What if??

[Raverdave]

Mogami posted the following on the History Channel forum, and frankly I think that it is too good a question to leave over there, so here it is!

Subject South Pacific 1942
Posted by Mogami
Posted on 5/9/02 00:05 AM

After securing the Southern Resource Area, Japan had no valid plan for continuing the war. Pre war planning was to construct bases around the perimeter and by attrition force the US/Allied nations to a compromise peace that would leave Japan in possession of her conquests. The Declaration of the United Nations to fight the war without compromise plus the April 14th Doolittle Raids led Japan into the failed Midway operation. This resulted in the US offensive in the Solomon's at Guadalcanal where the Japanese piecemeal commitment and response lost both New Guinea and the Solomon's. What if Japanese prewar planning had provided for operations beyond the Southern Resource Area. Including offensive action in the South Pacific (directed at Port Moresby and Noumea)With out Midway could the Japanese have cut off Australia?

[PBYPilot]

Then you'd have this scenario in UV:

017 Decision in the South Pacific: 1 May 42 - 31 Dec 1943

Hypothetical - Assumes no Midway. Starts with historical set-up in South Pacific but accelerates Japanese ground unit commitment to the South Pacific. All carriers for both sides are available to be committed to the South Pacific (usually they start arriving in June).



PBYPilot

[Raverdave]

What if Japanese prewar planning had provided for operations beyond the Southern Resource Area. Including offensive action in the South Pacific (directed at Port Moresby and Noumea)

The trouble with this question is that even if the Japanese were to consider this option, where were they going to get the troops from? They were fully committed in Burma, China and also had a large number of troops guarding against the USSR, just in case. So where were the troops to come from?

With out Midway could the Japanese have cut off Australia?

You cannot consider what would have happened if Midway without first considering the Battle for the Coral Sea, which in many ways ended the Japanese attemps to cut off Australia, and also helped Japan loose Midway. Although it was a tactical victory for Japan, the battle for the Coral Sea was a strategic win for the allies. If the Japanese attempt to force a landing on or near PM and been sucessful, then yes Australia would have been in a worse position but far from down and out as PM is within easy flight time from Darwin and cooktown....continued airattacks would have made PM useless. The US would still be able to supply Australia and instead of the US landing at GC it would have landed at PM. The second factor in the Coral Sea, is the withdrawal of two Japanese carriers which did not take part in Midway......would these two carriers have been what could have turned the tide in the battle at Midway?

[PBYPilot]

I have to agree with Raverdave that invading Port Moresby or Australia would not have produced good, long term results for the Japanese.

A more chilling prospect is if they had used the forces that had been committed to the Midway/Aleutians operation and directed them against the New Caledonia/New Hebrides area. The Allies might have been forced to send transport from the US to Australia/NZ via the Indian Ocean, lengthening supply lines, and tying up desperately needed shipping. This might have given the Japanese time to secure their new possessions and made the eventual conquest much more difficult, expensive, and time consuming..,

PBYPilot

[FAdmiral]

2 main things would have hindered the Japanese in their
conquests of the southern region. The constant strife
between the army & navy precluded their working together
in a smooth fashion. The Japanese trait of always having
to save face greatly affected their aggressive actions and
hindered any kind of lasting victory. Case in point, the salvo
battle where they sunk many warships but failed to attack
any transports because fear of air retailation at dawn.
Only a small handful of Japanese Commanders did not suffer
from this handicap.....

JIM BERG, SR.
FAdmiral

[brisd]

Japan had the troops to conquer the South Pacific if they could have freed them from their other commitments. But the Imperial Japanese Navy didn't request them from the Imperial Japanese Army. From the various histories I've read, there was no strategy to isolate Australia, let alone conquer it. The IJA was primarily concerned with the USSR and the land war in China/Burma. The IJA treated the South Pacific as a side show.
The IJN didn't even tell the IJA about the severity of the Midway disaster at first, no wonder the IJA wasn't too supportive.

I think with a few more divisions, an all out commitment from the IJN, Australia could have been temporarily isolated. The only way Australia could have been invaded and possibly conquered was for the British to be kicked out of India/Burma and Ceylon, and Japan either pacificing or making peace with China, to free the necessary troops for vacationing in lovely Perth and Sydney (I have been there).

That is why I am awaiting WITP, I want to buy vacation property in Perth cheap. :p

[mogami]

Hi, Ok why is this disscussion over here where we will all answer these questions in our own way starting sometime next week. These reply need to be in the History Channel forum where they will stir up interest in the subject and introduce Matrix games to the history crowd. (I think all History buffs are closet wargamers)
We know they have computers since they are posting online. We need to get them to discover "Historical Simulations"

[RolandRahn_MatrixForum]

Originally posted by Raverdave
[/I]
would these two carriers have been what could have turned the tide in the battle at Midway?

Perhaps, but not necessarily.

Perhaps because
- with these two additional carriers, the initial attack on Midway would have been larger. If the Japanese would have judged that no second strike is necessary, the 2nd wave would not have been rearmed (from AP-bombs and torpedoes to HE-Bombs).
Then, when the US fleet is spotted, the 2nd wave attacks the US ships regardless if the carriers are spotted or not.
- with these two additional carriers, there would have been a bigger CAP over the Japanese carriers
- even if everything went as it did historically, (the Japanese rearming their planes, the US attacking in the right moment)pu we must not forget one thing:
The decisive US dive bomber attack (at 10:24) put Akagi, Kaga und Soryu out of action. The counterstrike from Hiryu put the Yorktown out of action.
A counterstrike from Hiryu, Shokaku und Zuikaku could have severvely damaged all three US carriers.

But an US victory would still have been possible....
The decesive attack was launched from all three US carriers.
But the Yorktown committed only half of its dive bombers.
And the dive bombers from the Hornet lost their way.
Half of the dive bombers of the Yorktown were able to put one Japanese CV out of action.
The dive bombers from the Enterprise were able to put two Japanese CVs out of action.
- If the dive bombers from Hornet wouldn't have lost their way and if they would have attacked the two additional Japanese CVs.....
- If there would have been no battle of the coral sea, Lexinction would have been available at Midway and Yorktown would not have started Midway in damaged condition.
Let's assume Lexington would have been with Yorktown (under Fletchers command), would have commited half of ot's dive bomber strengh to the decisive attack....
That would be four Japanese CVs out of action, the counterstrike from two Japanese CVs hitting Fletchers TF (two undamaged CVs with more CAP).
Even if they would have been completely successfull (damaging Yorktown and Lexington), the counter-counterstrike from enterprise and Hornet should have been sufficient to put the remaining two Japanese CVs out of action....
- The additional Japanese CAP might have been useless against the decisive US dive bomber attack because every Japanese fighter flying CAP tried to fight off the US torpedo bomber attacks (at low altitude), while the 55 SBDs attacked unopposed (at least not opposed by fighters).
All in all, Midway could have been a more dramatic US victory:
Apart from the fact that the Japanese might have lost Shokaku and Zuikaku permanently (sunk), it would have been a great boost for US morale:
The first carrier battle resulting in the loss of all Japanese carriers that attacket Pearl Harbour.....

Just some thoughts about an intresting topic.

Can't wait to play UV.
Have already shaking hands.

Kikikikiiiiiiinnnnndndndnd rereregardddds,
Rororoland

[coach3play4]

The japanese could have elected not to build up Rabul, freeing up some units to fight in the Solomons. They clearly expected us to butt heads at rabul, and hoped for their victory there. I've tryed lots of "what ifs" using pacWar - and surely all gamers would agree the worst is to attack Rabul!

[brisd]

Since the earliest start date of UV is 1 May 42, we will probably have to wait for WITP. This is an operational game of the historical battles that took place in the south Pacific during the historical timeframe. If Japan had truly wanted to conquer Australia or even isolate it, why wait till May 42????!!!! Take even one division and many of the bases represented in UV could have been taken in first five months of 42, supported by the IJN. The USN would have been forced to commit to defend and the DECISIVE battle won before the US was ready. Just a conjecture, we will learn in WITP.
This is a criticism of the design parameters, not the game itself which I did preorder and look forward to.

[Crocky]

Maybe there is no what if check out this article about the industrial capacity of the US compared to Japan.Introduction

It's no secret that Japan was, shall we say, 'economically disadvantaged' in her ability to wage war against the Allies. However, the sheer, stunning magnitude of this economic disparity has never ceased to amaze me. So, just go give you an idea of the magnitude of the mismatch here, I decided to compile a few statistics. Most of them are taken from Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" (which, among other things, contains an excellent analysis of the economic forces at work in World War II, and is an all-around great book) and John Ellis' "World War II: A Statistical Survey." In this comparison I will focus primarily on the two chief antagonists in the Pacific War: Japan and the United States. They say that economics is the 'Dismal Science'; you're about to see why....

Overview

By the time World War II began to rear it's ugly head (formally in 1939 in Poland, informally in China in 1937), America had been in the grips of the Great Depression for a decade, give or take. The net effect of the Depression was to introduce a lot of 'slack' into the U.S. economy. Many U.S. workers were either unemployed (10 million in 1939) or underemployed, and our industrial base as a whole had far more capacity than was needed at the time. In economic terms, our 'Capacity Utilization' (CapU), was pretty darn low. To an outside culture, particularly a militaristic one such as Japan's, America certainly might have appeared to be 'soft' and unprepared for a major war. Further, Japan's successes in fighting far larger opponents (Russia in the early 1900's, and China in the 1930's) and the fact that Japan's own economy was practically 'superheating' (mostly as the result of unhealthy levels of military spending -- 28% of national income in 1937) probably filled the Japanese with a misplaced sense of economic and military superiority over their large overseas foe. However, a dispassionate observer would also note a few important facts. America, even in the midst of seemingly interminable economic doldrums, still had:

Nearly twice the population of Japan.
Seventeen time's Japan's national income.
Five times more steel production.
Seven times more coal production.
Eighty (80) times the automobile production.

Furthermore, America had some hidden advantages that didn't show up directly in production figures. For one, U.S. factories were, on average, more modern and automated than those in Europe or in Japan. Additionally, American managerial practice at that time was the best in the world. Taken in combination, the per capita productivity of the American worker was the highest in the world. Furthermore, the United States was more than willing to utilize American women in the war effort: a tremendous advantage for us, and a concept which the Axis Powers seem not to have grasped until very late in the conflict. The net effect of all these factors meant that even in the depths of the Depression, American war-making potential was still around seven times larger than Japan's, and had the 'slack' been taken out in 1939, it was closer to nine or ten times as great! In fact, accroding to Kennedy, a breakdown of total global warmaking potential in 1937 looks something like this:


Country % of Total Warmaking Potential
United States 41.7%
Germany 14.4%
USSR 14.0%
UK 10.2%
France 4.2%
Japan 3.5%
Italy 2.5%
Seven Powers (total) (90.5%)


When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the sleeping giant was awakened and came looking for trouble. And even though the majority of America's war-making potential was slated for use against Germany (which was by far the most dangerous of the Axis foes, again for reasons of economics), there was still plenty left over for use against Japan. By mid-1942, even before U.S. force of arms was being dramatically felt globally, American factories were nevertheless beginning to make a material effect in the war's progress. The U.S. churned out seemingly endless quantities of equipment and provision which were then funnelled to not only our own forces, but to those of Great Britain and the USSR as well. By 1944, most of the other powers in the war, though still producing furiously, were beginning to max out their economies (i.e. production was stabilizing or plateauing). This resulted from destruction of industrial bases and constriction of resource pools (in the case of Germany and Japan), or through sheer exhaustion of manpower (in the case of Great Britain and, to an extent, the USSR). By contrast, the United States suffered from none of these difficulties, and as a consequence its economy grew at an annual rate of 15% throughout the war years. As scary as it sounds, by the end of the war, the United States was really just beginning to get 'warmed up.' It is perhaps not surprising that in 1945, the U.S. accounted for over 50% of total global GNP.

War Production

What, then, were the concrete outputs, in terms of 'beans and bullets', of the two competing industrial bases? I have presented some statistics on this matter in the following tables. I start with naval vessels, because they were a very important index of power in the Pacific War.


Warship Production
United States CV/CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Escorts Subs Japan CV/CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Escorts Subs
1941 - 2 1 2 - 2 1941 6 1 - - ? -
1942 18 4 8 82 - 34 1942 4 1 4 10 ? 61
1943 65 2 11 128 298 55 1943 2 - 3 12 ? 37
1944 45 2 14 74 194 81 1944 5 - 2 24 ? 39
1945 13 - 14 63 6 31 1945 - - - 17 ? 30
Total 141 10 48 349 498 203 Total 17 2 9 63 ? 167


[Key: CV/CVL/CVE = Aircraft Carriers of all kinds; BB = Battleship; CA/CL= Heavy Cruiser, Light Cruiser; DD =Destroyer; Escorts = Destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops and corvettes]
A couple of points need to made here. First, the majority of the carriers listed in the U.S. totals were 'Jeep' carriers, CVEs carrying a couple dozen aircraft and suitable mostly for escort duties rather than front-line combat (which didn't subtract a whit from their effectiveness as antisubmarine or ground-support platforms). But it should also be noted that the American CVs on average operated substantially larger air wings than their Japanese counterparts (80-90 vs. 60-70 aircraft). The net result; by 1944, when Task Force 38 or 58 (depending on whether Halsey or Spruance was in charge of the main American carrier force at the moment) came to play, they could be counted upon to bring nearly a thousand combat aircraft with them. That kind of power projection capability was crucial to winning the war -- we could literally bring more aircraft to the party than any island air base could put up in its own defense, as the neutralization of both Truk and the Marshall Islands attests.

The other important figure here is the DD/Escort totals. Japan, an island empire totally dependent on maintaining open sea lanes to ensure her raw material imports, managed to build just sixty-three DDs (some twenty or so of which would have been classified by the Allies as DEs) and an unspecified (and by my unofficial count, relatively small) number of 'escort' vessels. In the same time span, the US put some eight hundred forty-seven antisubmarine capable craft in the water! And that total doesn't even cover the little stuff like the armed yachts and subchasers we used off our Eastern seaboard against the German U-Boats. All in all, by the end of the war, American naval power was unprecedented. In fact, by 1945 the U.S. Navy was larger than every other navy in the world, combined!

The Pacific War was also very much a war of merchant shipping, in that practically everything needed to defend and/or assault the various island outposts of the Japanese Empire had to be transported across vast stretches of ocean. Japan also had to maintain her vital supply lanes to places like Borneo and Java in order to keep her industrial base supplied. A look at the relative shipbuilding output of the two antagonists is enlightening.


Merchant Ship Production (in tons)
Year United States Japan
1939 376,419 320,466
1940 528,697 293,612
1941 1,031,974 210,373
1942 5,479,766 260,059
1943 11,448,360 769,085
1944 9,288,156 1,699,203
1945 5,839,858 599,563
Total 33,993,230 4,152,361


Every time I look at these number, I just shake my head in amazement. The United States built more merchant shipping in the first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven years. The other really interesting thing is that there was really no noticeable increase in Japanese merchant vessel building until 1943, by which time it was already way too late to stop the bleeding. Just as with their escort building programs, the Japanese were operating under a tragically flawed national strategy that dictated that the war with the United States would be a short one. Again, the United States had to devote a lot of the merchant shipping it built to replace the losses inflicted by the German U-Boats. But it is no joke to say that we were literally building ships faster than anybody could sink them, and still have enough left over to carry mountains of material to the most God-forsaken, desolate stretches of the Pacific. Those Polynesian cargo cults didn't start for no reason, and it was American merchant vessels in their thousands which delivered the majority of this seemingly divinely profligate largesse to backwaters which had probably never seen so much as a can opener before.

Finally, no examination of the Pacific War would be complete without taking a look at air power. For all the talk of the Pacific War being a 'Carrier War', an aircraft carrier is really nothing more than a vehicle to deliver an airplane to an area of operations. While airplanes certainly couldn't take and hold islands by themselves, air supremacy was vital in ensuring that such bastions could be reduced and captured. Below is a table depicting the aircraft production of the two antagonists.


Aircraft Production
Year United States Japan
1939 5,856 4,467
1940 12,804 4,768
1941 26,277 5,088
1942 47,836 8,861
1943 85,898 16,693
1944 96,318 28,180
1945 49,761 8,263
Total 324,750 76,320


Again, a pretty staggering difference. Not only that, but as Paul Kennedy points out, the Allies were not only cranking out more planes, but many of them were of newer design as well, such as the new F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat fighter aircraft. Japan, on the other hand, pretty much relied on variants of the Zero fighter throughout the war. The Zero was a brilliant design in many respects, but by 1943 had clearly been surpassed by the newer American models. This pattern was repeated across every category of airplane in the two opposing arsenals. In addition, a large part of the American production total (some 97,810 units) was composed of multiengined (either two or four engines) bombers, whereas only 15,117 of the Japanese planes were bombers (which were universally two engine varieties). Thus, if one were to look at aircraft production in terms of total number of engines, total weight of aircraft produced, or total weight of combat payload, the differences in production would become even more pronounced.

Strategic Implications

So America had an advantage; so what? Well, as an example, let's take a moment to consider the importance of the Battle of Midway. Midway is often cited as the 'Turning Point in the Pacific', the 'Battle that Doomed Japan,' and a string of other stirring epithets. And there's no question that it broke the offensive capability of the Japanese Navy. The question I ask is: what difference would America's economic strength have made if the Americans had lost badly at the Battle of Midway? Let's take the worst case scenario (which, incidentally, was very unlikely, given our advantage of strategic surprise) in which a complete reversal of fortune occurs and the U.S. loses Enterprise, Yorktown, and Hornet, and Japan loses none of the four carriers which were present. After such a hypothetical battle, the balance of carrier forces available for Pacific duty would have looked like this:


Midway: Before and After American CVs / CVLs
(# of aircraft) Total Ships / Total Aircraft Japanese CVs / CVLs
(# of aircraft) Total Ships / Total Aircraft
Pre-Midway
(Historic) Saratoga (88), Wasp (in Atlantic) (76), Enterprise (85), Yorktown (85), Hornet (85) 5 CV

419 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV
2 CVL

561
Post-Midway
(Historic) Saratoga (88), Wasp (in Atlantic) (76), Enterprise (85), Hornet (85) 4 CV

334 Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 2 CV
2 CVL

246
Post-Midway
(Theoretical) Saratoga (88), Wasp (76) 2 CV

164 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV
2 CVL

561


The question is, would losing Midway really have mattered? How long would it have taken America's shipyards to make good the difference and dig us out of the hole? Let's find out. We'll take the table just presented above and extend it out until the end of the war (in 6-month increments). Here are the assumptions I'll use while doing so:

I am only including carriers which were capable of conducting fleet operations. In practice, this means the vessel must be capable of speeds of 28 knots or more and be able to both launch and recover conventional aircraft. That leaves Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho and the converted Mogami, Ise, and Hyuga out of the picture. [Yes, I know the Japanese tried to use Junyo, Hiyo, and Ryuho with Combined Fleet, and they had some limited success. But they also were either too slow and mechanically unreliable, or too structurally unsound (in the case of Ryuho) to be really useful to the Combined Fleet. Furthermore, we used our little CVEs all the time in combat areas, and some of them participated heavily in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Not only that, we also had the older but still somewhat capable Ranger available for refit as well. So, if you want Hiyo, Junyo, and Ryuho in the picture, you really have to count Ranger and all those American CVEs, too, and that adds about a zillion (i.e. 2,000+) planes to the American totals. I just didn't feel like messing with all that, so I didn't. The point is clear enough without including the marginal players.]
A carrier could be placed in combat within three months of its completion date.
The war will probably last longer, so I am extending the build totals into the first half of 1946
As part of the longer war scenario, I further assume that the Japanese and Americans complete some vessels which were discontinued late in the actual conflict. I have taken my best guess as to their likely completion dates under wartime conditions.

Here's how the numbers work out:


Date American CVs / CVLs
(# of aircraft)
(ships in bold indicate new builds) Total Ships / Total Aircraft Japanese CVs / CVLs
(# of aircraft)
(ships in bold indicate new builds) Total Ships / Total Aircraft
7/1/42-
12/31/42 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76) 2 CV

164 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV
2 CVL

561
1/1/43-
6/30/42 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (82), Independence (33), Princeton (33) 3CV
2 CVL

321 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV
2 CVL

561
7/1/43-
12/31/43 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33) 7 CV
7 CVL

850 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30) 6 CV
2 CVL

561
1/1/44-
6/30/44 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp II (91), Intrepid (91), Hornet II (91), Franklin (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 10 CV
9 CVL

1189 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 6 CV
4 CVL

621
7/1/44-
12/31/44 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91), Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock (91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 14 CV
9 CVL

1,553 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65), Amagi (65), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 9 CV
4 CVL

811
1/1/45-
6/1/45 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91), Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock (91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91), Randolph (91), Antietam (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 17 CV
9 CVL

1,826 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65), Shinano (45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 11 CV
4 CVL

941
7/1/45-
12/31/45 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91), Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock (91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91), Randolph (91), Antietam (91), Coral Sea (120), Lake Champlain (91), Boxer (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 20 CV
9 CVL

2,128 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65), Shinano (45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Kasagi (?) (65), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30), Ibuki (?) (27) 12 CV
5 CVL

1,033
1/1/46-
6/30/46 Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington (91), Wasp (91), Intrepid (91), Hornet (91), Franklin (91), Ticonderoga (91), Hancock (91), Bennington (91), Shangri-La (91), Bon Homme Richard (91), Randolph (91), Antietam (91), Lake Champlain (91), Boxer (91), Kearsarge (91), Princeton II (91), Oriskany (91), Tarawa (91), Coral Sea (120), Franklin Roosevelt (120), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Bataan (33), San Jacinto (33) 25 CV
9 CVL

2,612 Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Taiho (60), Unryu (65), Shinano (45), Amagi (65), Katsuragi (65), Kasagi (?) (65), Aso (?) (65), Ikoma (?) (65), Ibuki (?) (27), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30), Chiyoda (30), Chitose (30) 14 CV
5 CVL

1,163


In other words, even if it had lost catastrophically at the Battle of Midway, the United States Navy still would have broken even with Japan in carriers and naval air power by about September 1943. Nine months later, by the middle of 1944, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed a nearly two-to-one superiority in carrier aircraft capacity! Not only that, but with her newer, better aircraft designs, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed not only a substantial numeric, but also a critical qualitative advantage as well, starting in late 1943. All this is not to say that losing the Battle of Midway would not have been a serious blow to American fortunes! For instance, the war would almost certainly have been protracted if the U.S. had been unable to mount some sort of a credible counter-stroke in the Solomons during the latter half of 1942. Without carrier-based air power of some sort there would not have been much hope of doing so, meaning that we would most likely have lost the Solomons. However, the long-term implications are clear: the United States could afford to make good losses that the Japanese simply could not. Furthermore, this comparison does not reflect the fact that the United States actually slowed down it's carrier building program in late 1944, as it became increasingly evident that there was less need for them. Had the U.S. lost at Midway, it seems likely that those additional carriers (3 Midway-class and 6 more Essex-Class CVs, plus the Saipan-class CVLs) would have been brought on line more quickly. In a macro-economic sense, then, the Battle of Midway was really a non-event. There was no need for the U.S. to seek a single, decisive battle which would 'Doom Japan' -- Japan was doomed by it's very decision to make war.

The final evidence of this economic mismatch lies in the development of the Atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project required an enormous commitment on the part of the United States. And as Paul Kennedy states, "...it was the United States alone which at this time had the productive and technological resources not only to wage two large-scale conventional wars but also to invest the scientists, raw materials, and money (about $2 billion) in the development of a new weapon which might or might not work." In other words, our economy was so dominant that we knew we could afford to fund one of the greatest scientific endeavors in history largely from the 'leftovers' of our war effort! Whatever one may think morally or strategically about the usage of nuclear weapons against Japan, it is clear that their very development was a demonstration of unprecedented economic strength.

Conclusion

In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend how Japan's leadership managed to rationalize their way around the economic facts when they contemplated making war on the U.S. After all, these were not stupid men. Indeed, internal Imperial Navy studies conducted in 1941 showed exactly the trends in naval shipbuilding I have outlined above. In the end, however, the Tojo government chose the path of aggression, compelled by internal political dynamics which made the prospect of a general Japanese disengagement in China (which was the only means by which the American economic embargo would have been lifted) too humiliating a course to be taken. Consequently, the Japanese embarked on what can only be described as a suicidal venture, against an overwhelmingly large foe. However, their greatest mistake was not just disregarding the economic muscle which lay partially dormant on the other side of the Pacific. In actuality, their chief error lay in misreading the will of the American people. When the American giant awoke, it did not lapse into despair as a result of the defeats that Japan had inflicted upon it. Rather, it awoke in a rage, and applied every ounce of its tremendous strength with a cold, methodical fury against its foe. The grim price Japan paid -- 1.8 million military casualties, the complete annihilation of its military, a half million or so civilians killed, and the utter destruction of practically every major urban area within the Home Islands -- bears mute testimony to the folly of its militarist leaders.

[byron13]

As I've argued at too great a length on the history channel forum, a wargame is very limited in determining "what if" scenarios because they are limited by fixed outputs based on assumed inputs. There are simply too many variables that decide what forces will be on hand and how a side will react to something that cannot be provided for. A radical departure from history by one side may be effective because the other side is limited in his response to that departure by the parameters set by the game. Historically, a radical departure by one side may have been met by an equally radical departure by the other side, but the game can't take that into account. At some point, an overly successful Japanese player should change the decision of the Americans to a Japan first strategy, which would drastically change the balance of forces in the Pacific. But most games won't model this.

It would be nice if WitP would model this somewhat by allowing for increased American and even Commonwealth reinforcements if the Japanese player is substantially more successful in the early stages of the war than it was historically.

[mogami]

Hi, The reason for the Germany first conduct of the war by the Western Alliance was they realized the defeat of Japan would not lead to a defeat of Germany. A German victory would be catastrophic and a German defeat would given time lead to a defeat of Japan. (Forces able to defeat Germany would have no real problem also defeating Japan.) Local considerations might have seen a very slight/temorary shift of forces. The US used roughly 30percent of available industrial output in the defeat of Japan.

[Raverdave]

Crocky !!
That was a fantasic post! (btw are you a beancounter in real life?)


Here are some facts that although do not relate to the topic I find interesting anyway, and also just goes to show the amount of effort the Britain put into the war, when in fact they could have sat it out after the Battle of Britain and waited.

In August 1940, the cash reserve of Britain was 490 million pounds, by March 1941, the Brits were technically bankrupt.
By 1945 Britain owed the US 27 BILLION pounds!


Astounding figures even by todays standards!

[CynicAl]

Not to be a jerk, but unless Crocky is an alias of Jon Parshall, he should probably have provided the link to that article on the Nihon Kaigun Web site.

[byron13]

Mogami:

I don't think the reason for the Germany First policy was because the defeat of Japan would not lead to the defeat of Germany. This logic works both ways: the defeat of Germany would not lead to the defeat of Japan. Neither was dependent on the other to stay in the war.

The reason for Germany First was simply because Germany was seen, at that time, as the larger threat. Since Churchill had Roosevelt's ear and England was being bled white by Germany, Churchill certainly influenced the decision. Given the geopolitical situation at the end of 1941, with the U.S. Navy temporarily ineffective and with Germany dominating most of Europe and on the verge of toppling the Soviet Union, this was a correct decision. Heck, Roosevelt had probably already made the decision well before the war even started, since America was so tied to Europe and had many fewer interests in the Pacific.

However, by the summer of 1942, that decision could have been changed. The Soviets had pushed the Germans back, and Britain was not on the brink. If Japan were significantly more successful than it was historically and was threatening to isolate or overrun Australia or India, Churchill may have sung a different tune. And if Hawaii were threatened, Roosevelt probably would have ignored Churchill and committed more to the Pacific. He certainly would have delayed Torch and committed those forces to defending American interests in the Pacific. As it was, things had stabilized in April after the Battle of Coral Sea (only five months after the start of the war) and completely turned around after Midway (only seven months after the start of the war). Because the tide turned so quickly in the Pacific, there was not much time to switch from an initial Germany First strategy to a Japan First strategy. But in the summer of 1942, it could easily have been seen that things in Europe had stabilized and that Japan was the larger threat to America. America was just beginning to gear up, and I see no reason why it could not have had a Japan First strategy out both self-interest and possibly even with the support of Britain - Uncle Joe's whining be damned!

What happens when the Battle of Midway takes place in March 1942 and America loses two or three carriers? Japan is one stop away from Hawaii, and the U.S. has nothing to stop it. You think America is not going to see Japan as the larger threat? America was in shock throughout that period because of its rapid string of losses in the Pacific - not because of anything happening in Europe. Invasion fears were rampant on the West Coast facing Japan - not the East Coast facing Germany. Provide a little more to be worried about, and I see the decision as to who to fight first changing.

[byron13]

And before anyone points to Crocky's arguments and says that America realized Germany was the larger economic threat and would have stayed Germany First, I say bull pucky. America was in a panic over Japan after December 7th. If Hawaii were threatened, the American public and Congress would have been clamoring for something to be done in the Pacific. It may not be rational that Japan would be deemed the larger threat or that it was believed that Japan would invade the West Coast, but the panic was real. Decisions made in a crisis are not always based on reason and are more often made out of emotion.

Look at America's response to September 11. Nothing had really changed in the world. Israelis were still dying every week as a result of terrorist attacks. Terrorist cells in Ireland, Germany, the Basque region, the Phillipines, and elsewhere in the world were still happily active and Saddam remained in power. The Taliban had been in power for years and the threat of bin Laden had also been present for years but warranted nothing more than a few desultory cruise missile strikes. The only thing that changed was that the American homeland was attacked. In a fit of emotion, America has finally awakened to the threat and decided to go after the perpetrators of the act against the homeland with everything it has. There are certainly larger dangers to American interests in the world than Arab terrorists, but look at what we're focused on. Why wouldn't America demand that Japan be dealt with first if it felt threatened?

[Ron Saueracker]

As I've posted earlier, there should be (at least by this stage in PC wargame design) more levels of AI reaction than just military with various automatic victory achievements as utilized now to cover up what we are beginning to realize is crucial to wargames of any strategic size....a political level AI engine.

Japan's plan for victory was to bitchslap the allies so badly that those same democracies would sue for peace (assuming of course that they would run wild for MORE than six months and that the allies would have their hands full with the European front. Trying to recreate history on a strategic level requires a political element or context. As with the above example, ignoring the historical and political context ignores the core of the strategy with the result that the attempt to recreate history and any what ifs fails on a crucial level.

[mogami]

Hi, Germany was considered the larger threat because she was much stronger then Japan. The Japanese Navy was the largest threat Japan had but the US knew it already had enough ships in production when the war began to counter it. The military force required to defeat Germany would, once that was done be more then enough to defeat Japan. (as it turned out the leftovers were enough to defeat Japan) The US would have raised another Marine division (or shortend the training period for the ones already being raised) but not one Army Division would have left the ETO (the time required would be longer then moving the West Coast units) The US was already planning the Solomon campaign in Feb/Mar 42 Midway made it easier lack of carriers might have postponed it a bit. The US in 1940 planned to raise a 1000 regt Army. It never did because it was not needed but this vast reserve remained to tap if had it been required. The US truely fought and defeated Japan with one hand tied behind it's back. The US could afford to wait to fight Japan after the defeat of Germany was assured. It just did not need to. Time does not help Japan in relation to the US. This is why it is so important for Japan in a wargame to utterly defeat the US Pacific assests early in the war. If the Pacific had been totally empty of US presence till 1943 Japan stil would reach the limits of what she could do by late 1942. The US airbases around Hawaii will be built manned and guarentee the safty of those bases by Feb/Mar 42. The South Pacific will be strong enough to stop the Japanese by then also (as proved to be the case). Capital Ships need 3-4 months at a yard every 18months or so (sooner and longer if at sea for long periods) The Japanese Navy would have ruined it's self trying to say at sea (not to mention ran out of fuel) Japan is not as strong as people think it is. (and most people think it was way to weak to try to fight a war with the US). In wargames Japan has to hope the US player offers battle in the period Japans still has fuel and before the IJN is crippled simply from being at sea too long. Japan since it does not have enough LCU to fight everywhere has to use the same units for more then one operation (14th Army takes PI then tranfers it's divisons to 16th Army. 25th Army takes Malaya and then transfers it's divisions to 15th Army . 16th Army invades Java and remainder of SRA before releasing units to 17th Army for Solomons while 15th Army now reinforced fights in Burma) This requires a very strict timetable and use of transports and supply. UV begins right on schedule (It will take even the most rapid Japanese player in WitP till April to have SRA secure and units tranfered. What this implies is that not intill May could Japan do anything that might influence the Germany first stance of the US. And by then it is too late, Since the US pipeline will contain enough to replace even the total loss of US offensive power. (US defensive power is sufficent by Mar 42 to put up a fight anywhere Japan wants to invade. ) Sounds like Japans position is hopeless (and it was it just took 9 more months for it to be clear to everyone) The only hope a Japanese player has in wargames is that the US player is overly aggressive or impatiant. If he commits his early forces recklessly Japan can gobble them up. Then after the US is reinforced in 42 Japan still has near parity and once again needs to win without loseing anything. The cycle has to repeat every 6 months or so. In the actuall event not only did Japan not defeat the US starting force it suffered a higher loss ratio. In UV Japan will need to achive near impossible ratios. (Japan can lose no CV or BB very few CA CL and DD can be lost if they kill 2-1 In aircraft Japan needs 5-1 kill ratio to maintain equality. ) This means in UV Japan must spend considerable thought to where it commits forces. The US player in UV only has to decide when he has a good chance at gaining at least 1-1 trades.
Japan has a major obstacle to hurdle right at the start of UV (I am using the long May non Midway scenario for this post as it reflects Japans position war wise the best in connection to my earlier points)
Port Moresby....This base wins the campaign for whom ever controlls it. It is a large base. Easy to supply (for US) and Aircraft from it can interdict all NG and reach main Japanese supply base at Rabual. Japan is not strong enough to fight in both NG and Solomons yet Port Moresby will win NG and then effect Solomons so clearly it has to be dealt with. Japan has no time to spare building up to take PM it must be done before US can make it impossible. US CV's are in area and will prevent transports from reaching PM (PM can not realistly be taken by going over mountains unless US player not only does not reinforce PM but removes LCU that start there. ) UV will decided to a large degree by the battle that results from actions the Japanese take in the first week. The US CV's have to be sunk, PM must be taken. (although I don't see how-without the game to study what is available.) I drifted far off course here.

[byron13]

But Mogami, everything you say is based on what historically happened, and most of the times you refer to are mid-1942 or later. Of course Japan was not a serious threat to invade Los Angeles and of course, in hindsight, we could outproduce Japan. But placed in the context of the time, nothing was obvious. If Midway fell in February 1942 and Japan threatened an invasion of Hawaii, America would have panicked. The shocked and horrified American public won't want to hear about your paper 1000 regiment armies and aircraft carriers that will roll out in two years when the enemy is on the doorstep. Germany was clearly not a threat to the physical survival of any U.S. territory, but Japan was.

So I ask you, Mogami, do you seriously believe that we would have sent forces to invade the African continent, which Britain was handling just fine, thank you, when the Japanese are drinking rum punches in Waikiki? That would read well in the L.A. papers wouldn't it? "Japanese Invasion Expected Any Day, But President Sends Army to Africa." Yeah, right.