And it would also have required a shift in doctrine which the IJA wasn't willing to make. The IJN at least attempted to make the ASW war a higher priority, even if they failed.
That would be another reason why the Japanese didn't copy tanks like the T-26 and BT-7, which were fast "cavalry" type tanks, diametrically opposite to the slower infantry support vehicles that the Japanese built.
Oh and Sid? Don't try to judge me based on your own criteria. I would never display the mind-blowing arrogance to dare name my mod "Real Historical Scenario", especially if I had as little weight to put behind it as you do.
It is YOU who's been making preposterous claims with no ability to back it up, it is YOU who's been untruthful, and it is YOU who are wrong almost all the time, but are also too cowardly to do anything except attempt to obfuscate it every time you're proven wrong.
Enough said. You're simply pathetic.
I would say that the one who is being pathetic is you. Your constant attacks on El Cid are tiresome beyond the extreme. Prehaps its time a Mod stepped in to put a stop to it..............
"If you are going through hell, keep going" - Winston Churchill
This may be poor timing: the last exchange with Terminous set all time records for civility. If this pattern continues, I don't think we should look back.
This may be poor timing: the last exchange with Terminous set all time records for civility. If this pattern continues, I don't think we should look back.
I admire your optimism, but i wouldn't hold my breath if i was you.
Its high time someone called time on his little crusades against you. Right or wrong, you are entitled to your opinions and you should be able to give them freely here without the constant harrasment. Believe me, if you were to go into the Thread and make personal attacks against him someone would be squealing for a Mod to come and stop you before you knew it.
Others here have expressed their dismay at his hostility towards you in the past, its way past time that something was done about it.
"If you are going through hell, keep going" - Winston Churchill
Another thing, Sid: can we agree that the K6 was the only Ro-type boat capable of using the Type 95 torpedo? According to my sources, the L4, K5 and KS all had to make do with the Type 89.
Totally agree. And so RHS has always kept the older subs with the older torpedoes (not just K5s, but ALL older submarines made before the introduction of the Type 95 - because they lack the oxygen generating gear). The main difference (in operational terms) between K5 and K6 is the introduction of the oxygen enriched torpedo (that requires oxygen generation equipment). I think I said that above: Under Medium submarines, second line: "The main change was the addition of Type 95 oxygen torpedoes..."
Hmm, it seems to me that this Evil Empire option is pretty similar to the Empires Ablaze mod. Both feature a Japan which is more unified in approach, puts more emphasis on tanks ( I just have them producing more of the old types and upgrading to the newer types during the war a LITTLE faster ( not much, just a little ) ), less emphasis on subs ( particularly in later war years ), builds more FlAK-heavy ships and probably begins the war with a few additional conventional infantry divisions ( e.g. in Empires Ablaze the SAA begins with an additional 4 divisions ready for deployment wherever Japan might want.).
Obviously that's not a reason not to go ahead with this but:
a) why duplicate effort in such a major way when the differences are much more minor than the similarities ?
b) IF it were to go ahead I think it would make sense for it to go ahead as written but with greater emphasis on early upgrading from inferior weapons types to superior weapons types. That'd actually help Japan a lot and is the direction I've decided to take with the next iteration of Empires Ablaze as the most reasonable way to boost capabilities above and beyond where they currently are to keep Japan competitive in 1943/44.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Totally agree. And so RHS has always kept the older subs with the older torpedoes (not just K5s, but ALL older submarines made before the introduction of the Type 95 - because they lack the oxygen generating gear). The main difference (in operational terms) between K5 and K6 is the introduction of the oxygen enriched torpedo (that requires oxygen generation equipment). I think I said that above: Under Medium submarines, second line: "The main change was the addition of Type 95 oxygen torpedoes..."
Amplification/Clarification: Due to slot limits, the Type 89 torpedo mentioned by Terminus is not in RHS. It was also not used by the K5 type submarines - only Ro-60 series submarines (older medium boats) used it. In RHS we make submarines not built for or (in a few large cases) retrofitted for Type 95 torpedoes use an even older model - the Type 6 - which dates from 1917. [The Type 89 dated from 1929]. It was not in use after 1942, so it is combined with the Type 92, a torpedo of similar range.
Hmm, it seems to me that this Evil Empire option is pretty similar to the Empires Ablaze mod. Both feature a Japan which is more unified in approach, puts more emphasis on tanks ( I just have them producing more of the old types and upgrading to the newer types during the war a LITTLE faster ( not much, just a little ) ), less emphasis on subs ( particularly in later war years ), builds more FlAK-heavy ships and probably begins the war with a few additional conventional infantry divisions ( e.g. in Empires Ablaze the SAA begins with an additional 4 divisions ready for deployment wherever Japan might want.).
Obviously that's not a reason not to go ahead with this but:
a) why duplicate effort in such a major way when the differences are much more minor than the similarities ?
b) IF it were to go ahead I think it would make sense for it to go ahead as written but with greater emphasis on early upgrading from inferior weapons types to superior weapons types. That'd actually help Japan a lot and is the direction I've decided to take with the next iteration of Empires Ablaze as the most reasonable way to boost capabilities above and beyond where they currently are to keep Japan competitive in 1943/44.
Hmm, I almost asked if you wanted to collaborate for EEO? The differences are essentially logistical in nature:
a) I retain supply sinks, and thus force Japan to import resources/oil and export supplies/fuel in a sense different from when they are absent;
b) I don't just add things, I do a detail calculus of resources shifted and time required; I don't add fictional ships to either side, nor allow construction faster than turbines could be cut, diesel motors assembled, etc.
c) I don't allow things to happen before they were advocated IRL by someone in the Japanese military; Thus there is not as much shifting toward FLAK or ASW as there might be if lessons not yet learned were understood; I assume that after 6-12 months these lessons have been partially learned, and that after two years fully learned (and so you see a progression in modifications in that direction).
I feared you might not like those sorts of limitations, and I felt that anyone not concerned with them could use Empires Ablaze and be happy. So I guess in my conception EEO is between EOS and EE - and identical to EOS in terms of the supply model.
Aside from the older J1 (5 units), J2 (1 unit) and J3 (2 units) fleet boats (of which J2 and J3 are scouting types with an aircraft, and of which J1 use older torpedoes), the "reformed" Type A, B and C submarines are as follows:
Type A1: 2 units - technically flagships but there is no representation of this function in the game - and fitted with scouting aircraft: numbers remain I-9 and I-10. I-11 built as C-1 type. Order No 700 and 701 laid as KD-7 type.
Type B1: Greatly reduced: 9 units - scouting submarines with a floatplane: renumbered as follows:
Type C1: Increased, by building some of the almost identical A1s or B1s in a smaller form, reducing construction time by 3 months in those cases - attack boats with NO aircraft: 12 units (up from 5) - renumbered as follows:
I-16 = I-11
I-18 = I-12
I-20 = I-13
I-22 = I-14
I-24 = I-15
I-11 = I-18 (former Type B1)
I-28 = I-16 (former Type A1)
I-29 = I-17 (former Type B1)
I-31 = I-19 (former Type B1)
I-32 = I-29 (former Type B1)
I-33 = I-30 (former Type B1)
I-34 = I-31 (former Type B1)
These submarines (and possibly also the J3 which is just as fast and scout fitted) form the Advance Force - a high speed and long range submarine force intended to move ahead of the fleet into enemy waters - spot enemy naval units - knock off cripples (as happened to USS Yorktown) - and cover critical enemy ports so units exiting or arriving might be sunk or damaged either before or after the critical naval operations take place. Later in the war, when the fleet is not engaged in offensive operations, the survivors are intended to contest more distant enemy SLOC than can be done by the smaller submarine types. In this conception, the Advance Force has 26 units (vice 39 IRL), all completed by May 1942, of which 17 are completed before the war begins (one more than IRL because the building time is less for the simpler design). [The date of operations could not be known when they were laid down.] 18 additional large units of these types, and a number of others not in the ABC series, are cancelled in favor of faster building vessels of smaller size.
In between the smaller K5, K6 and L4 "medium" boats (think of them as "Japanese Type VIIs),
and the A, B, C and J "big" boats, there were the "large" KD series. There were six series of pre-war boats,
and the Type KD-7 in production when the war began (but not yet completed). There is considerable confusion about the 10 KD-7s "actually built" - insofar as shipyard records claim ALL of them were built in different shipyards! [It may be there were shadow programs - of which there are a few other indicators - but no hard data]. In order to foster confusion, these vessels (and some others like the not mentioned minelayers) were renumbered by adding 100 to their original numbers in 1942. Because of number duplication with later construction, RHS has so far adopted the convention of using the 100 series numbers for all KD type vessels (boats to us, ships to IJN). But in EOS we will only adopt the 100 numbers for older vessels - and the KD7s will revert to lower numbers - reflecting their modernity. We also will begin the numbering at 32 - to dovetail with the ABC program number usage. Thus the ten KD-7s we are sure about (I-176 to 185, originally I-76 to 85) become I-32 to I-41. [Because these are large submarines, they are not laid down by a fictional program plan, but use resources based on actual submarine hulls, although uniformly less steel is required to build them, and, except for I-32 to I-41, which were built to this class originally on those dates, all will appear sooner than the real sub built, because this is a faster building design]. There are 31 additional vessels of this type, built instead of generally larger boats which completed (or would have completed) later in time. As with the medium boats, this program ends by the end of 1944, with only guppy production occuring in 1945. NONE of these vessels (the original 10 or the 31 taken over from other orders) complete before the war begins, but they appear at a steady rate from Dec 1941 until October 1944.
Other vessels, generally laid as larger, longer construction boats, are laid here as KD-7s, on the following scheme:
I-35 = I-42
I-36 = I-43
I-37 = I-44
I-38 = I-45
I-39 = I-46
I-54 = I-47 [Known to history as "second" I-1, before that as I-68, I-54 in RHS]
I-62 = I-48 [Known to history as I-14]
I-40 = I-49
I-64 = I-50 [Known to history as "second" I-15, before that as I-67, I-64 in RHS]
I-41 = I-51
I-42 = I-52
I-43 = I-53
I-44 = I-54
I-45 = I-55
I-56 = I-56
I-58 = I-57
I-12 = I-58
I-13 = I-59
I-46 = I-60
I-47 = I-61
I-48 = I-62
I-49 = I-63
I-50 = I-64
I-51 = I-65
I-52 = I-66
I-53 = I-67
I-55 = I-68
I-57 = I-69
I-65 = I-70
I-66 = I-71
I-67 = I-72
EDIT: The last 12 of these boats (I-61 to 72) are completed to a fictional KD8 design: the forward torpedo room is replaced (and slightly lengthened): the revised one holds 4 x 24" Type 93 torpedo tubes plus 4 reloads. There are also two external, forward facing 24" TT - yielding a load of 10 rounds in two salvos of 4 plus one of 2. These vessels could hold 3 Kaiten which weigh more than 2 tubes with torpedoes on (or under) the deck.
We now have a somewhat logical numbering scheme for Japanese I boats, inspired by the real one, but more consistent. Very low numbered boats (below I-7) are very old, long range cruiser submarines, slower than the ABC types. Low numbered boats, I-8 to I-34, are the ABC types (and the similar J3) - fast long range cruiser submarines - 14 of them with spotter aircraft. From I-35 to I-72 we have new Kaidai attack boats of fairly long range. Above 100 we have some older vessels - either earlier Kaidai attack boats or the minelayers. Above 200 we have the larger guppies. Above 300 we have the large transport subs. [Note all smaller transports - and almost all conversions to transports - are gone from EEO - as are the aircraft carriers - replaced by attack boats - mainly Kaidai and medium - but later also guppies.]
I was unable to figure out how to deal with Kaiten conversions? So I moved on to review of the USN 1945 submarine design (6 were ordered, later 3). In a world with a more aggressive Japan, this might have been pushed sooner. And of course, in a world with less sent to ETO, a consequence is Germany is not defeated in May, so there are no Type XXI submarines to study (which ultimately killed the obsolescent US design concept - the Tang was a US takeoff on XXI).
There were about 19 different versions - and some more abstract planning proposals as well by Atlantic and Pacific commanders and by advisory boards. These included a proposal to put in 24 inch torpedoes - specifically in imitation of Long Lance - which I had thought was unknown to the Allies - but perhaps it was known by 1945? The USN 1945 design was 2 knots faster, had 2 extra tubes aft, 30 torpedoes total (18 forward, 12 aft, 6 tubes on both ends), and it ALSO had athwartships 19 inch torpedoes on deck - 3 per side - with homing torpedoes to kill escorts. We could use the former Kaiten slot for a 19 inch US homing torpedo. But we must rationalize how these vessels might be COMPLETED before the RHS cutoff of October 1945 (cutoff for reinforcements)? The design was NOT ready in May, it takes 9 months to build a fleet boat - and probably more for the lead unit. The lead unit must lay about December 1944 to complete by October - and before that if there are to be several - although they should build slightly faster. These submarines are a bad idea - and probably should not be built - but in a desperate war - who knows? As Adm Lockwood and Adm King pointed out, the cost for the marginal gains was not worth it - better to have more fleet boats cheaper. There was one boat with TWO twin 5 inch guns - one each fore and aft - and that might be a better idea - fit a bunch of those - IF Japan still has long SLOC.
Then it hit me: that is the answer. In a world in which Adm Yamamoto is not killed, the idea Kaiten might become operational is almost unthinkable. But the PROBLEM they tried to solve could be better solved using a variation on the theme: Kaiten are modified 24 inch torpedoes carried on deck. One could address that problem - and much sooner - if you simply put 24 inch torpedoes on (or even under) the deck - in external TT. Or that is part of the solution: the problem with targeting remains. A submarine is much better at observing a target than a Kaiten is (a Kaiten is virtually blind - a fatal flaw - if killing the pilot is not "fatal" enough!). But how can it solve a fire control problem at greater range and do any good? Solving it at normal range just limits the change to a bigger warhead. The answer to that is radar and ESM. As soon as good radar and ESM equipment is available - about a year sooner than Kaiten - you can begin this sort of conversion - which is to say in 1944. And the Kaidai types built in that year could have an alternate front end: instead of 6 21 inch tubes, they can fit 4 24 inch tubes INTERNALLY (although they must be longer, the length will actuall prevent speed loss on the surface, but cost a quarter to a half a knot underwater due to greater wetted surface). Now we have something - Type 93 armed submarines properly fitted with snorkel, radar/ESM. That should be more effective than Kaiten subs -
The matter of the gigantic battleships Yamato and Shinano was decided before the period of this scenario begins. The design goes back to about 1934, and shipyards were expanded at great expense to make them. [In fact, cancelling the second pair saves a lot more than it seems, because two DIFFERENT yards don't have to expand to make them] Adm Yamamoto tried - and failed - at some risk - to prevent their building. He was considered a wide eyed radical: there was no proof a battleship could be sunk by airplanes. [I guess the controversial bombing of the Ostfriesland didn't impress them - because it was not underway and not manned I suppose] Both are laid down and well along by the time our fictional deal between Sugiama and Yamamoto is cut: and this might be one basis for common ground - Army support to prevent wasteful investment in what Yamamoto described as "white elephants." Because the SECOND pair are only laid down (and neither is yet named) in 1940, and because our management regime begins about the beginning of 1938, we can divert these resources (long lead was 17 months for a Yamato class battleship). We will get two Yamatos in EEO - and they will be better armed in terms of AAA as time passes (using historical plans and weapons as well as actual configurations) - but we will not expand 2 yards or spend any resources on what would have become Shinano and Kii (?) in battleship form. We COULD complete them as carriers - and Shinano does just that in EOS/AIO - but this plan is drawn up by air minded Yamamoto - and the cost return ratio is not sufficient - while the time to complete is excessive. He does not know exactly if or when war will erupt, but he believes "I will run wild for the first six months to a year and a half - after that I promise you nothing." To win the IJN must have the maximum STARTING strength (and IRL it had the most powerful carrier force in the world - so this is just that writ a bit larger) - and if the war cannot be won in a couple of years - Japan will never win a war of attrition with a mobilized USA aided by UK and others. The next most logical thing to do with part of those resources (in particular the turbines and boilers and a major amount of the hull steel) would be to lay down another pair of Shokakus. But the most efficient Japanese carrier design is Hiryu - and it builds in much less time - more than a year less time - it costs less - and it has almost as much value. Multiply its capacity times 14 months of use - that is the time saved - and it probably is the difference between being around when needed and arriving too late to matter against vastly larger enemy forces. Named Iwami and Iwari (famous Japanese warship names), they will arrive in July 1942 and January 1943.
Existing naval planning also had concluded the most efficient of Japanese carrier designs was the Hiryu and this process completed a modified design - taking even less time to build but fielding slightly more aircraft - in time to lay down (as Unryu) in August, 1941. All these ships lack armor, and are very vulnerable. To address that, IJN had also designed Tahio - something similar to a British Illustrious with armor - and planned to start building one of these just before Unryu. But that complex design would take a great deal longer to build - so long Yamamoto is sure the war will be well along and likely decided before it can arrive. The most it could hope to do is be a replacement. The war must be fought with the existing (or soon to exist) forces, and (quoting Stalin) "quantity has a quality all its own." It is better to have more packages - particularly more packages early - than fewer packages - particularly later. So the contract for Taiho is also not let (again its entire lead time is inside our planning window) - and a second Unryu is laid in her place. This ship will be called Ikoma - in honor of the original name of a different Unryu class ship - and also a famous Japanese warship name. The original planning for Unryu is used - it is a smaller program - it lays down sooner in some cases - and it uses the originally contemplated names for the additional units: Isama, Kurama and Izuma.
This means Japan will start the war with 6 CVs (nominal capacity 415 aircraft) - as in all RHS scenarios. It adds 3 more in 1942 (166 aircraft) vice the 2 (102 aircraft IRL and in EOS). It adds 3 more in 1943 (capacity 178 aircraft) vice the 2 in EOS (153 aircraft) and none IRL. These include the four "big boys" (Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku), four Hiryu's and four modified Hiryus (Unryu's). Depending on when the war begins, there is some prospect this will result in a larger force - particularly when the CVL elements are considered as well. It also has some prospect of being competative before 1944. Japan always planned to win a short war, or sue for terms if it could get them, if it could not win decisively, rather than let it drag out. In that sense, Japanese naval planning was more realistic than German - which focused on unrealistically long range projects rather than on a maximum operational force (submarines excepted).
The light carrier force is virtually identical with EOS - because I had gone almost all the way toward converting every suitable hull already - and there is at this point only one change: Nisshin is laid to a repeat Chitose design. This means Japan starts with and builds no seaplane carriers as such, and converts all suitable hulls, or builds them from scratch, as soon as possible in CVL (or CVE) form. Which is to say it ends up with 10 CVLs and 8 CVEs (vice 9 and 8 in EOS/AIO), most of them arriving early in the critical period to suppliment the major carrier force. Even so, if the war is not decisively won, Japan must expect at some point to be overmatched at sea, and it needs to focus on building land based air power, which may be supplimented by carrier air power at some moments. It is likely attrition will cause the carrier force to decline in size, and enemy construction will at some point result in a larger relative carrier force - if the war drags on long enough. This is not a robust plan - able to make up for likely loss rates for carriers venturing into dangerous waters several times a year. It is just the best Japan can do, and it is at first its strongest trump card.
My view is identical to that of Adm Yamamoto - who wanted to relegate battleships to the category of "support vessels." I see battleships as "super heavy cruisers" and think they are mainly useful as insurance against enemy surface forces that 'leak' through air attacks into places where they might do harm if there was no covering warship force. Otherwise they are useful in bombardment in offensive situations. But they should be risked rather than held in reserve, since unused they contribute little to operational success (but tie up lots of people and resources). Japan will have its historical ten battleships to start - and get two more - and that is it. The faster ones - the Kongos - might even be converted to carriers in an emergency - but the others are too slow to be very attractive in that role.
EEO has upgraded USN/USMC units (all two of them) to F4F-3s - taking the planes from the pool. The slot is taken by a special B-25C (Doolittle) with fewer guns/bombs, more range - and it is CARRIER CAPABLE.
The SBC-4 in one USMC unit was replaced bySB2U-2s - taking the planes from the pool. The slot was given over to the PB2M-1 Mars - which is assigned no units - but you can upgrade to it.
The JRM-1 Mars is built on the BBO (that is, original historical plan) scale - so you can get them in some "numbers" - a whopping 2 per month - but starting midwar instead of 1945.
B-17 and B-25 allocations are increased generally (but B-25H reduced to 17 in ALL scenarios, and B-17D unaltered because it accounts for all aircraft, including B17C upgraded to D standard already). The formula is 90% of (half of production minus lend lease) / no of months to Aug 1945 ) to PTO. B-17G is moved forward one month in ALL scenarios. The 10% accounts for training, attrition, and diversions (as Mac's B-17 which was wholly stripped of armament and "fitted with every kind of amenity" - I bet).
Do-24K ROC increased to 1037 fpm (up from 597) and maneuverability recalculated - but it remained at 3.
ROC P-43 is revised to carry 2x100 pound ICB cluster bombs (representing either 2x100 pound bombs or six smaller bombs), and in its also a small drop tank. Production rate is 9 (pool = 80) for the US version and 12 (pool 3) for ROC version. US version upgrades to P-47D. Initial ROC changed to 2850 fpm and maneuverability increased to 30. This aircraft is unusual - ALL the planes are PTO. It is also unusual - regarded as combat ineffective - it was wholly converted to PR use by the end of 1942 (outside China - where it fared badly because of lack of protection - but some AVG pilots liked it). Ironically - it just got better - and it is rated 2 points more maneuverable than a zero in our system! [It actually WAS maneuverable at altitude, but that isn't why - it had a good ROC - power loading - wing loading - and fair speed - which all count for us] While it is much maligned, it is IMPORTANT early in the war for Pacific Coast defense, and several units had it briefly - 2 in RHS (used to be 3 - but 49th Squadron just got P-63s instead). It might be more important in a crisis - and it was in production - so I let it stay as a fighter - and didn't force it into PR work. But because all the planes are PTO to begin with, no extras can be given to EEO scenario. We probably should get rid of free production and put it into factories on the West Coast. These changes reduced P-43 (US) pools from 151 to 80, and production from 15 to 9. It reduced the ROC pool from 98 to 3, but increased production from 0 to 12. The ROC version is inproduction because it WAS in production, and it does not upgrade, meaning it may STAY in production - a solution to the severe problems ROCAF has getting planes (which mainly must wait for later in the war, or make do with a trickle of P-35s, or convert over to types ROC didn't really use but code allows). This is the actual production rate in a statistical average sense (we may only assign one value). This isn't double the 81 because the N model was mainly for PTO, and way more than the usual 25% really went to PTO.
P-47D set so production is 54 (+9 = 63) in all scenarios except EEO, where it is 65 (+ 9 = 74). This is the opposite case - instead of all the planes being PTO, only a tiny fraction are. This is because of peculiar code rules. If we want to upgrade (and not produce it until 1945) - all its numbers transfer (to P-47N) - which builds in much smaller numbers. So we would then have vastly too many P-47Ns coming off the ways. So I am guided by other WITP mods, and let the base be 63 (after folding in P-43 production). Since we can increase it in EEO some (where the P-47N rate is higher), I put 11 of the 21 increase into the P-47D rate. It also starts production 1 month earlier (3/43). Here we increased production from 45 (old RHS) to 65 (EEO = 74) but did not reach the 90 of stock or 110 of old CHS. We also add one month's production at the front end by moving back the start date. And here we are fully four months ahead of stock and old CHS 155 (on which RHS is based). [FYI the formula value for P-47D would be about 107 - and if we add to our 81 lend lease aircraft - we find that we are very close - leaving 89 planes per month - very close to stock's 90 or our 90 before we take 10% out for attrition/training/diversion. That may mean we should increase the Commonwealth Thunderbolt to 46.]
P-47N revised so that production is 18 (+63 = 81) in all scenarios except EEO, which gets 51 (plus 81 = 102). However, it does not appear until 3/45 in all scenarios except EEO, where it is 1/45. Max load increased to 2700 pounds, to accomodate 2x205 gal drop tanks, endurance reduced to 89 minutes (plus 2 x 205 minutes for drop tanks). Here our production date is moved later four months in all scenarios except EEO (one month later). There is no P-47N in stock. CHS has our EEO date - a date one month after production begins - a very optimistic date. The rest of the scenarios wait until actual operational commitment IRL. We seemingly reduced production from 45 to 18. But that 45 was really 90 (because of converting model P-47D). Our total is actually 81 - very close to the 90 - which is 25% of production - but now we subtract 10% from it. EEO is up from that - at 102 - which is dead on our formula (90% of half of those produced).
EDIT: These values need to be reset - either to zero with the same numbers put into factories - or to the totals - because "production" does not work the same way as factories do!
I proposed to replace the P-26 in Philippine service with P-35 or P-36, freeing up a slot. What to do with it I have not worked out yet. The rationale for this (as with upgrading Buffalos and SBCs) was alarm over Japanese military preparations.
One possibility is the PBB (possibly PBB-1). This is the plane that Boeing Renton was built to build. Of all the giants, that is the giantest: the world's largest building until Boeing Everette was built decades later. The plane was named the Sea Ranger. When it was decided not to order any after the prototype, it got nicknamed "the Lone Ranger." This is a monster of a seaplane bomber, the largest two engine aircraft ever designed, with wings later used on the B-29. It could carry 20,000 pounds of bombs and had a theoretical endurance of 72 hours and a practical maximum range of 4245 nautical miles (4886 statute miles or 81 hexes for an extended range = 27 hexes). It is also the plane for which the famous ball turret was invented - it was to have one at the nose and one at the tail. It could have been in production by midwar. The decision not to build it meant Renton was available for B-29 construction - and engineering resources could be utilized in a way that would allow it to enter production sooner. As a seaplane bomber, this aircraft could use facilities faster than a land bomber - you need not wait for an airfield to be built to use it. We can use PBM Mariner art for it.
Another possibility is to transfer over from BBO the Wild Catfish (an F4F seaplane fighter). If anyone thinks a modest performing seaplane fighter appearing rather late (midwar) would be of use in a desperate Allied cause. It has its own art already. [ALL Allied planes are in the art, wether or not the planes are in a particular scenario of RHS - which is why we could add the patrol version of the Mars to EEO]
We can separate the Boing 314 Clipper in performance from the Coronado which represents it. [The RHS 314s are disarmed Coronados right now - there are not very many of them]. IF an early flying boat transport were of interest, we could also put it into production - and we could have it upgrade to the transport version of the Mars. We would still use Coronado art to represent the Clipper in that case.
We could separate the amphibious version of the PBY-5 from the flying boat version. It has significantly less range, ceiling, etc - and could be classified as a land plane - if that were somehow useful?
Of these choices, the PBB is the only one with much operational potential: it is a bomber that can use unique basing - and it has both range and load. It might be effective against defended targets at night, and undefended ones anytime.
You can move it to some unpredictable islet and launch heavy strikes unexpectedly. And you get these well before you get B-29s. But you will get fewer B-29s later.
Added the Ho I medium tank - it is between the Chi He and the Chi To in time. This is the first Japanese tank with a 75mm gun (a German ATG), but it isn't any better protected than a Chi He is. Also added the Chi Ri at the end of the war. We now have old tanks in a couple of units, mostly Chi Has in the rest, but they upgrade in a series: every July you get a newer model; each has better gun or armor than the one before, but a highter load cost. The Chi Ri (July 1945) weighs just under 38 tons and has 60 mm of armor and is armed with a high velocity 75mm AA gun as well as a bow 57mm gun (Chi Ha type) - which I represented ONLY in its anti soft value (you get both guns for soft targets, but only the 75 for a hard target).
Far as I know, the Type 2 Ho-I mated a short barrel Type 99 75mm gun to a Type 97-Kai turret. It was a fire support vehicle rather than an anti-tank vehicle, and since the Type 99 refers to 1939, and the Germans had no 75mm anti-tank guns in 1939, I'd say it's somewhat unlikely that this was a German weapon. Could have been the German short-barrel 75mm gun as mounted on the Pz IV, but I doubt it...
31 Ho-I were built in real life starting in 1944, thanks to very low priority, but what-if's are always nice...[:)]
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