Long Lance - Why Allies did not have them?

[DuckofTindalos]

"stmbled"?

[BrucePowers]

I would not want all those O2 bottles any where near me in any type of battle. I know what the term oxidizer means[:D]

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: BrucePowers

I would not want all those O2 bottles any where near me in any type of battle. I know what the term oxidizer means[:D]

Yes, much preferable to be standing next to a few tons of high explosive... [:'(]

[bsq]

Point here is that whether or not the Allies had them or not (they got one in 1943), they were pretty much stovepiped into the construction of models of their own. Allied torpedoes were, in the main, in the 533mm class (21"), so considerable engineering problems would have sprung up had they elected to change to the larger weapons. Generally things that can be bolted on or are small, are easier to copy or modify. Large systems like torpedoes would have required considerable effort to re-engineer ships and submarines to cope with them.

The advantage of the Long Lance was not it's range, but its speed. Simply put the shorter the time the weapon is in the water the greater the chance the target will still be where it was calculated to be when the firing solution was made. They were still unguided weapons, reliant on gyros to make them run true. In order to be effective, you had to fire a spread and even them your hit probability was still quite low. But if you did hit, it gave the firing ship (CA/CL or DD) the punch of a BB!

[DuckofTindalos]

The difference in maximum speed for the Long Lance and the Mk 14 was 5 knots at the slowest setting (36 vs. 31) and 2 knots at the fastest (48 vs. 46). That's not very significant.

At its maximum range of 40KYards, the Long Lance could travel at a maximum speed of 36 knots. 40KYards equates to 19,75 nautical miles at 36 nautical miles per hour, which means it would take it between 20 and 25 MINUTES to reach its target, rendering it COMPLETELY useless against maneuvering enemy ships.

Savo Island shows us that the Long Lance wasn't any better at sinking ships on it's own than any Allied torpedo.

Its fuel was horribly dangerous, and in my opinion not worth the bubble-free propulsion it could give.

That's four strikes against the Long Lance in my book. It's out!

[Big B]

Not to mention that the USN removed their TTs pre-war, and used the freed up space/weight for increased AAA. Most authors I have read have believed it was a better trade overall.

ORIGINAL: Terminus

The difference in maximum speed for the Long Lance and the Mk 14 was 5 knots at the slowest setting (36 vs. 31) and 2 knots at the fastest (48 vs. 46). That's not very significant.

At its maximum range of 40KYards, the Long Lance could travel at a maximum speed of 36 knots. 40KYards equates to 19,75 nautical miles at 36 nautical miles per hour, which means it would take it between 20 and 25 MINUTES to reach its target, rendering it COMPLETELY useless against maneuvering enemy ships.

Savo Island shows us that the Long Lance wasn't any better at sinking ships on it's own than any Allied torpedo.

Its fuel was horribly dangerous, and in my opinion not worth the bubble-free propulsion it could give.

That's four strikes against the Long Lance in my book. It's out!

[bsq]

I'm not supporting the Long Lance at all, as a weapon it had it's day and that day was probably before December 1941.

The IJN was mainly driven by doctrine, coupled with the strictures of it's society, this made for a very inflexible force. The Long Lance is just one expression of this (along with IJN sub commanders seeing merchantmen as, in the main, beneath them - and so the list goes on).

Problem with doctrine is that it relies on your enemy doing what you expect, most of the time US commanders just didn't oblige.

As for the US removing TT's - they soon put them back on the newer destroyers. Fletcher, Sumner and Gearing classes all had TT's. AAA only increased as a matter of neccessity and wasn't really a trade. Where TT's did disapear from the USN was on Cruisers as they were seen as superfluous on a ship designed for gun battles and AAA escort duties.

[Big B]

Ooops, I should have been more specific - I was referring to TTs on CAs, not DDs

ORIGINAL: bsq

I'm not supporting the Long Lance at all, as a weapon it had it's day and that day was probably before December 1941.

The IJN was mainly driven by doctrine, coupled with the strictures of it's society, this made for a very inflexible force. The Long Lance is just one expression of this (along with IJN sub commanders seeing merchantmen as, in the main, beneath them - and so the list goes on).

Problem with doctrine is that it relies on your enemy doing what you expect, most of the time US commanders just didn't oblige.

As for the US removing TT's - they soon put them back on the newer destroyers. Fletcher, Sumner and Gearing classes all had TT's. AAA only increased as a matter of neccessity and wasn't really a trade.

[bsq]

ORIGINAL: Big B

Ooops, I should have been more specific - I was referring to TTs on CAs, not DDs

A decision that the wisdom of which is queried by many as it reduces the flexibilty of the CA as a platform.

[BrucePowers]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: BrucePowers

I would not want all those O2 bottles any where near me in any type of battle. I know what the term oxidizer means[:D]

Yes, much preferable to be standing next to a few tons of high explosive... [:'(]

You get the explosive in any case (the fuel).[:D] Here we are talking about oxidizer[:D]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And as for my "in theory" comment, try to find out how many times the IJN used the weapon successfully according to pre-war doctrine. Wasn't very many. The times where the Japs launched their Long Lances taking full advantage of the weapon's monstrous range can be counted on one hand.

My viewpoint would be, that long range wasn't the only superiority of the weapon. It was also faster, had more range at that fast setting, had a bigger warhead, was nearly wakeless, and rather most importantly.....was very reliable for it's class. Focusing on the extreme range alone is only part of the pie. I do agree though that the pre-war long range night attack concept tended to be overoptimistic in the expected results.

Take Savo Island, for example. Five Allied cruisers were sunk or put out of action during that fight:

- HMAS Canberra was struck by two torpedoes (most likely Long Lances) and more than twenty 8-inch rounds, and was still around to be scuttled the next morning by nearly 300 5-inch shells and several torpedoes.

- USS Chicago was struck by a single torpedo (again, assumed to be a Long Lance) but was able to control her damage and stay in the fight.

- USS Astoria, Vincennes and Quincy were all sunk by Japanese 6-inch and 8-inch gunfire. Astoria was hit by no torpedoes, Vincennes and Astoria by three each, but all three cruisers went down fighting and had to be pounded to pieces by Jap guns.

Its not certain that Canberra was struck by LL's. There's a theory that she may have even been the victim of friendly torp fire. [Frank doesn't even mention Canberra being struck by torps for example, she did suffer some hits though that entered low on the port side and exited the starboard side underwater, knocking out her boilers and causing flooding.]

Chicago was actually struck by two LL's but fortunately for her, the one that might have crippled her enough for scuttling or in conjunction with the first hit, sank her in eventuality was a dud. It was fortunate in that the dud struck her dead center in the machinery spaces. It would be hard for any torpedo to sink a large cruiser type warship or larger when the weapon hits the narrower bow section. Even a little DD would be far more survivable under such condition and in WWI and II, DD's that had bows blown clean off or wrecked could survive such a hit. Still, the LL was powerful enough in battle that it could sever a larger warship's bow or cause it's complete or partial collapse. So it could mission kill with one hit even the most modern of CA' if circumstances are right. You just can't count on it every time of course. Thats like expecting a heavy AP shell to trigger a magazine every hit. Some AP shells do little more than create air ventilation on a target. Torpedo hits are generally more serious on a per hit basis but not always. Some torpedo hits do little actual damage at times (though the probability is much lower when you get warhead sizes as large as a LL's)

Quincy was struck by two 21in torps according to my sources....which helps explain her survival initially. the older Japanese weapon shared with the LL the high quality and reliability but not the huge warhead. I have Vincennes receiving two torps in total...one again forward which is a more survivable location to be struck and one in the mid section after she'd taken a beating via shellfire. I'm not sure how you can say they wern't at least partly if not substantially responsible for her demise. The action occured quickly enough that severe progressive flooding in conjunction with uncontrolled fires would largely account for her abandonment.

My point is, if the LL had been the Wonder Weapon that some people make it out to, why did the Japanese have such a hard time blowing these ships to pieces with gunfire?

I don't think anyone, at least recently has given it that moniker. It was a torpedo and the best of it's type but unless it has cruise missle type self guidance or a nuclear tip...its no wonderweapon. The type remained largely inaccurate given all the variables and the distances involved. Blowing any warship to pieces quickly is easier said that done. Given Savo's results it was quick enough though. [;)]

To answer the original question, the US was largely unaware of the weapon's specs which aided it given that it lulled the US forces into formations and stances that assumed such a weapon type couldn't reach them.

I used to be a believer, but not anymore...

good. believe in LOG! you'll never go wrong. [:D]

[DuckofTindalos]

What are your sources on the number of torpedo strikes? I just picked them out of DANFS...

[Nikademus]

Frank....cross referenced with Dull.

[DuckofTindalos]

Hm... Well, I think my point is still intact, with bow attached and gun turrets firing...[:D]

[moni kerr]

This picture is from Frank's book (it is public domain). Caption from the book reads:

A deadly Japanese 24-inch diameter, Type 93, "Long Lance" torpedo, the finest weapon of its type in World War Two. This example was recovered from a reef off Point Cruz on Guadalcanal. It is shown here displayed outside "Main Navy",, the building in Washington D.C. where Admiral King worked.

No date of recovery, or of photo is given.

This site mentions development of the Mk 17 torpedo being resumed in 1944, about the time that detailed knowledge of the Type-93 became available.

[Tofke]

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[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]here a very interesting article about LL at battleshipnc.com[/font]
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[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]The "Long Lance Junior"[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Japanese submarines never used the Type 93, "Long Lance" torpedo. That 24-inch, oxygen-powered torpedo was surface-launched, mainly by destroyers. The oxygen-powered torpedo designed for submarine launch, and used by the I-19 in its attack on the Wasp was the 21-inch Type 95, Mod 1. Both were deadly, the best in the world at that time. But, the Long Lance could run 22,000 yards at 49 knots, carrying 1,078 pounds of high explosive in its warhead. The shorter Type 95 was not nearly so powerful, able to travel 13,000 yards at 45 knots, with 891 pounds of explosive in its warhead. [/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]The Type 95 submarine-launched torpedo, although modeled after and following the same principles as the Type 93 Long Lance, was necessarily shorter and of reduced diameter in order to be accommodated in the limited confines of a submarine. I have always thought of the Type 95 as "Long Lance Junior." [/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]- CAPT Ben W. Blee USN (Ret)[/b] [/b][/font]

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[center][font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]The "Long Lance" Torpedo[/font][/center][font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]It was perhaps the best torpedo of the war. What made it so good? Several things made the oxygen type "Long Lance" torpedo "so good."[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Size: while the difference between a 21" and a 24" torpedo in diameter is not that much, the warhead on the larger one varies by the ol' "pi" ratio. The Japanese warhead was also longer in relative terms, making for a much more deadly load on the target.[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Simplicity: The development of the Japanese oxygen torpedo started in earnest back in the 1920's, and it was a "mature" weapon by the 1940's. Other nations tried to produce them as well (England and France, for example), but gave up as they felt the hazard was not worth the benefits. The Japanese continued in their efforts, and partially succeeded. The IJN also did not flirt with the magnetic exploder as did the US, Germany and Great Britain. [/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Speed: Oxygen torpedoes have two benefits: lack of combustion byproducts that leave a wake (most notably nitrogen; air torpedoes have less oxidizer (oxygen) and more inert gasses (nitrogen primarily) in their air flasks), and range (pure oxygen takes up less space than the same amount of oxygen as a component of air (tops of 20% by volume); more space for fuel and oxidizer. Oxygen oxidized flames also burn hotter (better combustion), so a given amount of fuel could stretch farther. All this translated out into going further faster. [/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]I don't have the figures with me, but I think that the top speed on our torpedoes (which only allowed a very short range) was well below the lower speed on the Japanese torpedo (which allowed a range that was so great we had trouble believing that it actually could occur). At their top speed, the things zipped along near 50 knots (compared to a top ship speed of 37 knots or so) out to a distance that was greater than our "close range". Faster to the target means less time to evade, hence more accurate. Longer range meant that we found ourselves surprised by Japanese torpedo attacks on at least three occasions, thinking that we ran over mines as there was no way that the nearest Japanese forces could have torpedoed us. We were, of course, wrong. The sinking of the USS Wasp, damage to the USS North Carolina, and fatal damage to a destroyer (don't recall the name; USS Edsall perhaps?) all by _one_ torpedo salvo from a single Japanese submarine, remains the greatest monument to Japanese torpedo systems (and to the American refusal to believe that someone else could do something better than us).[/font]
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Skads of them: Japanese ships were heavy on torpedo tubes, and even heavier on reloads. Some Japanese destroyers could reload twice, and could complete the reload cycle in twenty minutes or so. This tends to put more torpedoes in the water, increasing the likelihood of hits[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Systems: The Japanese put a lot of effort into their torpedo warfare, much moreso than the rest of the world. They saw the torpedo as an equalizer for the inferiority of size that they were persuaded to accept as part of the naval treaties entered into post WWI. They integrated the torpedo attack at both the destroyer and the cruiser levels (whereas most other nations made the destroyer use a "second function" and pretty well ignored the cruiser level (although some early US cruisers had tubes, they were almost completely abandoned by World War II (and for some pretty good reasons, see below). Torpedo directors were a major part of surface ship fire control systems, not a addon as found elsewhere.[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Skills: They practiced their doctrine, firing real torpedoes all the while, and not in the fairy tale conditions of the Caribbean Sea, either.
Japanese training was intensive, brutal (the North Pacific during the winter is not a tranquil place) and all encompassing. Unlike shells, torpedoes could be fired and recovered to fire again in a training situation. The IJN had a whole class of torpedo support craft (covered in post war intelligence reports by the USN, by the way).[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Stupidity (American): A lot of the IJN's success was due to the USN fighting a war that fit the IJN's doctrine. Early on, we persisted in using radar like it was eyesight, maneuvering in formations that suited the Japanese proclivity for torpedo attacks, and misusing one of the American "secret weapons" (the automatic loading 6" light cruiser) to almost a criminal extent. Once we got things sorted out, we did a lot better. The Japanese did a lot of stupid things too; somewhere in 1943 or thereabouts both sides straightened themselves out and the good aspects of both navies produced some interesting surface combats. At that point, the torpedo was nowhere near as dominant as it was when we were feeling our way early on.[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]In short, there were a number of factors that combined to make the Japanese torpedo threat so effective during World War II. The torpedoes themselves were only one of many such factors that made it a success (from the Japanese point of view, of course).[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]The "all torpedo approach" to light forces has its disadvantages. One is time on target for the weapons system; the torpedo can be avoided while the 6" shell cannot. Another is the massive concentration of explosives outside of the warship's protective systems. This is why the US gave up on torpedoes on cruisers. The Japanese lost one ship (don't remember which one) when the torpedoes were touched off by otherwise minor gunnery damage, and they did jettison torpedoes on more than one occasion when this was threatened. Torpedoes are also expensive compared to main gun rounds, even when you compare the number of the shells that have to be fired to get the same effect.[/font]
[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]One more thing: not all Japanese torpedoes were of the "Long Lance" variety. They also had 21" torpedoes on many of their submarines and some older surface ships. All of their torpedoes were well made (albeit mostly hand fabricated) and functioned well, according to post war tests by the Naval Intelligence Mission to Japan. The report (available on cheap microfilm from the Naval History Center in Washington DC) will tell you more than you ever want to know about the subject... [/font]
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[font="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"]Tofke[/font]

[Ken Estes]

No need for the microfilm, the NTM  to Japan is on line:
 
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ-200D-0022-0469%20Report%200-01-1.pdf
 
for ship torpedos & Kaiten;
 
 
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm
 
for the entire set!  Enjoy

[hvymtl13]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

The difference in maximum speed for the Long Lance and the Mk 14 was 5 knots at the slowest setting (36 vs. 31) and 2 knots at the fastest (48 vs. 46). That's not very significant.

At its maximum range of 40KYards, the Long Lance could travel at a maximum speed of 36 knots. 40KYards equates to 19,75 nautical miles at 36 nautical miles per hour, which means it would take it between 20 and 25 MINUTES to reach its target, rendering it COMPLETELY useless against maneuvering enemy ships.

Savo Island shows us that the Long Lance wasn't any better at sinking ships on it's own than any Allied torpedo.

Its fuel was horribly dangerous, and in my opinion not worth the bubble-free propulsion it could give.

That's four strikes against the Long Lance in my book. It's out!

I agree that the 40,000 yds was not needed. Have to be an awful large trgt to be seen by a DD at that range. But, the non-bubble trail was a major plus especially when engaging at longer ranges. The enemy ships must try to avoid an unseen threat, even if only the possibility of these torpedoes have been already fired in your direction. Unless you saw them fired you wouldn't really know if they were in the water running at your TF. So do you evade the potential threat? Or attempt to gain the best gun position in the engagement and possibly walk into a 2 degree spread of nine 40 knot torps with a 12 ship TF?
So even with the drawback of the possible secondary explosions (another reason to get them off your ship at long ranges) [:)]
they give you a tactical advantage. Forcing the enemy to react to your threat. I'd say a BIG plus for the lack of bubble trails.

[trollelite]

Long lance was not designed to deal with destroyers and cruisers, at least not its main purpose, if you have read the book "kaigun".  Its main target is US battleship fleet.
 
This weapon is especially dangerous to its user while facing air threat, but this is not in Japanese scenario. In their scenario, the torpedo flotilla should break through US outer screen in night and try to torpedo battleships. In the night surface battle the situation is hazardous enough even the ship don't take any torpedos with them.
 
If US ships facing so overwelming air threat the end is just the same. Of course they have no long lance on them, but detonation of depth charge just has same effect, if not worse.

[trollelite]

40000 yard so they can fire out of range of battleship gun. It's of course unnecessary in a confusing night surface battle as those actually take place around soloman and new britain. Besides, in such confusing, quick-paced battles, before torpedo (even the fast long lance) make halfway enemy ships already far from original place.