Historical Question Manila & Singapore Ports

[Buck Beach]

Can any of you historical buffs tell me how fast the ports of Manila & Singapore emptied out after the first day of the war. What about Pearl?

Don't want to be gamey by getting everything out of harms way and running like hell, but, it seems to me that would of logically have happen?

[mjk428]

The 18th Infantry Division is famous for landing in Singapore just in time to become POWs. So Britain was still reinforcing Singapore in January.

However, unless you and your opponent have agreed to follow the historical timeline, I see no reason why you should be so constrained. Not even the AI waits until January 11th to commence hostilities against the Dutch - at least not in my experience. I highly doubt many human opponents wait that long.

As long as the pace of Japanese expansion is accelerated I have no remorse over accelerating the pace of withdrawal.

[Dixie]

There was a lot of shipping leaving Singapore almost up until the final collapse, but very little of it was 'official' military evacuation traffic. The British army was expected to hold out at Singapore for quite a while (I think the official estimate before the invasion was about 180 days until the RN could relieve them). There were lots of individuals (often termed deserters) fleeing from Singers though.

I can't say about Manila though.

EDIT: As mjk said, don't feel constrained by this though. I usually evac the Aussie AIF units at the very least for future ops. Just because it didn't happen IRL doesn't mean you can't do it in the game, after all it is just a game.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: mjk428

The 18th Infantry Division is famous for landing in Singapore just in time to become POWs. So Britain was still reinforcing Singapore in January.

However, unless you and your opponent have agreed to follow the historical timeline, I see no reason why you should be so constrained. Not even the AI waits until January 11th to commence hostilities against the Dutch - at least not in my experience. I highly doubt many human opponents wait that long.

As long as the pace of Japanese expansion is accelerated I have no remorse over accelerating the pace of withdrawal.

I am an AI player and I have decided to maintain the land and air forces, against 20-20 hindsight, for balance in the first year of the war, but, the question relates to the shipping (both warships and cargo). That is where I would like some historical guidance.

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

I am an AI player and I have decided to maintain the land and air forces, against 20-20 hindsight, for balance in the first year of the war, but, the question relates to the shipping (both warships and cargo). That is where I would like some historical guidance.

I'm pretty sure most of the RN ships were moved fairly early (to Java IIRC) to form part of the ABDA command. Any ships incapable of fighting withdrew home or to the Indian Ocean, For example HMS Mauritius was under refit and she left a couple of days after Force Z was sunk even though she had no defensive weaponry.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: Dixie

There was a lot of shipping leaving Singapore almost up until the final collapse, but very little of it was 'official' military evacuation traffic. The British army was expected to hold out at Singapore for quite a while (I think the official estimate before the invasion was about 180 days until the RN could relieve them). There were lots of individuals (often termed deserters) fleeing from Singers though.

I can't say about Manila though.

EDIT: As mjk said, don't feel constrained by this though. I usually evac the Aussie AIF units at the very least for future ops. Just because it didn't happen IRL doesn't mean you can't do it in the game, after all it is just a game.

Here is the problem I'm having. The in game Japanese bombing wracks havoc and the fighter cover is inept in the initial attacks. How severe were those first weeks actual air attacks. Was there a sense of panic to get to open water and/or a safe port. Both Manila and Singapore are full of shipping. I want to save the shipping at the expense of gamingly evacuating cargo and personnel but want to be realistic. Example, there are like 30 plus subs at Manila. How long did it take them to decide to pull them and their supporting AS's back.

I am an AI player

[mjk428]

ORIGINAL: Dixie

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

I am an AI player and I have decided to maintain the land and air forces, against 20-20 hindsight, for balance in the first year of the war, but, the question relates to the shipping (both warships and cargo). That is where I would like some historical guidance.

I'm pretty sure most of the RN ships were moved fairly early (to Java IIRC) to form part of the ABDA command. Any ships incapable of fighting withdrew home or to the Indian Ocean, For example HMS Mauritius was under refit and she left a couple of days after Force Z was sunk even though she had no defensive weaponry.

As an AI player myself, I understand what you're trying to achieve. For me there's an ongoing conflict between behaving historically vs. preservation of forces. I don't throw away my units because they represent real people and real ships. In the end I just try to do what feels right. If it's any consolation, the game was designed based on 20-20 hindsight and the AI is scripted to attack sooner than the Japanese did historically.

Out of curiousity, do you send the Prince of Wales to her doom? I've thought about doing just that at the start of every new game but I just can't bring myself to do it.

My standard game start has me getting everything that floats and can't defend itself out of harm's way. I withdraw only one combat unit - one of the Aussie brigades at Singapore - in an attempt to slow down the juggernaut in Burma - always to no avail. The subs in Manila's port get sent to Pearl and stay there until at least their first refit - this is for convenience sake. I remove as many air units and base support units as my PPs allow and they mostly go to the defense OZ - even if the AI probably will never land there. Basically I make decisions on what could happen if I was playing a human opponent.

I think it does far less harm to withdraw faster than historically than to do the opposite. For instance, in my last game, I sent all my units in Java to Soerabaja because it's a non-malaria hex and it held out against the AI until August. This was a CHS game and Hong Kong never did fall. I gave up on that game around Dec. '42.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: mjk428
Out of curiousity, do you send the Prince of Wales to her doom? I've thought about doing just that at the start of every new game but I just can't bring myself to do it.

Ditto.

[String]

Reinforce Singapore and the AI will never ever take it. Same goes for Manila if you retreat there.

[Feltan]

I'm going to argue that the political point system prevents any really impossible ahistorical outcomes -- meaning that pretty much anything one does as the allies, it falls within an evelope of "potential" actions available to commanders at the time. Well, sort of -- we have a much better appreciation of what's coming.

Personally, as the allies, I try to accomplish a fighting withdrawl. I don't run like hell for the sake of it, but on the other hand I don't launch force Z and do try and pull units out of Singapore and the Ph.

I don't think there is anything wrong with this -- I mean we could just watch the computer fight itself using historical scripts if all one wants is pure history. The point of the game, within reason, is to see how you could do better than the historical commanders.

Regards,
Feltan

[KDonovan]

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

Can any of you historical buffs tell me how fast the ports of Manila & Singapore emptied out after the first day of the war. What about Pearl?

Don't want to be gamey by getting everything out of harms way and running like hell, but, it seems to me that would of logically have happen?

wouldn't call myself a historical buff, compared to some posters on this message board, but i'll give your question a stab..

at 2:30am Manila time, the general and navy staff became aware of the pearl harbor attacks. Sunrise is about about 6:30am in December (in the PI), so you figure an attack on harbor facilities would come around 7:30am. That gives you about 5 hours to empty the harbor.

One of the factors to consider, is the size of the channels leading in and out of the harbor. The habor entrance is about 11 miles (19km) wide. However several islands straddle the entrance (including Corregidor). Most of these small outcropings are located in the south, near the seldom used southern channel. Therefore the northern channel would be the perfered exit point for larger ships. The Northern channel is about 2 miles wide (3.2km).

So w/ only a 2 mile across exit point for large ships, things could get quite crowded fast if one was trying to empty the harbor in the middle of the night during the 5 hour period before a possible japanese attack.

So how many ships would be able to get out? Well i'm no harbor master, but i would imagine any small boat w/ out the need to fire up boilers and with low draft could leave the harbor in plenty of times, through either the southern or northern channels. Which means all MSW, PG, and PT's should be able to scoot out before day break. The Electric-Desiel Engines of the Submarines wouldn't take long to get ready either, and since Manila was on a wartime footing, all supplies should be on those boats already. So under the right circumstances i believe most of the subs should be able to slip out before day break (about 1 leaving every 15 minutes).

Now the big boys, such as the AK, AP, AD, AS, TK, AO, and AV will definetly need time to fire up their boilers before they get underway. I have no idea how long it would take, but i would image a few hours per ship. And even if all the boilers were ready to go, i can't imagine alot of these lumbering ships scooting out of the northern 2 mile channel at the same time. My uneducated guess would be about 2-3 ships out of the northern channel per hour.

That leaves the few DD's and AVD's left. With their speed, even w/ a late start, i can't imagine these fast, slick ships not being able to clear the harbor before daybreak

With all that said, i'm sure their are others w/ more expereince on how many ships can get out of an harbor (like Manila Bay) in 5 hours than myself. But i hope my information helps you.

[bradfordkay]

In my games I've tried to temper the desire to get the troops out safely with a nod towards historical reality.

My rule on the Manila subs is that on day one four subs per AS can be sent out, and two per day per AS after that. The reason for the extras on day one is that I am theorizing that some of them might have been more ready than others and only needed a little work to be ready. Oh, they are being sent t interdict enemy shipping, not to run away. In my PBEM S-42 managed to sink the heavy cruiser Maya in the first week of the war.

I always try to send Force Z to interfere with the landings and have had some good luck doing so against the AI. In CHS, however, the ships of Force Z are not all in port ready to go. The Repulse is still almost a day out of Singapore, coming up from the southeast. In my AI game of CHS v2.08, she was torpedoes by a sub on the way into Singapore, effectively preventing Force Z from being formed. In my PBEM against Chez, the landings at Mersing had already been going on for a full day before she made it into port. That factor combined with the spotting of at least two IJN BBs off Mersing led me to believe that it would be a wasted effort to send Force Z to oppose those landings (I don't believe in losing capital ships unless the return for the investment is worth it - not being able to stop the landings meant that it would be a waste of effort).

Historically the combat vessels of the Asiatic Fleet were under orders to withdraw form Philippine waters and coordinate with the RDN and RN, so you can feel comfortable in issuing such orders to your fleet. I prefer to keep many of the AKs and APs disbanded in Manila until a little later when they can be used to start evacuating non-combat troops (Asiatic Fleet HQ, excess base forces - oh, and the marine AA unit).

[Buck Beach]

I really appreciate all the feed back. Great to see that in my many starts (updates, updates, updates -and I appreciate them) I am not alone using my special 20-20 glasses kept close to my computer.[:D] I am terribly guilty of most of the asset saving strategies and then some. To the extent possible I have saved everything I could out of Malaysia, DEI and the Philippines. EVERYTHING !! All of those assets sure do beef up both major fronts with lots of Base units, aircraft, etc.

I am getting ready to start a new game using the new RHSCAIO (level 7) mod. I know it's not for everyone but it has a lot of things I really like. I want to give the poor old AI a break and still stay within the historical world for at least the first few weeks of the war. However, I don't much about the history of that short period and not really up to trying to Google it with 10 different variations of searches.

Thanks to everyone for sharing your strategies and information. Feel free to continue I will be reading them.

[okami]

The only thing I would add is that the Philipines was commanded by Douglas MacArthur and he was completely surprised by PH and even with a 5 hour lead time managed to get his airforce destroyed on the field so take that into account when you make a decision about moving ships out of Manila.

[bradfordkay]

Okami, the USAFFE air forces were caught on the ground not because they were unprepared, but rather because they had to RTB for refueling and the Japanese happened to show up at that time (the Japanese attack had been delayed by clouds - if it had left on schedule the US air units would not have been on the ground). MacArthur made a lot of mistakes, but getting caught with his aircraft on the ground was more a case of bad luck than being asleep.


EDIT: and the USN forces were under the command of Adm Hart, Asiatic Fleet commander. Their combat units were already under orders to Borneo, so I see no need for an allied player to consider himself under any such restrictions.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Okami, the USAFFE air forces were caught on the ground not because they were unprepared, but rather because they had to RTB for refueling and the Japanese happened to show up at that time (the Japanese attack had been delayed by clouds - if it had left on schedule the US air units would not have been on the ground). MacArthur made a lot of mistakes, but getting caught with his aircraft on the ground was more a case of bad luck than being asleep.

Totally true. I've always thought it a shame that this portion of the war wasn't modeled as the "crap shoot" it really was for the Japanese. They expected an extended campaign to wear down the USAFFE before they could invade (which is why NO immediate landings were made in the Philippines historically). The game gives them a guaranteed roll of "7" every time..., which is hardly historical.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay
and the USN forces were under the command of Adm Hart, Asiatic Fleet commander. Their combat units were already under orders to Borneo, so I see no need for an allied player to consider himself under any such restrictions.

Some very preliminary research shows that most the U.S. Navy ships did in fact escape. Dewey Dry Dock was scuttled only to be re-floated by the Japanese (I think, can't even remember what I looked up yesterday). Quite a few of the freighters, mainly those that were Philippine, were sunk, throughout the month of December 1941.

Ships Sunk, Damaged or Captured December 1941 (82 ships)
Date Ship Type Cause Result Location Deaths
12/01/41 Astral Tanker Torpedo attack None NAtlantic None
12/02/41 Astral Tanker Torpedo Sunk NAtlantic Crew 37
12/03/41 Sagadahoc Freighter Torpedo Sunk ApproachMed Crew 1
12/07/41 Cynthia Olson Steam Schooner Torpedo Sunk Pacific Crew 33; US Army 2
12/07/41 Islas Visayas Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Meifoo No. 5 Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Mei Kang Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Mei Ling [Ying] Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Mei Nan Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Mei Yun Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Foch Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Needwood Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Herleik Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Folozu Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 Ramona Freighter (Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/08/41 President Harrison Troopship Deliberately grounded Captured by Japanese Pacific Crew 3; Japanese POW: 164; Died POW:12 including 4 lost on SS Arizan Maru while being transferred to Japan
12/08/41 Admiral Cole Freighter Bombed Little damage Philippines None
12/08/41 Gertrude Kellogg Freighter Bombed Damaged Philippines Japanese POW: Crew 2
12/08/41 Capillo Freighter Bombed Damaged Philippines None
12/08/41 Morazan Freighter (Honduras or Panama) Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific None
12/08/41 Nisqually Scow (former Sub Boat) Japanese attack on Wake Island Sunk Pacific Unknown
12/09/41 Gran Freighter (Panama) Captured Captured Pacific Unknown
12/09/41 Donerail [former Danish Nordhval] Freighter (Panama) Torpedo Sunk Pacific Crew 33; Passengers 8
12/10/41 Cetus Unknown (Philippines) Scuttled Taken over by Japanese Philippines Unknown
12/10/41 Mauna Ala Freighter Grounded Total loss Westcoast None
12/10/41 Oregon (States Steamship) Freighter Collision Sunk Eastcoast Crew 17
12/10/41 Sagoland Freighter Bombed Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/11/41 Lahaina Freighter Shelled Sunk Pacific Crew 4
12/11/41 President Grant Troopship None None Philippines Japanese POW: Crew: 35; Died POW: 5
12/11/41 Wawa Freighter (British owned Panama-flag) Scuttled to avoid capture Sunk Pacific Japanese POW: Crew 3
12/12/41 Governor Wright Passenger ship (Philippines) Bombed Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/12/41 Marion Freighter (Panama) Scuttled to avoid capture Sunk Pacific Unknown
12/12/41 Vincent Freighter Torpedo Sunk Pacific Japanese POW: Crew 37; Died POW: 2
12/13/41 Essi Freighter (Panama) Captured by Vichy French Turned over to Japanese Pacific Unknown
12/13/41 Manatawny Tanker Bombed Sunk Philippines None
12/15/41 Vizcaya Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/17/41 Corregidor Steamship (Philippines) Mine Sunk Philippines 500 dead
12/17/41 Manini Freighter Torpedo Sunk Pacific Crew 2
12/18/41 L. P. St. Clair Tanker Shelled None Westcoast None
12/18/41 Samoa Lumber schooner Shelled and missed by Torpedo Slight damage Westcoast None
12/19/41 Prusa Hog Islander Torpedo Sunk Pacific Crew 10
12/20/41 Lindinha Freighter (Panama) Captured Captured Pacific Unknown
12/20/41 Florinha Freighter (Panama) Captured Captured Pacific Unknown
12/20/41 Agwiworld Tanker Shelled Little damage Westcoast None
12/20/41 Emidio Tanker Shelled & Torpedo Total loss Westcoast Crew 5
12/20/41 Tahoe Garbage scow Collision with submarine Slight damage Westcoast None
12/22/41 H. M. Storey Tanker Submarine attack None Westcoast None
12/23/41 Justine Foss Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Japanese POW 4 - 2 killed on Wake by Japanese
12/23/41 Pioneer Tug Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/23/41 Columbia Dredge Captured by Japanese Captured Pacific Unknown
12/23/41 Idaho Freighter Shelled Damaged Westcoast None
12/23/41 Larry Doheny Tanker Shelled Little damage Westcoast None
12/23/41 Montebello Tanker Torpedo & Shelled Sunk Westcoast None
12/24/41 Absaroka Freighter Torpedo Damaged Westcoast Crew 1
12/24/41 Dorothy Philips Freighter Shelled Damaged-No damage [sources disagree on damage] Westcoast None
12/24/41 Si Kiang [former French] Steamship (Ship confiscated by U.S. prior) Bombed Fire Total loss Philippines Total 10; Marines 2?
12/25/41 Admiral Y. S. Williams Freighter Captured Captured Pacific Crew 1; 29 to Japanese POW camp: Died POW: 4
12/25/41 Argus Steamship (Philippines) Captured CapturedJapanese Pacific Unknown
12/25/41 Barbara Olson Freighter Submarine attack None Westcoast None
12/25/41 Eldorado Freighter (Panama) Scuttled Sunk Raised by Japanese Pacific Unknown
12/25/41 Churruca Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Pacific Unknown
12/25/41 Daylight Freighter (Panama) Captured Captured Pacific Unknown
12/25/41 Hirondelle Yacht Captured Captured Pacific Unknown
12/24/41 Si Kiang Unknown (Ship confiscated by U.S. prior) Bombed Fire Unknown Philippines Unknown
12/26/41 Nancy Moran Tug Collision Sunk Eastcoast Unknown
12/26/41 Capillo Freighter Bombed Sunk Philippines Japanese POW: 39; Died POW: 6
12/26/41 Paz Freighter (Philippines) Bombed & Fire Damaged Philippines Unknown
12/27/41 Connecticut Tanker Torpedo Damaged Westcoast None
12/27/41 Ethel Edwards Freighter Bombed & Fire Unknown Philippines Unknown
12/27/41 Taurus Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/28/41 Mauban Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Taken over by Japanese Philippines Unknown
12/28/41 Ruth Alexander Cargo/Passenger Ship None Crew left behind Philippines Japanese POW: Crew 17; Died POW: 3
12/29/41 Don Jose Freighter (Philippines) Bombed Taken over by Japanese Philippines Unknown
12/29/41 Stone Street [former Italian Clara] Freighter (Panama) Engine room explosion Damaged NAtlantic Crew 1
12/29/41 Aloha Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/29/41 Bicol Freighter (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/29/41 Palawan Unknown (Philippines) Scuttled Taken over by Japanese Philippines Unknown
12/31/41 Dos Hermanos Unknown (Philippines) Scuttled Taken over by Japanese Philippines Unknown
12/31/41 Magallanes Steamship (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/31/41 Montanes Steamship (Philippines) Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown
12/31/41 Ruth Alexander Cargo/Passenger Ship Bombed Sunk Pacific Crew 1
12/_/41 Vizcaya Unknown Scuttled Sunk Philippines Unknown

I got this information from:

http://www.usmm.org/sunk39-41.html

There is great information at this and related links.

[msieving1]

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

ORIGINAL: Dixie

There was a lot of shipping leaving Singapore almost up until the final collapse, but very little of it was 'official' military evacuation traffic. The British army was expected to hold out at Singapore for quite a while (I think the official estimate before the invasion was about 180 days until the RN could relieve them). There were lots of individuals (often termed deserters) fleeing from Singers though.

I can't say about Manila though.

EDIT: As mjk said, don't feel constrained by this though. I usually evac the Aussie AIF units at the very least for future ops. Just because it didn't happen IRL doesn't mean you can't do it in the game, after all it is just a game.

There was a lot of traffic into Singapore up until just before the surrender, bringing in reinforcements, and evacuating civilians and some military personnel (generally skilled personnel who weren't particularly useful for ground combat). I don't think there were a lot of deserters. Similar evacuations were made from the Philippines, but I don't think a lot of reinforcement were sent in.

Here is the problem I'm having. The in game Japanese bombing wracks havoc and the fighter cover is inept in the initial attacks. How severe were those first weeks actual air attacks. Was there a sense of panic to get to open water and/or a safe port. Both Manila and Singapore are full of shipping. I want to save the shipping at the expense of gamingly evacuating cargo and personnel but want to be realistic. Example, there are like 30 plus subs at Manila. How long did it take them to decide to pull them and their supporting AS's back.

I am an AI player

Except for those undergoing overhauls, the submarines were all sent out on patrol within a couple of days. The only sub lost at Manila was USS Sealion. All of the subs had shfted their bases to Java or Australia by the end of December. As for the sub tenders, USS Holland and Otus were evacuated within a few days of the attack. USS Canopus was moved to Mariveles Bay on the Bataan penisula on Christmas day, and remained there, despite being damaged, until she was scuttled in April.

For myself (playing CHS against the AI), I tend to evacuate US base forces and Asiatic Fleet HQ from the Philippines, and pull out the larger cargo ships and tankers. I don't normally evacuate any ground forces from Malaya. I leave the small coastal freighters to pick up whatever supplies are scattered about and bring them to Manila and Bataan, or to Singapore. If I can scrounge up supplies to ship in, I might try, depending on the circumstances. But there's really nothing for the cargo ships to carry in to the Philippines or Singapore. There are not enough supplies in Australia and India to make it worthwhile.

[mlees]

I am in the middle of Vol. 1 of Bloody Shambles.
 
From what I can recall, the Japanese did not do more than a couple relatively inneffective air raids on Singapore in the month of December.
 
It's Air Force appeared to be busy with supporting the ground offensive up in the northern part of Malaya.
 
If your in game opponent is making life difficult in Singapore harbor early on, then of course evacuate. You don't have to hold yourself to historical actions if your opponent isn't. (IMO.)

[Buck Beach]

For thoses who care to know: Long Post

The Fleet Moves South
The mission of the Asiatic Fleet in the event of war was to support he defense of the Philippines, "as long as that defense continues." The actual employment of local naval defense forces was entrusted to the commander of the 16th Naval District, who was responsible for the Joint tactical and strategical employment of his forces in co-operation with the Army. The commander of the Asiatic Fleet, at his discretion and when the situation demanded, was authorized to "shift base to British and Dutch ports."[57]
The force assigned for this task was pitifully small and deployed aver a distance of more than 1,500 miles, form northern Luzon to Borneo. In the Manila Bay area were 5 destroyers, 2 of which were under repair and 3 on patrol; 27 submarines with their 3 tenders--3 of the underwater craft


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were being overhauled; 28 Catalinas (twin-engine patrol bombers or PBYs); 4 utility planes; and 1 observation plane. The planes were organized into Patrol Wing 10 under Capt. F.D. Wagner, with one full squadron operating from Sangley Point, Cavite, and the remainder from Olongapo. In addition, there were 5 gunboats, a similar number of motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, and other auxiliary craft in the area. At Mariveles was the floating dry dock Dewey. The installations of the 16th Naval district, commanded by Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, were centered in Manila and Subic Bays--at Cavite, Corregidor, and Olongapo--with approximately 2,000 officers and men assigned. The reorganized and strengthened 4th Marines, with a strength of 1,600 and commanded by Col. Samuel L. Howard, was at Olongapo.[58]
The bulk of the surface strength of the Asiatic Fleet, organized in Task Force 5, was based south of Manila Bay. The flagship of the task force, the heavy cruiser Houston, was at Iloilo, in Panay. The light cruiser Boise, which belonged to the Pacific Fleet, was also in the Visayas, off Cebu, where she had gone after her arrival in Manila on 4 December with an Army convoy. At the Dutch Borneo port of Tarakan was the light cruiser Marblehead accompanied by 5 destroyers, and at Balikpapan were 4 more destroyers and a tender.[59] The remaining 2 submarines of the Asiatic Fleet were on patrol off the Luzon coast, 1 in Lingayen Gulf and another in Sorsogon Bay. Patrolling to the south and linking up with the Dutch patrols from Borneo were 2 small aircraft detachments, 1 at Davao and another on a small island south of Palawan.[60]

On the morning of 8 December, the only portion of the Asiatic Fleet to come under fire was the small aircraft detachment at Davao with the tender Preston. After the attack from the Ryujo-based dive bombers and fighters, Preston let pass four Japanese destroyers, and then slipped out of Davao Gulf to escape southward.

Before noon of the 8th, Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, commander of Task Force 5 and recently arrived from China, left by plane for Iloilo to hoist his flag aboard the Houston. He was joined there by the Boise from Cebu. That evening the aircraft tender Langley, protected by two destroyers, slipped out of Manila Bay under cover of darkness to join the cruisers at Panay. From there Glassford, on orders from Admiral Hart, led his small fleet south to Dutch Borneo to pick up oil and to assemble the rest of his force. He met no enemy ships on the way, only a long line of merchant vessels making good their escape.[61] Thus, by the end of the first day of war, the striking force of the Asiatic


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Fleet, Task Force 5, was steaming south, and on 10 December had left Philippine waters.
The Japanese Gain Air and Naval Supremacy
The Japanese followed up their successes of the first day of war with a series of air attacks aimed at destroying or driving American air and naval power from the Philippines. Before dawn of the 9th 7 Japanese naval bombers struck Nichols Field near Manila. The Japanese had planned a larger attack but the fog had again rolled in over Formosa during the early morning hours. The 7 bombers were enough to do the job. The loss of 2 or 3 P-40s, as well as other planes, and the destruction of ground installations completed the havoc begun at noon the previous day.[62]
On the 9th ground crews worked desperately to patch up the damaged planes, and units were reorganized. Antiaircraft defenses, especially in the Manila area, were strengthened, and one battery of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) which had left Corregidor after dark on the 8th was in position on the morning of the 9th to furnish local protection for the port area, Nichols Field, and the oil storage and railroad yards.[63] About five hundred men of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) from Clark Field were dispatched to Manila during the day, supplied with equipment from the Philippine Ordnance Depot, and organized into a provisional antiaircraft regiment, later designated the 515th.[64]

The air attack against Formosa which General MacArthur had promised for the 9th never materialized.[65] At 0800 one B-17 took off from Clark Field for a photo reconnaissance mission over Formosa but was forced back because of mechanical difficulty. Army fighters flew reconnaissance missions over northern Luzon and the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 continued their patrols to the west and northwest. Numerous reports of enemy sightings were received but on investigation proved to be unfounded. Such reports, Hart noted, placed all Japanese vessels in one of two categories, "either a Transport or a Battleship!"[66] The Japanese also searched north Luzon during the day for evidence of American air activities.[67]

On the 9th, the thirteen heavy bombers on Mindanao moved forward to Luzon. Six of the Flying Fortresses landed at ill-fated Clark Field at 1430; the rest reached San Marcelino, an emergency field along the west coast of Luzon, later in the afternoon. The B-17s at Clark refueled and took off immediately after their arrival, remaining in the air until dark to avoid being caught on the ground as had the others the day before.[68]


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JAPANESE AIR ATTACK ON 10 DECEMBER 1941 left warehouses on fire at Nichols Field, above; below, at Cavite Navy Yard, small-arms shells explode (left) as the torpedo-loaded barge (center) burns.




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The weather over Formosa on the morning of 10 December was threatening, but the Japanese, anticipating a change for the better, decided to press their advantage. Naval planes took off about 1000 to strike Luzon again. This time the target was the Manila Bay area.[69] First warning of the approach of Japanese planes reached the Interceptor Command at Nielson Field at 1115, and fighters were immediately dispatched to cover Manila Bay, the port area, and Bataan. A half hour later, the enemy aircraft hit the Del Carmen Field near Clark, and the Nichols and Nielson Fields, near Manila. So severe was the attack against Nichols and so great the number of bombs dropped that the men at Nielson, nearly two miles away, thought the bombs were falling on their own field. The pattern set at Clark Field two days earlier was repeated. High-level bombers came in first and hit the barracks, offices, and warehouses. The fighters then came in at low level to strafe the grounded planes and installations. American planes returning to refuel were attacked by Zeros and destroyed. There was no antiaircraft fire and no fighter protection over the field; all the pursuits were engaged over Manila Bay.[70]
The naval base at Cavite received no less attention than Nichols Field. The Japanese force had divided north of Manila, and part had turned east toward the army installations. The rest, 54 bombers attacked ships and small craft in the bay and the remainder went on toward the naval base. With maddening deliberation, the bombers flew over Cavite, dropping their bombs from a height of 20,000 feet, above the range of the 9 3-inch antiaircraft guns protecting the base. Almost every bomb fell within the navy yard. After the first run, the first flight withdrew and the other 27 bombers, having completed their attack against ships in the bay, flew in to strike the targets.[71]

The attack lasted for two hours. As at Clark and Nichols, the opposition was feeble and the damage extensive. The entire yard was set ablaze; the power plant, dispensary, repair ships, warehouses, barracks, and radio station received direct hits. Greatest damage was done by the fire which spread rapidly and was soon out of control. Admiral Rockwell estimated that five hundred men were killed or seriously wounded that day.[72] The large submarine Sealion received a direct hit, but Seadragon was pulled away in time by its tender. The most serious loss to the submarine force, however, was the destruction of well over two hundred torpedoes.[73]

Throughout the attack, Admiral Hart had watched the destruction of Cavite from atop the Marsman Building. That night, after receiving an account of the damage done, he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington that he regarded Manila untenable as a naval base since the


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enemy had control of the air, but promised to "continue submarine and air operations as long as possible."[74] He then sent 2 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 23 submarine tenders, and 2 minesweepers south to join Task Force 5. "It is unfortunate," he noted in his report, "that two or three additional small ships were not sent south at this time."[75]
The naval vessels were not the only ships to move south. At the start of the war there had been about forty large merchant ships, many with valuable cargoes, in Manila Bay. The Navy had promptly closed the bay to all outbound traffic, and had extinguished the lighthouses on Corregidor and two other outlying islands.[76] Fortunately the merchant vessels had escaped attack during the first day of operations.

In the next two days, many commercial vessels sought protection in Manila Bay and were guided through the mine fields by the inshore patrol. During the attack of the 10th, the Japanese had dropped a few bombs among these ships, scoring one hit. Admiral Hart had told the shipmasters on the 11th that their vessels would be safer in Visayan ports, and that evening the commercial vessels began to steam out of Manila Bay. All but one finally escaped.[77] The Japanese had missed a golden opportunity to cripple Allied shipping.

On the morning of the 11th the fires at Cavite were burning more fiercely than ever. Evidently there was no chance of saving the yard. When Rockwell reported to Hart in manila that day the two men agreed to salvage as much as possible from the ruins. remaining supplies were to be distributed among the installations at Manila, Corregidor, and Mariveles. The base at Sangley Point was to be maintained as long as possible, and when no longer tenable the radio station and fuel supply were to be moved to Corregidor.[78]

Meanwhile, the Japanese air force continued the systematic destruction of the air and naval forces remaining in the Philippines. There had been no raids on the 11th, largely because the weather over Formosa had been bad. The planes returning from the raid on the 10th had been forced to set down wherever they could, thus scattering units among the many Formosan fields. The next day was spent in reassembling the units.[79] On the 12th and 13th the Japanese again attacked in force. On these two days hundreds of Japanese Army and Navy planes struck targets on Luzon at will in a final effort to destroy the remnants of the Far East Air Force and the Asiatic Fleet.

By this time American air power was at a low ebb. There were only 22 P-40s in commission, with 6 more promised if they could be repaired in time. In addition, between 5 and 8 P-35s and a handful of the obsolete P-26s were operational. Sixteen heavy bombers were still in commission but 5 of these were suitable only for low-altitude flights and another 4 were not fit for tactical missions. With the Far East Air Force thus reduced in strength it


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wad decided to use the remaining planes for reconnaissance in order to conserve them as long as possible. The pursuit planes were based at Clark and Nichols, and the heavy bombers were withdrawn to Del Monte. On the morning of the 12th few American planes remained to hinder the Japanese.[80]
The enemy attack on the 12th came at noon, the hour when Clark and Cavite had been hit. Sixty-three naval bombers from Takao in Formosa arrived over Central Luzon between 1130 and 1200 and struck Iba and Clark Fields. Only a small number of planes flew over Clark; the remainder delivered the main attack against Iba, reporting the destruction of ten planes on the ground.[81]

That morning, the PBYs at Olongapo had been dispatched on a fruitless search for a nonexistent Japanese carrier reported off the Luzon coast. They were followed in by a Japanese force of Zeros which had been escorting a large number of bombers in a scheduled strike against one of the Manila fields. When the mission was canceled on account of poor weather over the target, the Zeros sought targets elsewhere. The returning PBYs offered an opportunity too good to be missed. Unseen by the Americans, the Japanese planes waited for the seven Navy patrol bombers to land, and then destroyed them at leisure.[82] These same planes then went on to attack Batangas before returning to Formosa. MacArthur reported at the end of the day that "the crescendo of enemy air offensive was rapidly rising," with attacks by at least 113 planes. "Pilots have been ordered to avoid direct combat," he explained, in order to make a "show of strength and to have air reconnaissance."[83]

The next day almost 200 Japanese planes were over Luzon. The first attack came at dawn against Del Carmen. At 1030 and at 1100 Clark Field was attacked. About the same time Baguio and Tarlac were hit. These early strikes were made by Army planes. At 1230 the naval bombers put in an appearance. During the afternoon, Del Carmen, Clark, Nichols, Cabanatuan, and Batangas were hit at least once. The fields, already strewn with wrecked planes, received further damage. Over Subic Bay additional PBYs were destroyed, leaving less than a full squadron in Patrol Wing 10. By the end of the day, American Army and Navy air power in the Philippines had been virtually destroyed.[84]

One thing was clear to Admiral Hart by this time: the United States forces in the Philippines were on their own. With the loss of air power the possibility of effective naval support was extremely limited and the sea lanes along which reinforcements could be expected to travel were closed. he felt, therefore, that he must salvage what he could of the Asiatic Fleet for later operations in the defense of the Malay Barrier. On 14 December he sent out the remaining bombers of Patrol Wing 10, together with three tenders and such extra personnel


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and spare parts as could be carried southward.[85] Staff officers, including the chief of staff of the Asiatic Fleet, followed by plane and by boat. All that remained of the Asiatic Fleet in Philippine waters were 2 destroyers (1 under repair), 6 motor torpedo boats, 2 tenders, 3 gunboats, and various small craft, in addition to the 27 submarines. Admiral Hart himself decided to remain in Manila as long as the underwater craft could be operated and serviced from there.[86]
The position of the heavy bombers in Mindanao had by now become precarious. The Japanese were flying extensive reconnaissance missions in an effort to discover the remaining American aircraft. Thus far they had been unable to find the Del Monte field, but it was only a question of time before this last haven would be discovered and destroyed. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to service the B-17s with the inadequate facilities at Del Monte. There were no spare parts, engines, or propellers for the B-17s in the Philippines; B-18s and damaged B-17s had to be cannibalized to keep the bombers flying. The only tools were those in the possession of the crews. The men who worked on the planes all night often got no rest the next day because of air alerts. On some days the heavy bombers had to remain aloft during the daylight hours to avoid destruction on the ground. They dodged back and forth between Mindanao and Luzon, playing "a game of hide-and-seek that wore out men as well as planes."[87]

Under these conditions, it was evident that the remaining heavy bombers could not operate efficiently in the Philippines. General Brereton therefore requested authority on 15 December to move the B-17s to Darwin in northwest Australia, 1,500 miles away, where they could be based safely and serviced properly. His intention was to operate from fields near Darwin, using Clark and Del Monte as advance bases from which to strike enemy targets in the Philippines. Sutherland approved the plan the same day and secured General MacArthur's concurrence. The planes were immediately prepared for the long flight southward, and two days later the first group of B-17s left Del Monte airfield. By the following evening ten of the bombers had reached Batchelor Field outside Darwin. They had left Mindanao none too soon, for on the 19th the field at Del Monte received its first major air attack from Japanese planes based on the carrier Ryujo.[88]

By 15 December the air strength of the Philippines had been reduced to a handful of fighters All hopes for preventing the main Japanese landings soon to come and for keeping the supply routes open rested now on these few planes and on the submarines of the Asiatic Fleet.

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