The Divisions tasked to invade Hawaii

[el cid again]

In standup, if I did it, I would be the strait man.

Nor have I become upset. Both of your perceptions are related to your imaginations, albeit I must admit the medium is very restrictive of understanding the mood of a person.

All it takes for a statement to be "false" is any element of it not to be true. Nik has assumed that when I said a statement was false, it meant every possible facit of it was incorrect. In this case, the part that is false was the ending of development of the "Eastern Operation" planning - which indeed did not end when he said it did. Nik also has confused the primary thrust of this thread. I began it with identification of the units tasked for the 1942 invasion scheme. I had the impression we could not identify the 1941 units at all, and I did not at first identify them. I had also reported in a different thread that I remembered "not being impressed" with the units so identified. That might be interpreted as agreement with Big T's comment on this thread - about their being less than ideal choices - although I am not sure there won't be an earthquake or something if I dared to suggest we agreed on anything, however minor? Eventually I was able to identify units that might have been selected, and the reasons they were more suitable, for either operation.

The Japanese government bureaucracy was at all times, and in all matters, a complex and divided thing. Add to that the cultural tendency not to keep records on the scale we did in the first place. Add to that orders to destroy all records issued in 1945, which were substantially implemented. We are left with using a combination of what can be gleaned from memories, captured records, and the fractions of records not destroyed for various reasons. These are necessairily incomplete in almost every instance. To the extent we do know things, we are always going to know them about a governmental system that was NOT unified in the first place. It is not my fault that we must work from a tiny fraction of the original material - nor that institutions and individuals in Japan were not nearly as unified as the Western conception of "unified" means either in a non-democratic government or in a nation at war. There was never any possibility of producing evidence of a completely detailed plan for any operation because there never was one to begin with, and because we would not have it even if their had been. Japan didn't have a "completely detailed" operational plan for the campaign on Guadalcanal - or either the original or follow up ones intended to take Port Moresby. The nearest thing to a completely detailed play was for the invasion of Malaya - and that only because it had a proper (and joint) planning group for a couple of months in the late summer of 1941. But the nearest thing we have to an account of that plan is the second book by Tsuji - a source you don't seem willing to accept. [His document "Read Only This and the War Can Be Won troop briefing is an appendix] The second nearest thing to a complete plan is whatever Homma used for the Philippines - and it certainly didn't work out as well in the longer run as it started out doing. We do not have a similar account from his chief of planning or operations. But in the beginning it worked relatively far better than the plans of USAFFE - even if those were substantially done by two later to be famous US generals - one of them Eisenhauer. It appears that after the initial operations phase, planning was never done at the level of these two operations - nor is it likely it could have been because intelligence in wartime could never be as good as it was in peacetime. Regardless - if you delve into these matters - you are only going to get some of the dots to connect - and these are never going to show everyone on the Japanese side was always in harmony with everyone else - or that any plan was always properly formed, or even formally adopted in a proper sense. Presentation of a "compromise plan" to the emperor - such as occurred in the case of Eastern Operation - happened only in the vaguest of terms - deliberately so that different institutions could read what they wanted into them. It is false to say there were no plans and intentions. That should not be read to say there were completely functional plans at any point - even when implemented Japanese plans were often fatally inadequate. Japanese institutional concepts for escort vessels and convoys long predate WWII - but no serious effort was made to implement them until midwar - when a Grand Escort Command was formed - specialist ASW aircraft and vessels were built - and it was far too late and playing catch up ball was doomed to failure. I can say similar unkind things about MacArthur's planning concepts before the war: it was doomed to failure to try to defend almost everywhere with an almost untrained army - it was doomed to failure not to stock Fort Drum with food enough to last as long as it was likely to take to bomb it into submission (a year or so) - and it was doomed to failure not to plan to retreat into the non-diseased mountains of Northern Luzon - which can (and today do) feed a million people - which have dozens of ridgelines and swift rivers to defend - and which Yamashita did effectively in 1945. That plans are not perfect or universally loved is part of the real picture. It is indeed not my fault what those people did then, on either side. Do not attempt to understand what can be pieced together from fragmentary evidence if you want more than that - because it ain't gonna happen. That should not be interpreted as an excuse to say "there was never a plan to invade Hawaii." There was, and indications of it were properly detected by US intelligence in 1941, and they were (properly conditionally) reported to Nimitz at that time. If you want to say "there was never a plan to invade Australia" - in spite of a number of books by reputable Western Historians saying there was - I would be closer to agreement. There was a staff study - and a vague agreement at some unspecified time in the future if conditions warranted it to CONSIDER such a plan - but it was never agreed to - never allocated forces - and never even in a preliminary sense attempted.

[DuckofTindalos]

That should not be read to say there were completely functional plans at any point

Then why did you claim in an earlier post that Japan INVADED Hawai'i in 1942?

That might be interpreted as agreement with Big T's comment on this thread - about their being less than ideal choices

That was Spence's comment. As Nik said, try to display a proper record of who said what.

[aztez]

ORIGINAL: el cid again


All it takes for a statement to be "false" is any element of it not to be true.

LOL! With this logic... well, 99% of your post are than labeled "false".. [:D][:D][:D]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

All it takes for a statement to be "false" is any element of it not to be true. Nik has assumed that when I said a statement was false, it meant every possible facit of it was incorrect. In this case, the part that is false was the ending of development of the "Eastern Operation" planning - which indeed did not end when he said it did.

Bullshit. your quote: EL CID post # 6

Nothing in Japanese culture is ever simple. I like to reverse that and say "if it is simple, it isn't Japanese." It isn't quite true - "always" and "never" are dangerous words - and there almost always is some exception or other to any general truism. But the above statement is as close to false as can be - since it isn't true.

First off, sounds pretty all-encompasing to me. 2nd, your claim was in reponse to my post stating that no detailed, developed invasion plan existed.
What I later said that you are attempting to mis-quote occured in post #26

ORIGINAL: Me

Looks to me like this thread is about you weaving back and forth between 1941 or earlier and now 1942 in regards to the alleged "plan" against Hawaii and the time period in which such an operation is "valid". These "divisional" elements you "identified" were only mentioned and sent vague orders to "begin preperation" mere days before Nagumo's depleated Kido Butai set sail for it's date with destiny. Had the Americans done what Yamamotto expected of them and died like obediant enemies, perhaps something more substantial would have come of it. Perhaps not. One thing for sure, a reverse such as what was experienced at Midway or even a partial Midway would have quickly curbed any enthusiasm for a Hawaii adventure on the Army's part. The Army apparantly didn't realize how many American serviceman were stationed at Oahu by this point either...a little fact which also would have done much to dampen the initial enthusiasm created by Doolittle's sting.

As one can see, I never said anything absolute and specific about the "demise" of "Eastern Planning" I speculated that with Midway going the way it did in RL or even in part, that it was possible if not likely that further planning would have been curbed.

Nice try at sleight of hand Travathan.

Nik also has confused the primary thrust of this thread. I began it with identification of the units tasked for the 1942 invasion scheme. I had the impression we could not identify the 1941 units at all, and I did not at first identify them

Nik did assume you were continuing a discussion regarding the 41 or earlier invasion of Hawaii given your incessent insistance that you were never seriously arguing for a mid 42 or later invasion of Hawaii. You keep claiming all you were trying to was identify the 42 units given alert orders yet you keep referring to 41 and attempted to claim what i wrote about the absence of a detailed plan being as "close to false as it can be, because it isn't true" but can't back it up with anything other than to keep regurgitating the alert order sent to the C/O's of two divisions days before the disaster at Midway.

Nik also has confused the primary thrust of this thread. I began it with identification of the units tasked for the 1942 invasion scheme. I had the impression we could not identify the 1941 units at all, and I did not at first identify them. I had also reported in a different thread that I remembered "not being impressed" with the units so identified.

Yes and we've seen how flimsy your 42 "invasion scheme" turned out to be. If the thrust of the thread was simply to identify the 42 units sent an alert order which any reasonable person would immediately see is intimately tied to the complete success of the Midway operation (and anhilation of the US fleet ), then all you would have needed to do was simply say "All i'm doing is posting info that some divisional elements were given orders about a possible invasion of Hawaii in mid 42."

The Japanese government bureaucracy was at all times, and in all matters, a complex and divided thing. Add to that the cultural tendency not to keep records on the scale we did in the first place. Add to that orders to destroy all records issued in 1945, which were substantially implemented. We are left with using a combination of what can be gleaned from memories, captured records, and the fractions of records not destroyed for various reasons.

A tired and overused excuse for you to say things without being able to back it up when challenged or pressed. Its all very complicated. Wait...its Japanese so its really all very complicated!

But the nearest thing we have to an account of that plan is the second book by Tsuji - a source you don't seem willing to accept. [His document "Read Only This and the War Can Be Won troop briefing is an appendix]

Another incorrect statement from you. I've never said Tsuji's book was completely unusable anymore than I ever said he was a complete lier. I recall telling you that three times in succession but somehow Mr "speak precisely" continued to have problems with his memory or reading skills and kept implying that I had. Now we have the statement by you that i'm unwilling to accept his book as a source. Hmm.

I say again what i've said repeatedly and can re-quote. Tsuji as a source should be taken with a grain of salt. He is not an Avatar of truth and had his own view and agenda. Tell you what....quote specifically in his "book" about the detailed Hawaiian invaison plan that Evans and Peattie, in their published and professionally acredited book Kaigun said never existed except as an occasional study by the Naval General Staff.

There was a staff study - and a vague agreement at some unspecified time in the future if conditions warranted it to CONSIDER such a plan - but it was never agreed to - never allocated forces - and never even in a preliminary sense attempted

There were several studies done by the Naval General Staff on a Hawaiian invasion. Gee....I think i've now stated that what......four times now? None were ever pursued and developed into a standing, established detailed plan with Divisional elements assigned and prepared for it. You claimed thats FALSE. Prove it.

btw...I thought you were "done" talking to me about it since i'm obviously such an intractable person. Another useless petulant statement I guess....

[JWE]

My dear Mr. Sidley,

Not withstanding any of Niks comments, I think there are a couple things that the rest of the readers of this sub-thread ought to know.

1) Nik's got it wired.
2) Only you seem to have this idea that 'Japanese are too complicated for ordinary folk".
3) There were not enough hulls, in the entire Japanese merchant marine, to consider an invasion of Hawaii operation, in addition to the necessaries (SRA, PI, Malaysia). Please see the post at Day-One scenarios. This statement is operative throughout the 1941, '42. and mid '43 period.

I know you like to quote Mark Parillo, possibly because most people don't know who he is. However, I do, and I also know Geo. Blaine Howell, Alan Colton, Quan Huang, Sami Chi, and Iwasaki Yotaro. There were not enough hulls available, period.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

That should not be read to say there were completely functional plans at any point

Then why did you claim in an earlier post that Japan INVADED Hawai'i in 1942?

Well - that is not what I said. I said Japan attempted an invasion in 1942 - and in case you missed it - it failed to succeed. This would be true even if you only believed Adm Kondos invasion group was the only thing intended to invade anything outside the Aleutians: as it says in Hawaii Under the Rising Sun - and every map of Hawaii under US jurisdiction - Midway is part of Hawaii. It is the plan to invade Hawaii - in all its variations and permutations - that is discussed in the book Hawaii Under the Rising Sun. Only the final variation was actually attempted - as you well know - but apparently are unwilling to say - because it would require you admit you didn't express yourself perfectly. Too bad - it is still true.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

My dear Mr. Sidley,

Not withstanding any of Niks comments, I think there are a couple things that the rest of the readers of this sub-thread ought to know.

1) Nik's got it wired.

Care to translate? I do wiring on computers, used to be radar sets, and before that electric trains. Somehow I don't think that is your meaning. I hear the term has an application in drug usage - but I don't see how it might apply?

2) Only you seem to have this idea that 'Japanese are too complicated for ordinary folk".

You missed - then - the several posts in which I said that Japanese is structurally easy to read - and it took me only two hours to finish - reading aloud - Japanese in 60 Hours - riding on a train from Yokosuka to Tokyo with another sailor. Japanese writing is complicated, and Japanese society and history are complicated - but I have crossed the cultural bridge from Occident to Orient - my family is multi-cultural (by marriage - that is by choice) - and I am the last one to discourage people from trying to do that. In fact, at no point can you find where I said such a thing - because not only did I not - I would not.

3) There were not enough hulls, in the entire Japanese merchant marine, to consider an invasion of Hawaii operation, in addition to the necessaries (SRA, PI, Malaysia). Please see the post at Day-One scenarios. This statement is operative throughout the 1941, '42. and mid '43 period.

You are perfectly, 100% (not 99% or some lesser value) wrong. There are more than enough hulls - and it is hardly possible to give all the hulls a job. While some nonsense was posted, it was dead wrong, and is hardly proof worthy of citing. I have done this in far greater detail - once even lifting six divisions - using staffs of dozens of players working many months to work out details - many of them professionals. Even in WITP - which is horribly load inefficient for how we must use ships (and has no mechanism for using a Tsuji Box on an AK) - we can do it with many hulls left in port. Even in RHS - where half the AKs are 9999ed out - we can do it. You can not get more wrong than wrong: no matter how you do the analysis - no matter how many ships you fail to count - or how badly you load them - it is not true - and anyone who investigates is going to figure that out.

I know you like to quote Mark Parillo, possibly because most people don't know who he is. However, I do, and I also know Geo. Blaine Howell, Alan Colton, Quan Huang, Sami Chi, and Iwasaki Yotaro. There were not enough hulls available, period.

IF that were true - that there are not enough hulls - THEN the Japanese who thought there were were remarkably wrong. The truth is that there are far more hulls available in 1941 than later - in spite of capture of 300,000 tons - because in 1941 many hulls are idle in Japan - not yet allocated a job. After the SRA is captured, they will have things to do - and until then they are available for a sideshow. As for Parillo - most people can find a copy of his book in the library - and he explains that the Japanese fundamental plan was not untenable at its heart (as, for example, Germany's Z plan was).
"There was more than enough oil" for example. He gives remarkably good aggregate data on ships - and he for one does not fail to mention many sorts of vessels we don't have in WITP. He paints a reasonably clear academic picture - describing how the merchant marine was subsidized and substantially designed for dual civil-military application - and how it was mismanaged in several senses (including routing inefficiencies, type allocation inefficiencies, failure to allocate escort or adequate air patrol assets, failure to organize the Grand Escort Command in a timely way - name it). You may refer to his data for ships, to Lloyds data, or to several other sources - and if you do so - you will be unable to justify this assertion. It is an impression, a prejudice possible ONLY for someone who never took the ship list and worked it out in detail. You don't need em all. You get to pick what you need - and send some spares - and there are more besides. Only after the horrible attrition of war significantly shrank the fleet plus construction plus capturing (and note we cannot capture in the game) - did the point come when it was no longer possible - in a sheer sealift sense of the word.

I often get in almost exactly this same debate on a PRC invasion of Taiwan discussion. For some reason it is a gross falsehood that China cannot lift more than 2 or 3 divisions - whereas China can lift far more than ever it might need - it thinks it needs only 3 corps - but it could lift substantially the entire active PLA in a single bound if that made any sense (which of course it would not). The passion of the belief does not change the physical reality. Count the ships. Count the troops. Do the math.

[Alfred]

JWE, Terminus, Nikademus,
 
Gentlemen, I just wish to say that I had not previously read this thread and therefore had not been exposed to the quality of your work on this thread (which has me ROFL).  Your rapier thrusts, 100% hits on target and deconstruction of pomposity makes this thread almost as funny to read as Captain Mandrakes AAR.  Actually, now that I think about it, maybe Captain Mandrake could incorporate some of your opponent's statements into his AAR when he is in between plot ideas.
 
Keep up the good work guys.
 
Alfred

[DuckofTindalos]

That should not be read to say there were completely functional plans at any point

Then why did you claim in an earlier post that Japan INVADED Hawai'i in 1942?

Well - that is not what I said. I said Japan attempted an invasion in 1942 - and in case you missed it - it failed to succeed.

Post #185 in the "Yamamoto's Plan in Action" thread, by el cid again (in part):

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

That was EXACTLY what you said, Sid...

[bradfordkay]

This has actually been a fun thread to read, but - Sid - I do have a suggestion to make it more fun: Paragraphs are your friend. It is quite difficult to wade through a page long paragraph (or half a page, etc). If you could break your theses into shorter paragraphs it would make for better reading. Thanks.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
You are perfectly, 100% (not 99% or some lesser value) wrong. There are more than enough hulls - and it is hardly possible to give all the hulls a job. While some nonsense was posted, it was dead wrong, and is hardly proof worthy of citing. I have done this in far greater detail - once even lifting six divisions - using staffs of dozens of players working many months to work out details - many of them professionals.

IF that were true - that there are not enough hulls - THEN the Japanese who thought there were were remarkably wrong. The truth is that there are far more hulls available in 1941 than later - in spite of capture of 300,000 tons - because in 1941 many hulls are idle in Japan - not yet allocated a job.

Actually, it was true. There were not enough hulls. The Japanese who thought otherwise were, indeed, remarkably wrong. Please see the post on Day-1 operations, somewhere below; it lists every Japanese merchant vessel, by name and tonnage, that was assigned to initial operations in Malaysia, the PI and CenPac.

It is very easy to call up Lloyds or ONI 208J and get a listing of every single Japanese merchant vessel afloat, as of December 1941, by name, and by tonnage. If you do not have this (or anybody else who is interested) I would be pleased to send you (y’all) a copy of ONI 208J, by pm request.

It takes some time, and not a little digging, but anyone (everyone) can list every single Japanese merchant vessel, in 500 ton increments, and do a simple arithmetic subtraction. What you find is that over 80% of all, and I do mean all, high-speed and high-capacity merchant vessels were taken over for initial ops. There were old (slow) high-capacity vessels extent, and over 60% of these were taken as well. A simple ship-by-ship-by-tonnage analysis will verify this.

The Japanese merchant fleet was eviscerated. The remaining vessels were unable to meet requirements, but the Central Agreement was to return the majority of allocated vessels to commercial service, once initial operations had been completed. This did not happen. There were no idle hulls.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

This has actually been a fun thread to read, but - Sid - I do have a suggestion to make it more fun: Paragraphs are your friend. It is quite difficult to wade through a page long paragraph (or half a page, etc). If you could break your theses into shorter paragraphs it would make for better reading. Thanks.

That's part of his strategy of taking advantage of the perceived lack of patience of the average Internet user. Unfortunately for Sid, there aren't that many "average" Internet users around here.

[m10bob]

Fuel to the fire!

According to Richard B Frank, in GUADALCANAL, page 23 also refers to the study by John J Stephan (HAWAII UNDER THE RISING SUN), and apparently the idea of Yamamoto capturing Midway preparatory to assaulting Hawaii is mentioned on pages 89-118....
I do not have this latter book, cannot comment on it, but Frank's work, (and the fact he dares to quote from it) is interesting........??

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

Fuel to the fire!

According to Richard B Frank, in GUADALCANAL, page 23 also refers to the study by John J Stephan (HAWAII UNDER THE RISING SUN), and apparently the idea of Yamamoto capturing Midway preparatory to assaulting Hawaii is mentioned on pages 89-118....
I do not have this latter book, cannot comment on it, but Frank's work, (and the fact he dares to quote from it) is interesting........??

Bob, I think you’ve got it. Frank did a magnificent job! Yes indeedy do, the definitive work on the ‘Canal. So let’s just stick with Brother Richard for a moment.

Yeah, Yamamoto planned on capturing Midway, and may well have had a Hawaii assault in the works. Don’t take away from the proposition though.

Recall, somewhere about mid-book, the discussion about the September ‘42 Central Agreement regarding the allocation of shipping to a reinforcement convoy to the ‘Canal, where the civ sector said it was already impossibly strained and couldn’t maintain the economy even with the present allocation. The next paragraph mentions how the IJN and IJA disregarded this fatal flaw, and went forward in any case, their ultimate discomfort.

So, a Hawaii assault; sounds great. If the Japanese couldn’t even reinforce the ‘decisive engagement’ without killing their economy even more dead, it’s kinda hard to see how they could manage a HI assault lift. Maybe arrogance, maybe sepukku??

[m10bob]

Yep...I'm savvy to the Seppuku![:D]

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again
You are perfectly, 100% (not 99% or some lesser value) wrong. There are more than enough hulls - and it is hardly possible to give all the hulls a job. While some nonsense was posted, it was dead wrong, and is hardly proof worthy of citing. I have done this in far greater detail - once even lifting six divisions - using staffs of dozens of players working many months to work out details - many of them professionals.

IF that were true - that there are not enough hulls - THEN the Japanese who thought there were were remarkably wrong. The truth is that there are far more hulls available in 1941 than later - in spite of capture of 300,000 tons - because in 1941 many hulls are idle in Japan - not yet allocated a job.

Actually, it was true. There were not enough hulls. The Japanese who thought otherwise were, indeed, remarkably wrong. Please see the post on Day-1 operations, somewhere below; it lists every Japanese merchant vessel, by name and tonnage, that was assigned to initial operations in Malaysia, the PI and CenPac.

It is very easy to call up Lloyds or ONI 208J and get a listing of every single Japanese merchant vessel afloat, as of December 1941, by name, and by tonnage. If you do not have this (or anybody else who is interested) I would be pleased to send you (y’all) a copy of ONI 208J, by pm request.

It takes some time, and not a little digging, but anyone (everyone) can list every single Japanese merchant vessel, in 500 ton increments, and do a simple arithmetic subtraction. What you find is that over 80% of all, and I do mean all, high-speed and high-capacity merchant vessels were taken over for initial ops. There were old (slow) high-capacity vessels extent, and over 60% of these were taken as well. A simple ship-by-ship-by-tonnage analysis will verify this.

The Japanese merchant fleet was eviscerated. The remaining vessels were unable to meet requirements, but the Central Agreement was to return the majority of allocated vessels to commercial service, once initial operations had been completed. This did not happen. There were no idle hulls.

IF this is so then something does not work correctly in the games, as modded. There seems to be a healthy surplus of Japanese merchant ships in most scenarios I play.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

This has actually been a fun thread to read, but - Sid - I do have a suggestion to make it more fun: Paragraphs are your friend. It is quite difficult to wade through a page long paragraph (or half a page, etc). If you could break your theses into shorter paragraphs it would make for better reading. Thanks.

Time was they complained I used too many short posts - perhaps Lincoln had it right "you can't please all the people all the time"

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again
You are perfectly, 100% (not 99% or some lesser value) wrong. There are more than enough hulls - and it is hardly possible to give all the hulls a job. While some nonsense was posted, it was dead wrong, and is hardly proof worthy of citing. I have done this in far greater detail - once even lifting six divisions - using staffs of dozens of players working many months to work out details - many of them professionals.

IF that were true - that there are not enough hulls - THEN the Japanese who thought there were were remarkably wrong. The truth is that there are far more hulls available in 1941 than later - in spite of capture of 300,000 tons - because in 1941 many hulls are idle in Japan - not yet allocated a job.

Actually, it was true. There were not enough hulls. The Japanese who thought otherwise were, indeed, remarkably wrong. Please see the post on Day-1 operations, somewhere below; it lists every Japanese merchant vessel, by name and tonnage, that was assigned to initial operations in Malaysia, the PI and CenPac.

I saw it. But unless you believe each troopie needs some huge amount of tonnage - it prooves my point. There is plenty of tonnage. Adm Yamamoto used the phrase "happo yabure" (strike on all sides) to shorthand how this was the ideal strategy:

"Japan's only hope against such a formidable adversary lay in bold military action followed by skillful diplomacy. Japan must sieze certain strategic advantages and then quickly bring hostilities to a close through a negotiated peace. But how would the Americans be convinced that a negotiated peace would serve their interests more than prolongation of war? Yamamoto believed that Washington could be made to feel that war would be too costly to continue if Japan kept hitting American forces so hard that the loss of life would arouse American public opinion For this tactic to work, speed was essential. Japan must retain the initiative that she had seized in the Hawaiiand and Southeast Asian operations. These strikes must be immediately followed by aggressive action in all directions that would keep the Americans off balance and allow Japan to continue enlarging the perimeter until Washington sued for peace. Yamamoto dubbed this strategy happo yabure (strike on all sides). He had three targets in mind: Ceylon, Australia and Hawaii. Of these Hawaii was the most important for it sheltered the most serious strategic threat against Japan: carriers of the US Pacific Fleet."

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again
You are perfectly, 100% (not 99% or some lesser value) wrong. There are more than enough hulls - and it is hardly possible to give all the hulls a job. While some nonsense was posted, it was dead wrong, and is hardly proof worthy of citing. I have done this in far greater detail - once even lifting six divisions - using staffs of dozens of players working many months to work out details - many of them professionals.

IF that were true - that there are not enough hulls - THEN the Japanese who thought there were were remarkably wrong. The truth is that there are far more hulls available in 1941 than later - in spite of capture of 300,000 tons - because in 1941 many hulls are idle in Japan - not yet allocated a job.

Actually, it was true. There were not enough hulls. The Japanese who thought otherwise were, indeed, remarkably wrong. Please see the post on Day-1 operations, somewhere below; it lists every Japanese merchant vessel, by name and tonnage, that was assigned to initial operations in Malaysia, the PI and CenPac.

It is very easy to call up Lloyds or ONI 208J and get a listing of every single Japanese merchant vessel afloat, as of December 1941, by name, and by tonnage. If you do not have this (or anybody else who is interested) I would be pleased to send you (y’all) a copy of ONI 208J, by pm request.

It takes some time, and not a little digging, but anyone (everyone) can list every single Japanese merchant vessel, in 500 ton increments, and do a simple arithmetic subtraction. What you find is that over 80% of all, and I do mean all, high-speed and high-capacity merchant vessels were taken over for initial ops. There were old (slow) high-capacity vessels extent, and over 60% of these were taken as well. A simple ship-by-ship-by-tonnage analysis will verify this.

The Japanese merchant fleet was eviscerated. The remaining vessels were unable to meet requirements, but the Central Agreement was to return the majority of allocated vessels to commercial service, once initial operations had been completed. This did not happen. There were no idle hulls.

IF this is so then something does not work correctly in the games, as modded. There seems to be a healthy surplus of Japanese merchant ships in most scenarios I play.

Amen. To which add - that as a phib sailor - I long ago learned how to load ships IRL. The WITP requirements are FAR higher than really needed. And Japan needed less tonnage than I was taught to allocate, because of different standards. There is also a US manual on the matter - or you may go to How to Make War for quick and dirty rules of thumb. No matter how you cut it - you have more ships than needed. UNTIL a LOT of ships are sunk - this will be the case - baring incompetent play. I admit it is problematical - one must think for - five or ten whole seconds - to meet shipping requirements sometimes. But you always can find an acceptable solution.

[bradfordkay]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

This has actually been a fun thread to read, but - Sid - I do have a suggestion to make it more fun: Paragraphs are your friend. It is quite difficult to wade through a page long paragraph (or half a page, etc). If you could break your theses into shorter paragraphs it would make for better reading. Thanks.

Time was they complained I used too many short posts - perhaps Lincoln had it right "you can't please all the people all the time"

Quite true. I go by one rule: I look at my own posts and if the paragraph appears hard on the eyes, then I look for a reasonable point within it for a paragraph break. Thanks for understanding.