Japanese Source Material Translation

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: JWE
... I love the little red ornament ball.

Denotes 'Officer'.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Curiously, so do I.

Then why are you wasting so much verbage on a nonissue?

Because the comments are disrespectful and need to be reconsidered. Granted this is blowing in the wind - you do not consider being respectful to me - or to a staff officer who has bothered to tell us what he knows - or to the standard of evidence. I reported that the data is confirmed by Malays in person and by photographs. I note that you "will edit out" the data "if someone puts it in a mod" - but my courtesy in mentioning it is not grounds to ask HOW to edit it out? You will just guess - and the odds of really doing it right are poor. Modding is an art of compromise - of balancing many factors - and I adopted a minimalist approach (in part due to a lack of slots, we have no actual Japanese LMGs - or anyone else's either - and we cannot do different squads - although probably we should do it that way). I am tempted to do a major rework - because right now there is no reasonable way to show a Class A formation has different lower weapons than a Class B or C formation does. It would be a lot of work - and pretty much chrome - as firepower is almost not used at present. But SOMEDAY I expect a better ground model - and my instructions are "get the data right and the code will follow." So far it is - so I focus on the data - in spite of it having very little meaning (yet). I don't like what I reported above - that the board is too hostile to Japanese participants - and I think - someday - you might actually start using some of that Jesuit training to modify your attitude. But I truly am a man of great faith - and every week someone on the board privately mails me that my patience with negative attitudes is greater than theirs would be.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
One thing I learned in wading through "history" as written by actual participants like Tsuji is that you always give more weight to the portions where he admits mistakes or less than admirable conduct (like inciting/ordering an atrocity) than to the portions where he "saved the day", or was the "only one to see thecorrect course of action" or issued orders to his superiors. Doesn't mean that things didn't happen that way, but when the author claims many wonderful accomplishments for himself, it's usually a good idea to start looking for some independent confirmation.

Lets not keep driving away people who might help us have a broader perspective by always assuming a former enemy source didn't tell the truth after the war ended. Almost always, that is a false charge: when you can get them to talk at all - they usually tell what they know very well. Be as scholarly and as skeptical as you like - and have time to be: do not drive people away by being negative in your attitude.

I would love to know what you consider NEGATIVE about my comment? It's merely applied common sense...., the better the "story", the more likely it is to have been "embelished". Doesn't mean it has to be..., just that the more things diviate from the "norm", the more suspect they become, and the more confirmation should be sought. Just look at the "claims" made by fighter pilots on all sides..., and the "adjustments" that needed to be made after the war when the figures from the other side became available.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: JWE
... I love the little red ornament ball.

Denotes 'Officer'.

[:D][:D][:D]

BTW, what's your rank if you only have one little dingle ball?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
One thing I learned in wading through "history" as written by actual participants like Tsuji is that you always give more weight to the portions where he admits mistakes or less than admirable conduct (like inciting/ordering an atrocity) than to the portions where he "saved the day", or was the "only one to see thecorrect course of action" or issued orders to his superiors. Doesn't mean that things didn't happen that way, but when the author claims many wonderful accomplishments for himself, it's usually a good idea to start looking for some independent confirmation.

Lets not keep driving away people who might help us have a broader perspective by always assuming a former enemy source didn't tell the truth after the war ended. Almost always, that is a false charge: when you can get them to talk at all - they usually tell what they know very well. Be as scholarly and as skeptical as you like - and have time to be: do not drive people away by being negative in your attitude.

I would love to know what you consider NEGATIVE about my comment? It's merely applied common sense...., the better the "story", the more likely it is to have been "embelished". Doesn't mean it has to be..., just that the more things diviate from the "norm", the more suspect they become, and the more confirmation should be sought. Just look at the "claims" made by fighter pilots on all sides..., and the "adjustments" that needed to be made after the war when the figures from the other side became available.

I do not regard your comments as negative. I am not at all sure we agree on how to assess Tsuji as a source? But you use proper qualifiers, and are not certain he is not giving it to us strait. [The fact is that if you or I wrote a report - we would be subjective - because we are human - and not give perfect weight to every detail stated or omitted. I have no problem whatever thinking that we don't have a perfect source, no matter who it is.] It is JWE who asked why spend so much time on this matter - and it is JWE's unyielding position that "if Tsuji said it, I won't use it - even if it is confirmed to be true" - more or less because he "never read it" by a "credible historian." Which tells us that a tirtiary source carries more weight than a primary source - indicating he does not understand why we call them "tirtiary" and "primary." That a campaign (or theater) level history is almost certain not to mention such a detail is not germane for him - that he didn't read it is all that counts. This is a person who has not come to terms with the problems we (in our culture) have because we do not read, respect or listen to historical material from other nations, particularly former enemy nations. He is unimpressed even that the official historian of the US Army teaches changing this priority is essential if we want to learn what we do not know. I do not think you have any such problems.

[m10bob]

The question of translation of Japanese arms from WW2 by the "western world" is nothing new.

http://www.gunboards.com/sites/banzai/F ... l_Not_Type

For some the topic is mundane, for others, significant.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I am not at all sure we agree on how to assess Tsuji as a source?

I would assess him in the same manner I would assess the post-war writings of ANY military figure from any nation with a reputation to preserve or salvage..., with a large grain of salt. "Selective memory" is almost always involved in such writings, embelishments quite frequent, and outright lying not uncommon. This goes for the Allied side as well as the Axis.

Generally you find more historically accurate reporting from the pens of those who served WITH the folks who actually made the decisions, as they had less responsibility for the outcomes either way. Tsuji is a rather unique case, as by rank he shouldn't have been in a position to be a major "player". Yet by his own claims and the writings of those who delt with him, he seems to have had "a finger in every pie", for good or evil. His own uniqueness calls for a second grain of salt in accepting his accounts simply because there isn't really anyone to compare him with.

How would you assess him?

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: JWE
... I love the little red ornament ball.

Denotes 'Officer'.

[:D][:D][:D]

BTW, what's your rank if you only have one little dingle ball?

It just reminded me of the single large stripe on helmets! [:D]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The question of translation of Japanese arms from WW2 by the "western world" is nothing new.

http://www.gunboards.com/sites/banzai/F ... l_Not_Type

For some the topic is mundane, for others, significant.

The author is correct: With respect to equipment - not just small arms - a "type" might be better translated as "model" - and further - the type (or model) number is the last two digits of the year. Oddly - since the last two digits of the Western Calendar are identical in the Japanese Calendar - the fact they are different calendars does not matter - you can think Type 2 = 1942 if you want to! It works. The model/type number is the year the equipment is officially adopted for potential production. That is, the year development is completed and the design is certified for production. Usually this means the equipment was not in production for most of that year - and I use the convention production starts in July of that year if no better data is available. It almost certainly did not start in January, and it had to ramp up - so the convention is reasonable.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I am not at all sure we agree on how to assess Tsuji as a source?

I would assess him in the same manner I would assess the post-war writings of ANY military figure from any nation with a reputation to preserve or salvage..., with a large grain of salt. "Selective memory" is almost always involved in such writings, embelishments quite frequent, and outright lying not uncommon. This goes for the Allied side as well as the Axis.

Generally you find more historically accurate reporting from the pens of those who served WITH the folks who actually made the decisions, as they had less responsibility for the outcomes either way. Tsuji is a rather unique case, as by rank he shouldn't have been in a position to be a major "player". Yet by his own claims and the writings of those who delt with him, he seems to have had "a finger in every pie", for good or evil. His own uniqueness calls for a second grain of salt in accepting his accounts simply because there isn't really anyone to compare him with.

How would you assess him?

Well - I do like your lumping together your standard for both friend and foe - it is inherantly fair and reasonable.
And if you study eyewitnesses of all sorts you will find they are anything but perfect - period. The classical way this is taught in a classroom is to have someone run in and commit a crime (used to be shooting the teacher, but my child's school was afraid to do that, so they just stole her purse). Then the class is asked to write down what happened, and describe the perpitrator? In her case NO ONE agreed with ANYONE else! Only one student was able to draw (with software) what the person looked like. So we have a fundamental conundrum here:

a) People who were there have a monopoly on knowing what really happened.

b) People are not reliable witnesses even if they try to be, want to be, etc.

I think that the key to getting at the truth in forensic investigation is balance - to always remember BOTH principles. You are never free to ignore what you are told by those who know. You should never accept that it is a prefect report - even if you are yourself the reporter. It does help to be trained. It does help to read what you wrote and see if it says what you think you meant, and also if you omitted anything. But you never actually know everything. And you never actually have perfect judgement about what is more important, what is less so?

To this, I add two more principles:

1) If time and sources permit, and particularly if it is not pretty clear the reported matter is probably correct, obtain verification. The more time you have, the more important the matter is, the more you do it. But there is this problem: you may not have ANY ability to verify. So consider (2)

2) Note the pattern of other things reported by the reporter. Also note the idea "why is he reporting to us at all?" How you get information is a big deal. A voluntary statement or book is far different than a hostile interrogation. Reading the mail - a message or letter sent at the time to someone not on our side - is different still. Do not permit any form of prejudice to enter the analysis: instead ask yourself "if I was a detective, how much weight would I put on this particular report?" And note that a detective does NOT have the reasonable option of taking a long time to verify information - or the option of disregarding what might be a true report. He is limited by money (= time) and there may be pressing reasons to reach even a tentative conclusion soon. IF YOU are such a person - and you MUST say something - what would you say? Qualifiers are permitted. It is similar in battlefield intelligence: you only have so many assets that can intercept, so many that can snatch and grab, whatever. What significance do you put on the report - given what you know - never mind what you would like to know? Historians have a less pressing time frame - it is true. But they are remarkably similar in terms of time limitations: we won't live forever and we cannot spend years on every trivial item. This means the methodology which permits "estimates" can be used successfully. One historian I read used intel methods on the Nez Pierce war - a century after the fact. It worked remarkably well.

Now for my assessment of Tsuji. This is not based on a brief exposure. I once attempted to collect all there is on him for a book (never written). I have read both the books he wrote - something almost no one has done because one of them is very rare. I have read a vast array of materials - some of it in histories that are very formal - see for example Nomanhan for two different PRE WWII encounters with him (re fighting on the Korean and Mongolian frontiers). Also - from Tsuji himself - we have his vision of himself as a deciple of a great IJA general who engineered the creation of Manchuria/Manchukuo. This faction was willing to force the hand of national policy - but opposed taking over China.
[Japanese military culture is different from ours: one can - even should or must - do things that are for the benefit of the nation - even if illegal. This is similar to our doctrine of necessity - or Sun Tzu or Machiavelli on why a general might not honor the orders of his prince.] In the context of what I know of Japanese culture and history, I see Tsuji as a "nationalist" or even an "ultra-nationalist." That is, an ideolog. He is anti-colonial in the sense of opposing the rule of Asian peoples by "white" people from Europe or the USA. But that does not mean he does not favor a form of Japanese colonialism. Even so - this man is (like Prime Minister and IJA general Tojo) - wholly incorrupt - and incorruptable. He is not intimidated by rank - rather generals fear him if he is not on their side in a matter. He sometimes falls into traps laid by his assumptions: that US troops on Guadalcanal might be very different from US troops in the Philippines never occurs to him - until after he is ON Guadalcanal and sees it for himself. THIS kind of misreporting he is entirely prone to make: he does not know - he assumes he knows based on some other information - and he will press strongly for what he thinks is appropriate - as he did for sending troops to Guadalanal. He does not know how dismal Japanese logistics are - or how the enemy is not the sort of demoralized colonial regime stuff previously encountered. So he is dead wrong - and in his own report on the matter to the theater commander "I diserve a thousand deaths" for being so wrong.

Tsuji seems never to have changed his mind set. When he briefly returned to public life - his books were written to generate domestic political support in Japan for a nationalist party he headed - he was elected to the Diet - and he was the spokesman for the nationalist party - its leader. This was at the beginning of the Cold War - and it is pretty close to clear he ended up going back into intelligence work - either for Japan or (it is insisted in writing) for the USA itself (which might be possible in the context of Japanese attitudes about Russia). It appears that he was not the sort of man who sought a personal fortune, and if he clearly knew the likes of Nogouchi (possibly the greatest of the mid century industrialists) he did not end up owning great properties. The "grain of salt" to apply to Tsuji is the nationalist one - he is going to say what he does selectively because it further's his cause. He is going to do so truthfully - because obvious lies are not persuasive - and because he actually believes in his own point of view. He is a devout follower of Zin - he believes in truth in a sense uncommon in Japan - and he even attributes virtues of Zin to enemy leaders like Churchill - because he thinks anyone who is really virtuious must really secretly believe in Zin principles. This is a man whose attitude about lieing is far stronger than most people in the west can appreciate: perhaps a nun might come close. But that does not mean he will tell us things that don't make his cause look good. But since the Japanese cause DOES look good in Malaya - and since he headed the planning group - he was chief of operations - he flew recon in a Ki-46 personally - and he went to see conditions at the point - this makes him likely to be telling the truth about the operations there. Since the truth serves his cause admirably - there is no point in not telling it - complete with warts - as his confession of mistakes at regular points makes clear. [You get a lot more of this in his other book- but it is in both]

Finally - it needs to be said that I have found people who remembered the Japanese campaign who said things confirming Tsuji's account of it. I also have seen photographs of the way things were at the front in 1941 and 1942 Malaya. And I have a Western academic study of the Japanese campaign - beginning to end - which includes the Tsuji period. There is so much confirmation - both in general and of the point in contention - that it is impossible not to conclude Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Greatest Defeat is not well done. [A new history, by an American, is imitating half the title: Britain's Greatest Defeat - and it goes into what went wrong on the British side - which is practically everything]. A sense of the numbers can be gained from Bloody Shambles - which is nicely done by authors from both sides - and it shows Tsuji's tables are not bad at all. Taken in the context of all I know - I must say Tsuji's military history of Malaya is so good it should be mandatory at US military academies (which, regretfully, are engineering schools, and do not teach much history at all). I don't like Tsuji - or his cause. We would be enemies. But it is like Gen Giap - I had more respect for him as an enemy than I did for Westmoreland as a commander. I would not hesitate to shoot him on a battlefield - but I will listen to him with interest after the war is over. I do not suspect either of lieing, ever, in his own heart.

[JWE]

This has very little to do with Tsuji's veracity as a witness. Tsuji was a very unsavory character, one who should have been hanged at war's end. Nevertheless, what we are discussing is this business of the 18th Div. having an LMG for every infantryman, in addition to his rifle.

This is so absurd, that no credible historian has ever reported on it (proof of a negative is that no one has ever mentioned the positive), and that "Malaysians" are not considered credible witnesses (i.e., 2 teenage girls in Provo, Utah would not be expected to provide a credible account of the TO&E status of an invading Cuban or Libyan force).

The 18th division was equiped like everyone else. They did not have some mystical uber LMG capability. Proof is in the pudding. I want to see the original Japanese, not some fake bs translation, but the original.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

With respect to equipment - not just small arms - a "type" might be better translated as "model" - and further - the type (or model) number is the last two digits of the year. Oddly - since the last two digits of the Western Calendar are identical in the Japanese Calendar - the fact they are different calendars does not matter - you can think Type 2 = 1942 if you want to! It works. The model/type number is the year the equipment is officially adopted for potential production. That is, the year development is completed and the design is certified for production.

No? Really? Nobody here ever figured that out before you told us! Tell us more, O Great One![8|]

[JWE]

That probably explains why the Type 38 Arisaka rifle was accepted in 1905; or maybe someone just forgot that there's a couple parallel calendering systems.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE


This has very little to do with Tsuji's veracity as a witness. Tsuji was a very unsavory character, one who should have been hanged at war's end. Nevertheless, what we are discussing is this business of the 18th Div. having an LMG for every infantryman, in addition to his rifle.

This is so absurd, that no credible historian has ever reported on it (proof of a negative is that no one has ever mentioned the positive), and that "Malaysians" are not considered credible witnesses (i.e., 2 teenage girls in Provo, Utah would not be expected to provide a credible account of the TO&E status of an invading Cuban or Libyan force).

The 18th division was equiped like everyone else. They did not have some mystical uber LMG capability. Proof is in the pudding. I want to see the original Japanese, not some fake bs translation, but the original.

So a man never charged, never mind tried or convicted, is condemned outright - not only for being and "unsavory character" but a bad enough one to diserve hanging. Not for you American standards of justice. But do you note that even if you turned out to be correct in that assessment "this has very little to do with Tsuji's veracity as a witness"??
We interviewed Japanese "war criminals" during custody - including then retired General Tojo - and both interrogators and later students of what they said find there is a remarkable amount of useful historical material. It still appears that somehow you have a prejudice - not only in the sense that you quite literally are pre judging this man who was never actually charged with anything - but also in the sense you don't accept that he probably told us a great deal of truth in what he wrote. And you are not merely picking at this or that technical point - you are saying anything he says must be wholly discounted because - why? - YOU don't find him a credible witness? By which standard we pretty much are not going ever to know much of anything that goes on in an enemy HQ or unit - since pretty much we are not going to like the officers who served there and survived to tell us. This is a direct contradiction of the principle taught by my first history teacher - a US Army general officer and a military historian. He said if you will not use foreign, specifically enemy sources, you will not be able to know what really happened. This horse is pretty dead now - so I will let it alone. You are free to live in your prejudice if you choose. You are also free to think that Malays who moved the bikes and their baggage don't know what they were doing. You also may disregard photographs of them doing just that. You may also disregard what the soldiers who participated said later in life. But that does not mean this is a good path to understanding what probably happened. And unless I am confused - you have mixed up the division number once again.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
And unless I am confused - you have mixed up the division number once again.

I believe you are confused. Jeff’s post(s) refer to the 18 ID; no correction was noted in any replies. Please see below.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: JeffK
According to Tsuji,In the Invasion of Malaya, every infantryman of the 18 ID carried an LMG in addition to his rifle.

It looks so out of context in the book, and is not repeated, that it looks like a translation error.

It is also in the Japanese - so it isn't a translation error. It makes tactical sense, and all modern SOF and SWAT units do this. You pick the weapon for the tactical situation - and you have them forward with you. But then it was ahead of its time - probably the first time in history - and certainly the only time a major formation did so.

Frankly, I’m not all that excited about what the division number was anyway. Since it was an absurdity, in any case, it doesn’t really matter which unit it wasn’t.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
So a man never charged, never mind tried or convicted, is condemned outright - not only for being and "unsavory character" but a bad enough one to diserve hanging. Not for you American standards of justice.

Quite correct. I probably would have hanged little Schickelgruber too, unless I could have arranged for him to spend a nice three-day weekend in an isolated country retreat with a bunch of Israelis.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
But do you note that even if you turned out to be correct in that assessment "this has very little to do with Tsuji's veracity as a witness"??

True; never said he was a liar; never said he was worthless; never even said he wasn’t a decent tactician. I did say, “there was no division that had all infantrymen armed with LMGs and rifles” in War 2. If Tsuji said so in a book, there is a problem with either Tsuji or the book. It’s a very simple proposition.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
And you are not merely picking at this or that technical point - you are saying anything he says must be wholly discounted because - why? - YOU don't find him a credible witness?

My goodness, how did you get there? I never said that. I dislike people putting words in my mouth. Even Alvin Coox, who thinks less of Tsuji than I do, uses some of his stuff. What I did say was “no credible military historian has ever commented on, much less verified, this ‘every infantryman with an LMG plus his rifle’ thesis. If Tsuji said so in a single obscure sentence, in a book, I am entitled to disregard the notation in view of the complete lack of corroborative indications.

[JeffroK]

JWE,
 
Its amazing how you miss things with the Green light on[8|], after Sid said it was probably the 5th Div I acknowledged my error, I didnt change the original as it makes some of the folowing comments irrelevant.
 
I suppose the japanese original didnt arrive! Looking at a bit more in a history of the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders doesnt mention it. Again, poor training, poor dispositions, weak leadership on the Brit side v Firm leadership and a plan on the japanese side are given as the main reason for their complete victory.
 
I think Sids approach would be similar to my using Willoughby's history of D MacArthur, Ikes Crusade in Europe or Monty's El Alamein to The Baltic as a definitive history. They are, probably 95% correct, but have some glaring errors or misrepresentations. Maybe they are the honestly held opinion of the writer. The skill is in identifying them and using other documents to prove or disprove them.
 
 

[el cid again]

I don't think any source is perfect. I note that the point in contention is not "believed" because it was not confirmed by a tirtiary writer that a particular person has read. And that in spite of multiple primary sources that do confirm the story. Nothing about it is "absurd" either: it is in fact SOP in smaller units of the present age. There are many instances where what later became SOP military practice was used in IJA in this period of history. It may be this is simply another instance.

In a similar way it is alleged that Japan could not conduct an invasion of Hawaii and do other operations at the same time. Yet I found today that Adm Yamamoto advocated exactly that - that his concept of conducting operations even had a phrase associated with it - and that he did not think in terms of all resources would be drained by only one of them. [Stuck on jury duty, I was reading more of Hawaii Under the Rizing Sun] Never mind that we have solid information that the Japanese considered such operations feasible - and never mind that statistical analysis indicates that was not an irrational view - the position "it must not be so" is so emotionally held that neither history nor factual analysis can score points. I think disregarding evidence is the thing which is really absurd.

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: JWE

That probably explains why the Type 38 Arisaka rifle was accepted in 1905; or maybe someone just forgot that there's a couple parallel calendering systems.

Type 38 = 38th year of the rule of Meiji Tenno = 1905

The Japanese later changed the way they counted the year of acceptance of new military equipment to their imperial calendar which starts with Jimmu Tenno (year 660 BCE). Thus 1942 = 2602 = Type 02

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

JWE,

Its amazing how you miss things with the Green light on[8|], after Sid said it was probably the 5th Div I acknowledged my error, I didnt change the original as it makes some of the folowing comments irrelevant.

I suppose the japanese original didnt arrive! Looking at a bit more in a history of the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders doesnt mention it. Again, poor training, poor dispositions, weak leadership on the Brit side v Firm leadership and a plan on the japanese side are given as the main reason for their complete victory.

I think Sids approach would be similar to my using Willoughby's history of D MacArthur, Ikes Crusade in Europe or Monty's El Alamein to The Baltic as a definitive history. They are, probably 95% correct, but have some glaring errors or misrepresentations. Maybe they are the honestly held opinion of the writer. The skill is in identifying them and using other documents to prove or disprove them.

Hi Jeff,

Yes, I miss a lot of things with the little green light on. Sure, I'll go with the 5th.

BTW you ever looked at William Manchester's "American Caear"? It's a pretty fair (in both senses) bio of good old Doug. Never had the urge to read Willoughby; always thought of him as a suck-up. Is it any good?