What if??

[mogami]

Hi, The reason for the mid 42 time frame is Japan need till April just to complete operations in SRA. Japan is not going to have anything available for outside that area and she is not going to do anything before she secures the resources needed to carry on.
By May oil reserves will be very low. American planners knew before the war started we would be able to out produce them. The speed they conquered the SRA was a suprise. Japan knew they were being out produced. They went to war in Dec 41 simply because they only had two choices. Back down or go to war. In 1943 it would be too late. Mid 42 they would be outnumbered just from the 1940 US ship program. So they went. The US West coast did panic and the US military still sent the troops to ETO.
The goverment never paniced nor did it respond to panic. The ships left after PH strike were more then enough to provide for defense of PH. (note during Midway US did not commit surface forces to operation) There are no Japanese forces for capturing Midway or Hawaii before May 42 (and very little then)

[byron13]

Again, Mogami, everything you've said is based on what actually happened. My point is that if Japan had done something different, America would have too.

You base your argument on the fact that Japan consolidated in the SRA before moving on. What if they did not or diverted forces earlier?
You base your argument on the suggestion that the ships remaining at Pearl were sufficient to prevent an invasion (I would argue that!). What if they were not?
You say that there would be no forces available for an invasion of Midway before May. What physical law of the universe prevents them from loading ships in February to go invade Midway?

I agree that, based on the historical objectives and advances of the Japanese, the U.S. government was not mistaken in opting for a Germany First option. But try to understand that your arguments presume that Japan does things through 1942 that they were not inevitably constrained to doing. <IF> they undertook a different strategy that more greatly threatened the U.S., the U.S. would have reacted differently.

You may argue that the U.S. government did not panic, but it was close. Even if not panicked it did treat the invasion of the West Coast of the U.S. as a possibility. Units were moved to possible invasion areas and cities along the West Coast were blacked out at night. Radio stations were shut down so that Japanese forces could not use them for navigational aids. Does it seem reasonable now, sixty years later? No. But we have the luxury of sixty years of contemplation and authorship upon which to draw. You have to force the benefits of hindsight out of your mind and place yourselves in the shoes of those making the decisions at the time. Invasion was considered a possibility even when Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, Midway were not threatened. If the Japanese HAD invaded Midway or Pearl Harbor (which I'm sure you have successfully accomplished in PacWar and will do so again in WitP), there is simply no way that the U.S. government would have continued with a Germany First policy. It would have been an America First policy and to hell with North Africa.

Whether Japan could physically accomplish an invasion of the U.S. is of no matter. The point is that IF IF IF IF IF the Japanese do significantly better in a game than they did historically, the U.S. would have diverted additional forces to the Pacific Theater. You can argue the extent of the diversions, but they would have happened. (Personally, I don't think Algeria is as important as Hawaii, but you see things your way.) WitP should therefore allow the U.S. additional reinforcements that were historically available if Japan is more of a threat to U.S. or even Commonwealth interests than they historically were. This can be based on victory points or specific locations captured.

[byron13]

Originally posted by Mogami
American planners knew before the war started we would be able to out produce them.

As I pointed out, this doesn't mean a hill of beans when we can outproduce them later but they're on the doorstep now. How important is it to you that you've got three brothers in the next town that can kick my *** tomorrow when I'm holding a gun to your face right now?

[mogami]

Hi, OK somehwere I have become confused. The orginal question concerns Japanese intenetions into South Pacific in period covered by game.

We now have Japan attacking Hawaii in March causing the US to switch from Germany first to Japan first. The US could/can protect the Pacific points without impacting ETO. Japan does not have absolute free controll over events. Japan still has to observe laws of nature and gravity and such. Ships can not move without fuel. Units can not support operations in SRA and be in Central Pacific. Japan is not going to ignore SRA (I have seen PacWar Japanese go right to Cent Pac and by May 42 they have quit the game)

Still it remains an option for WiTP if wanted. I expect it to be more difficult in a game where supply and fuel can not be moved as easy as PacWar.

The SRA is the entire reason for Japan going to war. There is a limit to what units are available and they are a minium to begin with. Where will Japan not go to free up units for Cen Pac?
The US West Coast is closer then any Japanese base (none of which have required LCU for use in capturing Hawaii) Meaning US West Coast ships would operate to Hawaii easier then Japanese ships could operate in Hawaii even assuming they could aquire Johnston or Midway) The loss of Johnston or Midway would change US early offensive to them but would not require any outside units (be much easier for US to retake these bases then for Japan to defend and assets in South Pacific would not be reduced (excepting Japanese) There are no friendly bases in support range of Johnston or Midway as in South Pacific. Japanese fleet assets clearly can not be maintained so far advanced and under US LBA. The Cen Pac plan is a favorite one for Japanese players in PBEM games. I have seen it fail dozens of times causing the entire Japanese war effort to collapse along with it. (Oil reserves even with most rapid securing of SRA are effecting operations by May. If Japanese ignore SRA this effect is felt sooner. Everything is tied to SRA. There is a recoginized need to train more pilots and also maintain offensive action somewhere. both are dependent on the SRA resources being made available. This is a simple fact of life the Japanese recoginzed. In the actual war it must be remembered Japan knew it could not win a protracted war. It planed on simply securing SRA and then digging in and waiting for US to quit. The Japanese 'forgot' their success suprised them and led them to believe a larger victory was possible and they expanded their aims to include the Midway operation. This operation was not given proper time for planning, poor recon and vague orders. This led to failure. The orginal question was if Japan recognized the dig in defense would not work before the war begain could they have conducted a genuine offensive will realitic aims in the South Pacific. It is OK if you want to move it to the Central Pacific but still you must use the opening Japanese intentions to secure the SRA (this is vital and can not simply be jumped over or ignored. Every available unit is already used in SRA operations. Combined fleet was tasked with securing the flank. The PH strike Guam and Wake operations are all conducted to this end. There is not unlimited force left over for anything like an invasion of Hawaii.
If Japan can somehow bring the US CV's into battle and defeat them utterly prehaps something could be done but entering into US LBA in the amount Hawaii has based there precludes the Japanese from assuming it will result in any great victory. (Japan needs to face long odds to win but this is too much for me to risk. In WiTP I look forward to your AAR's describing how you conquered Hawaii)
In point of fact early US operations in Central Pacific are more possible then Japanese. The Japanese Central Pacific bases are all lacking in defense. The US could have captured destroyed and then abandond them much easier then the Japanese could capture the bases around Hawaii.

In WiTP as Japan I do plan on doing things alot different. Mainly I want to find a way to secure the SRA by April and have offensive power transfered and availble in South Pacific by May.

[byron13]

Actually, I'm looking at the thread, and I too am confused - and I'm the one that got off track. Quite frankly, I'm not sure how I managed to stick it in this thread, but I was suggesting that WitP allow for additional Allied reinforcements if Japan is significantly more successful than it was historically. Why I put it in the UV thread is a mystery even to me. I will stop pursuing this idea here and quit while I'm behind.