Modeling of Carrier Battles

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

Yes the Japanese destroyed some records but my guess is that because most westerners couldn't/can't read Japanese nobody did much looking and everybody did a lot less finding in the immediate postwar world.

IF we accepted that - it would be another reason NEVER to say "this was the only mission" or "we know ALL the missions."

But in Japanese argument, if you take my side, making my points, I must take your side, and not let you get away with that. [The point is to drive towards each other - which I am not sure we are doing here]

It isn't so. In 1945/6 we were profoundly worried and gathered a lot of material. I know a British technical historian who thinks we panicked - and dropped atom bombs due to that panic - after the surrender of U-234. He is a nuclear engineer and he has declassified British archival materials which were released (instead of destroyed) as a basis for his position. And I do have one bit from a secretary to Groves which implies he DID panic - if only for a moment. We wanted the bw research of Ichii - and gave his people immunity to get it. We were very interested in Japanese military operations and technologies (except submarines - we assumed theirs must be inferior to German - and we never did test a guppy - until too late and we figured out the German ones were not properly designed - US Submarines Since 1945). One of the people we sent to Japan was my aunt. Another - a naval captain who retired an admiral - was long my neighbor in Tacoma Washington.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

[
It is hardly a "charge" that these ships were sunk by submarines.

The "charge" is they were sunk by submarines - in spite of being ASW specialist ships - and running ASW patrols - which seems either never to have been the case (at the time of sinking) - or usually not the case (if there was an exception).
It is just assumed that "CVEs" were running ASW patrols - and in at least two cases - the ships could not have been conducting air operations at all - due to deckloads.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence


Not being an aviator I can't be sure but I've heard some aviators talk about weight in such a way as to suggest there is a difference in flying characteristics between a plane lugging a 250 kg bomb and a plane carrying an 800 kg torpedo.

There should be a difference. Different only implies different - not impossible.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

This suggestion is probably more for Witp II than the current version. What about adding a new button to the operations list which gives one specific type of ship for the aircraft to go after. If that type is present then the strike has a greater chance of choosing it as the target?

(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)

I would think "Pre-strike-targeting" would go after specific TF mission types rather than specific ships. So for example:

(a) Air Combat
(b) Amphibious
(c) Other

And maybe it could be that simple. But, the issue is, if you have a greater chance of going after one type, then you also have a lesser chance of NOT going after the other type. So if you pick amphibious, and the enemy carrier force comes close and strikes you, then you might still be waiting for that amphib force to appear!

In USN there is a doctrinal mantra - IF you spot an enemy CTG - you pull out all the stops. Similarly, in the Action Off Samar, when a heavy task group got into the TAFFYs - everybody forgot their mission of the day - and did what needed to be done. Surely a computer program can be written with priority tasking down two levels?

[Grotius]

I'm curious how AE will handle some of the concerns Ron Saueracker raised in his post that triggered this thread. Will AE still model the "one hex reaction" of CV TFs, over which the player has no direct control? Will it still be most advantageous for the Allied player to group carriers into 1-CV TFs, to avoid coordination penalties?

I understand that the nerfing of "uber CAP" will indirectly address these issues, by lessening the impregnability of a "death star." For example, we may not care so much if one of our CVs reacts alone toward the enemy while its friends stay grouped, since staying grouped is no longer going to be a guarantee of safety.

I secretly kinda wish some of UV's "Carrier Force" were making its way into WITP. Carrier battles really can make or break a game of WITP. Players might be less likely to quit a PBEM in a huff if they felt they had greater control over the events leading to the loss of their CVs.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Surely a computer program can be written with priority tasking down two levels?

I think we already have that (and more)!

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Grotius

I'm curious how AE will handle some of the concerns Ron Saueracker raised in his post that triggered this thread. Will AE still model the "one hex reaction" of CV TFs, over which the player has no direct control? Will it still be most advantageous for the Allied player to group carriers into 1-CV TFs, to avoid coordination penalties?

I understand that the nerfing of "uber CAP" will indirectly address these issues, by lessening the impregnability of a "death star." For example, we may not care so much if one of our CVs reacts alone toward the enemy while its friends stay grouped, since staying grouped is no longer going to be a guarantee of safety.

I secretly kinda wish some of UV's "Carrier Force" were making its way into WITP. Carrier battles really can make or break a game of WITP. Players might be less likely to quit a PBEM in a huff if they felt they had greater control over the events leading to the loss of their CVs.

(1) CV reaction has not be changed for AE.

(2) "Uber CAP" will change things, in remains to be seen how much (from testing).

[spence]

There should be a difference. Different only implies different - not impossible.

The physical implications of more weight, less "runway" and less aerodynamic flow over the wings argue forcefully against your assertion for flight further than 50 meters forward of the bow.

[Mobeer]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

Gosh, it has been a while since I played it, but in Grigsby game CARRIER STRIKE, the search planes would go out and locate enemy TF's and give a description of what they found, (2cv's, 4CA's, 3dd's),etc..Over a few such search flights, maybe the description of that TF would change and give the player a better idea of what the TF really consisted of.
The player then had the option to arm his planes for the target and launched them at a specific hex/target.
If the planes arrived and nothing was there, the player could then designate them to either "loiter", or move to the nearest known/reported enemy TF..
While this is tactical in nature, the scale was pretty much the same as what we use now in WITP..
...

As I remember in Carrier Strike:
(i) Search planes were launched in an arc around a player-set central direction, with 10 degree intervals
(ii) Search planes could report part or all of a task force in the correct or wrong location
(iii) Multiple search contacts would make false sightings disappear
(iv) Strike aircraft were armed and could then be launched towards any enemy land base or search contact within range
(v) Air strikes could be redirected but this required the launching carriers to break radio silence (and give away their position)
(vi) Strikes would only loiter for 1 turn over a launching carrier group that did not move, or for several turns when one square right of a target that could not be found.

Scale was 20 minute turns, 17 mile staggered squares.

--
The thing I would most like to have from Carrier Strike is an ability to search in particular directions. For example, patrol planes from Tarawa might be ordered to search towards Kwajalein and surrounding hexes only, rather than searching in every direction. This would make small groups of scout planes both more useful, but also more limited if t searching in the wrong direction\place.

[wworld7]

ORIGINAL: Grotius

Players might be less likely to quit a PBEM in a huff if they felt they had greater control over the events leading to the loss of their CVs.

A person who is going to quit because of a poor result is still going to quit. Only they will find some other reason to "justify" it. Of course at the same time taking no responsibility for what ever caused 1/2 his or her fleet to sink.

[Grotius]

A person who is going to quit because of a poor result is still going to quit. Only they will find some other reason to "justify" it.

Yeah, you're probably right.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Surely a computer program can be written with priority tasking down two levels?

I think we already have that (and more)!

so virklich! ausgeseichnet!

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

There should be a difference. Different only implies different - not impossible.

The physical implications of more weight, less "runway" and less aerodynamic flow over the wings argue forcefully against your assertion for flight further than 50 meters forward of the bow.

May I refer you to Japanese Aircraft 1910-1941?

Take a look at the evolution of carrier aircraft in Japan.

Carrier aircraft do not usually use all the deck to take off - or land - but only a fraction of it. That fraction is subject to change - and launching B-25s and C-47s from carriers was possible because it can be greater than planes with less weight and less payload normally require. Its not like ANY aircraft EVER required the full length to take off with a partial load, and would need more than that with a full load. The big problems with aircraft "too large" are things like "they cannot fit on the lift" - "they cannot fit in the hanger" - "they are too heavy for the catapult". Yet note that many carriers - including Japanese carriers - operated entirely without catapults. Everything is a trade off - and only the most extreme circumstances create a "it really cannot be done" situation. Not that we should tolerate true extremes as norms: but we SHOULD be able to launch B-25s and C-47s from carriers. For that matter, Japanese COD aircraft (they had em first folks) should be able to fly off - and maybe deliver paras even. If you don't think normal carrier planes can carry their normal weapons from a carrier - I bet you won't like a non-carrier plane carrying an even larger load one bit. Yet it should be possible - because it was possible.

[jwilkerson]

Ok, well we've had a fair amount of discussion, but I would like to focus the discussion a bit more.


My purpose in starting this thread was to move a discussion Ron and I had started over in another thread, so a thread of its own.

Ron was, IIRC, requesting improvements to the modeling of carrier battles in AE.

So I have tried to list out, what I think are the primary factors, in both real life and in the game that influence carrier battles. For the most part the discussion up to this point has been aligned with those factors, I did add one for strike targeting.

Thus, I would like to hear thoughts on these factors, which ones are modeled correctly in the game, which are not, what would be your priorities for improvements of these factors?

And here is a link back to the factors if you've forgotten them!
[:D]

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

[spence]

In the areas of fleet defense WitP does not appear to distinguish in any way between USN practice and IJN practice. The two became more similar towards the end of the war but at the beginning they were quite distinct.

USN
1) Characterized by having the CV closely supported by AAA fire from the ships of the screen arranged in a ring surrounding the carrier at distances between 1000-2000 yds.
2) The CAP controlled by radio from a single command authority who received input from radar and the other ships of the TF. Though not initially any quantum amount better than IJN practice the methodology and technology evolved side by side over the course of the war to produce something akin to what WitP Players term "UberCAP": radar information relayed on dedicated radio circuits to deploy and guide the CAP to interception.

IJN
1) Characterized by an extremely dispersed formation where the majority of the screen was essentially out of range of supporting the CV(s) with their AAA. The dispersed formation allowed for relatively distant detection of incoming raids by the screening vessels however. It also gave the CO the carrier unlimited manuevering room when under attack. IIRC "Shattered Sword" says something like 2/3rds of the AAA in the KB at Midway was on the carriers themselves (but they were not really within supporting distance of one another) so the loss of AAA support from the screen was more or less moot in any case until the screening ships had their AAA substantially upgraded as occurred mid-late war. In 1944 the IJN adopted a "ring defense" akin to the USN.
2) The IJN CAP depended throughout the war on the abilities of the fighter pilots on CAP.
Direction from any of the ships in the TF was problematical and uncertain: dependent on visual signals for the most part as many fighters carried no radio. Even for those fighters that actually had a radio the circuit used for CAP was the same as was used for search a/c, strike a/c and ASW aircraft. No one command authority within the TF was charged with informing the CAP about inbound strikes or guiding them to interception.
The concept of and basic operational parameters of a Fighter Direction Center (as was used in the USN) had only reached the "we should study this idea and see if we can come up with something" stage in the IJN by 1945.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: spence

In the areas of fleet defense WitP does not appear to distinguish in any way between USN practice and IJN practice. The two became more similar towards the end of the war but at the beginning they were quite distinct.

USN
1) Characterized by having the CV closely supported by AAA fire from the ships of the screen arranged in a ring surrounding the carrier at distances between 1000-2000 yds.
2) The CAP controlled by radio from a single command authority who received input from radar and the other ships of the TF. Though not initially any quantum amount better than IJN practice the methodology and technology evolved side by side over the course of the war to produce something akin to what WitP Players term "UberCAP": radar information relayed on dedicated radio circuits to deploy and guide the CAP to interception.

IJN
1) Characterized by an extremely dispersed formation where the majority of the screen was essentially out of range of supporting the CV(s) with their AAA. The dispersed formation allowed for relatively distant detection of incoming raids by the screening vessels however. It also gave the CO the carrier unlimited manuevering room when under attack. IIRC "Shattered Sword" says something like 2/3rds of the AAA in the KB at Midway was on the carriers themselves (but they were not really within supporting distance of one another) so the loss of AAA support from the screen was more or less moot in any case until the screening ships had their AAA substantially upgraded as occurred mid-late war. In 1944 the IJN adopted a "ring defense" akin to the USN.
2) The IJN CAP depended throughout the war on the abilities of the fighter pilots on CAP.
Direction from any of the ships in the TF was problematical and uncertain: dependent on visual signals for the most part as many fighters carried no radio. Even for those fighters that actually had a radio the circuit used for CAP was the same as was used for search a/c, strike a/c and ASW aircraft. No one command authority within the TF was charged with informing the CAP about inbound strikes or guiding them to interception.
The concept of and basic operational parameters of a Fighter Direction Center (as was used in the USN) had only reached the "we should study this idea and see if we can come up with something" stage in the IJN by 1945.

So these topics seem to be aligned with the topics in the list numbers (8) Flak and (9) CAP. So you are saying you would like to see improvements in the differentiation of these items between the IJN and USN.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: spence

In the areas of fleet defense WitP does not appear to distinguish in any way between USN practice and IJN practice. The two became more similar towards the end of the war but at the beginning they were quite distinct.

USN
1) Characterized by having the CV closely supported by AAA fire from the ships of the screen arranged in a ring surrounding the carrier at distances between 1000-2000 yds.
2) The CAP controlled by radio from a single command authority who received input from radar and the other ships of the TF. Though not initially any quantum amount better than IJN practice the methodology and technology evolved side by side over the course of the war to produce something akin to what WitP Players term "UberCAP": radar information relayed on dedicated radio circuits to deploy and guide the CAP to interception.

IJN
1) Characterized by an extremely dispersed formation where the majority of the screen was essentially out of range of supporting the CV(s) with their AAA. The dispersed formation allowed for relatively distant detection of incoming raids by the screening vessels however. It also gave the CO the carrier unlimited manuevering room when under attack. IIRC "Shattered Sword" says something like 2/3rds of the AAA in the KB at Midway was on the carriers themselves (but they were not really within supporting distance of one another) so the loss of AAA support from the screen was more or less moot in any case until the screening ships had their AAA substantially upgraded as occurred mid-late war. In 1944 the IJN adopted a "ring defense" akin to the USN.
2) The IJN CAP depended throughout the war on the abilities of the fighter pilots on CAP.
Direction from any of the ships in the TF was problematical and uncertain: dependent on visual signals for the most part as many fighters carried no radio. Even for those fighters that actually had a radio the circuit used for CAP was the same as was used for search a/c, strike a/c and ASW aircraft. No one command authority within the TF was charged with informing the CAP about inbound strikes or guiding them to interception.
The concept of and basic operational parameters of a Fighter Direction Center (as was used in the USN) had only reached the "we should study this idea and see if we can come up with something" stage in the IJN by 1945.

So these topics seem to be aligned with the topics in the list numbers (8) Flak and (9) CAP. So you are saying you would like to see improvements in the differentiation of these items between the IJN and USN.

I think SPENCE makes some good points here. We often hear that the Japanese deserve the benefits of operating their CV's in larger TF's than the Allies because of doctrine and practice. Better co-ordination for their airstrikes certainly seems to be the rule in the game at war's start. So why not include the poor defense of their carrier TF's..., also as a result of doctrine and practice? Limit their flak and CAP availability? Seems to make just as much sense.... My thoughts, anyway.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I think SPENCE makes some good points here. We often hear that the Japanese deserve the benefits of operating their CV's in larger TF's than the Allies because of doctrine and practice. Better co-ordination for their airstrikes certainly seems to be the rule in the game at war's start. So why not include the poor defense of their carrier TF's..., also as a result of doctrine and practice? Limit their flak and CAP availability? Seems to make just as much sense.... My thoughts, anyway.

I'm not sure SPENCE was exactly saying that Japanese TFs, at the start of the war/game, should have reduced Flak or CAP vis-a-vis the USN, but more like the USN capability should grow as their abilities increased. But if you (or he) do want to say that, do you have any data about relative numbers of shoot down by flak versus CAP for the IJN versus the USN in say the four main 1942 carrier battles? Might be useful to consider the data! This data might be in Lundstrom, or at least extractable from same.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: m10bob

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

I updated my list of factors and added "one item" (11) Strike targeting

As I indicate, this has three sub-components

(i) Pre-strike-targeting

(ii) To Target Navigation

(iii) Tactical targeting (over the enemy TF)

I was not a forum reader back before WITP was released, but according to one who was, a reason giving in the past was the designer wanted to give the A.I. and the player the same advantages as disadvantages when it came to the tactical resolution.

This game may at times "feel" like it is a (naval) tactical level game, but from much of what I read by the guys that made it, they did not view it as such. Many of us might, but they (so I've been told) did not.

But I am willing to add these factors to the list of factors because I do not think these are clearly covered by any of the other ones, and one of my purposes is to get a "complete" list.

Because of the scale - hex size and "impulse" time (12 hours) - the designers were absolutely right. This is NOT a tactical game, but an operational one. And we should not as players be able to pick tactical targets - ever. This is different from saying we should not be able to pick the TYPE of missions flown - and in many cases we cannot properly do that.

Ahhh...the scale issue. With the use of such generalizations as hexes and rigid time pulses (especially with air and naval movement being totally seperate phases, should an operational game have included such tactical game elements such as exact ranges of aircraft, Japanese strike coordination benefits yet not include CV launch/recovery rates, coordinated strike range penalties and non coordinated strike range bonuses and Allied CAP direction team bonuses? What is needed is to either include all tactical details into the operational scope of the game's mechanics to allow for more historical results or remove the few that exist which lead to ahistorical results.

An example of this prevalance of ahistorical results is the frequency of lopsided exchanges between Japanese and Allied CVs, primarily because the IJN have longer ranged a/c, no strike range penalties so coordinated strikes predominate at max range, and Allied CVs have no capacity to launch under the same conditions due to the shorter range of their a/c ,the rigidity of hex based maps and the awkward reaction feature. In the two games I had with Bill (Halsey), all three of the CV battles were at 5 hex range...the result being that the IJN got a free crack at the US CVs with no US strike. I can't think of any instance of this happenning historically, unless one cites Ozawa at Phillippine Sea (Mariannas Turkey Shoot) but this example does not fit as it included the use of land bases to extend the strike range...a feature not even in WITP.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

do you have any data about relative numbers of shoot down by flak versus CAP for the IJN versus the USN in say the four main 1942 carrier battles?

I do.