Admirals Edition Naval Thread

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: msieving1
Up until 1945, the US was building carriers to the limits of its capacity. More carriers could not have been built without sacrificing other types of ships. The ships that were cancelled would not have been available before 1947, at the earliest.

The Essex class CVs built at the end of the war had build times (to commissioning) that were a fair bit longer - months longer - than earlier ships. I don't believe that the USA, late in the war, was incapable of accelerating ship production to match earlier build rates (for Essex CVs) if it really, REALLY wanted to. My opinion about the USA war economy is not that pessimistic.

Andrew

And to add my 2p.... there seems to be a general misconception around here that the US was a boundless cornucopia of war material. It was not.

If I may refer you to Admiral King's Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy covering the period from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945. In the Chapter V entitled Fighting Strength, King expresses concerns about the decline in shipyard personnel and the strain it was placing on repairs and building programs. Namely shipyard personnel strength dropped from 970,900 in Jan 1944 to 861,300 in Jan 1945.

Earlier he adds that the ship construction program was under constant review. "The effect of building too many vessels of any particular type would be as serious as building too few, since the construction of unnecessary craft would involve waste of manpower and materials urgently needed for other parts of the war effort."

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: treespider

And to add my 2p.... there seems to be a general misconception around here that the US was a boundless cornucopia of war material. It was not.

If I may refer you to Admiral King's Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy covering the period from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945. In the Chapter V entitled Fighting Strength, King expresses concerns about the decline in shipyard personnel and the strain it was placing on repairs and building programs. Namely shipyard personnel strength dropped from 970,900 in Jan 1944 to 861,300 in Jan 1945.

Earlier he adds that the ship construction program was under constant review. "The effect of building too many vessels of any particular type would be as serious as building too few, since the construction of unnecessary craft would involve waste of manpower and materials urgently needed for other parts of the war effort."

Indeed. But was there anything preventing the Navy from increasing priority of CV construction over other activity if it felt the need to do so?

Andrew

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: treespider
And to add my 2p.... there seems to be a general misconception around here that the US was a boundless cornucopia of war material. It was not.

If I may refer you to Admiral King's Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy covering the period from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945. In the Chapter V entitled Fighting Strength, King expresses concerns about the decline in shipyard personnel and the strain it was placing on repairs and building programs. Namely shipyard personnel strength dropped from 970,900 in Jan 1944 to 861,300 in Jan 1945.

Earlier he adds that the ship construction program was under constant review. "The effect of building too many vessels of any particular type would be as serious as building too few, since the construction of unnecessary craft would involve waste of manpower and materials urgently needed for other parts of the war effort."

You're certainly correct that no power was a "bottomless pit" of production capacity..., not even America. One has only to look at the "shortage" of LST's in 1944, or the cancellations of DE's and other Escorts in 1943 after it became obvious the "U-Boat Crisis" had passed. It's only when you compare American Production totals to those of other powers engaged in WW II that it starts to seem that way. Carriers were so obviously the new "key" to "Victory at Sea" that nobody seriously considered cutting back on their production until it was pretty obvious that a ship couldn't be completed before the War's ending.

[bradfordkay]

For capital ships it was more of a case of having the needed shipyard workers in the right locations. For carriers and battleships (maybe heavy cruisers as well?) you only had a certain number of shipyards capable of building a ship of that size.

From memory (so feel free to add any I've missed), I get Behtlehem Steel in Quincy, Mass, New York Navy Yard, New York Shipbuilding Co, Philadelphia Navy Yard, Newport News Shipbuilding, Norfolk Navy Yard and Mare Island Navy Yard. In the twenties and thirties Fore River Shipbuilding in Massachusetts had built at least one carrier and battleship, but I don't think that they built any during the war though that wouldn't preclude the availability of that one being one more shipway for an extra carrier - but I believe that that was the only carrier capable shipway that was not in use during the war.

[Jim D Burns]

While not an endless cornucopia of production, here’s some figures to show just how much more productive the US was over Japan. The notion that in game Japan can build unlimited equipment items and the US and allies are hamstrung by limited pools is pure FANTASY!


Coal production (m. metric tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
2,149.7…… 4,283.6…… 184.5…… 2,629.9

Iron ore production (m. metric tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
396.9…… 591.1…… 21.0…… 291.0

Crude oil production (m. metric tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
833.2…… 1,043…… 5.2…… 67

Crude Steel production (m. metric tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
334.5…… 497.1…… 24.1…… 196.5

Aluminum production (m. metric tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
4,123.2…… 4,642.7…… 361…… 2,540.2

Tank and Self Propelled Gun production (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
88,410…… 227,235…… 2,515…… 52,345

Artillery production (includes AT and AAA) (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
257,390…… 914,682…… 13,350…… 180,141

Mortar production (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
105,054…… 657,318…… ? …… 73,484(German only no figures for Jap and Italy)

Machine-gun production (not submachine-guns) (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
2,679,840…… 4,744,484…… 380,000…… 1,058,863

Truck and Lorrie production (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
2,382,311…… 3,060,354…… 165,945…… 594,859

Military aircraft production (units)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
324,750…… 633,072…… 76,320…… 207,813

Merchant shipping production (gross tons)
USA…… Allies…… Japan…… Axis
33,993,230…… 43,075,072…… 4,152,361…… ? (496,606 for Italy unknown for Germany)


The general misconception around here seems to be that Japan had any chance at all to even come close to competing with the US on any level of production, let alone all of the allies. Japan’s entire wartime production doesn’t even out produce the US for one month’s production in most categories.

Jim

Edit: Figures given are for years at war, so the US is usually only listed between 42-45, while most other powers are listed between 39-45 (Japan is usually listed between 41-45). So the US's production dominance is even more massive than these numbers first lead you to believe.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

... Bethlehem Steel in Quincy, Mass ... Fore River Shipbuilding in Massachusetts ...

These two might have been one in the same. My Aunt was a welder there - ala Rosie the Riveter!

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

Indeed. But was there anything preventing the Navy from increasing priority of CV construction over other activity if it felt the need to do so?

Andrew

That would be one thing but the current re-spawn does no such thing - not even the rudest approximation of a hallucination of it. Okay, maybe that's colorful but you get my drift. Instead of being at some hypothetical 'lower priority' - never mind the stated policy of no hypotheticals in the base scenario - the 4 CV's are simply canceled if no original CV's are lost.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Captain Cruft

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Tom Hunter

In your own games do you one TFs of one BB to get the main battery to fire?

Tom, sorry to disappoint you, but we decided fairly early on, that changing the surface system would be a complete rewrite and thus it would have to wait for WITP_II. One area we did improve however, was the damage system, so this does change things a bit, we are still testing to see how much.

Did anyone ever test whether giving the main guns more than 9 ammo made any difference to this? I always suspected it would ...

I have also wondered why one ship that has 90 rounds per gun and one ship that has 130 rounds per gun would both have ammo of 9. Take rounds per gun and divide by 10. This way ships with increased ammo on board would be able to fight longer.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

For capital ships it was more of a case of having the needed shipyard workers in the right locations. For carriers and battleships (maybe heavy cruisers as well?) you only had a certain number of shipyards capable of building a ship of that size.

From memory (so feel free to add any I've missed), I get Behtlehem Steel in Quincy, Mass, New York Navy Yard, New York Shipbuilding Co, Philadelphia Navy Yard, Newport News Shipbuilding, Norfolk Navy Yard and Mare Island Navy Yard. In the twenties and thirties Fore River Shipbuilding in Massachusetts had built at least one carrier and battleship, but I don't think that they built any during the war though that wouldn't preclude the availability of that one being one more shipway for an extra carrier - but I believe that that was the only carrier capable shipway that was not in use during the war.

IIRC one of the major bottlenecks in ship construction was the production of armor. Only so much could be produced per year, and this dictated what could be built.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

Okay, if this was already discussed then direct me to the post. My concern is how will WITP:AE address the issue of barrel wear and the need for relining? In larger caliber guns this is a real issue. For instance, the USN 16"/45 Mk 6 was good for about 400 rounds before the barrel was in need of relining. Relining this gun involved pulling the gun from the turret then shipping the gun to a naval ordnance center where the liner would be replaced. Obviously this takes a considerable amount of time. A possible solution might be to count rounds fired and then after the relining total is reached the guns would be disabled? Another solution would be to ingore this problem? Finding a way to incorporate this would go a long way towards eliminating the revloving door shore bombardments.

Not to speak for the Naval team...This is a bit in the weeds for a game like WitP. Particularly when you consider the bigger issues we have tried to address. I'm sure if we kept peeling the onion back there would be hundreds if not thousands of these "chrome" concepts that we could code.

But suffice it to say that these barrels, and I am no expert on naval affairs of WWII, could have been kept in short supply so that when a BB came in to have relining done it didn't have to wait it could just change into a new set and be off.

All else aside you could just close you eyes and pretend that when a ship goes into the yard after 15 Sys damage that they are having barrels relined.

[spence]

But suffice it to say that these barrels, and I am no expert on naval affairs of WWII, could have been kept in short supply so that when a BB came in to have relining done it didn't have to wait it could just change into a new set and be off.

This was actually addressed in a thread (regarding "nuclear bombardments") a long time back. IIRC somebody actually dug up info that indicated the Japanese had what amounted to one extra barrel for each BB gun at the start of the war. Again IIRC, the same source indicated that the Japanese did not produce a single BB caliber gun/gun liner during the war. So for Japan the statement above is true to a limited extent. I don't remember whether stats were found regarding US heavy gun production but I think it's safe to say it was not as limited as the Japanese figures.

I think it's also safe to say that the whole "Bombardment Controversy" revolves around the acceptance during the design of the proposition that the results of the IJN's 90 minute hit and run bombardment of Henderson Field in Oct 1942 constituted the norm. I think also that insufficient attention was given to what the results actually were: most of the planes on the field were damaged, a lot of the avgas destroyed, and the runway was cratered and unusable for 12-18 hours. The purpose of the bombardment was not entirely achieved however in that a/c were still able to use an auxiliary fighter strip to attack the transports the bombardment was supposed to cover on the same day as the bombardment. Other bombardments like the one on the night of 13-14 Nov (CAs) didn't even prevent a/c from using the field the next morning to attack the bombarding ships themselves (sinking CA Kinugasa).

On the other hand, the type of stand offshore sustained bombardment used by the USN against innumerable islands is not simulated at all. Japanese coast defense guns accomplished next to nothing throughout the war against the ships from which the landing forces debarked because they were effectively suppressed by counterbattery fire. I read an exerpt from Gen Kurabashi's diary on Iwo Jima that indicated that in the first 24 hours after opening fire with his artillery counterbattery fire from the ship's offshore and close air support destroyed or rendered inoperable half of his guns. His machine guns, mortars and artillery firing indirectly on the Marines ashore were certainly effective; but any gun attempting to engage the ships offshore was quickly knocked out or suppressed.

[Mike Scholl]

An additional problem with the IJN doing the number of Bombardment missions the average Japanese Player wants to do. Japan did not provide "reduced charges" for her naval rifles..., it was "all or nothing" (with the attendent barrel wear). This is because she never really planned to use heavy naval artillery for anything except "the Decisive Battle" (which never took place). Which fits right in with the lack of barrel liners..., The "big guns" would only be used once in the "big battle"..., so why waste limited resources on additional barrel liners?

The US (thanks to the Marines) had at least considered the use of shore bombardment. And prepared accordingly when the time came. In truth, the "reduced charges" were probably due to balistic requirements (lower muzzle velocity gave a more effective "howitzer-like" trajectory for bombardments) as for any concern about barrel wear.

In truth, the Japanese should really be severly limited in their ability to use BB's in a bombardment role at all.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

While not an endless cornucopia of production, here’s some figures to show just how much more productive the US was over Japan. The notion that in game Japan can build unlimited equipment items and the US and allies are hamstrung by limited pools is pure FANTASY!

...
...
The general misconception around here seems to be that Japan had any chance at all to even come close to competing with the US on any level of production, let alone all of the allies. Japan’s entire wartime production doesn’t even out produce the US for one month’s production in most categories.

Jim

Edit: Figures given are for years at war, so the US is usually only listed between 42-45, while most other powers are listed between 39-45 (Japan is usually listed between 41-45). So the US's production dominance is even more massive than these numbers first lead you to believe.

I never said that the Japanese or the Axis outproduced the US nor implied that should be the case. Nor did I think that anyone else did. I was merely pointing out the fact that the US could not produce everything it wanted when it wanted. IMO and I assume Andrew's opinion the "Respawn Rule" is a "simulation" of production priorities...Now how that Rule was implemented in the code is another matter.

Again IMO a better solution would be to force the arrival of the "Repawned Carriers" to the end of the production Que or to simply make the delay in the arrival of the respawned carriers such that if the originals are lost early the respawn's would arrive later in the war representing the Essex's that were cancelled and/or some of the late arriving ships. The effect would be that even if the US does not lose the original 4 CV's the early "missing" Essexes still arrive when they historically did with the caveat being that some of the late arriving Essex's would be cancelled because the original 4 Cv's that were sunk are still afloat.

Another one of the "problems" with the current implementation of the rule is that it does not taken into account the state of the Japanese Fleet as historical US production decisions did and was one of the many reasons certain vessels were scaled back in production and/or cancelled.

Now with all that being said I would be all in favor of a US based production system but it would be a monster to create as it would have to represent manpower shortages and the demands of the European theater...and that is far outside the scope of AE.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

In truth, the Japanese should really be severly limited in their ability to use BB's in a bombardment role at all.

I do not know that I entirely agree with this statement. I believe there were many considerations at play in the Japanese decisions on whether to use BB's to bombard or not...one of them being fuel consumption. It's not like they only did it once...they did try it on other occasions but happened to be met by an opposing surface fleet.

Perhaps with the changes being introduced by AE an Allied player may be inclined to position a surface fleet at Guadacanal to oppose a bombardment, especially if the Land based air can provide some cover. Afterall with the changes to air combat I suspect the dynamics we are used to will be changed...ie Carrier fleets may become fragile as opposed to the impervious deathstars of WitP and Land based air will become more significant along with the assumption that long distance air missions from Rabaul will be much more challenging to the Japanese..

enough babbling for now...

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

In truth, the Japanese should really be severly limited in their ability to use BB's in a bombardment role at all.

I do not know that I entirely agree with this statement. I believe there were many considerations at play in the Japanese decisions on whether to use BB's to bombard or not...one of them being fuel consumption. It's not like they only did it once...they did try it on other occasions but happened to be met by an opposing surface fleet.

As far as I know, in the entire first two years of the war, they tried it twice. Both times at Guadalcanal, both times using only two BB's, once successfully, once not. Once per year sounds pretty "limited" to me. Compare those totals to the average AAR, and I think you will find that "twice" is the "severly limited" version of what is occuring in the game.

[Chad Harrison]

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

While not an endless cornucopia of production, here’s some figures to show just how much more productive the US was over Japan. The notion that in game Japan can build unlimited equipment items and the US and allies are hamstrung by limited pools is pure FANTASY!

I am going to have to echo this also. 144 Hellcats a month? Andy Mac, how do you feel about that? [:D] I read somewhere that it was around 20 a day once they were up to full production. They had an entire factory devoted to just Hellcats IIRC.

PzB out producting America in fighter aircraft production in 1945 should tell you everything you need to know about how well the current game represents production.

While this is the naval thread and I should ask it in the air thread, Ill risk asking here: are we going to see more realistic production numbers for the US for aircraft and land unit elements (squads, tanks, guns, ect)?

Thanks

Chad

[Chad Harrison]

On another completely different note, are PT boats spawning at any base going to handled differently?

For instance, you could spawn them on the West Coast and then have to put them on a transport and lift them to the base they are going too. I know that would require quite a bit of changes, but we got midget subs in after all [:)]

Thanks

Chad

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

In truth, the Japanese should really be severly limited in their ability to use BB's in a bombardment role at all.

I do not know that I entirely agree with this statement. I believe there were many considerations at play in the Japanese decisions on whether to use BB's to bombard or not...one of them being fuel consumption. It's not like they only did it once...they did try it on other occasions but happened to be met by an opposing surface fleet.

As far as I know, in the entire first two years of the war, they tried it twice. Both times at Guadalcanal, both times using only two BB's, once successfully, once not. Once per year sounds pretty "limited" to me. Compare those totals to the average AAR, and I think you will find that "twice" is the "severly limited" version of what is occuring in the game.

You failed to mention a third time...

7 March 1942:
BatDiv 3/2 bombards Christmas Island with DesDiv 17's URAKAZE and HAMAKAZE...

I'll look for others.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

In truth, the Japanese should really be severly limited in their ability to use BB's in a bombardment role at all.

I do not know that I entirely agree with this statement. I believe there were many considerations at play in the Japanese decisions on whether to use BB's to bombard or not...one of them being fuel consumption. It's not like they only did it once...they did try it on other occasions but happened to be met by an opposing surface fleet.

As far as I know, in the entire first two years of the war, they tried it twice. Both times at Guadalcanal, both times using only two BB's, once successfully, once not. Once per year sounds pretty "limited" to me. Compare those totals to the average AAR, and I think you will find that "twice" is the "severly limited" version of what is occuring in the game.

Not that I doubt the historical accuracy of this, but I politely disagree with limiting the players ability to perform the mission. The main reason being that this is the ultimate 'what-if' game, players are free to try different tactics than the major powers did.

I do have a proposal to help add the limit that would also give the player contorl over his own bombardment destiny, though I believe it would the OTS of AE (perhaps WITP II). That would be to code in gun wear so that after X number of combat/bombardment rounds the gun becomes 'disabled'. Make the guns producable as a device, and if you don't have the replacements on hand, it will limit the number of times you want to use them. Not only that, it would also require more yard time more often, which is probably a lot more accurate historically, Murphy's Law being what it is. [:D]

Basically, you'd have to weigh the immediate results with the possibility of not having a ship you really need when you need it later on due to it being in port for a gun replacement.

Also, that would allow players who plan to do lots of bombardments to increase naval gun production at the cost of using precious resources that may be needed elsewhere. Despite the Japanese players ability to super-charge their economy, there are still only a finite amount of oil centers and resource centers on the map.

Just some rambling thoughts on the issue.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Shark7
Not that I doubt the historical accuracy of this, but I politely disagree with limiting the players ability to perform the mission. The main reason being that this is the ultimate 'what-if' game, players are free to try different tactics than the major powers did.

We're just looking at it from different viewpoints. I agree on the game being "the ultimate what if", but I favor limiting the basic game to the "what if's" that are historically accurate. What can you accomplish using what your historical counter-parts had available? If the Japanese couldn't and didn't engage in a host of "bombardment missions" due to real physical limitations, I think the game should reflect that limitation. Some "modder" will soon supply a more "wide open" version.

Allied planning and doctrine never envisioned the need for ultra-long-ranged land-based Torpedo Bombers, so they Allies shouldn't have anything equivelent to the Nell or Betty running around in the game. They don't, so historical accuracy is preserved in play. Would the Allied player like to have some? Probably..., but he didn't have them in real life, so he shouldn't have them in the game. Some "modder" might create some for his "version", but they don't belong in the basic game.

I do appreciate the level of cordiality that's been maintained in this discussion. It's nice to discuss different opinions vehemently and vociferously, without the "violently".