. Especially if there is time for the US to act on the intel.

I’m skeptical about that, too. It would have been more likely that we would be aware of the existence of an invasion TF, but not its objective. Lot’s of available alternatives.

Alert status would have increased, patrols increased, etc, but we, most likely, wouldn’t have dispersed, sortied and manned the defensive positions till indications showed the TF passing about 175 – 180 degrees East. That would have given us only a couple days, to prepare, but …

My thinking is this - IRL the US was aware of transports massing at Hainan, Taiwan & Shanghai. That didn't increase Hawaii's alertness - it was assumed that the Japanese were going south. I agree that the existence of another invasion TF or two in Japanese waters most likely would have been noticed, but it seems most likely to me that the assumption would still be: Japan's heading south. I consider it possible, but not likely, that Hawaii would be more alert in such a scenario.

If there also wasn't a build-up of shipping in the Marshalls, which was prevailing view of where a threat to Hawaii would come from, I think it would be justified for the Japanese to have surprise turn one.

In game terms the Japanese player would have a better shot at neutralizing the US Fleet, but would still have to sail several weeks before their first landings in Hawaii, giving the Allied player some time to respond. It's certainly an assumption on my part, but I'd be willing to play under it.

I agree, allow orders, I also like upping the initial pool of PPs, by sufficient to activate 7 Div, 2 MarDiv, some addl arty, and eng troops. Would be nice and not unreasonable to accelerate arrival of 1 MarDiv, so need PPs for that one too.

An alternate could be a modded start, if a neutral modder would agree to help. One could assume a heads up of 7? 10? days and issue orders based on that. E.g. Sara is in hex x,y and CruDiv 6 and DesRon 5 have sailed from Hawaii to form her screen. The battleline is in hex xx, yy composed in such and such a way. 100K supply is in a TF at xxx, yyy in transports a, b & c screened by a division of flush deckers. Marine Defense battalions have been rushed to Palmyra & Hilo from Pearl. Etc.

I am sort of in the middle of this debate here: the 1941 plan WOULD see a build up of ships in the Carolines - but we probably WOULD NOT be very aware of it. It was Japanese territory, they pretty much discouraged foreign presence, and there was a lot of transport shipping building up stocks at Truk, Kwajalein, Palau, Saipan and about 8 lesser points as it was: are we going to understand if the number of ships moving is 25% or 50% greater? Greater than what - if it happened it would not be compared to the IRL number - because history only occurs one time. No one could say "in the alternate reality they sent 4 ships to Kwajalein on Nov 1 - but we have 5 arriving today - a 25% increase" or "that means, over several months, a about 100,000 tons more military stocks at Kwajalein - ominous for invasion of Hawaii?" It might be defensive, it might threaten the South Pacific, or it might threaten Hawaii - and we would not know which?
But we probably would detect some of that increase in shipping pre war.

What we could not detect pre war is the big transport forces that did not leave Japan. Those still there are - well - still there - we don't even have a sailing direction - and (news flash) ships can change course - initial sailing direction is not a firm indicator. Even the ships that leave Japan on Dec 1 (say) - and which stumble onto a submarine or merchant ship or transferring B-17 - have no clear threat meaning: we cannot tell what is on board, we cannot read their orders, and their courses will uniformly be set for places that are very logical (e.g. Kwajalein). Understanding what that means would be very hard to to - because there is more than one possibility. Usually you get a partial and garbled contact report - the number is wrong - the ship size is wrong - the bearing and speed are not exact - and you have no idea what is actually on board or what their orders may be?