In the very early days of the war the USAAC pilots used the tactics they were trained in. As each individual pilot and unit gained experience with the enemy they adapted...sometimes in mid-air.
A2A combat is complicated and the version of history that suggests that US pilots had a problem consequence of doctrine or training, or some yet-to-be-realized learning curve thingie that gave the Zero an edge are not, in my view, substantiated by any quantititaive data. The claim's been made. I've never seen anyone back up the claim. The claim might be correct but, again, I'll have more faith in it when the data have been systematically examined.
They learned...but they also got shot down far more frequently in the early part of the war.
More frequently than whom? Under what circumstances? According to what data? Yeah, a Zeke could easily down a P-40 when they were landing or taking off. At low energy states there's no question that the Zeke held all the cards. I wonder what the data look like when such circumstances are eliminated from the data, or at least given a footnote.
The lessons and tactics adopted by the AVG took months to filter throughout the units in the pacific.
As you say, USAAC pilots may have adapted "on the fly. Possibly even in their first encounter. As energies dropped below a certain threshold, IIRC about 250 knots, the Zeke was going to start to fly rings around any P-40. Unless every P-40 driver died the instant a Zeke started to get ahead, I suspect that a whole lot of viral learning went on among USAAC pilots whether or not they'd heard from the AVG.
I'm not sure that anyone made this claim...I didn't see it.
It seemed implicit. After all, if you think that Zekes must have always held a maneuverability edge, then you have to believe that US pilots always tried to turn with them until the P-40s were in the lousy edge of their performance envelope. Because it is evident that the P-40s at high speeds could out roll not only Zeros but far more maneuverable Ki-43s. And roll is an important part of maneuver.
In the opening months of the war I don't think this is verifiable.
We shall see.
Why do you keep bringing up US naval pilots in all these threads?
Because for quite a while here in the Matrix fora "everyone knew" that the Zero was a "superweapon" against which only grinding attrition with an unfavorable loss ratio for US naval pilots broke the back of the 25th Air Flotilla in the Solomons Campaign. If everyone could believe it when it wasn't actually true about USN pilots (that the Zero was a better plane than the F4F and that Zero pilots were better pilots than USN pilots), then it may also be true that the same claims made about the relative merits of early war USAAC pilots and a.c. vs IJN/IJNAF pilots and a.c. may be equally an "urban legend."
That said, was one to talk about the F2A, which I haven't, I'd concede that the Zero was hands down the better plane.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?