Modeling of Carrier Battles

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

Which plan could be very sophisticated. At PH they had six different options - because they planned for all (or at least most) possible contingencies

Sophisticated is one word. Overly intricate are two more words that have been repeatedly applied to many Japanese plans. By 0700 or so on Dec 7th 1941 the Japanese would have had more plans than planes available to hit an unexpectedly discovered American carrier. Frankly their strike on PH was masterfully executed but it was a risky one if surprise was not achieved (far more so than WitP mechanics would indicate).

Ovderly intricate can be applied to Midway/Aleutians fairly if you wish. Not to PH. The plan was as masterful as Philippines - and worked out with a great deal less good luck. Surely you have heard how the Japanese WANTED to "discover" an American carrier, how they were very disappointed they didn't do that. And how NON Japanese historians virtually all agree that it was very fortunate for USN that the American carriers did NOT "discover" their enemies. The Japanese plan actually used was not the preferred one - it was the one for "surprise achieved, no carriers in port" - and to build a plan matrix based on other possibities was sound operational doctrine. WE do that - now - and it does not mean we are "overly intricate" to do so. Fujida had different code words and visual signals to make it easy to comprehend. [In the event this went slightly wrong - as not all planes saw all the flares - or saw too many. But it didn't turn out badly in the event. It is difficult to decribe how easy it is to mess up in a tactical high speed battle situation: for any side in any era. I have been fired upon by gigantic US SAMs - locked on to a surface ship - and I saw HMAS Hobart after she was actually hit by three Sparrows. Lots of things can go wrong. Inevitably some will go wrong. Having a flexable plan freshly briefed and giving tactical control to a senior officer forward was wise, and better than anything we did at that time.]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

With the word 'mostly' in there that statement is very wrong. CVE's did plenty of ASW and land attack work. They did ferry aircraft, but that was by far the minority of what they did, even as important as it was. The very Taffy carriers you mention were all there to perform land strikes, not be ferries.

Note here both sides are correct. The statement was JAPANESE CVEs - and it is true. But the topic began with just CVEs- and a restriction on them in general would not be a good thing. In fact, the one case (JAPANESE CVEs) where limited operations was generall true ALSO is an exception: Hosho - officially a CVL but de facto a CVE - operated with torpedo bombers - often exclusively. They could carry torpedoes from her - and she is actually smaller than any of the "true CVEs". Probably this is too complicated to mess with. Let players decide.

What WOULD be nice is if LATER carrier bombers were too heavy for small carriers. Even the later war dive bombers were too big for small carriers - which is why the A6M5 came up as a fighter bomber. [The late war Japanese carrier bomber was both a torpedo plane and a dive bomber, but unable to even fit in the hangers, or the lifts, or safely take off or land on the smaller carriers.] If somehow aircraft were rated for size - it would not be too hard to work this in. But in WITP planes are "weightless."

That brings in a related concept: the bigger the plane, the fewer ANY carrier can operate. IF planes had size, we could figure out a way to express capacity. [72 x 5 tons = 360 tons. Divide by 6 tons and you carry only 60 planes. That sort of thing.]

[spence]

Hosho made 1 operational deployment during the whole war: Midway. And she carried B4 Jeans or whatever the Kate's predecessor was. Read the TROMs of the IJN CVEs at Combined Fleet Cid. Not one of the IJN CVEs launched any attacks on land targets. Not one launched a torpedo bomber with a torpedo on a strike mission. They deployed a few times conducting ASW in support of convoys but putting a close-in antisub patrol a/c of 1 or two planes up is a far cry from conducting intensive strike operations. And apparently they weren't all that great at ASW since they all died of an overdose of submarine (except Hosho which spent the war in the Inland Sea). Mostly they ferried a/c (and other things) to and fro.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

I updated my list of factors and added "one item" (11) Strike targeting

As I indicate, this has three sub-components

(i) Pre-strike-targeting

(ii) To Target Navigation

(iii) Tactical targeting (over the enemy TF)

I was not a forum reader back before WITP was released, but according to one who was, a reason giving in the past was the designer wanted to give the A.I. and the player the same advantages as disadvantages when it came to the tactical resolution.

This game may at times "feel" like it is a (naval) tactical level game, but from much of what I read by the guys that made it, they did not view it as such. Many of us might, but they (so I've been told) did not.

But I am willing to add these factors to the list of factors because I do not think these are clearly covered by any of the other ones, and one of my purposes is to get a "complete" list.

[Buck Beach]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Buck Beach

ORIGINAL: el cid again




But you can play with a house rule range limiting searches in proportion to the number of aircraft searching.

No in house rules for me Sid, I'm a hard fast AI player.

I see. Well - the best AI is you on the other side. Lots of problems - not just this one - if AI bosses anything. It will waste abotu 80% of your shipping capacity for example - something Japan cannot afford. Nor will it upgrade air units intelligently, modify production with any sense of strategic priority for THIS war (which must be different than the real one). The list is endless.

But it would be nice if this could be fixed. I just think it takes hard code to do it - that the charge "no mod has done it" is somewhat unfair - how can we? [Please tell me I am dumb and you have a way] Not that you made that remark - I think Spence did.

Hmmm, the old AI song. Heard it so many times I can sing it in tune.[:D]

[witpqs]

Hey Spence,

I totally missed that you wrote Japanese CVE's, my comments were oriented toward the US CVE's.

Doh! [&:]

[spence]

I totally missed that you wrote Japanese CVE's, my comments were oriented toward the US CVE's.

Comparing the experience levels of the squadrons assigned to the the IJN CVEs (aircraft ferries) to those assigned to the USN CVEs (which fought the IJN battlefleet to a standstill) just adds egregious insult to injury.

[GaryChildress]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A more general but related problem is air search efficiency. This matters vitally to carrier vs carrier battles, but also in carrier vs land battles (and any air vs ship battle). Mathmetically speaking, air search is usually too effective in WITP for the number of aircraft and the distances covered. But - if the number of aircraft is large enough - it actually works rather well.

There was a thread - forgotten I assume by most - which came to the conclusion that air searches ought to be range limited to something like half the number of hexes as the number of searching planes (rounding up). Thus four aircraft could search 360 degrees to a radius of two hexes. If there was some way to limit search sector - and one passive way is "if there is a continent behind you your sector is only 180 degrees" sort of thing - these values could be increased in proportion to the reduced search area.

IF somehow air search efficiencies could be made more reasonable THEN the concept of a "two phase search" (an early war Japanese concept which gave them an advantage when used - and which did not when they failed to use it as at Midway) might then be worth looking at.

When I saw this thread I was going to make a comment about air search as well but it looks like Cid already covered it.

I agree that air search is way too efficient in the game. I mean, Midway is a prime example I would think. The Japanese completely missed the US carriers to start with didn't they? Also, the US knew the Japanese were going to be there so we stepped up our air search from typical levels. I'm not familiar with air search tactics but if the US didn't have foreknowledge of the impending attack what are the chances that our planes would have spotted the Japanese by accident?

[spence]

There were around 30 PBYs on Midway at the time of the battle. I suspect that the search assets of the island were augmented for the battle though the location of the island fairly screamed for a substantial search force to be located there in any case. The Japanese were surprised when one of their search planes from Wake encountered a PBY 700 miles WSW of the island a few days before the battle and when their Invasion Force was discovered when still 600 miles from the island. Even the 30 PBYs didn't search 360 degrees around Midway however but only 180 degrees. In part this was from design...Nimitz did not want a PBY to sight and report the USN carriers since such a communication was likely to be compromised and give the IJN notice that US ships were in the area.

The Japanese allocated 7 search planes to cover an area the size of Sweden in an area of relatively bad weather (broken clouds and some rain) on the day of the battle searching a 180 arc to a distance of 300 miles. The inbound and outbound legs were some 60 miles apart at the limit of their search sectors. Apparently Chikuma #5 overflew TF16 without sighting it before the infamous Tone #4 found TF17. Tone #4 abbreviated his outbound leg and thus located TF17 at time and place that did not make sense to Nagumo (Tone #4 wasn't supposed to be where he said he was). Part of Nagumo's problem with getting his strike off against the US CVs was he was unsure that the position of the sighting was correct. In fact, it wasn't, placing the US TF outside the distance from which the Japanese could anticipate an immediate strike). ISOM cites this as another contributing factor for Nagumo's decisions that morning. Belief in the sighting report indicated to him that he had an additional hour before the Americans could get into position to launch to attack him).

[spence]

2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)

Both sides could bring bombs to the flight deck and in fact it was apparently Japanese practice to load bombs (242 kg and 250 kg) on the dive bombers on the flight deck during engine warmup. Where the two sides differed was in the USN's ability to start engine warmup in the hangar deck. This allowed the USN to keep the flight deck clear for landing operations while at the same time warming up the engines of strike planes preparing to launch. With the enclosed hangars on the Japanese CVs the IJN could not do this because they would quickly asphixiate their plane handling crews. Thus the IJN had to have an estimated 40 minute window where they did not conduct any landings in order to spot and warm up their strike aircraft. American plane handling crews were probably not as accomplished their Japanese counterparts early on so this American advantage was probably cancelled out most of the time. But the Japanese limitation was important once: June 4, 1942 near Midway. The nearly continuous recycling of the CAP occasioned by the ceaseless but otherwise futile American attacks kept the IJN from ever getting their "40 minute window of opportunity".

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

Hosho made 1 operational deployment during the whole war: Midway. And she carried B4 Jeans or whatever the Kate's predecessor was. Read the TROMs of the IJN CVEs at Combined Fleet Cid. Not one of the IJN CVEs launched any attacks on land targets. Not one launched a torpedo bomber with a torpedo on a strike mission. They deployed a few times conducting ASW in support of convoys but putting a close-in antisub patrol a/c of 1 or two planes up is a far cry from conducting intensive strike operations. And apparently they weren't all that great at ASW since they all died of an overdose of submarine (except Hosho which spent the war in the Inland Sea). Mostly they ferried a/c (and other things) to and fro.

This is confused - and untrue - or the truth is mixed. She made 2 battle deployments we know about - and that is not the same as saying it is all she made. In the first she did indeed carry B4s - and also fighters - while on the second she carried B5s - both carrier fighters. During the initial operations, she had A5s and B4s. During Midway she had only B5s. And this shows that torpedo bombers could indeed operate from the smallest of carriers. We don't know very much about Japanese CVE operations - and it is not even clear they did ANY ASW operations at all? The charge "these ASW carriers were sunk by submarines" may be bogus - because it may be there were no ASW operations at the times of these attacks. They operated as aircraft ferries and training ships much of the time. But the latter means they WERE able to do real missions: there is no point in training if you don't train like you fight. If you do learn how to fuel, arm, launch and recover - it does not matter much that you don't get to bomb or torpedo a real enemy. I have run into this attitude before - in particular from Spence - but also from many others over the years: we have an enemy that kept few records; most of the records kept were deliberately destroyed; most of the records recovered have not been preserved by us; many of the people involved were ashamed to say anything (with a few exceptions near the ends of their lives, when memories were dim and suspect). Yet it is common to say "this only happened once, that never happened," etc.
We don't really know that. There are a few incidents incidating that many of the things we THINK we know - the truisms - were not always the case - and that alone makes the truisms false when stated flatly. A good example of that is the sinking of the most hated of USN submarines - USS Wahoo - which was systematically hunted by combined arms forces on a sustained basis exactly opposite of the way it is usually said Japanese forces "never" did ASW. If they did it - even once - they clearly had the knowledge and operational and tactical methods and devices required. The biologist's law probably applies - there are probably other instances we don't know about - very likely "lost patrols" we don't know the fate of. We really do not know much about Japanese CVEs - or their cousins - Army and mechant aircraft carriers. [Army carriers began as true transports, incapable of flight operations. Yet they ended up doing ASW for sure - and possibly fighter escort as well. The merchants probably always had one or both roles. But lots of specific information we don't have.] An unknown should not be translated into "they never did that." It is far too strong a conclusion.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

I updated my list of factors and added "one item" (11) Strike targeting

As I indicate, this has three sub-components

(i) Pre-strike-targeting

(ii) To Target Navigation

(iii) Tactical targeting (over the enemy TF)

I was not a forum reader back before WITP was released, but according to one who was, a reason giving in the past was the designer wanted to give the A.I. and the player the same advantages as disadvantages when it came to the tactical resolution.

This game may at times "feel" like it is a (naval) tactical level game, but from much of what I read by the guys that made it, they did not view it as such. Many of us might, but they (so I've been told) did not.

But I am willing to add these factors to the list of factors because I do not think these are clearly covered by any of the other ones, and one of my purposes is to get a "complete" list.

Because of the scale - hex size and "impulse" time (12 hours) - the designers were absolutely right. This is NOT a tactical game, but an operational one. And we should not as players be able to pick tactical targets - ever. This is different from saying we should not be able to pick the TYPE of missions flown - and in many cases we cannot properly do that.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A more general but related problem is air search efficiency. This matters vitally to carrier vs carrier battles, but also in carrier vs land battles (and any air vs ship battle). Mathmetically speaking, air search is usually too effective in WITP for the number of aircraft and the distances covered. But - if the number of aircraft is large enough - it actually works rather well.

There was a thread - forgotten I assume by most - which came to the conclusion that air searches ought to be range limited to something like half the number of hexes as the number of searching planes (rounding up). Thus four aircraft could search 360 degrees to a radius of two hexes. If there was some way to limit search sector - and one passive way is "if there is a continent behind you your sector is only 180 degrees" sort of thing - these values could be increased in proportion to the reduced search area.

IF somehow air search efficiencies could be made more reasonable THEN the concept of a "two phase search" (an early war Japanese concept which gave them an advantage when used - and which did not when they failed to use it as at Midway) might then be worth looking at.

When I saw this thread I was going to make a comment about air search as well but it looks like Cid already covered it.

I agree that air search is way too efficient in the game. I mean, Midway is a prime example I would think. The Japanese completely missed the US carriers to start with didn't they? Also, the US knew the Japanese were going to be there so we stepped up our air search from typical levels. I'm not familiar with air search tactics but if the US didn't have foreknowledge of the impending attack what are the chances that our planes would have spotted the Japanese by accident?

Pretty good, actually. The US had a sort of "unsinkable aircraft carrier task group" based on two islands at Midway - and could put out a 180 degree search of more range than the Japanese could mount from their ships - which were not well supported by land bases in that area.

To which add the Japanese had - in their own term - "victory disease." They "knew" the US carriers were not there. So the search was perfunctory - one plane per sector. When one failed - it prevented spotting of Yorktown. When only one overflew Hornet and Enterprise - it was far more fatal than the same thing would have been with another plane on the same vector at a somewhat different time would have been. Most battles are lost rather than won, and Midway is a prime example. The US did almost everything right - had remarkably bad luck for quite a while - and then got so lucky for a few minutes one Marine historian said "this is the only time I know of when it appears, on objective military evidence, that there is a God and He was on the American side." Pretty lucky anyway.

There were other battles. The famous Mariana's Turkey Shoot is actually an amazing case. For once the Japanese had numbers of operational carriers with strike groups at sea: 9 carriers - and something like 450 embarked aircraft on these and supporting ships. The US commander made grave operational errors - he believed he read the enemy's mind - when the reverse happened. By the normal rules of carrier battles, the Japanese "won" - they got in strike range and launched what should have been a decisive strike - and probably would have been in any previous period of time. What went wrong was that the strike was combat ineffective. Spectatularly so. So much so we usually miss OUR commander was wrong about the operational situation, and theirs was right. We also fail to note that they pulled off what carrier commanders dream of - get UNDETECTED into strike position on a DETECTED enemy. This indicates an enemy competent in some ways - perhaps even more competent than we were. Even if outclassed in air combat by the F6F. Here the enemy made a grave strategic error - not funding the A7M in time.

[okami]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

I updated my list of factors and added "one item" (11) Strike targeting

As I indicate, this has three sub-components

(i) Pre-strike-targeting

(ii) To Target Navigation

(iii) Tactical targeting (over the enemy TF)

I was not a forum reader back before WITP was released, but according to one who was, a reason giving in the past was the designer wanted to give the A.I. and the player the same advantages as disadvantages when it came to the tactical resolution.

This game may at times "feel" like it is a (naval) tactical level game, but from much of what I read by the guys that made it, they did not view it as such. Many of us might, but they (so I've been told) did not.

But I am willing to add these factors to the list of factors because I do not think these are clearly covered by any of the other ones, and one of my purposes is to get a "complete" list.

Because of the scale - hex size and "impulse" time (12 hours) - the designers were absolutely right. This is NOT a tactical game, but an operational one. And we should not as players be able to pick tactical targets - ever. This is different from saying we should not be able to pick the TYPE of missions flown - and in many cases we cannot properly do that.

This suggestion is probably more for Witp II than the current version. What about adding a new button to the operations list which gives one specific type of ship for the aircraft to go after. If that type is present then the strike has a greater chance of choosing it as the target?

[spence]

This is confused - and untrue - or the truth is mixed. She made 2 battle deployments we know about - and that is not the same as saying it is all she made. In the first she did indeed carry B4s - and also fighters - while on the second she carried B5s - both carrier fighters. During the initial operations, she had A5s and B4s. During Midway she had only B5s. And this shows that torpedo bombers could indeed operate from the smallest of carriers. We don't know very much about Japanese CVE operations - and it is not even clear they did ANY ASW operations at all? The charge "these ASW carriers were sunk by submarines" may be bogus - because it may be there were no ASW operations at the times of these attacks. They operated as aircraft ferries and training ships much of the time. But the latter means they WERE able to do real missions: there is no point in training if you don't train like you fight. If you do learn how to fuel, arm, launch and recover - it does not matter much that you don't get to bomb or torpedo a real enemy. I have run into this attitude before - in particular from Spence - but also from many others over the years: we have an enemy that kept few records; most of the records kept were deliberately destroyed; most of the records recovered have not been preserved by us; many of the people involved were ashamed to say anything (with a few exceptions near the ends of their lives, when memories were dim and suspect). Yet it is common to say "this only happened once, that never happened," etc.
We don't really know that. There are a few incidents incidating that many of the things we THINK we know - the truisms - were not always the case - and that alone makes the truisms false when stated flatly. A good example of that is the sinking of the most hated of USN submarines - USS Wahoo - which was systematically hunted by combined arms forces on a sustained basis exactly opposite of the way it is usually said Japanese forces "never" did ASW. If they did it - even once - they clearly had the knowledge and operational and tactical methods and devices required. The biologist's law probably applies - there are probably other instances we don't know about - very likely "lost patrols" we don't know the fate of. We really do not know much about Japanese CVEs - or their cousins - Army and mechant aircraft carriers. [Army carriers began as true transports, incapable of flight operations. Yet they ended up doing ASW for sure - and possibly fighter escort as well. The merchants probably always had one or both roles. But lots of specific information we don't have.] An unknown should not be translated into "they never did that." It is far too strong a conclusion.

Oh I stand corrected. For some reason I left out Hosho's glorious 5 day sojourn where she single handedly (well except for Zuiho) covered the withdrawal of KB from Pearl Harbor.

Yes the Japanese destroyed some records but my guess is that because most westerners couldn't/can't read Japanese nobody did much looking and everybody did a lot less finding in the immediate postwar world. The TROMs at Combined Fleet seem reasonably complete being day by day and all but perhaps one of the CVE's would sneak in a patrol between the midwatch and the forenoon watch every so often that escaped the Navigator's notice. Or maybe he just forgot to enter it in the ship's log since nothing happened.

It is hardly a "charge" that these ships were sunk by submarines.

CVE Taiyo (ex Kasuga Maru) got tagged 4 times (obviously wasn't sunk the first 3): USS Trout (9/28/42), USS Tunny (04/09/43), USS Cabrilla (9/24/43) and USS Rasher (8/14/44).

CVE Chuyo (ex Nitta Maru): once was enough for her: USS Sailfish (12/04/43)

CVE Unyo (ex Yawata Maru): but not for her: USS Haddock (01/19/44), USS Barb (09/17/44)

CVE Shinyo (ex German liner Scharnhorst): USS Spadefish (11/17/44)
CVE

Not being an aviator I can't be sure but I've heard some aviators talk about weight in such a way as to suggest there is a difference in flying characteristics between a plane lugging a 250 kg bomb and a plane carrying an 800 kg torpedo.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: okami

This suggestion is probably more for Witp II than the current version. What about adding a new button to the operations list which gives one specific type of ship for the aircraft to go after. If that type is present then the strike has a greater chance of choosing it as the target?

(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

I would think "Pre-strike-targeting" would go after specific TF mission types rather than specific ships. So for example:

(a) Air Combat
(b) Amphibious
(c) Other

And maybe it could be that simple. But, the issue is, if you have a greater chance of going after one type, then you also have a lesser chance of NOT going after the other type. So if you pick amphibious, and the enemy carrier force comes close and strikes you, then you might still be waiting for that amphib force to appear!

[spence]

Tactical targeting within a TF should be entirely up to the AI though some sort of weighting of ship values should restrict what the AI does (MSWs and PCs seem to attract too much attention to the exclusion of the fat, slow, and loaded transports when the bombers find an Amphib TF.

I would think "Pre-strike-targeting" would go after specific TF mission types rather than specific ships. So for example:

(a) Air Combat
(b) Amphibious
(c) Other

And maybe it could be that simple. But, the issue is, if you have a greater chance of going after one type, then you also have a lesser chance of NOT going after the other type. So if you pick amphibious, and the enemy carrier force comes close and strikes you, then you might still be waiting for that amphib force to appear!

A two-edged sword to be sure but one that is more in keeping with the theoretical level of command the Player is supposed to be exercising.

[okami]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

This suggestion is probably more for Witp II than the current version. What about adding a new button to the operations list which gives one specific type of ship for the aircraft to go after. If that type is present then the strike has a greater chance of choosing it as the target?

(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

I would think "Pre-strike-targeting" would go after specific TF mission types rather than specific ships. So for example:

(a) Air Combat
(b) Amphibious
(c) Other

And maybe it could be that simple. But, the issue is, if you have a greater chance of going after one type, then you also have a lesser chance of NOT going after the other type. So if you pick amphibious, and the enemy carrier force comes close and strikes you, then you might still be waiting for that amphib force to appear!

I was thinking more about the targets in the hex attacked then say going after only hexes with for example CVs. You would set your TF on Naval Attack and a button would appear and you choose transport so you strike will more likely go after transports in the hex that the program has sent your strike too. I am just wondering if anything like this is possible with the current game engine?

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

This suggestion is probably more for Witp II than the current version. What about adding a new button to the operations list which gives one specific type of ship for the aircraft to go after. If that type is present then the strike has a greater chance of choosing it as the target?

(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

I would think "Pre-strike-targeting" would go after specific TF mission types rather than specific ships. So for example:

(a) Air Combat
(b) Amphibious
(c) Other

And maybe it could be that simple. But, the issue is, if you have a greater chance of going after one type, then you also have a lesser chance of NOT going after the other type. So if you pick amphibious, and the enemy carrier force comes close and strikes you, then you might still be waiting for that amphib force to appear!

Gosh, it has been a while since I played it, but in Grigsby game CARRIER STRIKE, the search planes would go out and locate enemy TF's and give a description of what they found, (2cv's, 4CA's, 3dd's),etc..Over a few such search flights, maybe the description of that TF would change and give the player a better idea of what the TF really consisted of.
The player then had the option to arm his planes for the target and launched them at a specific hex/target.
If the planes arrived and nothing was there, the player could then designate them to either "loiter", or move to the nearest known/reported enemy TF..
While this is tactical in nature, the scale was pretty much the same as what we use now in WITP..
My previous comment ref no mod nor AE yet addressing this issue was not an insult to either, merely a statement of fact, and nobody should be provoked by my comment into reading something which is not there..
I was merely responding to my friend JWilkerson's thread, which is somewhat tactical, (to me) in the question...[:)]

As for a means to "target" where to send the planes, maybe each turn the player could have a "switch", in which a value can be placed on certain TYPES of TF's based on what the spotter planes have reported.
This would contravene the tactical target decision, but would prevent (to some extent) sending all of a carriers planes against empty barges, when an enemy carrier TF has been reported in the area.
On some turns, I might want enemy transports as my primary target,(as at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea), but let that be MY decision, and I still believe spotting in itself should have some kind of bonus based on whether the spotter is land-based, or carrier based.(If I am reading the press correctly about AE, this is possible..)

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: spence

2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)

Both sides could bring bombs to the flight deck and in fact it was apparently Japanese practice to load bombs (242 kg and 250 kg) on the dive bombers on the flight deck during engine warmup. Where the two sides differed was in the USN's ability to start engine warmup in the hangar deck. This allowed the USN to keep the flight deck clear for landing operations while at the same time warming up the engines of strike planes preparing to launch. With the enclosed hangars on the Japanese CVs the IJN could not do this because they would quickly asphixiate their plane handling crews. Thus the IJN had to have an estimated 40 minute window where they did not conduct any landings in order to spot and warm up their strike aircraft. American plane handling crews were probably not as accomplished their Japanese counterparts early on so this American advantage was probably cancelled out most of the time. But the Japanese limitation was important once: June 4, 1942 near Midway. The nearly continuous recycling of the CAP occasioned by the ceaseless but otherwise futile American attacks kept the IJN from ever getting their "40 minute window of opportunity".

Regarding the Japanese practice of loading bombs aboard the dive bombers on the flight deck. Note that on page 123 of Shattered Sword, we see:

On Akagi and Kaga's flight decks, the dive bombers were now in place and being armed from carts ... Kaga had a bomb lift next to the midships elevator forward that ran all the way to the flight deck, so she loaded her bomb carts on deck...

So the implication, is that Kaga and only Kaga had a bomb lift that went all the way from the magazines to the flight deck and that this bomb lift was sufficient for the normal dive bomber ordnance, but not for torpedoes (or bombs like 500KG or 800KG).

As near I as can tell, then only other IJN carriers that had flight deck ordnance lifts were the improved Taiho's, which were never built.

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Of course this "detail" may not be very relevant to WITP as it might not manifest itself in any model we might use, but we do try to track all the details we can find so as to build the most complete and accuracte picture we can build.