The Evil Empire Option: Standard Merchant Ships

[DuckofTindalos]

Hmmm, I have a lot of doubts as to whether or not the Japanese were capable of building a great number of CVE's. In my personal mod, I've removed the historical six ships (Hosho, Taiyo, Shinyo, Unyo, Chuyo and Kaiyo), and replaced them with a standardized class of merchant conversions, numbering 8 vessels, all with integral air groups. That's about what I figure they could realistically build and sustain.

[el cid again]

IRL Japan invented the conversion of merchant ships via austere methods to CVEs. Only one (British) ship preceeded them, and she was not successful. The historical ships were exactly what you say you put in - merchant ships converted to CVE on an austere basis.

And remember, what can be done is almost always greater than what was done. It is a matter of resource management - and here Japan is not a great shining light - so the opportunities for doing better are far greater than might normally be expected. The first CVE conversions were poorly done in terms of time efficiency, for example - although they turned out OK. Japan managed to convert similar vessels in as little as four months, but took as much as two years for a virtual sister ship. It was the middle of the war before Japan appointed an economic tzar similar to Albert Speer - and he was able to do even better than Speer did on a % basis - because probably in part he started with an inherently less efficient foundation susceptable to much improvement. One should never confuse what they did do with what they could have done - and it is a military principle to think in terms of what an enemy is capable of doing - not what you expect him to do. If you can cope with his worst, you are able to deal with less than that: so that is my habit of thinking - and simulations permit us to explore those worst case scenarios. This is that: the worst they could have done - and it is deliberately done on the assumptiong it was deliberately so (which those who got in the way presumably murdered).

[el cid again]

The names of the Aikoku Maru class as CVEs are Wayo, Yoko and Zenyo.

These were new ships - the third only completing in Aug 1941 (in non CVE form) - the others in 1940 - so the design is new enough that the power plants are in production - they are very fuel efficient by Japanese standards, so it will be the basis of the wartime replacement construction program - as spaces and engine plant capacity permits - we will use this class. They are more or less Taiyo's with 3 inch 60 guns and better range.

[DuckofTindalos]

I see you stopped short of calling a ship the "Yoyo"...[:D]

[DuckofTindalos]

Hmmm, if I remember correctly, the IJN actually subsidized the building of the three ships that would later become the Taiyo class of CVE's, and made sure they were prepared in advance to allow for conversion to escort carriers. Same thing for the two liners that were turned into Hiyo and Junyo.

[el cid again]

Well - yes - these and several others - naval auxiliaries were designed so they could be sub tenders, fast oilers, seaplane carriers or light aircraft carrers - while civlian companies were asked to do liners that could become carriers. But these three ships were not quite identical - two had 4.7 inch guns - the other one 5 inch guns - diferences like that.

If you consider all those Unryu hulls Japan really built - and suspended only because they were not in the event going to be able to outfit them with aircraft- it is clear Japan might have built ships of less complexity and expense in simililar numbers.

I have been able to come up with six building spaces, times, and engines:

Miyo, Kenyo, Choyo, Chiyo, Koyo, Okuyo

for 1943 and 1944 completions

which means two more probably can be had for 1945 completion.

EDIT: These vessels had to be scheduled as repeat Taiyo class - that is as steamships - rather than as motorships. This means they will have significantly less range. Wartime diesel engine plant capacity was a problem: because Kampon motors all used a single set of parts - you just extended or compressed the block by adding or deleting cylindars - they were able to get greater numbers of smaller engines (for submarines for example) - but then those same parts cannot be used for engines for motor ships.

In addition, one M class ship was not turned into a slow, coal fired AK - she was made into a fast Amphib Command ship - and she can convert to Kumano Maru - indeed it is the same hull. It is sort of a CVE. But IF this is done, players will ONLY have an aircraft transport unless they transfer air groups from another carrier - there is no plan to train an air group. This gives players an emergency option to get another flight deck.

[DuckofTindalos]

Actually, if I remember correctly, it was the Taiyo who was completed with 4.7in guns, while the other two were born with 5in guns. The Taiyo was eventually updated with 5-inchers. But that's neither here nor there.

Turning back to your CVE's, Sid, did I understand correctly that you intend all of them to have air groups with both fighter and attack aircraft components?

[el cid again]

Well - kind of sort of. Except for the first four (that is, ancient Hosho and the first Taiyo's, which all participate in initial operations) - what you get (later in the war) is a fighter squadron (and that short range Me-109T interceptors) of some significance (the later Japanese naval organization is four flights of four for ALL fighter squadrons) plus an "ASW squadron" - borrowing from IJA usage. The ships that arrive late enough get the ASW variant of the Kate - that is one equipped with MAD sensors. The rest upgrade to that after getting the earlier Kate - but these groups (and ships) do NOT carry torpedoes - they carry 2 bombs and one DC.

The first three Taiyo's get a completely different organization - because the later one does not yet exist - and because the need for fighter cover is not yet as pressing (or not understood to be as pressing). Here the fighter squadrons are only 9 machines, 3 vic's of 3, and those obsolescent A5M4s, which remain very servicable when the war begins, while the attack squadron is larger, with 15 Kates. These are not yet armed for ASW directly (although they will attack submarines) - they only carry 250 kg bombs.

In several cases it was not the shipyard capacity that limited availability dates: it was the time required to work up the air groups. The early war practice of converting hulls outran the capacity to train carrier groups, and since these are vital to a working carrier (vice an aircraft transport that looks like a carrier) - I scheduled some conversions later to put them in sync (and strain builders slightly less).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I see you stopped short of calling a ship the "Yoyo"...[:D]

FYI I would have done if it was a Japanese name. ALL my names are actually Japanese names, and ALL are considered appropriate for a ship. They are derived from the Maru LIst in Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. IJN often duplicated names also used on Marus - usually without the Maru - which more or less is the Japanese form for SS - as in SS United States (i.e. steamship). But in Japanese it means "merchant ship" - steam or not. Anyway - all RHS names are either historical - or plausable insofar as they were used by older historical naval vessels or by merchant vessels. I lack the skill and confidence to make up plausable names in Japanese - so I use real ones.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Well - kind of sort of. Except for the first four (that is, ancient Hosho and the first Taiyo's, which all participate in initial operations) - what you get is a fighter squadron (and that short range Me-109T interceptors) of some significance (the later Japanese naval organization is four flights of four for ALL fighter squadrons) plus an "ASW squadron" - borrowing from IJA usage. The ships that arrive late enough get the ASW variant of the Kate - that is one equipped with MAD sensors. The rest upgrade to that after getting the earlier Kate - but these groups (and ships) do NOT carry torpedoes - they carry 2 bombs and one DC.

The first three Taiyo's get a completely different organization - because the later one does not yet exist - and because the need for fighter cover is not yet as pressing (or not understood to be as pressing). Here the fighter squadrons are only 9 machines, 3 vic's of 3, while the attack squadron is larger, with 15 Kates. These are not yet armed for ASW directly (although they will attack submarines) - they only carry 250 kg bombs.

In several cases it was not the shipyard capacity that limited availability dates: it was the time required to work up the air groups. The early war practice of converting hulls outran the capacity to train carrier groups, and since these are vital to a working carrier (vice an aircraft transport that looks like a carrier) - I scheduled some conversions later to put them in sync (and strain builders slightly less).

That was my main issue; that the IJN would be able to work up a sufficiently large number of air groups. In my mod, my CVE's only carry ASW Kates.

[el cid again]

There are plenty of land based air groups fitted with carrier capable Zeros. It is a matter of running them through the carrier training program. Japan used an older carrier fighter with two seats - so the first practice landings can be with an instructor right on the plane - a good system. They also modified the Claude - and later the Zero - into trainer variants. The problem is not carrier qualified pilots - it is "can we get enough pilots through flight school" period? Increasing the number of air units is not a good solution either: it means you make the problem of supplying replacement pilots worse - and sooner or later it becomes critical. We are further disciplined to honor this by a lack of slots: we cannot add a lot of units even if we could rationalize doing so. And note that I have in many instances NOT built carriers - no Taiho - no Shinano (no G15s as in BBO which replace many of the Unryus there) - so these big ships do not need to be fed either aircraft or pilots. My philosophy is mainly one of reallocation of resources - and also one of not straining the capacity of the infrastructure beyond its limits. Even so, I find that players have the option of running too many carrier operations (or too many land based air missions) - and running themselves out of pilots. Which is fine - real world operations were limited by such considerations as well. I organize with a view to postponing that day - by not creating a lot of new and large air units just because it feels good (assuming I could slot wise - I would not).

A little known technical fact: IF you put only one squadron on a carrier, AND IF the squadron resizes, it will set itself to be 80% of the capacity of the carrier. Under revised code, this happens even if you land the squadron, or put other squadrons on the carrier: only the START OF GAME assignment of the squadron matters. This means if you have one squadron carriers they will only have the illusion of deck capacity - actual capacity after resize will be only 80% of that. I don't know what you use for deck capacity - but RHS uses hanger deck capacity - no deck parks - because of technical problems we cannot solve in this system with present code. So our capacities are not overstated (as is common). Nor have I heard a single complaint about the smaller air groups. Anyway - thought you should know about the single squadron matter - it applies to HMS Hermes - it is how we learned about it.

[el cid again]

A semi-useful naming convention for guns: if a gun on a ship has the designation AA gun - it means the gun has no AP or semi-AP shell - and it won't penetrate as if it does - but it also means it hits with the full effect of the weight of the shell (rather than the reduced effect of an AP shell). Such guns will be more effective against unarmored ships, and less against armored ships.

The problem is - what to do with NON AA guns of this sort (no AP shells)? One case is solved by the use of SP Short Gun.
A Short gun - like a howitzer - has a greatly reduced anti-armor value - due to low m/v. But the rest - well all I can say is that they are not US or UK guns, and they are 5.5 inch or smaller. [The Japanese 5.5 inch comes in two species - surface ship/CD and submarine. The submarine one carries ONLY HE shell. The other one has the usual combination of shells.]

We are going to end up with a very sophisticated gun system: the very heavy AA will fire - without much effect on planes - and those with severe altitude limits will have them (and those that do not will not). A regular gun will always "choose the right shell" for a soft target - even if it is rated as AP it will have the anti-soft value of the HE from the same gun. Neat.

[el cid again]

Gen Yamashita went to observe the Eastern Front in 1941 - on the German side of the lines. He returned recommending the formation of a "tank corps" modeled on what Germany was doing. By the time the war began, the core of his future tank divisions had already formed - four tank brigades. After Malaya, he was sidetracked by being sent to Manchukuo - an important post because of the Soviet Red Army in the area. While there he formed up the tank corps - expanding the brigades into divisions - all four of them. RHS gives you the tank brigades at the start and in mid 1942 it gives you the rest of the divisions - calling them motorized brigades because they are essentially a reinforced motorized regimental combat team (a motorized infanty regiment, a mech infantry battalion, an artillery "unit", an AA "unit" - an engineer "unit" - etc). But the actual concept was to operate these assets in two different, combined arms teams.
The tank corps was different than the other tank organizations - which were infantry support organizations. It was to operate independently - and be all arms.

In EEO we will represent this in a different way than former RHS scenarios: we will add the two brigades up and then divide by two - creating "combat commands" 1 and 2 (IJA always uses numbers, never letters, at all levels). Thus you end up with a very unusual combined arms brigade - nominally 1.5 tank battalions, 1.5 motorized infantry battalions, half a mech battalion, a battalion of mech artillery, a full battalion of engineers - one company of the construction sort and two of the assault sort, half a AA battalion, an AT company, an "infantry gun" battery (old 75mm), and a recon element. Oddly - this ends up very like many contemporary organizations on paper.

The heart of higher Japanese organization was the tank regiment (or mech regiment). These differ significantly from other organizations because of the lack of familiarity with mechanics and even driving in Japan. These organizations had first, second and third echelon support shops - and significant numbers of spare tanks - organic to the "battalion". And they were over strength battalions. There were several kinds - one for independent infantry brigades - one for separate operations in support of any infantry division - one for the tank brigades. But they were all very similar, all mixed (not one kind of tank or AFV), all with very little organic infantry and no AAA. The Tank Brigade corrects this - and does so on the task organization principle: infantry belongs to a true infantry organization to train - same for tanks - artillery - AAA and engineers. But for operations, elements of these commands are combined for the mission. They don't really divide by two - they form proper commands for the op - and usually this is not identical - but there are almost always two combat commands - otherwise the might be a small reserve element. Using half is a compromise to get the average strength of a combat command - literally "kampgruppe" - but designed rather than ad hoc in nature. A Japanese motorized, mechanized or armored unit larger than company has organic spares of all sorts - including people. But since Dupuy and Dupuy say everything counts in a battle - we count em all. I am rekoning these combat commands (rated as brigades) at 67 light tanks, 89 medium tanks, 22 gun tanks, a composite SP arty battalion with a battery 6 of 150s and two batteries 6 of 105s, a composit engineer battalion with 9 squads of construction engineers and 18 squads of assault engineers (complete with Goliath like demolition vehicles - invented in Japan before Germany had any), a brevit AA battalion with a battery of 75mm AAA and a battery of SP 20mm light AAA, and a great deal of mech support. Since the support was too much to use in game terms, I actually reduced it by about 90 squads per brigade - so we end up with 950 squad organizations of which exactly half are motorized support. These are not really very big - but they are very mobile - they have lots of firepower - they are not too hard to lift by sea or rail - and they do not have vehicles that overburden the fragile road/bridge networks as badly as ours did. They won't stand up to a US armored division - but how many of them are there? [One in theater I think - although facing this threat maybe we should change that??] They should eat a US tank battalion for lunch.

After Yamashita was sent to the Philippines, the tank corps was disbanded - but the divisions remained. The 2nd fought on Luzon - the only one to see combat - and it still had 1938 vintage tanks. [Nobody's 1938 tanks looked very good in 1944 and 1945] Another was prepared to fight for the either Kyushu or Honshu. The other two remained in Manchuria - and were overwhelmed by the Soviet offensive August Storm - which seems to have managed superiority in every possible area - even places it was "impossible" to get at (sending secondary forces down the Usurri river for example - where no normal infrastructure existed for a land army to advance on - or sending a force overland in the Gobi desert - along routes "impossible" to transit for a large force. Nothing IJA looks very good in this campaign - subject to a number of good US Army studies in the Levenworth Papers - and a book called Nomanhan. By this time the units had been gutted of experienced people - and were woefully understrength in most respects. The scale, speed, number of directions and unexpected operational methods of the Red Army - in the context of the broader war - demoralized what was left of the Kwangtung Army - and it was pretty much a route.]

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Gen Yamashita went to observe the Eastern Front in 1941 - on the German side of the lines. He returned recommending the formation of a "tank corps" modeled on what Germany was doing. By the time the war began, the core of his future tank divisions had already formed - four tank brigades. After Malaya, he was sidetracked by being sent to Manchukuo - an important post because of the Soviet Red Army in the area. While there he formed up the tank corps - expanding the brigades into divisions - all four of them. RHS gives you the tank brigades at the start and in mid 1942 it gives you the rest of the divisions - calling them motorized brigades because they are essentially a reinforced motorized regimental combat team (a motorized infanty regiment, a mech infantry battalion, an artillery "unit", an AA "unit" - an engineer "unit" - etc). But the actual concept was to operate these assets in two different, combined arms teams.
The tank corps was different than the other tank organizations - which were infantry support organizations. It was to operate independently - and be all arms.

4th Tank Division was formed in 1944 (it was ordered to form in 1942, but this did not happen). And both 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions were formed in China, not in Manchuria. 4th Tank Division did not received its own 'Mobile' (motorised/mechanized infantry - with ten APC/regiment) regiment (the 4th only formed a company). The original tank 'brigades' were 'tank groups' without any organic 'brigade' elements (simple HQ's for up to four tank regiments without any support elements).

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

After Yamashita was sent to the Philippines, the tank corps was disbanded - but the divisions remained. The 2nd fought on Luzon - the only one to see combat - and it still had 1938 vintage tanks. [Nobody's 1938 tanks looked very good in 1944 and 1945] Another was prepared to fight for the either Kyushu or Honshu. The other two remained in Manchuria - and were overwhelmed by the Soviet offensive August Storm -

1st and 4th Tank Divisions had moved to Japan, they never encountered the Soviets. 3rd Tank Division was still in China when the war ended. 2nd Tank Division was destroyed on Luzon.

[DuckofTindalos]

Actually, IIRC, 4th Tank Division was formed in the Home Islands (at the Chiba Tank School in the summer of 1944) and assigned to the 36th Army, alongside the 1st Tank Division. They would have faced the Kyushu invasion (and died there) if it had ever come that far.

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Actually, IIRC, 4th Tank Division was formed in the Home Islands (at the Chiba Tank School in the summer of 1944) and assigned to the 36th Army, alongside the 1st Tank Division. They would have faced the Kyushu invasion (and died there) if it had ever come that far.

As far as I can tell, the 4th Tank Division was formed in China from assets of the tank school in July 1944 but was sent 'back' to Japan in early (February?) 1945 (it was not assigned to 36th Army before 1945).

[DuckofTindalos]

Hmm, I read "Chiba Tank School" and figured it was formed there. Still, it didn't see action in Manchuria.

[Kereguelen]

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Still, it didn't see action in Manchuria.

No, it didn't (and I never said it did). It is even possible that it was formed at Chiba and remained in Japan. This is not completely clear, my sources disagree somewhat when it comes to the 4th Tank Division. The only really hard facts are that is was formed in July 1944 and that it was in Japan when the war ended.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Kereguelen

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Gen Yamashita went to observe the Eastern Front in 1941 - on the German side of the lines. He returned recommending the formation of a "tank corps" modeled on what Germany was doing. By the time the war began, the core of his future tank divisions had already formed - four tank brigades. After Malaya, he was sidetracked by being sent to Manchukuo - an important post because of the Soviet Red Army in the area. While there he formed up the tank corps - expanding the brigades into divisions - all four of them. RHS gives you the tank brigades at the start and in mid 1942 it gives you the rest of the divisions - calling them motorized brigades because they are essentially a reinforced motorized regimental combat team (a motorized infanty regiment, a mech infantry battalion, an artillery "unit", an AA "unit" - an engineer "unit" - etc). But the actual concept was to operate these assets in two different, combined arms teams.
The tank corps was different than the other tank organizations - which were infantry support organizations. It was to operate independently - and be all arms.

4th Tank Division was formed in 1944 (it was ordered to form in 1942, but this did not happen). And both 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions were formed in China, not in Manchuria. 4th Tank Division did not received its own 'Mobile' (motorised/mechanized infantry - with ten APC/regiment) regiment (the 4th only formed a company). The original tank 'brigades' were 'tank groups' without any organic 'brigade' elements (simple HQ's for up to four tank regiments without any support elements).

Not sure where this idea comes from. My primary source is Nomanhan. I also have information from a Japanese former member of this board - who left because of what he believes is a general atmosphere of disrespect for Japanese capabilities among many members. I also have a paper listing the details of every Japanese armor operation - even very small ones. The dates given for all four divisions in RHS are historical ones - the tank Brigades formed in 1941 - and they expanded in the summer of 1942 - forming a "tank corps" in Kwangtung Army. Apparently the 2nd Division went to Luzon after forming up as a division. Apparently the tank brigade in Malaya had returned to Kwangtung Army. There appears to have never been any major figure pushing armor except Yamashita - and the expansion to divisions - and forming of a corps command - both occurred during his tour in Kwangtung Army.

That said, I admit that the tank brigades when formed were not to a standard TO&E, and even the later expansion to divisions generally involved transfer of existing units rather than creating new ones from scratch. Just what unit was selected to assign - and what that unit had - naturally determined the actual TO&E. So far, in RHS, I have used actual vehicle counts for the tank brigades when formed - and I force the Japanese player to "round out" the organization by "paying for" the extra squads/vehicles from production. I should probably do the same thing when the expansion occurs in 1942 - but I lack exact data on vehicle/squad counts. Every document listing a unit and its actual composition at formation is always of interest - and will probably be used.