The Evil Empire Option: Standard Merchant Ships

[el cid again]

This is sort of a goodbye preseant. I am collecting a vast sum of reference materials to work on revision of a PLA game - and I must soon actually justify it. Further, an unusually secretive shake up at the top of the PLA (almost unnoticed outside PRC) may indicate we need to have a current OB again - and there is not enough money to integrate open source intel in any agency. So I am going to become less active.

When I get sick of doing some kind of data entry or other, I revert to redesiging "ships that never were." That is, ships as they might have been, but were not, if only the designers had unlimited political clout and priority for funding, and benefit of 20-20 hindsight about how to use what they had. In RHS, the main difference between scenarios are differences between ships. These in turn dictate most differences in air units.

EEO is based on the question "What if all the things believed during the war, and long after the war by American nationalists, were actually true?" That is, what if Japan had LONG prepared for war (instead of since July 1941)? What if Japan had really fortified the islands (or some of them) of Nanyo during the 1930s (instead of after the Makin Island raid)?Further - as in EOS - what if Japan were more unified - only in this case for longer than since July, 1941?

There is only one powerful figure in Japanese (read IJA) politics from beginning to end, holding his office for the duration of what we call WWII - and indeed even the longer thing the Japanese actually fought (Japan went to war with China in 1937 and was continuously at war until 1945). That man was Gen Suguiama, and he was the kingmaker who put Tojo in power as nominal head of government (with the help of two other IJA generals who were later sidetracked by Tojo). In 1945 Sugiama is still IJA Chief of Staff. So here is the one person who was at the heart of Japanese (that is, IJA) political power, who wanted war with China, who was willing to risk war with the USA not to accept defeat in China, who had the savy to stay in office even when things turn sour. He is the person at the heart of the Evil Empire regime, perhaps IRL as well as in this scenario.

My working political assumption is that, by the end of 1938, Sugiama is frustrated with progress in the war with China, and greatly concerned about the US permitting financing of the ROC regime, and occasional political opposition to Japan's role in China. At the same time, he sees a repeat of the problems in Manchukuo with not only enterpreneurs, but actual IJA generals, turning into profiteers who have no concern for the interests of Japan. He can deal with the crooks (a loose translation of a Japanese term used to describe them) the same way he did in Manchukuo: send Tojo - who led the Kempetai in Manchukuo and brought renegades to heel. Perhaps even promote Tojo to head of the Kempetai and let him go after crooks (profiteering officers) throughout the empire. But IF he gets the Army acting as an army should, what will the Americans do when China is at risk of defeat? The US Army is not a big concern - in 1940 the New York Police Department is bigger - and the US Army has only one division in fairly good shape (the Hawaii Division) by WWI standards. But nevertheless, the Allies taken together might cut off Japan from vital resources, none more critical than oil. Again - the JNAF is bigger than the US Naval air force - but it might be prudent to be prepared to deal with the combination of British, Dutch and American naval power. To that end, it might be better to make an alliance with the Navy, to share resources, and to conduct joint contingency planning.

In this fictional world, it would still not be clear just how weak the British were until the Andromedon affair. That is the name of a ship, bearing a report by the former governor of Malaya written in the UK back to Singapore. Captured by a German raider (her captain was made head of the German Navy in the 1950s), its political value was recognized. Suspending raiding ops, he sailed on a prize (a Norwegian tanker) to Japan, and sent the report by Soviet postal telegraph to Berlin. Using a commercial code meant that the message was not intercepted by the Allies, and neither was the reply "show it to Japan." So the report fell into Japanese hands, together with the unusual circumstances of its capture: a security detail had died to the last man, and the message was in sacks weighted with rocks to be thrown into the sea to prevent capture. The message made clear just how vulnerable Imperial defenses were - and meant Japan had a very current and detailed enemy order of battle (one reason Tsuji is able to write it in his book, but Churchill was not in his, about Malaya: Japan had the data from the other side). This occurs in the summer of 1941, about the same time the Allies decide to put an embargo in place. Intended as a selective and conditional embargo, it somehow got implemented as a total one - one Japan could not long survive without a change in the situation: give in (and start the oil flowing again) or take the oil. These twin events - the Andromedon report and the embargo - cause our fictional world to erupt into war at virtually the same moment it did IRL. Longer term contingency planning gives way to detail operational planning in July 1941, and there is barely time to attack before December. Weather is also a factor in parts of the SRA: this isn't the monsoon season.

A big part of Sugiama's thinking (which is absent from most WITP scenarios) is grave concern about the "real enemy" - meaning Russia. IJA long prepared for war with Russia. Russia is the competator for Manchukuo and Mongolia and Korea - and was in all three before IJA drove them out of Manchuria, Korea and Inner Mongolia. Japan has part of Sakhalin island, but having the rest - with its oil fields - is a strategic priority difficult to overstate - because no great power has as little oil relative to its needs as Japan did (does). And there is the possibility, since the German invasion, that the Soviets are distracted as much by the European war as the British and Dutch are. This may be the best time to "settle" things with the Russians - to set up a defensable border in the mountains west of Chita - instead of that monsterous long border as it existed in 1941. To deal with this front - it would be best to turn to Gen Yamashita - and to approve and implement his report that Japan build a Panzer Korps modeled on Germany's. It migh also be good politics - a Yamashita busy with building a Panzer Korps - and leading selected offensives - will not be available to participate in designs to change who is running IJA (and Japan). But Yamashita's report also dates from 1941 - so not much could have been done with it before operations begin. It will mainly impact what happens after operations begin - and it will be severely constrained by the limited industrial assets of Japan. This will look a lot like what you see in EOS - just tweeked and sustained longer.

The main difference is in how ships are configured. Another difference is in which ships are ordered. But there are differences in other weapons. A superior light tank that really entered production in 1942 can enter production in 1939.
Two superior AAA guns (3 inch and 4 inch) that were accepted in 1938 can enter production in 1939. Continuing to produce less effective weapons can give way to these - and you will notice more of them than you otherwise do.

Another difference is that the ordering of different ships is assumed to be noticed - and may have some impacts on ship orders on the other side. Since the scenario cannot be dynamic (under player control) I must also think about what happens in 1942? Presumably production decisions will be more focused and more ruthless - focused on Japan - less willing to invest in "frills" at the cost of production delays or money. Someone may decide "we better relegate the Mark 14 to R&D - and mass produce the Mark 10 until the 14 works right" - at some point. More submarines may sport dual 5 inch guns fore and aft - to make long distance raiding of SLOC more feasible. Japan is a big threat, so it may be more is sent West than East - meaning Germany stays in the war longer - and forces transferred in 1945 are not transferred in this scenario. BUT stuff sent the other way in earlier years gets sent to PTO - so there is some hope of defending the West Coast - if not Hawaii (in the early period) - and some hope of rolling them back faster (later on).

[Mike Scholl]

Cid. Interesting suppositions. Might be a fun "what if?". One real world problem with Yamashita's "Panzer Corps". Not so much that Japan's tanks are pretty much junk (Germany's weren't any great shakes at this time either), but the Japanese simply lack the wherewithall to duplicate the German's greatest strength---communications gear. Probably because Guderian served in the communications branch during WW I, Germany's tanks were much better supplied with communications gear than their opponants..., which made them a much more "flexible" instrament than the armored forces they faced. Japan just doesn't have the capability to duplicate and install such gear..., so their "panzer corps" is going to end up more like a Russian Tank Corps of the 1941 campaign (waving flags and playing "follow the leader"). Still better than what they actually had.

[el cid again]

Well - it is all relative. Japan has the advantage of being in Asia. Its tanks are far less "junky" in terms of what is going to work with the infrastructures that exist (or rather don't exist) most places.

As you know, I do not subscribe to the "Japanese tanks were junk" theory - because I didn't get my education mainly from materials preaching that theme - and I do not think that a tank in 1941 has to look like a tank in 1945 to be useful.
In fact, and IRL, Japanese tanks (and most other military vehicles) were the first to adopt diesel power - Japan invested in research to that end - and also they were tied with the Russians (but way ahead of the Germans) in designing tanks (and vehicles and aircraft) for cold winter conditions. And the 1942 production of a 1938 tank design was plain silly: why not make the better tank sooner? [It is virtually the same thing, won't even require a changeover like changing auto models does every year - but it addresses the critical weakness of Japanese armor - protection]

While a few slightly better tanks, and a few more tanks, may be useful facing down China, or the early Allies which more or less don't have proper tanks or AT weapons in theater - facing the Soviets is a different matter altogether. I have never belived driving Russians back far into mountainous terrain - with ever lengthening Japanese lines of supply vs ever shortening Soviet lines of supply - was going to be a easy task. The deserts of Mongolia are a sideshow - but the forests and mountains along the Trans Siberian RR are not going to fall cheaply. And the sheer size of the Soviet position and its forces may result in a debacle if lousy generalship is employed. Japan has more than one problem - it is a very long border - and moving here does not mean you are free not to defend there. I don't think Japan can defeat the Allies and sieze the SRA instantly. I don't think Japan can take on Russia, China and the Allies all at the same time. And the longer Japan waits to deal with the USSR, the stronger it will be. No way I think the Imperial forces will win most games, never mind IRL would/could defeat the Russians. I think we are almost as guility of understating the importance of the Russians in defeating Japan as the Russians are guilty of understating the importance of the other Allies in defeating either Japan or Germany. Russia is the reason even a slightly better organized Japan is still in deep do do. Take Hawaii - take India - sink so many ships the Allies cannot even try to return until 1944 - Russia is still there - still close - and if despearte enough might even agree to let Allied bombers base near enough to cut the heart out of Japan WITHOUT taking island bases. [This was proposed IRL but rejected by Stalin. Had he agreed, we planned to turn the ALCAN into a RR, all the way to Nome - and use it as a port to forward supplies into Siberia, the Aleutians and the Komandorskies - potentially a faster way to end the war. The seas can be rough in the Gulf of Alaska, and fog is perpetual, but these obsticles are far less critical than is usually represented.]

[m10bob]

As for "what if", the Japanese had the ability to study excellent captured Russian tanks from the battle of Khalkin Ghol like the T 26 and BT 7.. What if they had mass produced them?
Seems to me the Japanese have proven themselves adept at taking a good idea and going forward with it often.
IRL I suspect only the lack of resources prevented them from doing it..

[DuckofTindalos]

And that's a rather large stumbling block... No resources, no industrial infrastructure, no mass tank production.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

As for "what if", the Japanese had the ability to study excellent captured Russian tanks from the battle of Khalkin Ghil like the T 26 and BT 7.. What if they had mass produced them?
Seems to me the Japanese have proven themselves adept at taking a good idea and going forward with it often.
IRL I suspect only the lack of resources prevented them from doing it..

IRL Japan got its 47 mm tank rifle/AT rifle by adapting the Soviet 45mm weapon to Japanese tooling - which already existed in 47mm caliber. Also, Japan was so impressed with the SB-2 bomber they designed the Ki-48 in imitation. But while the SB-2 was "the most important bomber of the 1930s" - it was an obsolescent concept by mid-WWII - if not before. Similarly, the 47 mm weapon is fine enough - but pretty marginal as WWII wears on. They did develop 76 mm tank and AT weapons - but these never faced US forces (althought would have had we invaded Japan proper, and they probably did face the Russians).

Lack of resources is a relative thing. In absolute terms Japan only has so much steel making plant capacity. That is the critical item. Steel is the second most important strategic resource after petroleum. You can only do one thing with any given ton of steel. It can do widely different things: make frames for factories, make machine tools, make RR tracks, make RR rolling stock, make tanks, make escort ships, make battleships, make rifles, the list is very long. What I do is play with steel - and inside that plant capacity: nothing is ever free just because it would be fun. If you get more tanks, you get less of something else.

A British tank authority says that Japan made a strategic error in not believing tanks were "a war winning weapon." They converted plant capacity to other things. He also says they figured out it was an error - but it was too late to correct it. If he is right, then a change in choices earlier would indeed make a difference. [I refer to George Forty, author of several books on AFVs]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And that's a rather large stumbling block... No resources, no industrial infrastructure, no mass tank production.

I am glad to see you are at least consistent - wrong about everything! Japan has a significant amount of resources and industrial infrastructure. This is WHY it was a problem. Japan was the most developed economy in Asia - far from the larger industrial giants of the world. There is plenty of iron ore and coal (for coking) to make steel. There is plenty of plant capacity - at least according to George Forty. Japan did not elect to commit its steel to tank making until too late to matter. But Yamashita drew up plans in 1941 - after touring the Eastern Front (on the German side of the lines, of course). Just as Japanese planning for Hawaii shows it was possible, so do Yamashita's plans. You don't waste time proposing what is impossible. And just as Yamamoto was the best naval thinker in Japan, so was Yamashita the best army thinker. Both were probably great captains, and will likely be so judged by history. What Japan did not do is not the same as what Japan could not do. History is not the story of what inevitably had to happen. It is, instead, the story of what did happen, in the context of choices, including mistakes, and also of luck.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And that's a rather large stumbling block... No resources, no industrial infrastructure, no mass tank production.

I am glad to see you are at least consistent - wrong about everything! Japan has a significant amount of resources and industrial infrastructure. This is WHY it was a problem. Japan was the most developed economy in Asia - far from the larger industrial giants of the world. There is plenty of iron ore and coal (for coking) to make steel. There is plenty of plant capacity - at least according to George Forty. Japan did not elect to commit its steel to tank making until too late to matter. But Yamashita drew up plans in 1941 - after touring the Eastern Front (on the German side of the lines, of course). Just as Japanese planning for Hawaii shows it was possible, so do Yamashita's plans. You don't waste time proposing what is impossible. And just as Yamamoto was the best naval thinker in Japan, so was Yamashita the best army thinker. Both were probably great captains, and will likely be so judged by history. What Japan did not do is not the same as what Japan could not do. History is not the story of what inevitably had to happen. It is, instead, the story of what did happen, in the context of choices, including mistakes, and also of luck.

"Significant", but limited. Japan could do somethings, but not everything. Even the Germans couldn't "mass produce" tanks in the sense of the US or USSR. And the Japanese were faced with a much larger "robbing Peter to pay Paul" situation than anyone else but the Italians. They started changing over their basic infantry weapons in the mid 1930's..., and still weren't finished by the end of the War (in the mid 1940's). Could they have built more tanks? Certainly..., but at the cost of building fewer of their already-to-few ASW assets (or something else equally necessary). The industrial base is just too small, and in many areas too primitave. Like the multiple radios for tanks I mentioned in my first post.

[DuckofTindalos]

And it would also have required a shift in doctrine which the IJA wasn't willing to make. The IJN at least attempted to make the ASW war a higher priority, even if they failed.

That would be another reason why the Japanese didn't copy tanks like the T-26 and BT-7, which were fast "cavalry" type tanks, diametrically opposite to the slower infantry support vehicles that the Japanese built.

Oh and Sid? Don't try to judge me based on your own criteria. I would never display the mind-blowing arrogance to dare name my mod "Real Historical Scenario", especially if I had as little weight to put behind it as you do.

It is YOU who's been making preposterous claims with no ability to back it up, it is YOU who's been untruthful, and it is YOU who are wrong almost all the time, but are also too cowardly to do anything except attempt to obfuscate it every time you're proven wrong.

Enough said. You're simply pathetic.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And that's a rather large stumbling block... No resources, no industrial infrastructure, no mass tank production.

I am glad to see you are at least consistent - wrong about everything! Japan has a significant amount of resources and industrial infrastructure. This is WHY it was a problem. Japan was the most developed economy in Asia - far from the larger industrial giants of the world. There is plenty of iron ore and coal (for coking) to make steel. There is plenty of plant capacity - at least according to George Forty. Japan did not elect to commit its steel to tank making until too late to matter. But Yamashita drew up plans in 1941 - after touring the Eastern Front (on the German side of the lines, of course). Just as Japanese planning for Hawaii shows it was possible, so do Yamashita's plans. You don't waste time proposing what is impossible. And just as Yamamoto was the best naval thinker in Japan, so was Yamashita the best army thinker. Both were probably great captains, and will likely be so judged by history. What Japan did not do is not the same as what Japan could not do. History is not the story of what inevitably had to happen. It is, instead, the story of what did happen, in the context of choices, including mistakes, and also of luck.

"Significant", but limited. Japan could do somethings, but not everything. Even the Germans couldn't "mass produce" tanks in the sense of the US or USSR. And the Japanese were faced with a much larger "robbing Peter to pay Paul" situation than anyone else but the Italians. They started changing over their basic infantry weapons in the mid 1930's..., and still weren't finished by the end of the War (in the mid 1940's). Could they have built more tanks? Certainly..., but at the cost of building fewer of their already-to-few ASW assets (or something else equally necessary). The industrial base is just too small, and in many areas too primitave. Like the multiple radios for tanks I mentioned in my first post.

In a sense, all powers are resource limited. The most critical strategic material in the USA (after petroleum) was steel - the same as in Japan. And likely it was the same in the USSR and the UK and Germany. Compared with what one would like to do, one is always forced to trim back this and that, constrained by reality - and most of all that reality is "how much can be made with so much steel." And - measured in this way - or in terms of any other economic measure (a good one is supheric acid, another is total industrial output) - Japan is not in the same size league as several other countries are - including Germany (which is why we regarded Germany as the "more dangerous enemy"). Certainly Japan is not going to out produce the USA - or the USSR - or even the UK. And it has all as enemies (or potential enemies). So in this fundamental sense, no way it can compete. Japan cannot fight a war of attrition and win, period.

But the salient point - lost on Americans (and Russians almost equally) is that Japan does not NEED to fight a war of attition. It has a very fine strategic position - far from its enemies. USN estimated the inefficiency imposed by "the tyranny of distance" was 50% - you needed two warships in USN to keep as many warships in action at the front as Japan needed. The Japanese could have made it a lot worse for us than they did: contesting the long SLOC with submarines (as happened in the Indian Ocean) would have tied up a lot more assets than it cost Japan to make the trouble. Japan has interior lines - making shifting of air power in particular - but also naval and land power - able to deal with problems in a sense similar to the way Fredrick the Great did. The Allies have significant disadvantages of position - and it is the leverage of geography that Japan must depend upon first of all. An even larger leverage is potentially available: anti-colonial sentiment is a real phenomena - and one Japan might have exploited even more than it did - although it would have required better strategic analysis and top down control to get the most out of it. But in places - or at times - when Japanese forces did attempt to exploit this - it generally worked out very well from their point of view. Japan might have on tap very large manpower resources if it went this way.

What it would NOT have is more steel! Well - yes and no. It would not have more steelmaking capacity. But IF the flow of iron and coke were never interrupted, and IF the plant were not damaged, or not damaged as much, or not damaged as soon, the TOTAL amount of steel made might be significantly greater. Still - it is quite true - doing this "right" is hard. JF Dunnigan thinks the best investment is in lowly AKs! A Japan without more shipping cannot do more. A Japan with more shipping moves more stuff, and ultimately that creates the potential to make more industrial output. The trade offs are difficult ones. They always are - for any nation. But the strategic situation of Japan in WWII is probably the worst such challenge in modern times. And it is one I have studied for 40 years. So I have attempted to do it with a sense of balance - and you will not find a total focus on bombers, tanks, or any other single thing. I am a combined arms theorist, and I believe in a balanced strategy based, first of all, on what works economically. That means I cannot ignore shipping, escorts, AAA, infantry, anything.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And it would also have required a shift in doctrine which the IJA wasn't willing to make. The IJN at least attempted to make the ASW war a higher priority, even if they failed.

REPLY: Actually - the IJA DID attempt to shift to ASW. It is the only ARMY in the world to build its own aircraft carriers - and they were purely defensive ships - to provide fighter cover for convoys and ASW patrols for the same convoys. They were also the very first service to operate rotary wing ASW aircraft. Not that any of this was enough, or good enough. But it shows the statement above to be false in that it obviously was willing to make the shift in doctrine: it did. But there were visionaries in Japan before the war - and institutional visionaries had drawn up plans for escorts - and even perfected perfectly sound designs for them. Similarly, the concept of a Grand Escort Command existed - it just was not implemented in time - nor given enough priority. But a game permits us to look at "what if" they had honored pre war planning? [I for one won't look at pure fiction: they do not have the option of trying anything no one was advocating]

That would be another reason why the Japanese didn't copy tanks like the T-26 and BT-7, which were fast "cavalry" type tanks, diametrically opposite to the slower infantry support vehicles that the Japanese built. My approach is scientific: what I know can be modified by facts - and I am not afraid to learn my pre judgements were not in all cases correct (as you are afraid).

REPLY: Here I agree. Yamashita was not looking at Soviet concepts, but at German concepts. Japan did this in re airborne - and is said to be the only power with the political will to give an airborne commander "ownership" of the aircraft. [Not that they gave them enough aircraft] Further, Yamashita thought in IJA terms, and those did include using tanks to support the infantry, in addition to independent armor operations. But his organizations were possibly the all time best at supporting tanks in a technical sense. Not so much because he was a genius (he may have been) as by necessity: Japan could not draw on any support outside motorized units as was possible in more industrial societies like the USA or Germany; the normal person could not drive, never mind fix a vehicle. Yamashita's organizations included support that others would put at higher echelons - and it included generous allowances of spares UP FRONT - BEFORE they were needed - as part of TO&E. Again, not so much because he was brilliant, as because he did not trust the system to deliver spares in a timely way. On the other hand, he didn't propose to build a gigantic tank force - just a "corps" - and IRL it was formed for a while - based on four "tank groups" or "tank divisions". This was the (typically) watered down implementation of his proposal - but it would not have been vastly larger had he been dictator. There are several reasons that a moderate sized force was practical, but a substantially or wholly mechanized one was impossible. Add to that I have no more slots to play with: look for changes in quality rather than quantity. I have to rationalize this because of lack of program resources - but I have no trouble doing so on sound principles.

Oh and Sid? Don't try to judge me based on your own criteria. I would never display the mind-blowing arrogance to dare name my mod "Real Historical Scenario", especially if I had as little weight to put behind it as you do.

REPLY: As usual, you are basing your view on ignorance and assumption rather than fact. I didn't name the mod. And the name was based on a war game tradition (RSH = Real Sub Hunter) and a desire to have a name similar to CHS - to show its roots (and respect for those roots). I accepted the proposal of another (Joe Wilkerson) - after getting comments on the board - and arrogance was never a factor. This isn't a secret - and is described in the RHS Manual and several threads - where it all occurred: but as usual you never let openly available facts stand in the way of your hostile assumptions. Consistency - in the negative and hostile sense - at least toward anything I say or do - is your salient feature.

It is YOU who's been making preposterous claims with no ability to back it up, it is YOU who's been untruthful, and it is YOU who are wrong almost all the time, but are also too cowardly to do anything except attempt to obfuscate it every time you're proven wrong.

Enough said. You're simply pathetic.

REPLY: Consistent - negative - hostile - I have you pegged. It is posted for all to see the many occasions on which I have been able to admit error of one sort or another - and RHS is full of things different from how I did them - and even has things I disagree with - because I understand the concept of respect. My approach is scientific: what I know can be modified by feeding me facts - and even my pre judgements (prejudices) are subject to review. If being willing to learn is to be wrong - then perhaps I have been. This is far better than your approach of "he says something I don't like, it hurts my feelings to think Japan (or whoever) might have been good at anything, so I will never modify it - even if he really is right - even if he prooves it - and even if almost everyone agrees with him in the end." Nor it it required, in my world, that any person agree with me all the time, to retain respect. Only in your world does a disagreement have to translate to "he must be wrong" and "he must be lieing" - combined with "his sources must be liars as well." The problem is that you reason from conclusions, you start with all the answers - and the threat that they might be wrong is unbearable for you. I don't know if that is (ie. you are) pathetic or not, but I do feel sorry for you. It is not reasonable to be negative, hostile and closed minded as you consistently are: nor is it useful. Since you have no constructive interest in RHS or my ideas - you should not post in threads about them. If you do - expect to be treated as your hostility warrants - until the day you are banned by Matrix for breaking the terms of participating on the board.

Disclaimer: unlike you - who has posted we can "never" be friends or on honorable terms - I do not rule out the possibility you can reform. But I will no longer facilitate your denial. You have a problem. It gets in the way of anyone and everyone trying to have a useful discussion. IF you reform, I will accept it and not look back. Because that is the way people of principle behave. But I require your reform - and apology - and civility - as a condition of my respect. And the apology won't count if it does not include a retraction of the allegation about lieing. I would not - you know me well enough to know it by now - and you must face it and admit it to be on civil terms with me. Cowardly is not worthy of demanding an apology for: not one person believes it - including you; it was never part of who I was or am. Cowards don't face problems, never mind all problems, in the sense I do. I face them too much - maybe even to a fault. I plan to die in attempting a rescue - because in my family everyone dies of cancer - except one who died in a plane crash - and I have no wish to go on chemo.

[el cid again]

I decided to get rid of the Japanese AA rocket device, in favor of a 5 inch 50 caliber DP gun (Model 1 = 1941). It was a high performance weapon - probably the best AA gun in the world in practical terms (by the same people who did the 100 mm and 76 mm 60 cal guns). While 6 and even 8 inch guns were developed in Japan - and six inch guns in the US, the Netherlands, and probably elcewhere - only the US 6 inch was really practical - and it didn't see service until after the war was ended. These weapons uniformly had too slow elevation, traverse and ROF - except the US device - which was horribly complex, heavy and expensive. The Japanese 5 inch gun weighed about 20 tons (19,900 kg), could elevate and traverse at 18 degrees per second, and fire 18 rounds per minute. It was intended for dual mountings (for example for Taiho and other large ships) - and then for single mountings ashore - but in the end older weapons were retained in production instead. [The case of the 3 inch 60 is almost the same: only the Agano class cruisers and the incompleted Ibuki in its CVL form were to use the weapons. Only one battery was used ashore (4 guns, possibly for Ibuki, were at Maizuru). The outstanding weapon - accepted for production in 1938 - was very little produced - and many older 3 inch guns of lower performance were produced instead.]

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: m10bob

As for "what if", the Japanese had the ability to study excellent captured Russian tanks from the battle of Khalkin Ghil like the T 26 and BT 7.. What if they had mass produced them?
Seems to me the Japanese have proven themselves adept at taking a good idea and going forward with it often.
IRL I suspect only the lack of resources prevented them from doing it..

IRL Japan got its 47 mm tank rifle/AT rifle by adapting the Soviet 45mm weapon to Japanese tooling - which already existed in 47mm caliber. Also, Japan was so impressed with the SB-2 bomber they designed the Ki-48 in imitation. But while the SB-2 was "the most important bomber of the 1930s" - it was an obsolescent concept by mid-WWII - if not before. Similarly, the 47 mm weapon is fine enough - but pretty marginal as WWII wears on. They did develop 76 mm tank and AT weapons - but these never faced US forces (althought would have had we invaded Japan proper, and they probably did face the Russians).

Lack of resources is a relative thing. In absolute terms Japan only has so much steel making plant capacity. That is the critical item. Steel is the second most important strategic resource after petroleum. You can only do one thing with any given ton of steel. It can do widely different things: make frames for factories, make machine tools, make RR tracks, make RR rolling stock, make tanks, make escort ships, make battleships, make rifles, the list is very long. What I do is play with steel - and inside that plant capacity: nothing is ever free just because it would be fun. If you get more tanks, you get less of something else.

A British tank authority says that Japan made a strategic error in not believing tanks were "a war winning weapon." They converted plant capacity to other things. He also says they figured out it was an error - but it was too late to correct it. If he is right, then a change in choices earlier would indeed make a difference. [I refer to George Forty, author of several books on AFVs]

Lack of resources and lack of production capacity were always the limiting factors for Japanese production. I don't understand what you are trying to say here.

Just to give you something to think about:

Germany produced about 147,000 20mm AA guns (Flak 30 and 38), the USA produced 124,735 20mm Oelikon and the UK/CW about 55,000, how many 20mm and 25mm AA guns did Japan produce?

[el cid again]

I am trying to say lack of resources and lack of production capacity is always a problem in managing a war economy, no matter whose it is. I am trying to say that, whatever the limits may be, there are choices which can be made about allocation - above all allocation of steel. You can trade one Yamato class battleship for 150 escorts or 1500 tanks (a famous example I am quoting). Japanese actual production was nothing like plant capacity times time. It would require supply of resources, fuel, and lack of damage to see what total capacity was. If the Allies fail to cut the supplies, or the Japanese fail to deliver them, or the Allies fail to damage the production facilities (all happened IRL), Japan will produce more even at the same priorities. And changing priorities is also an option.

I said that Japan's overall capacity was not as great as Germany, the USA, Japan or the USSR. That does not mean Japan was unable to produce more than it did. In a game it might also produce less than it did. It is up to choices made (and also how the campaign goes) to decide.

[el cid again]

The Ro-33 and 34 were Kaichu Type 5 submarines. Intended for mass production, they were instead modified into the Kaichu Type 6 before wartime production began. The main change was the addition of Type 95 Oxygen torpedoes. K6 vessels did not complete until April 1943 - and we assume nothing different here. But we are unwilling to wait for the better design before building a perfectly suitable medium type submarine. [It is bigger submarines we will not be so interested in]

In our fictional game-world, the decision to prepare for hostilities with the US because a focus on China might lead to sanctions necessitating a takeover of the SRA leads to a deal in which the existing plan to mass produce the K5s is implemented at the beginning of 1938. This is continued (at a rate of one boat per month) until the date the K6 class laid down (October 1941). However, instead of laying down 5 in that month, the K6 lays at a steady rate of 1 per month as well. This results in an almost continuous stream of relatively high quality medium endurance boats (called ships in Japan) until the end of 1944. These include 32 K5 types (30 additional units from July 1940 to Feb 1943) and 22 K6 types (from April 1943 to Dec 1944). To prevent a confusing numbering situation, 9 Type L4 submarines Ro-60 to 68 are renumbered Ro-24 to 32 - these being older submarines than Ro-33 it makes more sense anyway.

There is not much we can do in game terms about it, but these were the best performing Japanese submarines (excluding the late war guppies not really operational). In particular, starting with 17 K5s is a whole lot different than starting with only 2: this is the sort of thing that really planning for war would have resulted in. The price is a modest amount of steel - less than 15,000 tons before the war, and just under 15,000 tons more spread from Dec 1941 to February 1943. The K6 boats were really built - and on the same dates - so there is no cost change for them at all. A more serious impact would be the 60 extra diesel motors and 60 extra electric motors (there are no generators in Japanese submarines - the motors act as generators when running diesels) required. All are quite small - and most of this period involved a lot of non-production time in the plants - which would not have been subject to shortages of material or war damage in these early years. But we must remember to tally both the steel and the engines, as well as the yard capacity, involved.

Production is not continued in 1945 because (a) the guppy subs should be producing by then and (b) Allied ASW will be pretty awesome by then, and conventional submarines probably won't compete very well.

[DuckofTindalos]

The Japanese didn't develop 76mm guns, but 75mm long-barreled tank guns were certainly developed and a few vehicles were built to carry them. However, the majority of late-war new tank production never went outside the Home Islands. They were hoarded there to face the anticipated US invasion. Nearly 3,000 AFV's of all types were counted in Japan after the capitulation...

As for the medium submarines, what sort of construction time would you envision for them? Plus, did Japan have enough slipways available to lay down one per month?

[el cid again]

If you are genuinely interested in the matter of shipyards, slipways, graving docks, and what they could build, I have a fairly sophisticated spreadsheet - now converted to MS Excel (it began before Excel existed, and long was done in Lotus 123) on the subject. I also have a separate spreadsheet for each type of vessel: CV & BB, CA & CL, DD & TB, Escort Vessels (e.g. DE, MLE, MSE), submarines, auxiliaries, amphibious ships, small craft, miscelaneous vessels (and I might have left one or two off the list). When I put something in a scenario, I actually have put each individual hull in a particular yard on a particular date. I have allowed for long lead orders of components, for time in the graving dock, and for time fitting out. [This is required by my mechanical game system, and I have done it for years, I actually have fun doing it, and I think it is much better to do a detail calculus like real planners do than to just do whatever you feel like]
Anyway - I can answer questions specifically - because this information has been worked out - and I am working from far more complete listings of ships than we have - or could put - in this game.

In the case of these submarines, both require 16 months to build. K5 requires 3 months of long lead time BEFORE those 3 months begin. K6 requires 4 months long lead time. The first submarine (after the historical Ro-34) is authorized in January 1938 - so it cannot lay down until April 1938 - so it cannot complete until sixteen months later. The last K5 completes in February 1943. The long lead time for K6 is one month longer. I only permit ONE submarine to lay down per month on a sustained basis (although IRL FIVE K6 were laid down at the same time - that was after more than two years without straining the production system for this sort of submarine - and it could not be sustained). Because the K6 takes a month longer in long lead, no submarine completes in March, 1943. The first K6 completes in April, 1943 - the same date as IRL. While in some months two medium attack submarines would lay down, the best this industry could sustain was one, and I limit it to that. This turns out to be better for budgeting and for other aspects of the production infrastructure. It is far better to sustain at a predictable and reasonable rate than to start and stop, or to surge.

This sort of detail planning is the hallmark of how I put things together. So if you have genuine interest in what the details are - I either can answer off the top of my head (when I just did it) or I can look it up and figure it out from my databases. Your questions were very well phrased, and I know these ships and their details (not to mention these shipyards) almost as children: I am pleased to fill in the blanks. FYI I once was advance home ported in the largest naval station in Japan - and one of the three largest of its navy yards - called Yokosuka. Sent to a school inside the caves dug for WWII era storage of things (there are two story wooden buildings inside these which USN uses for classified schools), I found some passages were sealed off - and we were permitted to open and explore some of them - and sometimes we found things of historical interest. I have participated in technical studies of some naval or military technologies, including radar, propulsion and weapons. I have extensive collections of materials, including books, magazines and journals, and individual documents - from which it is possible to run down much of what has not been lost. If you ever have any question you cannot find an answer for, even if it is not directly related to a game matter, I always help academics, authors, gamers or intelligence officers if I can.

[DuckofTindalos]

I'm just interested in an answer to that particular question...

[el cid again]

Go back and read the now expanded post - all the details are in there - along with kind words about your civil questions.

Well - not quite all: here is the shipyard data:

IF we ignore Army supply submarines built late in the war by Chosen Iron Works in Keijo,

IJN built submarines only at four locations:

a) Kure
b) Yokosuka
c) Sasebo
d) Maizuru


Commercial companies also built submarines at the following locations:

Mitsubishi: Kobe
Kawasaki: Kobe
Kawasaki: Senshu
Kawasaki: Tanagawa


Additional commerical locations only for midget submarines include:

Ourazaki: Kure
Harima: Aioi
Hitachi: Mukajima
Mitsubishi: Nagasaki
Niigata Iron Works: Niigata
Tamano Tonsensho: Tamano

[el cid again]

I regard the larger guppys (the I-200 series) as medium submarines myself. But Japan regarded them as "first class" submarines - which is what I means. [Japanese is written in syllables - except for Romanji (Romanized letters) there is no way to write letters in Japanese. There are 42 syllables - arranged in a rectangular fashion - vowels one one axis and consonates on the other - at least when it is taught in modern times. But there was a traditional way of listing the syllables. This way began with the syllable I (which - as in all languages except English is ee or long e). The second syllable was Ro (pronounced like it looks like). The third syllable was Ha (also pronounced like it looks like). Since every educated Japanese knows this traditional ordering of syllables, I is used to mean "first", Ro is used to mean "second" and Ha is used to mean "third." You will see this usage many places - and now you will understand why.]

Because I regard the Type ST (I-200s the larger guppy's) as medium sized submarines, I end production of medium sized boats in planning at the same time these begin to produce. This is too late for my taste, but I make no attempt to rationalize how Japan might have done better than it did? These submarines are ordered so that they begin appearing at the beginning of 1945 - and if there are no delays (due to damage or shortage of resources or oil) - they will appear at the same rate as the earlier medium submarines do - one per month. Again, that is not fast enough for my taste, and insufficient to have a decisive impact - but I work this as a technician - we do the best we can - and the operational "commanders" (i.e. the players) have to figure out what to do with the best we can give them? Only ten of these vessels are put in the scenario - because RHS has a cut off date. And this represents a fairly optimistic view of what could be done - in the context of other production priorites - and assuming that Japanese industry is well fed and undamaged. In 1945 this may well not be the case, and if it is not, the required shipbuilding points may not exist, and I have seen vessels "stack up" - not delivering - waiting for more points. So just because something is "in there" does not mean it will appear for Japan (as far as I can tell, Allied ships will always appear somewhere - on time - if the designated place is captured - then some other place). ST means "sensuikan taka" - the first word is literally "diving can" and means "submarine" while "taka" literally is "falcon" and means "fast." The entire class were built at a single shipyard: Kure Naval Yard.

The smaller guppies (STS) (the Ha-201 series) are properly classified as third class submarines. I treated this program somewhat differently than larger programs. The design basis for both guppies was a special experimental submarine (No 71) done before the war. There is no reason the Ha-201 series could have begun production at the same time as the I-201 series - at the beginning of 1945. Also, in 1945, much shipyard capacity was devoted to very small submarine production - but we lack the slots to simulate these. So I lay down two type STS per month, both to simulate the actual submarines and to simulate other small submarines. This only permits 18 to be completed before the cutoff date. Again, this is not IMHO sufficient to be decisive, but it is enough to be a problem, if they can be completed at all. STS stands for "sensuikan taka sho" and can be thought of as translating "submarine fast small." All the completed vessels came from a single shipyard: Sasebo Naval Yard. However, Kawasaki and Mitsubishi tried to build them, and were too slow for the war. Also - Japan wanted to do 13 a mnoth and it appears it did get to the point of completing five in just part of August, so possibly my two is too severe? [Industry should have been at its worst in Aug 1945 IRL - and if 5 could be completed in part of a month - perhaps it really was better than we credit it for? But I have no slots!] EDIT: OK- on review I found three companies building these submarines at four locations. I ramped production up until Sasebo was building 3 a month and the other companies 2 a month - peaking in August 1945 at 7. Out of slots, I let it fall off in September, a month before the nominal cutoff for RHS. These are not ideal submarines - with only two forward tubes - and a maximum speed of only 13 knots - so perhaps it is a mistake to build them at all? But I don't believe they were up to building a lot of the bigger ones fast - so this may be a reasonable compromise. Total at this time = 31 units. [90 were planned, of course to take a longer time to produce]

All these later submarines are fitted with snorkels and ESM.