Device Review: RHS Microupdate x.782 uploading

[el cid again]

Sure? No way. I long was afraid to do this. Time and experience have reduced my fear - because I have a sense of how things work. Firepower is not going to have very large impact on ground combat - which is not exactly the way I would prefer it was - but that is the system we have.

However, I am an experienced analyst. Values simply must be integrated - wether or not this was understood up front.
In supply, one Matrix programmer said "ultimately, a ton is a ton is a ton - there is nothing else that will work - wether or not that was the original design intent." This is similar: you may NOT pick two different values for a CD gun. That gun gets used in naval combat AND in land combat. So it MUST have the same scale - because it is only going to have ONE value. Why give CD guns radically too low a rating? [Those based on land guns were] Why give CD guns radically too high a rating? [Those based on naval guns were - if the land based ratings were "right"] And AA guns are similar: they ALSO can be used (or should be used and potentially some day will be used) in land combat and in naval combat. We work for the long run here: my assignment was "get the data right" - and that was just the first clause of the sentence: if the code isn't right, it can be changed. But the game will never work properly if we don't have consistent data.

One thing I have noticed is that making ratings consistent have beneficial impacts on the engine. The engine appears to be robust, generally well concieved, and susceptable to improvement. If "garbage in, garbage out" is a principle, so is the opposite!

In general, it appears that games tend to undervalue artillery in land combat. It is not widely understood by gamers that artillery is the very heart of an army. Infantry is mainly a way to screen the artillery and to find enemy targets - for the artillery. Artillery inflicts the vast majority of damage and casualties. Any game system where this is not the case isn't simulating properly in the first place. IF we CAN increase the relative meaning of artillery, it is all for the better. I doubt we can do so anywhere near enough. Right now - players wrongly think about adding artillery battalions/regiments to units as "making them stronger" - when with these ratings they are almost not doing that at all.

In particular, the IJA was "artillery happy." So, for that matter, was most of the US Army. We only engaged Japanese artillery used doctrinally one time - and we did not do well on that occasion. But we did the same sort of thing effectively many times. Institutionally, possibly because it is a good idea, the IJA and US Army were both organized to put heavy weapons in independent battalions/units. [IJA did more of this than anyone else in the period; US Army did it more than anyone else except the IJA - because Gen Marshall believed in it.] It means you can - as a commander - send your heavy firepower where it will make a difference - and not dilute the expensive heavy guns by sending a few everywhere. But ONLY IF the system makes a unit or two of heavy guns matter will you see this in play as it was IRL. I am profoundly skeptical we can wholly change the nature of how things work well enough to make this be like real army combat is? I HOPE we can change it enough to notice SLIGHT impacts in that direction.

Even so, my methodology is - as always - conservative. We will try this for a while before we consider stronger medicine.

One thing clear (I am running my sixth test) is that these changes HAVE done the right thing to AA combat. Good. I am pretty sure it will do better in CD combat, but that takes a hands on test (AI isn't up to it). I have seen NO impact on land combat so far - and I hope microscopic observation will show SOME. This is unlikely to have done very much - and whatever it does will almost certainly not move as far in the direction of "artillery is king" as we probably should go.

[Dili]

You continue to add typical noise to all discussions. I'll repeat again: The issue is your argument for accuracy of a 300mm Mortar with a almost 800lb round. 80 to 24 is the acc between a 75mm round and a 300mm round. I found that totally wrong.

[el cid again]

I have no clue what weapon you are talking about?: we did not change any mortars except the ALLIED 12 inch CD mortar - which is treated as a CD gun vice a mortar. There are two 30 cm howitzers - long and short - and they are not mortars - although like a mortar - a howitzer may fire at greater than 45 degrees. Siege guns come with very fine suporting organizations, including surveyers, spotters, and a full sized fire direction center. There is never much doubt wether they can hit a target at 9 or 13 thousand yards? The question is "on which round will we hit?" The statistically probable answer is "the third round" - and if not then - or by luck on the second - the alternate statistically significant case is "the fourth round." The accuracy is a matter of "can the target be hit" - and the chances are higher for a shorter ranged weapon than for a longer ranged weapon. [The reason big guns have lower accuracy is that they usually shoot longer ranges - and at longer ranges hit probability goes way down. Short range weapons that may never engage at long range should be rated on a different scale - because they simply don't have the same kind of problem to solve. IRL big guns are more accurate than small ones - at some short range.] I did not treat Allied guns any differently - for the first pass experiment I rated them EXACTLY the same - class for class - range for range.

Nevertheless - if you can name a weapon and tie it to a recommended rating - as long as it is in the right range - that is something we can adopt. I did most ratings in a few seconds and would love more considered values. It is a question of time - and gunnery is a topic I understand: I can solve in my head problems adequately problems most people need paper to work out - and a lot more time. But it is likely better values can be suggested - and if they are - we will use them. Ratings of 2 or 4 are clearly out of bounds - and I wanted to try something more reasonable. You work em all out to the last digit - I will use em. Just like we use AKWarriors LSTs - I didn't check on his dates or IDs - he did vast work - and we simply used it.

Testing indicates this has worked rather well. CD hits are up significantly. [Heavy AAA is way up, but not too far up] Land combat is not affected as much as I would prefer: it mattered more when I added (historically correct) MMG and light mortars - probably because squad count matters so much in this system.

[Dili]

They are no diferent from 305mm Skoda "Morser" ranges from begin of the century. Btw the Japanese are 305mm too. Why a 75mm gun have 80 and a 305mm Howitzer have 24 without all mechanical help that a Ship gun have? At least more than  10x n rate of fire have the 75mm over 305mm. To not talk about setup/setout times.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

They are no diferent from 305mm Skoda "Morser" ranges from begin of the century. Btw the Japanese are 305mm too. Why a 75mm gun have 80 and a 305mm Howitzer have 24 without all mechanical help that a Ship gun have? At least more than  10x n rate of fire have the 75mm over 305mm. To not talk about setup/setout times.

[I believe the Japanese 30 cm guns may have copied similar European concepts - likely from Sneider of France - so you are quite correct in their similarity to Skoda weapons.]

Ships pitch and roll; the ground almost never does that (earthquakes excepted).

A ship never knows where it is - it is moving at a somewhat unknown rate relative to geographic coordinates. A land artillery piece is sited in with surveyers - and its FDC knows exactly where it is.

Technically, land guns should be rated HIGHER than ship guns - not the same. Doing the same is quick, dirty, and conservative - and probably we should change that some day.

Larger caliber guns are more accurate than smaller calliber guns at any given range both can reach - a principle of gunnery.

WITP rates AA guns of the same caliber as higher in hit probability than SP guns - and I preserved both scales. But for shooting at a fixed target on land, it may be this is not right. Maybe the probability is the same? If not, maybe the NON AA guns are MORE likely to hit? AA people are not usually specialists in "put a round through the left slit of that bunker."

If you want to work out a formal criteria - and then rework ALL devices to it - and I do mean all - I will adopt your calculations - after the forum agrees on the criteria. My three second top of the head guesses based on EXISTING WITP norms will not be as good as that - they just took only 2-3 days to make. You take weeks, work em all out - we will use em.

[Dili]

Technically, land guns should be rated HIGHER than ship guns.

 
I agree with that if those ship guns in land have same mechanical capabilities and support includes sighting, fire control. We are not talking about ship artillery put in land with all hoists ,mechanisation and power.
 
I am comparing artillery guns that have not facilities of a ship gun. We are not talking about turret guns of Corregidor with Fire controls, powered hoists etc. A Skoda 305mm have a rate of fire of 10 ronds per hour with a 384kg round. A 75mm gun can put 6 rounds per minute continous fire. A 75mm gun can be moved put to fire in minutes a  40t  gun  gun needs 1-3 Hour to be prepared to fire and travels much slower. The only advantage and only reason this guns were made was their penetration power against armored structures. They are inneficient for other proposes.

[el cid again]

Reviewing the Thunderbold in RAF service, a tale came to by attention (by Donaldson) re an instance on the march to Rangoon where three - count em three - IJA 105 mm Field Guns held up an entire field army. The P-47s were credited with taking them out and permitting the otherwise stalled offensive to resume.

A similar instance occurred in Italy - with a single 88 mm tube - well sited at the head of a mountain valley - alone halted an entire corps advance - until finally it was taken out.

If artillery lacks that kind of potential, it is not being properly modeled. A single battery of light artillery can put more weight of metal on a target than an entire battalion of infantry can. The real limits on modern artillery are (a) how much ammunition can you feed it? and (b) how many targets can you find for it. If (a) isn't a problem, you can always take out ALL the targets you can find.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Technically, land guns should be rated HIGHER than ship guns.

I agree with that if those ship guns in land have same mechanical capabilities and support includes sighting, fire control. We are not talking about ship artillery put in land with all hoists ,mechanisation and power.

I am comparing artillery guns that have not facilities of a ship gun. We are not talking about turret guns of Corregidor with Fire controls, powered hoists etc. A Skoda 305mm have a rate of fire of 10 ronds per hour with a 384kg round. A 75mm gun can put 6 rounds per minute continous fire. A 75mm gun can be moved put to fire in minutes a  40t  gun  gun needs 1-3 Hour to be prepared to fire and travels much slower. The only advantage and only reason this guns were made was their penetration power against armored structures. They are inneficient for other proposes.

Actually - we are. We cannot tell in the device file WHERE a gun will be used. But numbers of these devices ARE used on proper CD positions - or in the case of IJA and USSR - inland fortifications of similar complexity that just don't shoot at ships but are really the same idea. [The Japanese 16 inch gun on the Soviet border was, in fact, designed for CD use]

More germane, it is pretty academic. Mobile and semi-mobile (the Japanese heavies are transportable, not mobile in our sense) are always sighted in and surveyed in. The ROF is not significant at all - they can always out shoot every round they can get in any unreasonably small time period. This isn't like naval battle - and the issue is always "shoot until the target is gone". If it takes - at most - four rounds to hit a target - the issue is not ROF - and you must NOT fire fast or you will waste rounds - you need to call in corrections between rounds. Only some targets require "fire for effect" after they are hit. But if they do - usually a remarkably small number of rounds is all it takes for overkill. The issues are not really ROF related - so don't get confused with AA or naval combat - unless of course it is a naval or AA battle. We fix that partly by not permitting land guns to shoot AA UNLESS they are AA guns. As for CD - land guns - even non CD type - have inherant advantages - starting with they are not moving and they know where they are. They also can use aiming stakes in the water (Viet Nam did that in the 1960s - and they work fine). Ships have no such advantages - and their fire is inherantly less accurate because of these factors. Rating land guns as merely equal is very conservative.

EDIT: Add to these comments a comment on the final point: it is incorrect. The IJA brought in its heavy guns to face us on Corregedore - forming an artillery brigade for the occasion. It used them to break the line - it took about 20 minutes - and this was most assuredly not an "armored structure." Later the same artillery was used against the fortifications on Manila Bay - so I do not mean such guns cannot be used against such structures. But they were TOTALLY effective against soft targets and only MARGINALLY effective against armored structures. [Fort Drum had lost 26 feet of concrete, but not a single system was rendered non-operational: See The Concrete Battleship and The Defenses of Manila Bay]
IJA doctrine was to use artillery exactly as it was done at Corregedore - to break the back of resistence of an enemy army. It is the only time the US faced that doctrine in action. And it worked just fine. To misunderstand this is to misunderstand the thinking of the period in most or all armies - and the reality of the role of heavy artillery in combat. In the end, it is not very good against "armored structures" - and had there been food at Fort Drum - it would have continued to close Manila Bay - in spite of the enemy artillery - for several or many more months. It IS effective against UNARMORED troops.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Reviewing the Thunderbold in RAF service, a tale came to by attention (by Donaldson) re an instance on the march to Rangoon where three - count em three - IJA 105 mm Field Guns held up an entire field army. The P-47s were credited with taking them out and permitting the otherwise stalled offensive to resume.

A similar instance occurred in Italy - with a single 88 mm tube - well sited at the head of a mountain valley - alone halted an entire corps advance - until finally it was taken out.

If artillery lacks that kind of potential, it is not being properly modeled. A single battery of light artillery can put more weight of metal on a target than an entire battalion of infantry can. The real limits on modern artillery are (a) how much ammunition can you feed it? and (b) how many targets can you find for it. If (a) isn't a problem, you can always take out ALL the targets you can find.

I sure respect artillery, but these are rare enough that they are recorded instances.
If you tried to simulate that kind of threat in this scale, you would have "uber-weapons".

[el cid again]

I don't think non-artillerymen often grasp the reality of artillery in modern warfare. It is the dominant weapon system of the battlefield - the US MIGHT be changing that today (it isn't yet clear). The operational reality of modern combat is that you assign 'dedicated batteries' to battalions (or other formations) - and these are what takes out anything of great significance which you can locate. It is almost impossible to overwhelm a position covered by artillery - and artillery used in the classical direct fire role with canister shot is a thing of the past: it never gets to that point. We have the ability to wipe out any formation not dispersed and concealed - or better dug in or fortified - in a brief period. The real battle is the battle for information: where is the enemy? To the extent your troops have answered that question, you can almost always take him out - with guns - provided you have sufficient ammunition. Artillery eats MOST of the supply of a unit in combat - and the more intense the combat - the worse it gets. A unit may or may not require fuel, it requires a small amount of food and general supplies, but it requires a very large amount of ammunition - almost all of it (by weight) artillery ammunition. And the more you can supply, the more effective the unit will be. The limit on the power of artillery is usually "how much can you feed it" - not what firepower can it generate - not how many targets can you find - but ammo limits force you to limit what you wipe out with the guns. I suspect WITP may work better than anyone ever guessed - IF we turn the guns loose - because of its supply rules. You will eat your supply fast - and then your guns won't matter very much - UNLESS you can keep generating/delivering more supply.

FYI the term "barrage" is a technical one, grossly and generally misused by almost everyone not an artilleryman (see Ian Hogg on the term), but IF a unit is subject to an artillery barrage - it will either not survive - or it will not be doing anything but taking cover and losing significant elements. A barrage is NOT the same thing as "fire for effect" - and it is not possible for a small unit to lay one down. It is not lightly done - due to the cost in ammunition (and all the targets the same ammunition could take out if not used in this way). It is done for a purpose, when there is good information about the targeted unit(s), for the purpose of rendering them combat ineffective. It almost always works exactly as it did on Corregedore - survivors are wholly disorganized, demoralized, in shock, both unable and unwilling to fight any more. And there may not be survivors - depending on circumstances. Artillery always has the potential to do this - and when conditions are right - it will do this. It is the main power of a land military unit - just as the guns of a classical warship were the main power of a naval unit. There is a reason that many very senior officers are artillerymen.

[m10bob]

"I don't think non-artillerymen often grasp the reality of artillery in modern warfare."

Unless you have been at the wrong end of it..............
At basic training durning the late '60's, early '70's, we were trained to be in the mess hall exactly 2 minutes, from the time you passed the NCO at the table, yelled "RA Drill Sgt", got your chow, got your seat, shovelled it, and hit the garbage window and got out.
In country, some of us avoided known "meeting places" anyway.

[Dili]

I wonder why there were only a dozen of 305mm How/Guns...Probably the Artillery men of Imperial Japanese Army were a bunch idiots and didnt grasped the "reality of artillery in modern warfare".
 
 

[Dili]

After the failure of the first attack against the Bataan, the Japanese GHQ sent strong artillery forces to the Philippines in order to smash the American fortifications. They had 190 guns and included some big guns like 15cm cannons or 24cm howitzers. Especially, Type 96 24cm Howitzer was a very rare gun and its action is only known in this battle. To command and control these artillery forces, the 1st Artillery HQ also moved to the Philippines. The HQ commander was Major Gen. Kineo Kitajima, who was a leader and authority of the IJA artillery.
On April 3rd, about 300 guns bombarded the enemy positions. It started from 9:00 and continued to 15:00. Synchronized with bombardment, about 100 airplanes dropped more than 700 bombs. The land shaked and the mountains were covered with the dust of explosion. It was just like a volcano erupted. When the Japanese troops started the attack at 15:00, there was a little resistance. American defenders, shocked by heavy bombardment were routed. The Bataan Peninsula was occupied only in one week.
The consumption of the shells during the battle of Bataan is as follows.
Type 41 75mm Mountain Guns - 1,389 rounds
Type 94 75mm Mountain Guns - 6,822 rounds
Type 38-improved 75mm Field Guns - 16,875 rounds
Type 91 10cm Howitzers - 2,908 rounds
Type 92 10cm Cannons - 4,595 rounds
Type 96 15cm Howitzers - 6,300 rounds
Type 89 15cm Cannons - 1,130 rounds
Type 45 24cm Howitzers - 1,047 rounds
Type 96 24cm Howitzers - 80 rounds
Type 98 32cm Spigot Mortars - 175 rounds
In the battle of Corregidor, heavy artillery were used to destroy the batteries on the fortress islands. The Type 96 15cm Cannon first saw action at this time. They bombarded the Corregidor and two islands for about one month and silenced most enemy batteries. On May 5th, Japanese ground forces landed the Corregidor Island and the garrisons surrendered the next day.
The consumption of the shells during the battle of Corregidor is as follows.
Type 92 10cm Cannons - 7,246 rounds
Type 96 15cm Howitzers - 8,793 rounds
Type 89/96 15cm Cannons - 3,513 rounds
Type 45/96 24cm Howitzers - 2,915 rounds

 
http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/artillery_history.html

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

I wonder why there were only a dozen of 305mm How/Guns...Probably the Artillery men of Imperial Japanese Army were a bunch idiots and didnt grasped the "reality of artillery in modern warfare".

The size of heavy forces available to IJA was generally remarkably small. There was one - count em one - 24 cm rail gun (built by Sneider and rebuilt in Japan) assigned to the "first independent artillery company." There was also one (wow a whole one) 16 inch howitzer - at Houtou Fortress - a prototype for coast defenses not required because the Washington Naval Treaty made naval guns available. [There were also two 30 cm guns you probably are not counting at Houtou - as well as two 24 cm] There was also a "2nd independent artillery company" with two 24 cm guns. The 30 cm guns were actually very old - and had been used to reduce the German fortifications at Tsingtau during WWI. This was their principle job - be the trump against a heavily defended position. A "regiment" had only four guns - two per "battalion" - and presumably only one per "company." [IJA had no batteries, only companies] If memory serves, there were more than a dozen, but not all were sent to the Philippines. The Japanese always kept most of their heavy guns to deal with the Russians. Japanese artillery OB is carefully represented in RHS, taken from a Japanese paper listing each gun, and another listing each major action. We even have the unique gigantic siege mortars and also rockets used on Iwo Jima, and both independent companies. IMHO the real "heavy" artillery of IJA was stuff we would call medium: 15 cm guns and 15 cm howitzers. These existed in some numbers, and you can send them where required in regiments - or as components of artillery brigades. Look for most up in Manchukuo - where they really lived - and where the artillery that went to Bataan came from. In my view the Japanese choice to standardize on moderate weapons of signfnificant range was wise: the infrastructures of Asia at that time would not support moving very heavy guns easily. We ended up making similar choices, finding really heavy guns (and even heavy tanks) too much for most areas in PTO.

[Dili]

The most efficient Anti Personel(soft) artillery weapon is the 81mm Mortar. Usually more bigger they are more ineficient they get. The only reason to have bigger weapons is to have more range and to destroy structures(from a ad-hoc casamate just made to an armored bunker) and equipment. 

[el cid again]

Well - Touched With Fire - a highly regarded history of the PTO land campaign - says that the Japanese 50mm mortar was the "best" of all the mortars. It certainly was the most portable! And it may be we think that this sort of weapon was a good idea: the M-79 can be described as a 40 mm mortar. I didn't get trained on such weapons - the Navy does not use mortars - but I never met anyone who felt mortars were a bad idea.

On the other hand, in the US Army, and in many other Armies, lighter mortars are NOT weapons of the artillery branch at all. In IJA they were both - that is - organic to infantry formations AND ALSO part of separate specialist battalions of artillery. The reason for their not being regarded as the premier artillery weapon is the lack of range - and to a lesser degree - punch. The reason for their being popular in the infantry is "if we own em, we are sure to have em when we need em." Artillery may or may not be available when you call for it. It may be (a) it is not there at all; (b) it is supporting someone else; (c) it is out of ammunition, having already been used on targets that were planned or thought to be higher priority. None of that "feels" good when you need artillery support - so having some portable artillery is a good idea. I once DID need artillery support (or air support, or naval gunfire support - I did not care which), and it was NOT available - and it was not a nice feeling at all. Nor did we have any mortars. So I am wholly sympathetic with the view that having mortars organic to the infantry is a good concept.

But I am not sure it is a good idea to regard mortars as your "most efficient" artillery. In operational analysis terms, this is not the case: you have only limited assets in terms of trained people, including for artillery spotters and fire direction teams, also gunners. If you give them longer range weapons with heavier rounds, the same number of people is inherently able to engage more targets, and more kinds of targets, with gains in efficiency so great that you would be far better off with an artillery force entirely fitted with guns than with mortars. IF your assertion is correct - that medium mortars are "most efficient" - then it is because (a) they are near to the action and available when artillery is not; (b) they use very light shells, and bang for buck wise, may indeed be more efficient inflicting casualties on unprotected troops. Related to (a) calling a different organization - and worse needing trained spotters (infantry cannot spot for artillery as a general truism) from that organization - means that when you need support - you must wait for approval by a different bureaucracy (with different priorities) - and you may also have to wait for the spotters to get to a point where they can see the target. Mortars in your own organization may be far faster to respond - they have no other organization to support - they may be able to fire WITHOUT observers with some confidence your position is known - and you may have people trained for mortor correction who are in position to see the target. There is also this: the lethal radius of a shell is proportional to the square root of its size - so as a shell gets bigger - while the area it affects goes up - it does not do so efficiently. The extreme case of this was the 15 inch CD guns defending Singapore. There is considerable mythology to the effect they "could not fire inland" - utter bunk - they could and did. But they did NOT have any HE shells - only AP shells - and the ground was soft - so they would not even detonate when they hit. They would destroy anything they hit - but anything less than an AFV would not even set them off (and it might not set them off) - and they ONLY had a "lethal radius" of 7.5 inches or so if they did not detonate. Very inefficient to say the least. This is not normal - artillery almost always has HE - and in the age we are talking about - even cannister shot. How effective it is vs soft targets depends on conditions - and it varies widely. I don't care why they yell "incoming" - or what it is that is coming in - it is not going to be good from the point of view of being near the target. Virtually all armies have concluded you want a range of gun and mortar type weapons - including howitzers which fire like mortars at high angles to clear hills and obsticles. As a combined arms theorist, I support this consensus view.

Ironically - if mortars are the most efficient - IJA was better organized. It had numbers of 50mm, 70mm and 81 mm mortars - and relatively fewer heavier weapons - compared to (say) Allied standards. But it can hardly be said that the Allies neglected them: they almost always had more mortars in support than the Japanese did.

Your thesis does raise an interesting question: should we treat mortars on the same scale as artillery?

Note that in RHS - uniquely - we DO rate guns for their soft effects properly. In WITP and CHS, effect = weight of shell = soft effect; in RHS effect = weight of shell if HE and 2/3 of weight of shell if AP; further anti-soft = square root of effect, either way (HE or AP). So our small shells are far more efficient against soft targets than big ones are. But the anti-armor value remains the same for high velocity guns: 1.75 times caliber in mm. [For mortars and low velocity guns, anti-armor is half that] At least we are trying to show the relative efficiency of light shells vs small targets compared to the relative inefficiency of big shells - also the difference between AP and HE. In general, AT and CD guns and naval guns are given AP, but land artillery, mortars, and AA guns are rated as if they are HE.

[Dili]

I dint say that mortars are the most efficient. I said that 81mm mortar are the most efficient anti personel artillery weapon . Because rate of fire with a good explosive round. It is also better to send 40kg of explosive in 10 rounds than 1 round with 40kg.

[el cid again]

Well - I agree that for a wholly unprotected target - more packages are better. But in that case, even more packages of even lower size would be better still. Making US 60mm, British two inch and Japanese 60 mm mortars better still. I put the 60 mm and two inch into RHS. The 50 mm is used de facto lower in the organization - and is too small to give proper ratings to (it won't bombard for example) - so it is included in squads (as an attachment from platoon - probably the only case ever with organic platoon SECTIONS below company in line (vice SOF) organizations.

[Dili]

The problem with 60mm is that rate of fire doesnt appear to improve much if at all over 81mm and since the later have a more powerfull round.

[witpqs]

What is the difference in portability and amount of ammo that can be man-carried?