ORIGINAL: Trick37
he's one of my heroes. Sorry, but that's where I place him.
Picking on other people’s heroes is all in good sport. I like Patton too; he was quite a character. But, what I really like is arguing against him. On the other thread I mentioned he was over rated and I think this is largely due to his fame and almost mythic standing in pop-culture (the movie is a major source of this). No question, he had his moments. His reaction to the Ardennes offensive being his shining moment. Most of his other campaigns were more sensational than spectacular. Just my two cents.
As for Patton in the Pacific. It’s a fun hypothetical. Not really the best environment for his cavalry mind. And, of course, Dugout Doug would have flipped his lid before letting Georgie have a go at the Japanese.
Patton in Korea. Who knows? I think the best question to ask here is not how Patton would have responded to Chinese intervention but whether or not an Inchon would have occurred in return for something more Patton-esque. I am a fan of the Inchon maneuver and it is interesting to speculate how to break the Pusan perimeter without such a strike at Inchon or elsewhere. End results would likely be similar, but then again Korea isn’t really my area so my opinion on this is limited.
ORIGINAL: Trick37
I hear you, but this is a forum for those of us who make and enjoy these types of games, be they historical or "what if"? Why can't this thread go in this direction?????
By all means it should go in any direction the conversation takes it. That’s why I’m reading it and commenting.
ORIGINAL: Trick37
4). If Patton would've been ordered to stop UN forces at the 38th, then he would've done so, although he would've protested until the moon was black. He had tactical sense, whereas MacArthur has his tactical head up his pompus ass (and he was warned what the Chinese were doing).
Wasn’t Patton’s insubordination legendary?[&:]
Seriously though, you might be right on one account: Mac’s ego in 1950-51 had surpassed Patton’s of 1945.
ORIGINAL: Trick37
Sure they did, a bit part. Yet, if CNN weren't there, then the "intel" that we were feeding them may well have done the trick, too.
“Bit part” is an understatement. The press was manhandled by the military and still is.
True, but we were actually caught a bit unprepared by Kafji. Thankfully, because of a few Marines there, they didn't go further (although I think Kafji might have been their objective).
I agree with you on your "Hail Mary" thoughts and the Iraqi misunderstanding of the modern battlefield.
It must've also been either Iraqi arrogance or Saddam's stupidity that led to them not adapting. Seriously, if they were able to watch CNN (which I understood they were), why didn't they heed to what CNN's "military experts" were saying on TV, and adjust accordingly?
.
Yeah Khafji was the objective. I saw an interview with Schwarzkopf after the war. He was just about salivating when he made the remark “It was after Khafji that I realized these guys couldn’t operate at anything above the brigade level.”
CNN also had people talking about beach landings and so forth.
I'm not saying build a whole fleet of them. We don't need many....4 is enough. Besides, they could have other uses, too....
4? Pretty pricey. Other uses being policy projection, national prestige as well as off shore support I assume? I think we’ll just have to agree to disagree on this one.
Then again, they are pretty. Maybe I can be convinced. [:D] My whole life I ignored naval history, preferring tanks and infantry. Just recently I have found a new fascination for these big ships. I suppose the land fight no longer interests me as much as it once did, but ships are so foreign to me. They are so damn cool. This is why I really want to see more naval detail in TOAW. There is something to be said for those big old battlewagons.
Fighting the current war with the last war's tactics are a sure way to at least put you into a severe disadvantage (i.e. see Iraq' Gulf Far "defenses" in Kuwait and Iraq, as well as their foray into Kafji...as we discussed). It's also why I suggested not going all "light" or "motorized" with our army, like I alluded to earlier. We should keep the heavy units as they are, and have the troops trained to fight in multiple ways---heavy, motorized, light, airmobile/airborne, and non-traditional. Special Ops, however, need to be left to the SF guys.
It’s a delicate balance, an expensive one unfortunately. But the Army seems to think that she is too heavy, hence transformation. Take the current fiasco, heavy forces in Iraq aren’t as effective as they could/should be. I think I mentioned on another thread how utterly useless M1s and AH-64s were during my little stint. But under different circumstances, my weak Strykers and Kiowas would not fair well either. Thus, a balance.
My major critique of the heavy force is the unlikely need for it (there are always surprises though). Our little China discussion pits USA v. China. I certainly see the possibility but the likelihood of a major military confrontation in the next 25 years is only a slight one. Even then, I just can’t see fighting on the mainland in the conventional sense. Excursions into Iran, Syria, Africa, Indonesia, and North Korea seem more likely.
As for “Special Ops being left to the SF guys” depends on how you define Special Ops. At one time just about everything outside conventional warfare was left to these guys. Now, the unconventional is conventional so these guys aren’t that “special” anymore [:D]. They have greatly expanded in size and scope.
