Ship Class Design

[vahauser]

Well, after spending some more time with it, I knew there would be a downside to Erik's concept.  The downside is that I can't make it work.  I really like his idea, but try as I might I just can't put his theory into practice.

If anybody else out there can see a way to turn Erik's idea into a TOAW reality, then please let me know.

[Erik2]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Well, after spending some more time with it, I knew there would be a downside to Erik's concept.  The downside is that I can't make it work.  I really like his idea, but try as I might I just can't put his theory into practice.

If anybody else out there can see a way to turn Erik's idea into a TOAW reality, then please let me know.

I know it won't work if you put in ie one ship-equipment and one artillery eqp.
In combat the ship eqp may be destroyed while the art survives.
What should work is putting ie 2 different ship-eqp in the unit with different AP, DF, range etc.

Edit: I've added an Excel-sheet (still under construction) with examples.
I plan to use this system for my Malta-scenario and run a PBEM-test soon.

[vahauser]

Erik,
 
I'm not following you.  Can you post a screenshot of what you mean?

[Erik2]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Erik,

I'm not following you. Can you post a screenshot of what you mean?

Warspite has main/secondary and tertiary guns so I'll create 3 different ship equipments in BioEd using the values from the spreadsheet example. I've modifyed Bob's ('Curtis') original formulas so Warspite-1 only includes gun values for the main guns, Warspite-2 is using the values for the secondary guns etc. This gives me a ship with 3 gun components, each with its own AP-value, range and shell weight.
The total AA value of pure AA guns is divided evenly between the 3 ship equipments. The AA value of main/sec/tert guns are added to the corresponding equipment.
The total Defence Factor is divided between the 3 ship equipments thus: Warspite-1 = Def*5/8, Warspite-2 = Def*2/8 and Warspite-3 = Def*1/8. These fractions are my own educated guesses. The reasoning behind is that main guns are more difficult to destroy than tertiary guns. Please comment...
There are options in BioED to set 'Anti Shipping' and 'Anti Shipping only' flags (unchecked for default ship equipment in TOAW). I have no idea how these work, but maybe you could create one main gun platform with long-range 'Anti Shipping only' and one main gun short range for land bombardments.
The downside in creating all these details is of course that you use several equipment slots for one unit.
This doesn't bother me as I create scenario-specific equipment-files anyway.

[vahauser]

Erik,
 
Thanks for the screenshot.  It explains a lot.  I was trying to tackle the problem from a different angle.
 
I didn't want to have to create more equipment slots, I wanted to use less (my WW2 database currently uses about 75 slots for naval units).  I wanted to use already existing equipment slots, namely the guns already listed in the standard TOAW .eqp file.  A "ship" would then consist of an empty hull (using a ship slot in the naval units section that has all weapons removed), and then add armament from the guns section.
 
For instance, the Iowa in 1945 would have a battleship hull, plus 9x 16" guns from the guns section, plus 20x 5" guns, plus 80x 40mm AA guns.  But this would require no new equipment slots since everything would come from existing equipment slots.  Oh well.  It was a nice dream.
 
I guess I'm back to using the concept I'd posted earlier in this thread for my WW2 database, even though it's not very optimal.  My method does get the job done, though, and only uses around 75 equipment slots for naval units.
 
Thanks again for the clarification.

[a white rabbit]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Well, after spending some more time with it, I knew there would be a downside to Erik's concept.  The downside is that I can't make it work.  I really like his idea, but try as I might I just can't put his theory into practice.

If anybody else out there can see a way to turn Erik's idea into a TOAW reality, then please let me know.

..in a purely ship/ship scen it works by constructing a unit with the right bits in it and using a BioEd hull using inf/mtrised move rate. Just paint the sea green..

..the same might work by giving your guns and stuff naval move rates, then building a unit from there on a BioEd hull or hulls, but i have to admit i've not played a lot with naval move stuff

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Second, I just ha' my doots when it comes to battleships and heavy cruisers being able to exert the same impact on combat thirty km inland that they had on combat near the coast. The German attacks on Sicily and at Anzio didn't collapse in the face of naval gunfire landing thirty km inland -- at least, that's not my impression. They collapsed as they were nearing the beach. That's when naval gunfire was able to exert a decisive effect.

Your solution addresses this issue to some extent -- but not completely. After all, the Warspite can still exert 75% of her full effect at a target that's well away from the coast. I suspect that while WW2 warships could lay down indirect fire, to get really effective they needed to see what they were shooting at, or at least have it pop up on their radar screens. It might even turn out that the best solution is simply to allow naval vessels to participate only in combat in which at least one of the contestants is in a coastal hex.

I don't see why naval guns are any different than any other artillery in that regard. Spotters can direct their fire.

Maybe they can, and perhaps in the Pacific they did. However, my impression is that at Anzio et al, while the heavy cruisers flattened German counterattacks that got to within a couple of kilometers of the beach, they weren't exerting the same effect 20 km inland -- although in OPART they would.

That's the point. Speaking generally, ships' guns seem to have been very effective right on the coast: this was true in Syria (in 1941), in Sicily, at Anzio, and at Normandy. However, and for whatever reason, they don't seem to have exerted a similar effect inland up to anything like their theoretical range -- or even their OPART range.

[vahauser]

Colin,
 
I guess we just have to chalk it up as being another one of the idiosyncracies of TOAW.  The best solution I can come up with is to shorten the ranges of naval guns.  I have no problem with making heavy guns 25km, medium guns 20km, and light guns 10km.
 
Curtis is correct, the USMC had dedicated on-shore fire-control teams to coordinate naval gunfire support in the Pacific.  I don't know if the US Army (or any other army) had something analogous in Europe.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Colin,

I guess we just have to chalk it up as being another one of the idiosyncracies of TOAW. The best solution I can come up with is to shorten the ranges of naval guns. I have no problem with making heavy guns 25km, medium guns 20km, and light guns 10km.

Curtis is correct, the USMC had dedicated on-shore fire-control teams to coordinate naval gunfire support in the Pacific. I don't know if the US Army (or any other army) had something analogous in Europe.

I'd be inclined to say that as a norm, we'd want poor cooperation levels between the navy and the army -- with the US in the Pacific being an exception. The problem with this is that ships are effective when the target is so close to the sea that it can be seen from there. 'Hmmm...those onrushing tanks. That must be what the army is talking about. Guns...'

Also, obviously ships do very well firing in support of amphibious assaults. So it'd be good if there was some way of distinguishing between fire support when the target hex is actually on the coast and fire support when the target is inland.

Like in Seelowe. Well, there's no problem with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau doing a lot to help the Heer evict the British from Brighton. Quite realistic. The problem comes when they provide the same service in clearing Lewes (15 km or so inland). That's really quite unrealistic. Just didn't happen -- not with anything like the same effect.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Like in Seelowe. Well, there's no problem with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau doing a lot to help the Heer evict the British from Brighton. Quite realistic. The problem comes when they provide the same service in clearing Lewes (15 km or so inland). That's really quite unrealistic. Just didn't happen -- not with anything like the same effect.

In this particular example, slashing range won't cut it. You still want the big guns to be able to outrange the shore batteries. You'd need a house rule.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Like in Seelowe. Well, there's no problem with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau doing a lot to help the Heer evict the British from Brighton. Quite realistic. The problem comes when they provide the same service in clearing Lewes (15 km or so inland). That's really quite unrealistic. Just didn't happen -- not with anything like the same effect.

In this particular example, slashing range won't cut it. You still want the big guns to be able to outrange the shore batteries. You'd need a house rule.

Even a house rule would only be partially satisfactory. The ships would still provide automatic support at 50% strength simply by being within range. That'd be an improvement, of course.

Really, what would be best would be an editable modifier that could be set to between 0 and 100. It would determine the percentage of a ship's firepower that would actually be applied if the target hex was neither deep water nor adjacent to deep water.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Maybe they can, and perhaps in the Pacific they did. However, my impression is that at Anzio et al, while the heavy cruisers flattened German counterattacks that got to within a couple of kilometers of the beach, they weren't exerting the same effect 20 km inland -- although in OPART they would.

That's the point. Speaking generally, ships' guns seem to have been very effective right on the coast: this was true in Syria (in 1941), in Sicily, at Anzio, and at Normandy. However, and for whatever reason, they don't seem to have exerted a similar effect inland up to anything like their theoretical range -- or even their OPART range.

I know we're all infallible historical gods here, but this amounts to taking absense of evidence as evidence of absense. And I'm not ready to make that leap. I want some hard proof that they couldn't support at their full ranges. Just because we in this group don't have an example of them doing so isn't enough for me.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Maybe they can, and perhaps in the Pacific they did. However, my impression is that at Anzio et al, while the heavy cruisers flattened German counterattacks that got to within a couple of kilometers of the beach, they weren't exerting the same effect 20 km inland -- although in OPART they would.

That's the point. Speaking generally, ships' guns seem to have been very effective right on the coast: this was true in Syria (in 1941), in Sicily, at Anzio, and at Normandy. However, and for whatever reason, they don't seem to have exerted a similar effect inland up to anything like their theoretical range -- or even their OPART range.

I know we're all infallible historical gods here, but this amounts to taking absense of evidence as evidence of absense. And I'm not ready to make that leap. I want some hard proof that they couldn't support at their full ranges. Just because we in this group don't have an example of them doing so isn't enough for me.

Well, look at Anzio. The Allies were unable to make progress inland, and the great German counterattack rolled them back quite nicely -- until the Germans advanced to within a couple of kilometers of the beach. Then -- and only then -- ships' guns blew the attacking columns apart, and the situation was reversed. Same thing in Sicily. In Normandy as well -- why didn't Montgomery just use ships' guns to take Caen?

You talk about an 'absence of evidence' -- but what evidence could we find to prove a negative? How can there be attacks where ships' guns played a major role inland if there never were any such attacks?

The only logical inference is that most times and places, the effectiveness of naval firepower was greatly attentuated as one moved inland. On the other hand, no such effect exists in OPART. Pending further data, the conclusion is not that everything is just fine: the conclusion is that there is a flaw.

Put it this way. Suppose the system did attentuate ships' firepower inland. Is there anything to suggest such an effect would be incorrect and should be eliminated?

[vahauser]

Colin,
 
The issue here is spotters.  I have no idea how US Army spotter teams operated in Europe in regards to naval liason.  Perhaps they only operated near the beaches and not farther inland.  Coordinating naval gunfire is more complicated than coordinating field artillery.
 
Here is my concern.  This is a really big issue for you.  For me, however, this is not a very big issue on the priority scale of "things that need to be fixed".  AEDs, aircraft ratings, AFV ratings, antiaircraft fire, movement rates, etc., are way higher to me on the priority list.
 
I realize that you see a very real need to 'fix' naval gunfire support.  But compared to the other problems regarding naval units in TOAW (like the absence of torpedoes and the inability to 'customize' individual ships), I just don't see this as a very big deal.  To me, in the overall scheme of TOAW "idiosyncracies" naval gunfire support doesn't rate very high on the list.
 
The only practical solution (as of today) to this issue is to create a house rule for your scenario prohibiting players from firing more than 1 hex inland with their naval units.  Indeed, this might be the best long-term solution as well.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Colin,

The issue here is spotters. I have no idea how US Army spotter teams operated in Europe in regards to naval liason. Perhaps they only operated near the beaches and not farther inland. Coordinating naval gunfire is more complicated than coordinating field artillery.

Here is my concern. This is a really big issue for you. For me, however, this is not a very big issue on the priority scale of "things that need to be fixed". AEDs, aircraft ratings, AFV ratings, antiaircraft fire, movement rates, etc., are way higher to me on the priority list.

I realize that you see a very real need to 'fix' naval gunfire support. But compared to the other problems regarding naval units in TOAW (like the absence of torpedoes and the inability to 'customize' individual ships), I just don't see this as a very big deal. To me, in the overall scheme of TOAW "idiosyncracies" naval gunfire support doesn't rate very high on the list.

The only practical solution (as of today) to this issue is to create a house rule for your scenario prohibiting players from firing more than 1 hex inland with their naval units. Indeed, this might be the best long-term solution as well.

It's not the biggest problem in the world. In fact, it's not even big enough for me to want a house rule. However, it is a rather provocative inaccuracy. The historical record is really quite clear. Naval gunfire imposed its impressive effects along the coast -- not 25 km inland. No doubt it was used at such ranges -- but I doubt if it was anything like as effective.

[Erik2]

Here's an idea that may have potential.

I have created a sub unit using a (graphically modified) Guerilla icon and checking various additional equipment flags (63.Torpedo, 25.Anti Shipping, 29.Anti Shipping only) in BioEd in addition to the normal naval flags. The sub-unit has a high anti-shipping value and fairly low defence and unit/formation supply values to simulate a one-shot attack before it will have to return to port. I've also used an icon colour combination that is unique and set the formation cooperation level to internal.

Using the Guerilla icon for the sub unit allow it to be hidden (submerged), it will be 'discovered' if an enemy ship try to pass through the same location. The enemy ship can then attack the invisible sub-unit. Please see screenshot where one sub is revealed while the battleship targets the submerged one.
I've noticed that the equipment apparently need to have a range greater than 4 for the anti-shipping capability to show in the unit report.

Marc Custer and I will test this in my Malta scenario.

Comments?

[vahauser]

Erik,
 
I hope it works.  The trade-off seems to be that you lose guerillas to gain submarines.

[Veers]

ORIGINAL: Erik Nygaard

Here's an idea that may have potential.

I have created a sub unit using a (graphically modified) Guerilla icon and checking various additional equipment flags (63.Torpedo, 25.Anti Shipping, 29.Anti Shipping only) in BioEd in addition to the normal naval flags. The sub-unit has a high anti-shipping value and fairly low defence and unit/formation supply values to simulate a one-shot attack before it will have to return to port. I've also used an icon colour combination that is unique and set the formation cooperation level to internal.

Using the Guerilla icon for the sub unit allow it to be hidden (submerged), it will be 'discovered' if an enemy ship try to pass through the same location. The enemy ship can then attack the invisible sub-unit. Please see screenshot where one sub is revealed while the battleship targets the submerged one.
I've noticed that the equipment apparently need to have a range greater than 4 for the anti-shipping capability to show in the unit report.

Marc Custer and I will test this in my Malta scenario.

Comments?

That would be awesome if it works out as intended. And Vahauser seems to have pegged the main trade-off.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Erik Nygaard

Here's an idea that may have potential.

I have created a sub unit using a (graphically modified) Guerilla icon and checking various additional equipment flags (63.Torpedo, 25.Anti Shipping, 29.Anti Shipping only) in BioEd in addition to the normal naval flags. The sub-unit has a high anti-shipping value and fairly low defence and unit/formation supply values to simulate a one-shot attack before it will have to return to port....

Naval units don't need to return to port to recover supply. If this thing is functioning as a naval unit, it won't need to do that. Of course, if it's functioning as a guerilla unit...

[ColinWright]

I'll also note that against naval units, submarines really couldn't be directed to engage particular targets. Too slow and too blind. The Royal Oak is about the only major warship I can think of that was sunk as a result of a specific plan. All the others -- Ark Royal, Yorktown, Barham, Indianapolis, that late-war Japanese carrier -- were more or less good (or bad,depending on how you look at it) luck.

So there is at least one argument against having submarines as player-controlled, on map units. It implies an ability to direct planned attacks against specific vessels -- and such an ability doesn't seem to have existed.