Yamamoto's Plan; The Execution

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
The choice is 1) historical hit on PH, rest of the ops as irl 2) the JWE special; nothin touchin HI, major revamp on Malaysian ops, with KB running South flank and striking Singapore (Mersing hit day 1, Palembang in play, week 1), and 3) the HI invasion option, in conjunction with the PH hit; compels reduced ops in PI to get the transport capability.

Wouldn't Kido Butai have a lot of trouble staying un-spotted while trying to get into position to make an overnight speed run and hit Singapore? Not to mention getting the troop convoy in position to land at Mersing on the 7th? I assume the Allies are getting "full readiness and a couple of days of movement" as well...., do they have the option to "strike first"?

Why? It isn't very far to run - and there isn't very much looking for it. Consider all the planes that hunted Force Z - and how long it remained undetected even so. [See The Hunting of Forze Z, a fine little special topic book] Nothing like that number of assets is available to the Allies - and detecting out far enough (to get them the day before) is a big problem with the planes available.

Not that I think this makes sense. IJN planned to use KB off the Philippines, and did not need to when the A6M turned out to have greater range than expected. Leaving Pacific Fleet free to act seems unwise.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
Oh my goodness, this is almost giving up the baguette. KB might not likely open the overcoat. I'm assuming, if the hard Maylay op is the choice, that the KB will clear from either the home islands or Taiwan; full sigsec. If this is the option, surprise is on.

Huh? Is this English? You lost me if it is. I was just trying to point out that Kido Butai was "lost" to Allied Intelligence before the PH Operation..., a situation that could hardly apply if it was operating off the China Coast. And any move towards the South would definately trip alarms all over the SRA.

Also, once any Invasion Convoy kept going South past Singora all chances of "masking it's purpose" are gone. Every Allied unit in the Far East would be on "full alert" and moving to man it's "invasion imminant" locations. It's hard to see how "suprise is on" could apply...

Concur in detail.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
Oh my goodness, this is almost giving up the baguette. KB might not likely open the overcoat. I'm assuming, if the hard Maylay op is the choice, that the KB will clear from either the home islands or Taiwan; full sigsec. If this is the option, surprise is on.

Huh? Is this English? You lost me if it is. I was just trying to point out that Kido Butai was "lost" to Allied Intelligence before the PH Operation..., a situation that could hardly apply if it was operating off the China Coast. And any move towards the South would definately trip alarms all over the SRA.

Also, once any Invasion Convoy kept going South past Singora all chances of "masking it's purpose" are gone. Every Allied unit in the Far East would be on "full alert" and moving to man it's "invasion imminant" locations. It's hard to see how "suprise is on" could apply...

Mostly English. Yes, I think you are substantially right, in the general scheme of things. However, in the context of a day-1 scenario, surprise is off for the Hi track, on for the historical track, and "sorta on" for the 3d option. Don't forget, I'm the moderator, and I get to give intel, based on my desire.

I hear and understand your concerns. I'm thinking on the KB signal security, and am assuming they could clear home islands, and go South, without unopportune warning to the Brits. It is, after all, a scenario.

Would like to hear more. Always up for a kick in the a$$ when it comes to ops. Ciao.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: JWE
I hear and understand your concerns. I'm thinking on the KB signal security, and am assuming they could clear home islands, and go South, without unopportune warning to the Brits. It is, after all, a scenario. Would like to hear more. Always up for a kick in the a$$ when it comes to ops. Ciao.

Wasn't their "signals security" I was thinking of. Sneaking across the rerely travelled waters of the North Pacific with no radio is one thing...., but short of sinking every fishing boat and tramp steamer; and shooting down every unfriendly aircraft, radio silence isn't going to do you much good in the China Seas. Too many folks who's mouths aren't under Japanese Control are going to see and blab.

Not that the Allies being "ready" would probably have a big effect with KB supporting ops, but I think you need to allow the Allies a couple of days to try and "pull a rabbit out of their hats" just to keep things "real". Give the Japanese player at least an excuse to sweat a bit...

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
I hear and understand your concerns. I'm thinking on the KB signal security, and am assuming they could clear home islands, and go South, without unopportune warning to the Brits. It is, after all, a scenario. Would like to hear more. Always up for a kick in the a$$ when it comes to ops. Ciao.

Wasn't their "signals security" I was thinking of. Sneaking across the rerely travelled waters of the North Pacific with no radio is one thing...., but short of sinking every fishing boat and tramp steamer; and shooting down every unfriendly aircraft, radio silence isn't going to do you much good in the China Seas. Too many folks who's mouths aren't under Japanese Control are going to see and blab.

Not that the Allies being "ready" would probably have a big effect with KB supporting ops, but I think you need to allow the Allies a couple of days to try and "pull a rabbit out of their hats" just to keep things "real". Give the Japanese player at least an excuse to sweat a bit...

Well ... I s'pose. It's not unreasonable. let me run a few turn-1s and se how it works. It's not a bad idea, and I'll see what I can do.

Fortunately, nobody gets to know what's 'on' & whats 'off'.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
I hear and understand your concerns. I'm thinking on the KB signal security, and am assuming they could clear home islands, and go South, without unopportune warning to the Brits. It is, after all, a scenario. Would like to hear more. Always up for a kick in the a$$ when it comes to ops. Ciao.

Wasn't their "signals security" I was thinking of. Sneaking across the rerely travelled waters of the North Pacific with no radio is one thing...., but short of sinking every fishing boat and tramp steamer; and shooting down every unfriendly aircraft, radio silence isn't going to do you much good in the China Seas. Too many folks who's mouths aren't under Japanese Control are going to see and blab.

Not that the Allies being "ready" would probably have a big effect with KB supporting ops, but I think you need to allow the Allies a couple of days to try and "pull a rabbit out of their hats" just to keep things "real". Give the Japanese player at least an excuse to sweat a bit...

There were USN eyes out - or might be - depending on the date. USS Isabel managed to make a patrol without incident. She and USS Lanokai were nearly ready for another patrol when events overtook their mission. They were trying to provoke a war - if you believe R Adm Vince Trolly - who was skipper of the Lanokai - and you should believe him. [See The Cruise of the Lanokai, USNI] There were only a few navy people on the Lanokai (3 chiefs and an LT - but that is enough to recognize the KB. Isabel had a navy crew. A third vessel was working up to join them. Being on the "wrong side" of the South China Sea might have made avoiding such vessels difficult. But on Dec 7 - if you are strict - they were not in position.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

There were USN eyes out - or might be - depending on the date. USS Isabel managed to make a patrol without incident. She and USS Lanokai were nearly ready for another patrol when events overtook their mission. They were trying to provoke a war - if you believe R Adm Vince Trolly - who was skipper of the Lanokai - and you should believe him. [See The Cruise of the Lanokai, USNI]

Because YOU say so? HAHAHAHAAA!!! Give me a break...

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If one can believe William Stephenson's "A MAN CALLED INTREPID",(written about an intel chief of the era), an associate and double agent for MI5 and MI6 named Dusko Popov who was an Abwehr agent warned the Allies of an impending strike by the Japanese and had provided certain details and locations of intended targets.
This info was more detailed and date specific than to warrant just the timely order to park all those theatre bombers wing to wing to "hinder possible saboteurs"..
During the war and for years afterward it was rumoured and suggested FDR was aware of the impending strikes.
For some, this book and Mr Stephensons' revelations served to provide the smoking gun.
BTW, IMHO this book is a "must read" for any WW2 intel fan.....

[DuckofTindalos]

Eeeew...

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Wasn't their "signals security" I was thinking of. Sneaking across the rerely travelled waters of the North Pacific with no radio is one thing...., but short of sinking every fishing boat and tramp steamer; and shooting down every unfriendly aircraft, radio silence isn't going to do you much good in the China Seas. Too many folks who's mouths aren't under Japanese Control are going to see and blab.

Not that the Allies being "ready" would probably have a big effect with KB supporting ops, but I think you need to allow the Allies a couple of days to try and "pull a rabbit out of their hats" just to keep things "real". Give the Japanese player at least an excuse to sweat a bit...

Well ... I s'pose. It's not unreasonable. let me run a few turn-1s and se how it works. It's not a bad idea, and I'll see what I can do. Fortunately, nobody gets to know what's 'on' & whats 'off'.

Well, they will know something when the Allied player gets to move stuff around on the 6th as well..., but with what the Japanese can bring to bear about all he can do is try to work the old "shell game" and keep his assets from getting waxed in the initial strikes. If he succeeds, he'll have something to "plink" at the Japanese landings with for a while. Any airstrike that goes after KB will be "uber-capped" right out of the sky, but something might be able to slip around it to scare a transport or two. And a Dutch sub could always get lucky..., or maybe a mine. At least the Allied player will have some "toys" to play with... Always easier to stay interested and enthused when you have some "toys".

[herwin]

Over the weekend, I had the pleasure of reading Double Edged Secrets, by W J Holmes. Sounds like a professional operation, even during 1941.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: herwin
Over the weekend, I had the pleasure of reading Double Edged Secrets, by W J Holmes. Sounds like a professional operation, even during 1941.

All the excellent inputs from you, Mike, Brad, & the rest, is making this a real fun exercise. Way it works is:

I send the 3 different ops versions, along with a strategic analysis, to the Japanese player. The Japanese player reviews, chooses, and prepares warning orders based on his choice (knowing Capt. Quintan, he may well choose an option 4). Based on the warning orders, I finalize the scenario for Japan.

Next, based on the Japanese choice, I provide a suitable intel summary to the Allied player. The Allied player develops an A-day (–1) response. There’s lots of room here to play God, and mess with minds, but Dr. Banner’s pretty fierce and won’t allow arbitrariness. This is the most difficult aspect of the scenario.

Once this is done, we go to the machine on Dec. 6. All JP TFs are 12 – 18 hrs out (sufficient to land Dec. 7). Allies get their moves, but only within the constraints of their own warning orders, based on the intel summary. We then do the Dec. 6 turn, and the results are put into the Master Scenario that begins Dec. 7.

I get the files, and I set the switches; surprise on or off, etc .. Once the shooting begins, things take their natural course.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If one can believe William Stephenson's "A MAN CALLED INTREPID",(written about an intel chief of the era), an associate and double agent for MI5 and MI6 named Dusko Popov who was an Abwehr agent warned the Allies of an impending strike by the Japanese and had provided certain details and locations of intended targets.
This info was more detailed and date specific than to warrant just the timely order to park all those theatre bombers wing to wing to "hinder possible saboteurs"..
During the war and for years afterward it was rumoured and suggested FDR was aware of the impending strikes.
For some, this book and Mr Stephensons' revelations served to provide the smoking gun.
BTW, IMHO this book is a "must read" for any WW2 intel fan.....

Apparently Popov ran afoul of J Edgar Hoover - who detested him as a playboy - which indeed he may have been (by his own account). His information was discounted, and not made available in a military sense. I tend to believe Popov - who was a contractor from Spain - who worked for Germany, for Japan, for the UK and for the US - at least - at various times. His penetration of the first atomic reactor project at the University of Chicago real time enabled Japanese scientists to measure that the power of that reactor (in hundreds of WATTS - a string of light bulbs) was minimal -
was very clever. I don't think he was on our side - but he probably hoped for pay and he seems to have given very good information - only to be rebuffed. The problem with intel is that it is hard to know who to trust - and I do not think Popov was worthy of trust - after reading his own version of events (see Spy Counterspy). You may not use this sort of dim input as a grounds for real time, operational military policy - it is wholly unjustified. In the real world we didn't believe him at the time, and didn't inform the Navy or the Army about what he told the FBI.

A better case can be made for a Korean spy - who seems to have got it right - and he spent most of the rest of his life (at the University of California) documenting his wartime actions to the point that probably we should rewrite the history of Pearl Harbor in its context. But IRL it also was not believed at the time - we were told at the civilian intel level - and this was not treated as worthy of generating reports to the military.

A better case still can be made for the RN black chamber at Singapore. It is now well documented - with original material - that this information went at least to Asiatic Fleet. But Hart did not share it with Kimmel as far as we know - or Mac right in the same building (both lived in the Manila Hotel - but never dined together because they hated each other and each thought he was senior to the other in the Philippines). Again - this had no operational impact - Hart knew FDR wanted war sooner than springtime - and was looking for an excuse to get Congress to delcare it (due to the special mission of the Lanokai and two other vessels). His ships were NOT cought in Manila - but were dispersed. But he kept his information close to the chest - and whatever he knew didn't help save the United States Fleet or the Far East Air Force. The politics of this are hard to understand in our age of joint - but we were almost as bad as the Japanese then - and even in my day there was a strong sense of "union" about the services. We still have silly institutional ideas - like the Army should not be able to fly armed, fixed wing aircraft.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Wasn't their "signals security" I was thinking of. Sneaking across the rerely travelled waters of the North Pacific with no radio is one thing...., but short of sinking every fishing boat and tramp steamer; and shooting down every unfriendly aircraft, radio silence isn't going to do you much good in the China Seas. Too many folks who's mouths aren't under Japanese Control are going to see and blab.

Not that the Allies being "ready" would probably have a big effect with KB supporting ops, but I think you need to allow the Allies a couple of days to try and "pull a rabbit out of their hats" just to keep things "real". Give the Japanese player at least an excuse to sweat a bit...

Well ... I s'pose. It's not unreasonable. let me run a few turn-1s and se how it works. It's not a bad idea, and I'll see what I can do. Fortunately, nobody gets to know what's 'on' & whats 'off'.

Well, they will know something when the Allied player gets to move stuff around on the 6th as well..., but with what the Japanese can bring to bear about all he can do is try to work the old "shell game" and keep his assets from getting waxed in the initial strikes. If he succeeds, he'll have something to "plink" at the Japanese landings with for a while. Any airstrike that goes after KB will be "uber-capped" right out of the sky, but something might be able to slip around it to scare a transport or two. And a Dutch sub could always get lucky..., or maybe a mine. At least the Allied player will have some "toys" to play with... Always easier to stay interested and enthused when you have some "toys".

I am not seeing that air strikes cannot hurt the KB. The problem is - it is hard to get a big enough one to matter. But IF you can assemble a strike in three figures - it will almost certainly deliver bombs into CVs - at least in RHS.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I am not seeing that air strikes cannot hurt the KB. The problem is - it is hard to get a big enough one to matter. But IF you can assemble a strike in three figures - it will almost certainly deliver bombs into CVs - at least in RHS.

Possibly Sid...., but with the variety of types and nationalities of A/C available to the Allies in SE Asia, what are the chances of a strike even half that size actually reaching KB at the same time? 1 in 250? The Jap Player would almost have to cooperate to have that happen..., and it's unlikely that he will park KB one hex off Singapore with no CAP while the Allies gather their strike. And if he does..., he deserves to get "spanked"..., doesn't he?

[spence]

and it's unlikely that he will park KB one hex off Singapore with no CAP while the Allies gather their strike. And if he does..., he deserves to get "spanked"..., doesn't he?

After lots of experimentation and all sorts of manipulation I achieved the following results attacking the KB off Pearl Harbor with a combo of:

1) an airstrike of 65 SBDs and 25 TBDs (escorted) from Enterprise and Lexington (CAP was 50 Zeros
2) an airstrike from PH by every flyable fighter and bomber: (didn't count the fighters but the bombers approxiamated 18 SBDs, 10 SB2Us, 5 A-20s. 15 B-18s, 8 B-17s and 10 Kingfishers). For this strike the experience of all a/c at PH was raised to 70 and their morale increased to 80. The CAP for this strike was 27 Zeros
3) PM airstrike from US CVs: 13 SBDs and 6 TBDs (escorted)
4) surface engagement with 4 US BBs, 2 Brooklyn CLs and 9 DDs
5) a second surface engagement (cause I knew which hex the AI would have KB retreat to) with 2 BBs, 2 CL and 10 DDs
6) a sub attack

Kaga got hit with 3 1000 lbers and a torpedo and dropped out with 43 sys, 65flt, and 17 fires (she's had it pretty much for sure I think). One DD accompanies. Another DD got hit by a 14 incher in the surface engagement and dropped out heavily damaged also.
The rest of the KB looks like this:

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence

and it's unlikely that he will park KB one hex off Singapore with no CAP while the Allies gather their strike. And if he does..., he deserves to get "spanked"..., doesn't he?

After lots of experimentation and all sorts of manipulation I achieved the following results attacking the KB off Pearl Harbor with a combo of:

1) an airstrike of 65 SBDs and 25 TBDs (escorted) from Enterprise and Lexington (CAP was 50 Zeros
2) an airstrike from PH by every flyable fighter and bomber: (didn't count the fighters but the bombers approxiamated 18 SBDs, 10 SB2Us, 5 A-20s. 15 B-18s, 8 B-17s and 10 Kingfishers). For this strike the experience of all a/c at PH was raised to 70 and their morale increased to 80. The CAP for this strike was 27 Zeros
3) PM airstrike from US CVs: 13 SBDs and 6 TBDs (escorted)
4) surface engagement with 4 US BBs, 2 Brooklyn CLs and 9 DDs
5) a second surface engagement (cause I knew which hex the AI would have KB retreat to) with 2 BBs, 2 CL and 10 DDs

That's a LOT of "manipulation"...., and hardly representative of the situation in Malaya (Where the Japanese have superior land-based airpower, and the Allies no CV's at all).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I am not seeing that air strikes cannot hurt the KB. The problem is - it is hard to get a big enough one to matter. But IF you can assemble a strike in three figures - it will almost certainly deliver bombs into CVs - at least in RHS.

Possibly Sid...., but with the variety of types and nationalities of A/C available to the Allies in SE Asia, what are the chances of a strike even half that size actually reaching KB at the same time? 1 in 250? The Jap Player would almost have to cooperate to have that happen..., and it's unlikely that he will park KB one hex off Singapore with no CAP while the Allies gather their strike. And if he does..., he deserves to get "spanked"..., doesn't he?

This is surely an exaggeration. In RHS it is routine to have "leakers" if there is a moderate strike. Off Hawaii - KB - reinforced in EOS - took on ONE US CV - and Kaga took an AP hit by a SBD. I set CAP on 50% - and that is a lot of CAP - while one US carrier (even if it had two fighter squadrons embarked) would not field nearly as many escorts. Never mind, SOME of the SBDs delivered bombs, and one hit. I meant that a strike of 100 plus planes is going to take come carrier out of action or sink her - but a smaller strike will set her on fire - for a while anyway. Even with CAP. The Zero is good - but when there are too many targets - there are too many targets.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: spence

and it's unlikely that he will park KB one hex off Singapore with no CAP while the Allies gather their strike. And if he does..., he deserves to get "spanked"..., doesn't he?

After lots of experimentation and all sorts of manipulation I achieved the following results attacking the KB off Pearl Harbor with a combo of:

1) an airstrike of 65 SBDs and 25 TBDs (escorted) from Enterprise and Lexington (CAP was 50 Zeros
2) an airstrike from PH by every flyable fighter and bomber: (didn't count the fighters but the bombers approxiamated 18 SBDs, 10 SB2Us, 5 A-20s. 15 B-18s, 8 B-17s and 10 Kingfishers). For this strike the experience of all a/c at PH was raised to 70 and their morale increased to 80. The CAP for this strike was 27 Zeros
3) PM airstrike from US CVs: 13 SBDs and 6 TBDs (escorted)
4) surface engagement with 4 US BBs, 2 Brooklyn CLs and 9 DDs
5) a second surface engagement (cause I knew which hex the AI would have KB retreat to) with 2 BBs, 2 CL and 10 DDs

That's a LOT of "manipulation"...., and hardly representative of the situation in Malaya (Where the Japanese have superior land-based airpower, and the Allies no CV's at all).

Ah what? The Brits have a CV and a CVL. If they don't elect to send em in - that is not the same as "no CVs at all."

[spence]

The point I was trying to make with all that manipulation was that the game engine is not going to allow the Japanese to get hurt even if they F@%& up by the numbers and get hit square in the puss with the biggest hammer the Allies can throw.

3 repititions of the experiment produced very similar results: although in one test 2 IJN CVs were rendered incapable of airops by the Dec 7th air, sub and surface attacks. On a single test of the Dec 8th turn with 5 IJN CVs air capable the Allies lost Lexington and a BB sunk and two BBs likely to sink before making PH while managing only a single bomb hit on one of the IJN CVs (Enterprise hid under a cloud all day and neither launched nor received any strikes).