Submarine Speed Theory in RHS

[el cid again]

Normal ships have a full speed and a cruising speed.

So do normal submarines. This is to say, cruising speed is the speed associated with the range given in the ship definition screen, and moving at full speed consumes fuel faster. Normal submarines operate on the surface almost all the time - often even in battle (which is why they can use deck guns) - and so this model works well enough for them. Normal submarines do submerge when attacked, or when counterattacked, if they can - probably depending on die rolls (representing luck and tactics).

Special Case Number One: Submarines with snorkels. [Note that in RHS there are submarines on both sides with snorkels. Most are found on German and Japanese submarines after certain dates in 1943 and later. But the snorkel was invented by the Dutch - before the war began - and so some of their subs also fit them.] In this case, cruising speed is ALWAYS 8 knots - because it cannot exceed that speed when using a snorkel. Range is adjusted - if given for some other speed, you get more range when you move at this speed. A sub that refits and converts to a form with snorkel also slows down for cruising - and gains range. IF you want to move faster than eight knots, you MUST set move at full speed - and you will consume fuel accordingly. So early war subs, and subs that never convert to snorkel form, always are treated normally. But late war subs fitted with snorkels come under this case. I do not allow this vessel to be operational until its return from Germany - in June 1945 - and just in time to make the crossing to Panama. But how to treat it? Taking a cue from the captain of the Nautilus, the first USN nuclear submarine, "there is no incentive to move at moderate speed to conserve fuel, so your operational speed is full speed." [This, of course, in days before we had fully developed German sonar ideas - which eventually meant that NOISE was a reason NOT to go full speed; our first modern long range sonar was taken from Prinz Eugen - see US Submarines Since 1945 for a picture of that submarine - naked - surrounding the conning tower of a US submarine - for testing - and details of how it revolutionized our understanding. Apparently wartime German ships could track distant targets passively - and do so when moving at faster speeds than our ships could use more primitive sonar and hydrophones.] My solution is to make crusing speed = full speed. In this case, it does not matter if you set crusing speed, full speed, or operational speed: AI will always give you 25 knots = 5 hexes per phase - whatever you do.

Special Case Number Two: Guppy Submarines: [Note there are only two submarines that are technically guppies in the game: Japanese Type ST and Type STS. These were not understood, but according to US Submarines Since 1945 (Friedman, USNI) "they were based on superior hydrodynamic research" and were actually better than the more famous German Type XXI and Type XXIII. We were so sure the German subs were better we FAILED to examine them fully - and simply scuttled them!] This case is wierd: how to show a guppy? I decided to define "full speed" as "best tactical speed" - so the SUBMERGED speed (which is higher) goes in the full speed field. Since they are snorkel fitted, "cruising speed" is the "cruising speed." That causes a range adjustment for 8 knots (see Case One above). The AI will use full speed in battle - but players should NOT order movement at full speed - because they cannot move even one hex underwater on battery power at full speed (a problem with all non-AIP submarines). IF they do that - they will pay a severe fuel penalty. These submarines are fast TACTICALLY - not OPERATIONALLY - and should always be limited to cruising speed by players. That is, late in the war, they cannot survive moving on the surface. Such a submarine could "sprint" underwater - surface and recharge - and sprint again - but it would not average full speed - so players interested in realism should have a house rule: the guppies ALWAYS are set at "cruising speed" - or perhaps "operational speed" if you think that would mean short movements at full speed in a tactical situation.

Special Case Number Three: Nuclear Submarines. [Note there is only one nuclear submarine in RHSEOS family scenarios at this time. There is a possibility of an RN SSN for EEO - if we can find out about the design characteristics. But so far the British have kept secret everything except the fact her design began in 1942 - and it is not supposed to declassify until 2145 or so. I learned about her working on Japanese atomic research with authors and officials, and if anyone knows more than I do I would be glad to rationalize her construction in the conditions of EEO. The first US nuclear submarine took EXACTLY the same time to build as the first Japanese one - so a RN one might be similar. But the US made a wartime decision to forgo SSN development during the war, in favor of atom bombs, although they DID take over the PREWAR USN program aimed at getting there. That program involved uranium research, and was equally applicable to the bomb program. Japan made the OPPOSITE choice - to give PRIORITY to use of atomic power - both on land and for "battleships" (in its first form) - and eventually also decided that land reactors could produce radiological weapon material at the same time. This material is unpopular in Japan - which wants to surpress any evidence it did serious atomic research - including weapon research - during the war - so as not to create the impression the atomic bombings were justified. It is also very severely restricted in the US, UK and Australia - probably because some of the Japanese approaches are far cheaper and suseptable to imitation by small nations/terrorists.] The Japanese C4 submarine design - about which engineering data is usually listed as "not available" was in fact a second generation SSN (the first generation being a variation of the I-400 - no less than six of which were to have atomic steam-electric engines IF fuel could be found for them - the other 12 were always diesel electric. The I-500 - whose name is masked by a later I-500 given to a captured German U-boat - appears to have been completed enough to make a round trip to Germany before it surrendered (according to US Army intelligence, including passengers who made one way of the trip) - but not considered operational. She is also the ONLY submarine yet identified that might have put a "recon type" kaiten on a beach in Panama in August 1945 - no other submarine of sufficient range is unaccounted for. [That recon midget was also found by a US Army beach patrol, long was in US custody, and now is on display in Japan: see Advance Force Pearl Harbor]
Nor is range an issue: the submarine has as much range as we can give it (32,750 nm) - and uses only a little fuel (actually emergency auxiliary engine fuel) to get that immense range. That little bit of fuel DOES mean that the ship requires "refueling" (= maintenance) periodically - and so it has a game function: you cannot stay away from port forever or you will drop to 0 fuel status and speed goes to 1 hex per DAY. Her actual range was pretty awful by our standards - no more than 30 months & degraded after only 18 months - but it was unlimited relatively speaking.

[On the Brits, they did not trust the US - and rightly so - we ultimately DID lock them out of atomic research - and they had to do it on their own. They had both a SSN program and a bomb program (in Australia) secret from the US during the war. I don't know the details of the SSN program (other than it began in 1942), but a US citizen who knew nothing of atomic science (who is for that reason a wonderful witness - he records things he could not look up) reported to US Consular officials what he learned DURING the war about the bomb program. The big problem (for everyone always) was fuel - and the British decided to exploit rich Thorium resources (on this guy's ranch in SW Australia) - and to do so using a natural uranium reactor of extraordinarly low tech (no expensive heavy water or enriched fuel). That produced U-233 - and it worked - but produced something "not suitable for a military weapon" - very nasty and hot when NOT in use apparently. This was similar to Japanese work in Korea on a "thorium bomb" (see Origins of the Korean War, Vol II, and The Two Koreas, and Japan's Secret War). Both lines of research seem to have generated official fear terrorists might want to go that way - and extraordinary efforts have been taken to keep the details even from those with the highest clearences and Presidential authorization. [The first person to complain of this was McGeorge Bundy, who explicitly had Presidential authority to research for Danger and Survival, and he records in it he had trouble getting everything. In the middle was Robert K Wilcox, author of Japan's Secret War, and denezin of the US national archives. And just a year ago the same thing happened to an ONI contractor with the highest clearences and aided by a team including scientists from two national laboratories. This effort to keep information from being examined, long after the law allows, has not yet ended.] The Japanese didn't get as far as the British - who seem to have tested a bomb. Rumors of a Japanese bomb test are - I believe - related to a radiological weapon: it was too small for an atomic bomb UNLESS it was a failure and a "fizzile". On the RN SSN, eventually all RN SSNs used US reactor technology with very highly enriched uranium fuel - higher than weapons grade in fact (although this is disputed by some, it is in a number of open materials including US Nuclear Weapons, and for that reason I am free to say so). This permits a relatively compact and lightweight power plant. France attempted and failed to produce a natural uranium reactor for Gymnote (never completed with nuclear engines, but still extent with conventional ones) - it was too heavy for the ship. Japan also tried this route - and produced an engine barely powerful enough - and not shielded to US standards - so it was dangerous to be around - but the weight would not be excessive. I speculate (speculate) the RN may have attempted this same route - they used natural uranium to make their U-233 in Australia - and if so they probably failed for the same reason: the product would be too big for a submarine, or it could not be shielded enough to be safe. So later RN SSNs ultimately waited for the US to cooperate again, and used our ractor designs. The British don't use our stuff on land - but do at sea - where it is not that easy to make a compact engine safe to use. We also know the Soviets operated the Japanese natural uranium prototype reactor at Hungnam (Konan to Japan) Northern Korea - until 1948 - but while that reactor was designed for submarine use - and the Soviets ended up specifying EXACTLY the same power for a submarine reactor (putting TWO on a ship to get enough speed and also some redundancy) - the Soviets ultimately also went the way of light water and highly enriched uranium fuel - to excape the weight problem of natural uranium reactors - probably.]