Modeling of Carrier Battles

[el cid again]

I see another dimension of these matters:

are players in charge of their task groups - or are they merely distant commanders telling them where to go?

Even a distant admiral could change the tactics ordered.

We ARE permitted to specify the composition of a strike, its mission, even its altitude. But we are NOT permitted to specify inner screen, outer screen, pickets, or any other aspect of tactical air defense. Perhaps equally significant (but not done in any games I have ever seen) - we don't get to control if a task group is active or passive (electronically speaking). By late in WWII the US had developed the bad habit it STILL has - "always radiate with everything possible" - to such an extent a major task force betrays its location, course, speed and often composition to anyone willing and able to listen within hundreds of nautical miles - and never less than 120% of the radar horizon. Japan in particular was able to identify USN ships using "radar" in a recieve only mode more reliably and at greater ranges than if it was on - and had the opportunity (often squandered) to elect to engage or evade.

As an AAW and EW guy (specifically in the fleet air defense role) I like to give players control over these elements - and to set up norms as the standard defaults. IF a player WANTS to do things different than the norm, he MAY - and if not he is stuck with the fleet norms. Precicely because range DOES matter, having pickets out (or not) matters - and in the right direction (it takes 6 to cover all directions at a not too great distance - more if we spread a TF over more than one hex - so if you only have 1 picket there is a 1/6 chance you get early warning from it kind of thing). Similarly, there ARE trade offs between having an inner screen - close enough to matter for AAA - and carrier flexability - which could be put into sortee rate.

In 1941/2, Japan has almost NO light AAA at all. A DD has as little as 1 .30 cal or .50 cal MG per side (MODERN DDs at that) - and never more than 2 or 3 x 25mm per side. That is so few it matters not a whit if they are close enough to support the TF with AAA in the light AAA sense. But the bigger guns are different. They work from the OUTER screen - and they vary a lot. A long 5 inch 50 is a lousy AAA gun, but a short 5 inch 40 - or a 100 mm gun - are very good. [There was also a Model 1 5 inch that could have been produced sooner - they finally did it in 1945 - which was very good indeed] A wise commander/player should consider the ship - and that should influence where it goes. Japanese ships in the inner screen in 1941/2 not only are ahistorical - they are not going to be particularly useful - because at that time the light AAA is poor - and the many ships that later traded 5 inch 50s for 5 inch 40s have not yet done so. On the other hand, the first AA destroyers are building - and these have an AAA fire direction center. Putting such vessels in the outer screen (when finally they are available) ought to matter. Putting a DD with poor heavy AA guns out on picket duty also makes sense. But we have no way to do any of this.

A late war development is AEW (Aircraft Early Warning radar) on aircraft - and also submarines with air search radar. Big land based aircraft and submarines operating in hexes adjacent to a TF should be able to influence the ability of fighters to intercept in the fleet air defense (or base air defense) problem. Both of these were USN concepts - and RN concepts - not Japanese ones.

In a similar way, very distant radar picket destroyers (or even visual picket destroyers) should influence carrier (and other air defense) battles. Players CAN put a picket "north of Okinawa" as IRL - and can even put a TF in the hex beside a carrier TF - but they cannot make the pickets MOVE WITH the carrier TF. I think a friendly air search radar in an adjacent hex matters - on land or at sea - and I think a TF should be able to have distant pickets (in an adjacent hex) - which are NOT separate task forces at all - so they will move in sync with the main body. IRL TFs could be gigantic.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
Cool, thanks Nik!
Ok, so looks like there is a quantum leap for Santa Cruz. Next question for the master, is why?

I find it interesting that as early as Coral Sea the Neosho and Sims managed to do as well as Shokaku and Zuikaku---that the AAA of one US Destroyer scored equally with that of the entire Japanese Task Force.

Santa Cruz does seem to indicate a "quantum leap", reflecting better AAA guns and stronger screening forces. Probably should be a second "quantum leap" by the end of 1943 as the 40mm's aquire radar direction and the 5" get "proximity fuses.

[spence]

The IJN had developed a doctrine of massing carrier airpower in 1941. The ships, commanders, and flyers had all trained and the bugs were for the most part worked out.
The USN did not have such a doctrine. From this perspective and that of the players having perfect hindsight the Strike Coordination Rule which afflicts the USN in 1941-43 makes sense.

The IJN also had a fleet defense doctrine which in many ways embodied Japanese cultural predispositions: individual Samurai warriors doing battle against the enemy (fighter pilots in air combat and ship's captains by adroit manuever). With hindsight it can be seen that this doctrine had serious flaws. So by 1944 the IJN adopted more or less a copy of the USNs AA defense formation and along the way implemented the technological changes necessary to make such a formation effective (enhanced AAA suites and radar though to a much more limited extent).

The players of WitP are cast more or less as supreme commanders. The cyber ships, planes and men should fight as they have been trained: that is to follow the tactical doctrines of their respective sides.

AE will apparently address in some way the phenomenon of UberCAP so I'll wait to see how that works out. Since the IJN never even got off the ground as far as Fighter Direction Centers were concerned any UberCAP that ever develops should be associated only with the Allies. In any case I won't address this issue further.

To reflect the dispersal of IJN ships in AA defense I suggest that the AA fire at any particular group of attacking a/c be limited to the AA guns of the target or the target and 1 additional DD (or smaller). This rule would stay in effect from Dec 7th 41 until 1 Jan 1944 when the IJN adopts more or less a copy of USN AA defense formations.

To reflect the better manuevering possibilities of the dispersal I suggest that the manuever rating of carriers, cruisers, and battleships be enhanced such that the probability of a hit be decreased statistically by 5% or so (5% of whatever the percentage is without accounting for manuevering). When the IJN implements "the ring defense" this "manuever advantage" would be cancelled at the same time.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

OK. But is there any way to simply add range penalties for coordinated strikes (the larger the strike the shorter the range), range bonuses for uncoordinated strikes (to ensure that CVs with shorter range a/c have a much higher chance of getting off a strike within the limits of the games operational scale), enhanced Allied CAP to reflect fighter direction, and reduced Japanese flak in CV TFs to reflect the two differrent CV TF defensive doctrines to level the playing field?

First, let me analyse what you are saying here, to align it with my list of 11 factors http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/fb.asp?m=1657775

So I think you are really focusing on two areas:

(1) & (2) Strike Coordination, Strike Cycle Times and Strike Range

(8) & (9) Flak and CAP.

Regarding the second one, I think Nik will post some data for us, basically showing us the flak and cap losses inflicted by the IJN and USN over the four 1942 carrier battles, so that should help us decide if there is a different in 1942 that needs to be represented. If so, then we can consider mechanisms to implement. For 1943 and beyond, there is already some "Allied CAP" enhancement code, that might cover a CAP increase there and there also might already be some Allied flak enhancement code, I'll have to check on that. I know I've seen the CAP code, I do think I've looked for the flak code.

Regarding the first one. Let's discuss further. Can you come up with a nice simple, maybe 2-3 part proposal that would implement the idea? I've got some ideas myself, but if your brain works faster than mine feel free to post away!

Just saw this. Sure, I'll see if I can remember what I was proposing before WITP was released...I'm not at my PC right now so I can't check if I still have the WordPad files.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Question for Nick: did the source you are using cross check against Japanese sources? That could provide a useful verification.

Yes. Lundstrom utilizes records from both sides. I also cross referenced the Midway results with Shattered Sword, which also uses records from both sides. The two sources' figures don't completely match, several results differing by +/- 1. Mostly they are complementary and Lundstrom was a consultant for SS.

[Nikademus]

Here are the CAP preformance figures. Collating this data proved far more troublesome than i thought despite having made prior summary notes. Lundstrom doesn't always make it easy to pull figures out because he's storytelling and sometimes his summaries don't match what you pull out in the actual accounts. I've found Shores to be much superior here even though his work is often described as "overly dry." But thats because Shores doesn't waste words telling a story. He just presents the data on a day by day basis, reserving comments for important or technical related aspects interspaced with the occasional english with. It can be sleep inducing at times when sitting in a bar reading day after day of repetetive occurances...but it sure makes accessing data in future times far more quick and easy vs. the admitedly more pulse pounding Lundstrom style of story-writing. I don't fault Lundstrom for this btw.....his goal after all "was" to tell the story of the First Team and he succeeded, at least from the American side. (while he did access Japanese records for loss estimates, the motivations and thoughts of the Japanese are largely a mystery outside of his static appendexes on Japanese combat methods.....but you get put "in the cockpit" with alot of the American pilots as they are fighting their battles and can read their thoughts and versions of events as they saw it) Its just not always research friendly.

Coral Sea

Over Shoho

1 SBD (A6M)
2 x A5M(F4F)
1 x A6M(F4F)

Over Shok and Zuik

2(+1) x SBD(A6M)
3 x F4F(A6M)
2 x A6M(F4F)

Failed unescorted Dusk attack near USN TF 5/7/42

7(+3) x B5N (F4F)
1 x D3A

Over York and Lex

3 x D3A(F4F)
1 x D3A(SBD)

1 x B5N(F4F)
5 x B5N(SBD)

3 x F4F(A6M)
5 x SBD(A6M)



Midway

Over Kido Butai

1 x B-26(A6M)
4 x TBF(A6M)
8 x SBD(A6M)
3 x SB2U(A6M)
15 x TBD(A6M) VT-8
10 x TBD(A6M) VT-6
10 x TBD(A6M) VT-3
1 x F4F(A6M)

1 x A6M(B-26)
1 x A6M(TBF)


1 x A6M(SBD)
1 x A6M(TBD)

1 x A6M (TBD)
1 x A6M (Friendly AA)
6 x A6M(F4F)
2 x A6M (possible SBD/TBD)
(+3) - (1-op; 2 damage vs. bombers?)

(Total 11 A6M downed + 3 ditch during carrier attack period 1010 - 1045 (essentially VT-3/VS-3/6 VF3 phase)

Over Yorktown (Hiryu 1st strike)

8(+3) x D3A (F4F)
3 x A6M (F4F)

1 x F4F(A6M)

Over Yorktown (Hiryu 2nd strike)

2 x A6M (F4F)
3 x B5N (F4F)

4 x F4F (A6M)

Over Hiryu

3 x SBD (A6M)

Eastern Solomons

Over Ryujo

zip

Over Enterprise

bombing run

2 x A6M (F4F)
6 x D3A (F4F)
2 x F4F(A6M)

after bombing run

1 x F4F(A6M)
1 x TBF (A6M)

1 x A6M(F4F)
1 x A6M(TBF)
7 x D3A(F4F)

Santa Cruz


Over Zuiho

1 x A6M(SBD)



Over KB and Chikuma Vanguard group

5 x F4F (A6M)
2 x SBD (A6M)
2(+1) x TBF (A6M)

4 x A6M (F4F)
3 x A6M (TBF)
2 x A6M (SBD)


Over USN TF

6 x A6M (F4F)
16 x D3A (F4F)
10 x B5N (F4F)

11 x F4F (A6M)

numerical values in ()'s denote planes not immediately shot down but whose loss/ditch can be directly attributed to damage inflicted by the attacker denoted in ()'s

Note on above estimates:

Normally for land based air loss accounting I award delayed losses due to ditching/forced landing/write off to the attacking weapon as long as a direct or highly probable link to specific damage can be established. Several examples are present here., noted as numerical values in ().

"op" losses are reserved for planes who's loss/force landing cannot be either attributed to any form of combat damage or if damage is suspected but cannot be linked to a direct form of damage/engagement. The latter case is done to help preserve the integrity of the data that points to a2a or AA. An exception is a successful force landing at an airfield facility, unless the plane is a clear write off.

(A good example of the latter situation concerns losses of night intruders documented in Shores "Fighters over the Desert" A good number of these simply cannot be tracked by records to a specific cause, nor can even a connection be made to a perp, such as a claim made same night by the enemy for an intruder allowing a probable connecting of the dots. Such an entry might say; "A Wellington failed to return from a night mission over Tobruk" You figure it probably involved combat but was it AA or an aircraft, if an aircraft, what class of aircraft? Or was it indeed equipment failure which did happen frequently. Hence...the default classification of loss is "op" in cases like this in order to help preserve data integrity)

For carrier combat, its more difficult to classify op vs. kill because of the increased hazzards of fighting and navigating over the ocean not present for most air combat over land masses. Many planes, sometimes even if undamaged, were lost due to navigational errors (MIA), ditched from fuel starvation and/or mechanical failure or pilot error/fatigue or wrecked while preforming the admitedly more challenging deck landing at sea due to said fatigue. Damage of course and possible wounding of crews makes this more challenging still. As such, i've focused initial estimates based on immediate kills while also noting ditchings and write offs seperately. In many cases tracing damage to a specific weapons device is impossible. It should also be noted that it has proven impossible to totally account for all aircraft lost in combat situations described in Lundstrom. Some specific tracing can be done. I have included the most probable in this list. Take or delete as you wish.

I have not included after-battle figures here for the most part but may at a later date. The other reason i did it this way for carrier battles (vs. my normal methodology) was to better highlight the actual number of losses over a TF during actual combat because the tendancy is for people to look at the summary of losses in these carrier battles and attribute it to a massive bloodbath such as one sees in WitP. Such thinking is reinforced by accounts such as the famous SoDak claim of shooting down 26 enemy planes single handedly during Santa Cruz and by the unarmored nature of the Japanese airplanes.

In the end the issue of "op loss" vs. Kill in carrier combat is a more blured line because especially given Lundstrom's writing style its not always certain if a ditching/missing aircraft occured because of combat damage and even if combat damage is stated, a direct perp can't be traced so it becomes a guessing game.

Finally....ok i have to say it....given my years here and having seen one too many silly agenda charged Zero vs Wildcat threads. Be careful when interpreting these numbers. As with any stripped statistic, you can pretty much argue any POV using them when seperated from the circumstances by which they were generated. Each battle had it's own unique variables which can also be used to pursue any agenda as we have seen. (my favorite will always be the "oh they were all in a landing pattern at the time" excuse. [:D]) Being evil, thats why I havn't provided any details on how the losses were acrued. I'll just get popcorn and watch the sparks fly. Oh wait....thats the general WitP forum so we may be safe here + I know Joe will frown hard at any such distractions [:D]

That and its that much more work for me too! I'll drop one hint though given all the recent study i've devoted to day to day air ops. These ratios are not uncommon in a variety of campaigns and tactical matchups vs. a variety of aircraft types be they German, American, Japanese, Commonwealth, Italian or......or even French believe it or not.

[jwilkerson]

Great, thanks Nik!

What would be really nice [:)][&o] would be a summary table (extra dry!) of flak losses by side and by battle and same for CAP ... I guess it could be by type.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Great, thanks Nik!

What would be really nice [:)][&o] would be a summary table (extra dry!) of flak losses by side and by battle and same for CAP ... I guess it could be by type.

Yes it would be nice. I'm building spreadsheets for all the Shores books i'm reading but as of yet havn't done it for Lundstrom/Shattered Sword. Someday i suppose. I'm two Shores books behind as it is for collating that recorded data.

Be sure to recheck the edited AA list. Turned out on further review i left out 2 D3A losses attributed to North Carolina's new AA weaponry.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I find it interesting that as early as Coral Sea the Neosho and Sims managed to do as well as Shokaku and Zuikaku---that the AAA of one US Destroyer scored equally with that of the entire Japanese Task Force.

Variables always exist. I found it amusing as well that Tanikaze shot down an SBD all by herself and that Mogami and Mikuma did better than all of KB as well vs SBDs.

[:)]

[jwilkerson]

Ok, well I'll see if I can do it just from what you've posted. Thanks again!
[:)]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

The IJN had developed a doctrine of massing carrier airpower in 1941. The ships, commanders, and flyers had all trained and the bugs were for the most part worked out.
The USN did not have such a doctrine. From this perspective and that of the players having perfect hindsight the Strike Coordination Rule which afflicts the USN in 1941-43 makes sense.

The IJN also had a fleet defense doctrine which in many ways embodied Japanese cultural predispositions: individual Samurai warriors doing battle against the enemy (fighter pilots in air combat and ship's captains by adroit manuever). With hindsight it can be seen that this doctrine had serious flaws. So by 1944 the IJN adopted more or less a copy of the USNs AA defense formation and along the way implemented the technological changes necessary to make such a formation effective (enhanced AAA suites and radar though to a much more limited extent).

The players of WitP are cast more or less as supreme commanders. The cyber ships, planes and men should fight as they have been trained: that is to follow the tactical doctrines of their respective sides.

AE will apparently address in some way the phenomenon of UberCAP so I'll wait to see how that works out. Since the IJN never even got off the ground as far as Fighter Direction Centers were concerned any UberCAP that ever develops should be associated only with the Allies. In any case I won't address this issue further.

To reflect the dispersal of IJN ships in AA defense I suggest that the AA fire at any particular group of attacking a/c be limited to the AA guns of the target or the target and 1 additional DD (or smaller). This rule would stay in effect from Dec 7th 41 until 1 Jan 1944 when the IJN adopts more or less a copy of USN AA defense formations.

To reflect the better manuevering possibilities of the dispersal I suggest that the manuever rating of carriers, cruisers, and battleships be enhanced such that the probability of a hit be decreased statistically by 5% or so (5% of whatever the percentage is without accounting for manuevering). When the IJN implements "the ring defense" this "manuever advantage" would be cancelled at the same time.

The IJN had better AA training than any other bellegerent power - in spite of expending zero ammunition for training. Because of a superior training technology. Ultimately the IJA adopted the same trainers, directors and even guns - for use ashore. In particular - and also culturally (Japan always trained for night and bad weather combat in a sense we are not willing to do - and this is still the case) - they are better in bad conditions (having trained for it). It is a bit too simplistic to say what was said above.

If we just put the right guns on DDs - early Japanese DDs won't be worth much for AAA. Later ones will - no code required. But an early ship with the nice 100 mm guns will be pretty good even so - and should not be penalized by code - having not just better guns but better fire direction behind the guns (than other early ships have).

It might be nice if we could include directors in ships as devices - these limit the number of effective targets that can be engaged - and their absence leads to more random AA effectiveness. Thus wether a ship is good or poor is more related to directors than to guns - and we could model it.

Similarly, it might be nice to model AA radar. This can multiply the effect of the AAA - particularly in bad conditions. Again - it isn't just guns that matter - but what aims them.

[spence]

The IJN had better AA training than any other bellegerent power - in spite of expending zero ammunition for training.

You apparently did not review the statistics regarding the combat results (in 1942)produced by this incredible IJN AAA training regimen. Pre-war American torpedo development and training compares nicely in terms of ammunition expended and results produced in combat for the same period.

[el cid again]

An you apparently are not reading my posting clearly: it is not based on such statistics nor related to them.

Early in the war only a single Japanese type had the combination of 100 mm guns, FDC and director/computer control needed to be effecive (the AA destroyers). Also there were almost no light AA guns of any sort, controlled or not, on any ship - even the AA destroyers. Things not in service are hardly going to score.

Later - where these things exist - they have effect. They have MORE effect than Japanese fighters do. But since that isn't in those statistics, you hardly can see that there. They COULD affect carrier battles - if they were present - and if the battles were not ones in which they were moot (e.g. targets not detected are not engaged). We don't know what will be present in a game world and must design for the possibility.

Once again you are using the mentality:

a) We know all that happened and

b) We should force everything to happen exactly the same way in our game worlds.

Worse, you are doing that in the context of very limited data, generalizing it to apply even to places/cases we know about - where it does not apply - and then saying that should be the standard.

Well - IRL the Japanese DID have a better AA training system - it DID work - and it SHOULD be required to be even in strictly historical scenarios -- so it can work wherever the ships (or land AA units) so trained and fitted happen to be present - and not in other cases. If we had directors - a unit with zero will not benefit from them - for example. A unit with few gains only the ability to aim at 1 or 2 planes with them, and a better fitted US unit may engage more (3 or 4 perhaps) per pass.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: spence

With regards to flak effectiveness I read that there was a "proximity fuze bonus" in WitP which applies to Allied flak starting some time in early 1943.

I recall a statement in "Shattered Sword" something along the line of Japanese flak from the KB claimed exactly 2 planes shot down on June 4, 1942. But Flak from both sides was sufficiently effective that a fairly substantial number of planes were put out of action
at least temporarily.

Yeah, I've heard about the Allied flak bonus too - just need to go hunt it down and see exactly how it works.

Ok, I've tracked down the Allied flak bonus.

Briefly, it applies from the first turn of 1943 to the end of the war/game.

It applies to all Allied flak: Chinese, British, USA, everybody on the Allied side.

It applies to both land based flak and ship based flak.

All flak is halved by default. Then if the year is 1943 or beyond, then Allied flak will not be so halved.

[jwilkerson]

Continuing in the vein of looking at the stock baseline (i.e. what do we have already). And aligning with previous mention of CAP and Flak as being aspects of carrier battle modeling you guys would like to see improved ....

The "CAP Bonus" currently works as follows:

Effects begin in July 1943.

Allied Air Search Radar effect is essentially doubled (we added some randomness to this in 1.8.0.6 but it still kicks in about 80% of the time, rather than the 100% prior to 1.8.0.6).

Doubling of radar effect dramatically increases detection level of incomming enemy aircraft.

Works for both land bases and task forces.

Increased detection significantly impacts the subsequent ReinforceCap step which launches additional CAP against the incomming strike. For the Allies in the late war (July 43 on), this essentially generates an "Uber CAP" effect automatically.

======

We note the above results in some games (like AndyMac versus PzB) making house rules to try to decrease the Allied Uber CAP late in the game. However, house rules restricting Allied CAP settings cannot usually overcome the above CAP bonus, because the ReinforceCap step overrides the CAP settings of the player. The CAP will be launched anyway.

======

So above, I have tried to layout the "state of things" with regard to Allied bonuses (in stock) for both flak and CAP. I'd be interested to hear comments on these aspects from at least Ron and Spence, since they have raised these as issues in the carrier battle modeling. Others are of course welcome to comment as well!

[spence]

To reflect the dispersal of IJN ships in AA defense I suggest that the AA fire at any particular group of attacking a/c be limited to the AA guns of the target or the target and 1 additional DD (or smaller). This rule would stay in effect from Dec 7th 41 until 1 Jan 1944 when the IJN adopts more or less a copy of USN AA defense formations.

To reflect the better manuevering possibilities of the dispersal I suggest that the manuever rating of carriers, cruisers, and battleships be enhanced such that the probability of a hit be decreased statistically by 5% or so (5% of whatever the percentage is without accounting for manuevering). When the IJN implements "the ring defense" this "manuever advantage" would be cancelled at the same time.

I have no idea how the code works to know if changes such as I propose above could be implemented. IMHO they'd reflect the essentially different philosophies and doctrines of the belligerents regarding defense during the early period of the war.

A slight revision to the first part of the proposal: Each group of attacking aircraft would be fired at by the AAA of the target ship ONLY in 1941-42. This would apply to any class ship. In 1943; each group would be fired at by the target ship and one escort.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Continuing in the vein of looking at the stock baseline (i.e. what do we have already). And aligning with previous mention of CAP and Flak as being aspects of carrier battle modeling you guys would like to see improved ....

The "CAP Bonus" currently works as follows:

Effects begin in July 1943.

Allied Air Search Radar effect is essentially doubled (we added some randomness to this in 1.8.0.6 but it still kicks in about 80% of the time, rather than the 100% prior to 1.8.0.6).

Doubling of radar effect dramatically increases detection level of incomming enemy aircraft.

Works for both land bases and task forces.

Increased detection significantly impacts the subsequent ReinforceCap step which launches additional CAP against the incomming strike. For the Allies in the late war (July 43 on), this essentially generates an "Uber CAP" effect automatically.

======

We note the above results in some games (like AndyMac versus PzB) making house rules to try to decrease the Allied Uber CAP late in the game. However, house rules restricting Allied CAP settings cannot usually overcome the above CAP bonus, because the ReinforceCap step overrides the CAP settings of the player. The CAP will be launched anyway.

======

So above, I have tried to layout the "state of things" with regard to Allied bonuses (in stock) for both flak and CAP. I'd be interested to hear comments on these aspects from at least Ron and Spence, since they have raised these as issues in the carrier battle modeling. Others are of course welcome to comment as well!

Regarding the CAP bonus...

Allied CAP was theoretically better from the start of hostilities given the Allied use of radios in their aircraft (facilitates communication between CAP elements), their early adoption of fighter direction utilizing radar and aircraft communication capability (British had practiced this well before Pearl Harbor) and of course the lack of any of the above for Japan.

I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience. For Allies, instead of initiating a single generalized bonus at what appears to be a generalized date, perhaps institute a multiple step progression rate and start at a more reasonable date. Perhaps allow the Allies a 1.0 capability at games start, increase it to 1.25 in June/42, 1.50 in Dec/42, 1.75 in June/43 and 2.0 in Dec/43 to reflect their early experience (Britsh), equipment, doctrinal advantages and gradual accumulation of combat experience
.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience.

Hopefully the effects of upgrading to better radars should be taken care of by the ratings of the radar devices themselves.

Andrew

[Ron Saueracker]

As I'm still unable to access my old PC (gave it to my mummy![;)]) for a few more days I'll just bounce a few ideas which might be easily added to improve the carrier ops in AE.

My main beefs with the current incarnation is that there are a few tactical details which have been included in an operational level game which impact the mechanics negatively while further, other tactical details which would go a long way to counter those currently included are glaringly absent, leaving the mechanics somewhat crippled as a result.

1) Having rigid tactical level data such as exact range figures for aircraft but having operational level 60 mile hexes often results in a/c that have a few extra gallons in the tank enjoying an extra hex range over a/c that have just a few less gallons losing a hex range. This is one of the reasons why Japan regularly gets to hit Allied CVs with strikes yet Allied CV a/c remain on deck in the game yet historically there is no example of this actually occurring. The new map with its' 40 mile hexes should alleviate this somewhat. Perhaps implementing a mechanic which rounds up the a/c range if it is closer to the next further hexside than the center of the hex (basically adding a hex in range) and rounds down the a/c range if closer to the hexside than to the hex center (basically reducing the range by a hex) might also mend the tactical with the operational level of the design.

2) The limitations of the phase/pulse design is another operational level design limitation which plays havoc with such rigid tactical data like a/c range and naval movement during non naval movement phases. Not much can be done about the necessity of the phase/pulse design approach at this point but perhaps the suggestions in (1) can augment the well intentioned but rather clunky reaction mechanism currently used as the sole design feature which attempts to allow for an abstract ability for naval forces to maneuver into/out of range during the air phases.

3) The co-ordinated strike bonus. In the current model, Japan enjoys an arguably unwarranted hard coded strike bonus. In my opinion, this should be removed and have coordination rely upon aircraft endurance, CV operational efficiency/maximums, weather and leader skill (both TF and squadron leaders).

3a) Aircraft endurance. Co-ordination of strikes relied greatly upon an aircrafts ability to loiter while further aircraft massed prior to departing for the target. Historically, the a/c with the longest endurance launched first and the a/c with the shortest launched last. The co-ordinated strike should therefore have a range equal to the lowest endurance a/c. Due to relative a/c speed, sometimes the strike would form up miles from the target to allow the slower longer ranged a/c to proceed while the faster a/c caught up after launching last, lessening the range penalty. The success rate of this latter method of coordination was less than that of those which formed up over the TF as it was much more difficult to join up enroute. These two approaches to co-ordinated strikes had an impact on historical strike ranges, yet the current model does not penalize co-ordinated strike ranges.

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

3c) I believe both weather and leader skill are factored in right now to some degree.





to be continued...

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
I'd lean towards establishing a base line for CAP capability (1.0) and have Japan start below it (perhaps 0.75 penalty) and gradually improve the capability with bonuses for such documented advances as radar, radio equipped a/c, doctrine and combat experience.

Hopefully the effects of upgrading to better radars should be taken care of by the ratings of the radar devices themselves.

Andrew

I'm hoping this is the case as well but it really only reflects the radar itself, not the other issues like dedicated CAP Direction Teams (FDTs), doctrine, radio equipped a/c etc which were present. That's why the July/43 bonus was added in the original build. I just think that the July 43 date is too general and as a result does not adequately deal with the differences between Allied and Japanese capabilities, specifically in 1942.