Modeling of Carrier Battles

[m10bob]

"dedicated CAP Direction Teams (FDTs),"


FYI...In the American AAF the technical and correct terminology of the unit was "Fighter Control Squadron."
These units had everything to include their own ground radar units.
My Uncle George was un the 322nd FCS...........

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: spence

With regards to flak effectiveness I read that there was a "proximity fuze bonus" in WitP which applies to Allied flak starting some time in early 1943.

I recall a statement in "Shattered Sword" something along the line of Japanese flak from the KB claimed exactly 2 planes shot down on June 4, 1942. But Flak from both sides was sufficiently effective that a fairly substantial number of planes were put out of action
at least temporarily.

Yeah, I've heard about the Allied flak bonus too - just need to go hunt it down and see exactly how it works.

Ok, I've tracked down the Allied flak bonus.

Briefly, it applies from the first turn of 1943 to the end of the war/game.

It applies to all Allied flak: Chinese, British, USA, everybody on the Allied side.

It applies to both land based flak and ship based flak.

All flak is halved by default. Then if the year is 1943 or beyond, then Allied flak will not be so halved.

It reflects VT fusing (fairly large shells), and should actually be tripled for those guns with VT ammo. The rest didn't change.

The number of AA control positions should also play a role for long-range fire. Local control for nearby targets and for ships that lacked anything more.

El Cid can probably describe the standard operations research analysis of the task--I'd have to do some digging. An AA weapon was typically effective from its maximum effective range to about one third of that range. Within that range, the targets could usually move faster than the guns could adjust.

[el cid again]

It is slightly more complex than that - but Matrix loves simplicity - so we might need to ignore the total reality.

What matters re the gun itself - ignoring range and size of burst for the moment - is the rate of elevation and traverse. As you imply, tracking the target - actually leading the target - can be a problem.

Fortunately, for a ship under direct attack - or in the screen of a ship being attacked - neither matters much.
The target is "constant bearing decreasing range" and so you don't move the gun - you just shoot. But if a target is close enough - and crossing - for whatever reason - there comes a point at which you cannot keep shooting - and so you stop - and usually will then get assigned a different target.

Just as for an attack using a Norden Bombsight - there can be lots of things to worry about - but we can simplify out most of it by assuming the Navy (whatever Navy) knows enough to do them:

The basic information is already in the game: what guns exist, and things like range and ceiling for those guns - and something apparently not used in WITP I - facing for the guns;

The next basic information we SHOULD have is directors - and their facing.

To which add air search, surface search, visual and/or sound spotting equipment for warning. [SURFACE search because AIR SEARCH does NOT tell you about low fliers - but surface search does tell you]

So the matrix (a matrix for Matrix?) should be:

1) Does radar (etc) detect the enemy - or do they get surprise (a free first pass?)

2) Is the target aircraft (or element - we could do this in small pairs or threes) within the effective ceiling of the AAA guns which bear? [right now this is the ONLY question in WITP - range more or less is not a factor at all]

3) Does a director exist and bear on this target on this ship?

4) Resolve the attack.


We could add a step 2(A) Is the target aircraft in range of the AAA?

We could add a step 1(A) Is there a ship downrange of the target - in a screen or even a picket - which gets a "free shot" at this plane?

That sort of thing.

But probably we should resolve attacks ship by ship - and divide the number of shots as follows:

Case 1: No directors at all (or all that bear are damaged): 1 shot

Case 2: Directors exist and are undamaged on the target bearing: 1 shot per director with double the hit probability of undirected fire.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

To reflect the dispersal of IJN ships in AA defense I suggest that the AA fire at any particular group of attacking a/c be limited to the AA guns of the target or the target and 1 additional DD (or smaller). This rule would stay in effect from Dec 7th 41 until 1 Jan 1944 when the IJN adopts more or less a copy of USN AA defense formations.

To reflect the better manuevering possibilities of the dispersal I suggest that the manuever rating of carriers, cruisers, and battleships be enhanced such that the probability of a hit be decreased statistically by 5% or so (5% of whatever the percentage is without accounting for manuevering). When the IJN implements "the ring defense" this "manuever advantage" would be cancelled at the same time.

I have no idea how the code works to know if changes such as I propose above could be implemented. IMHO they'd reflect the essentially different philosophies and doctrines of the belligerents regarding defense during the early period of the war.

A slight revision to the first part of the proposal: Each group of attacking aircraft would be fired at by the AAA of the target ship ONLY in 1941-42. This would apply to any class ship. In 1943; each group would be fired at by the target ship and one escort.

The basic idea isn't bad. Certainly only the target ship itself can fire all its AAA weapons. [A big problem is that you cannot shoot on many bearings if there are friendly ships close by] The idea that a target ship and one screening vessel in good position is also a good simplification - and greatly reduces the amount of work figuring out what happened too.
But for more than a tiny task group - the number of screen ships able to fire should probably go up - perhaps on a ratio of 1 in 6, or better - 1 for 1 to 6 escorts, 2 if 7-18 escorts, 3 if 19 plus escorts. Still - not many get to shoot. And the COMPUTER picks who shoots - just as computer deck officers pick the formation (and try to spread it so things average out from all bearings - but won't be able to do it perfectly with odd ships present). Here we are assuming that the officers are screening for AAA properly. To which add: divide the screen vessel AAA by 2.

It is not needed to distinguish procedure by year. Instead, let two things in the data make AA get better over time:

a) You get more and better AA guns as the war goes on - even on the same ship;

b) You get more and better radar warning as the war goes on - even on the same ship;

and ideally also

c) You get HA directors on later ships - and perhaps more of them as well.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: herwin


It reflects VT fusing (fairly large shells), and should actually be tripled for those guns with VT ammo. The rest didn't change.

The number of AA control positions should also play a role for long-range fire. Local control for nearby targets and for ships that lacked anything more.

Regarding VT, it could be argued that VT fused AAA shells should be quadrupled. One article I read indicated that VT fused shells required 500 shells per each aircraft shot down, whereas none VT shells required 2,000 shells per aircraft shot down.

Neither AAA directors nor surface directors are modeled directly in WITP, nor are they likely to be. We will have to deal with the parameters we are given instead.

[spence]

The basic idea isn't bad. Certainly only the target ship itself can fire all its AAA weapons. [A big problem is that you cannot shoot on many bearings if there are friendly ships close by] The idea that a target ship and one screening vessel in good position is also a good simplification - and greatly reduces the amount of work figuring out what happened too.
But for more than a tiny task group - the number of screen ships able to fire should probably go up - perhaps on a ratio of 1 in 6, or better - 1 for 1 to 6 escorts, 2 if 7-18 escorts, 3 if 19 plus escorts. Still - not many get to shoot. And the COMPUTER picks who shoots - just as computer deck officers pick the formation (and try to spread it so things average out from all bearings - but won't be able to do it perfectly with odd ships present). Here we are assuming that the officers are screening for AAA properly. To which add: divide the screen vessel AAA by

The whole proposal I made was for the IJN only and was hopefully simple enough that it could be implemented "without designing a new game". It was the doctrine of the IJN to spread their ships over a 30000 - 40000 meter radius in 1942 with even the heavy units 8-10000 meters off from the CVs. That essentially made most of the AAA of all the ships in the screen irrelevant. Just look at photos of Japanese carriers under attack in 1942 (nice shot of Shokaku afire at Coral Sea where one can see a single DD within a 1500-2000 yds astern but a screening cruiser is just the faintest smudge on the horizon behind Shokaku). As you've already mentioned the early IJN DD had next to nothing for AAA anyways so it can be ignored. The Japanese didn't finally adopt a ring defense similar to the Allies until 1944. In the meantime they started upgrading the AAA suites of their DDs so for 1943 I propose to allow them to use the AAA of the target and one screening DD (selected at random (?) but by careful selection of the ships in a TF it could provide a small boost in the flak).

The same IJN that spread the ships in a TF out all over the ocean provided a ship's captain with unlimited sea room for radical manuevers. Although a US CV gave up a little of this ability to manuever while under attack the AAA support from the screening ships keeping station only 1000-1500 away tended to make up for such minor restrictions as the CV captain operated under. To simulate this slight manuevering advantage accorded an IJN ship under air attack I felt a slight manuever rating enhancement ((?)not sure exactly how manuever figures into attack resolution since merchies seem to have higher manuever ratings than warships which makes no intuitive sense to me (?)). In any case I sorta picked a -5% modifier to hit probability as the effect sought by whatever programming is needed.

AAA resolution for Allied TFs would essentially be handled identically to how they're handled now as would Japanese TFs starting in 1944.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Ok, well I'll see if I can do it just from what you've posted. Thanks again!
[:)]

Ok, here is a summary table of the data Nik posted earlier in this thread related to the Flak and CAP losses during the 1942 Carrier Battles.

Of course, as always, the devil is in the details, some could argue that this plane should be included and this plane not included, but I tried to be fairly strict and count only enemy planes shot down over enemy ships (for example). This means that losses to "escort fighters" are not included (among other things). Also, I did not include "possible"(s) which Nik had on his list.


A next step would be to take stock and try to run the historical battles a few times and see what the results are. Let's take a "base line" before we decide how "broke" it is!

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: spence

The basic idea isn't bad. Certainly only the target ship itself can fire all its AAA weapons. [A big problem is that you cannot shoot on many bearings if there are friendly ships close by] The idea that a target ship and one screening vessel in good position is also a good simplification - and greatly reduces the amount of work figuring out what happened too.
But for more than a tiny task group - the number of screen ships able to fire should probably go up - perhaps on a ratio of 1 in 6, or better - 1 for 1 to 6 escorts, 2 if 7-18 escorts, 3 if 19 plus escorts. Still - not many get to shoot. And the COMPUTER picks who shoots - just as computer deck officers pick the formation (and try to spread it so things average out from all bearings - but won't be able to do it perfectly with odd ships present). Here we are assuming that the officers are screening for AAA properly. To which add: divide the screen vessel AAA by

The whole proposal I made was for the IJN only and was hopefully simple enough that it could be implemented "without designing a new game". It was the doctrine of the IJN to spread their ships over a 30000 - 40000 meter radius in 1942 with even the heavy units 8-10000 meters off from the CVs. That essentially made most of the AAA of all the ships in the screen irrelevant. Just look at photos of Japanese carriers under attack in 1942 (nice shot of Shokaku afire at Coral Sea where one can see a single DD within a 1500-2000 yds astern but a screening cruiser is just the faintest smudge on the horizon behind Shokaku). As you've already mentioned the early IJN DD had next to nothing for AAA anyways so it can be ignored. The Japanese didn't finally adopt a ring defense similar to the Allies until 1944. In the meantime they started upgrading the AAA suites of their DDs so for 1943 I propose to allow them to use the AAA of the target and one screening DD (selected at random (?) but by careful selection of the ships in a TF it could provide a small boost in the flak).

The same IJN that spread the ships in a TF out all over the ocean provided a ship's captain with unlimited sea room for radical manuevers. Although a US CV gave up a little of this ability to manuever while under attack the AAA support from the screening ships keeping station only 1000-1500 away tended to make up for such minor restrictions as the CV captain operated under. To simulate this slight manuevering advantage accorded an IJN ship under air attack I felt a slight manuever rating enhancement ((?)not sure exactly how manuever figures into attack resolution since merchies seem to have higher manuever ratings than warships which makes no intuitive sense to me (?)). In any case I sorta picked a -5% modifier to hit probability as the effect sought by whatever programming is needed.

AAA resolution for Allied TFs would essentially be handled identically to how they're handled now as would Japanese TFs starting in 1944.

This sounds excellent. [&o]

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

As I'm still unable to access my old PC (gave it to my mummy![;)]) for a few more days I'll just bounce a few ideas which might be easily added to improve the carrier ops in AE.

My main beefs with the current incarnation is that there are a few tactical details which have been included in an operational level game which impact the mechanics negatively while further, other tactical details which would go a long way to counter those currently included are glaringly absent, leaving the mechanics somewhat crippled as a result.

1) Having rigid tactical level data such as exact range figures for aircraft but having operational level 60 mile hexes often results in a/c that have a few extra gallons in the tank enjoying an extra hex range over a/c that have just a few less gallons losing a hex range. This is one of the reasons why Japan regularly gets to hit Allied CVs with strikes yet Allied CV a/c remain on deck in the game yet historically there is no example of this actually occurring. The new map with its' 40 mile hexes should alleviate this somewhat. Perhaps implementing a mechanic which rounds up the a/c range if it is closer to the next further hexside than the center of the hex (basically adding a hex in range) and rounds down the a/c range if closer to the hexside than to the hex center (basically reducing the range by a hex) might also mend the tactical with the operational level of the design.

2) The limitations of the phase/pulse design is another operational level design limitation which plays havoc with such rigid tactical data like a/c range and naval movement during non naval movement phases. Not much can be done about the necessity of the phase/pulse design approach at this point but perhaps the suggestions in (1) can augment the well intentioned but rather clunky reaction mechanism currently used as the sole design feature which attempts to allow for an abstract ability for naval forces to maneuver into/out of range during the air phases.

3) The co-ordinated strike bonus. In the current model, Japan enjoys an arguably unwarranted hard coded strike bonus. In my opinion, this should be removed and have coordination rely upon aircraft endurance, CV operational efficiency/maximums, weather and leader skill (both TF and squadron leaders).

3a) Aircraft endurance. Co-ordination of strikes relied greatly upon an aircrafts ability to loiter while further aircraft massed prior to departing for the target. Historically, the a/c with the longest endurance launched first and the a/c with the shortest launched last. The co-ordinated strike should therefore have a range equal to the lowest endurance a/c. Due to relative a/c speed, sometimes the strike would form up miles from the target to allow the slower longer ranged a/c to proceed while the faster a/c caught up after launching last, lessening the range penalty. The success rate of this latter method of coordination was less than that of those which formed up over the TF as it was much more difficult to join up enroute. These two approaches to co-ordinated strikes had an impact on historical strike ranges, yet the current model does not penalize co-ordinated strike ranges.

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

3c) I believe both weather and leader skill are factored in right now to some degree.

I'll attempt to make this fairly straight forward in a bit...once my brain cramp goes away.[:D]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Midway total for IJN CAP should be 55. [;)]

[jwilkerson]

I tried to filter out the American landbased planes.
[:)]

[spence]

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

I think something along this line would be appropriate. Carriers such Ryujo, Hiyo class, IJN and USN CVEs should not be capable of launching mass strikes. These ship didn't operate in the forefront of battle at the kind of efficiency as the KB, the Yorktowns, and the Essexes because they were afflicted with limitations of design, or speed, or general equipment that are not really portrayed in the limited specifications of the WitP database; not because the crews/captains/naval commanders were less imaginative than your typical WitP Player.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: spence

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

I think something along this line would be appropriate. Carriers such Ryujo, Hiyo class, IJN and USN CVEs should not be capable of launching mass strikes. These ship didn't operate in the forefront of battle at the kind of efficiency as the KB, the Yorktowns, and the Essexes because they were afflicted with limitations of design, or speed, or general equipment that are not really portrayed in the limited specifications of the WitP database; not because the crews/captains/naval commanders were less imaginative than your typical WitP Player.

Any ideas as to how you would approach this Steve? I like the simple and sound approach you presented for the AA question alot.

[herwin]

Directors were important. If there was one on the ship (DDs?), it could only fire at one target (aside from local control). If there weren't any (AKs, APs, etc.) only local control was available. If there were two (smaller cruisers), the ship could engage two targets. If there were four (capital ships), four could be engaged. A target could be any formation of aircraft.

The introduction of VT fuses tripled the planes shot down per gun tube, but since a VT fuse was a little radar set in the shell, it was unavailable for the smaller allied calibers (20-40 mm).

Phit was approximately 1/(target range), integrated over the period that the target was being fired at by the tube.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: spence

3b) CV operational characteristics. Seeing that strikes, CAP and search patrols are launched and recovered, refueled and rearmed per air phase, one must also assume that these varied evolutions occur within a specific portion of an air phase. Therefore, a CVs ops capacity should come into play, even on an operational level, if only to counter balance the unpenalized coodination of strikes and the CAP capability of CV TFs.

CVs had different levels of ops capability, dependent on design. Those CVs converted on the stocks, older prewar purpose built CVs and the smaller CVs had a less efficient ops capability than the larger war built CVs which benefitted from pre war experience and from combat experience. Tactical level wargames have always used these differing capabilites (ie Flattop) and Jim Dunnigan, one of the designers of many tactical carrier games, published some abstract ops capability rates in his Victory at Sea book. What I'm suggesting is that a very basic way of utilizing these abstract capabilities be included in the code to help determine strike sizes , co-ordination, and CAP percentage per CV. Would it be possible to simply use these figures as a multiplier? ie, if a CV was rated at a 70% ops efficiency rating, could this 70% figure be used to limit the max assigned air mission x .70? Therefore, 70% of the CVs airgroup assigned to strike missions can go in the first wave (the remaining 30% go in a seperate wave during the same air phase) or 70% of the a/c assigned to CAP can be aloft at any one time.

I think something along this line would be appropriate. Carriers such Ryujo, Hiyo class, IJN and USN CVEs should not be capable of launching mass strikes. These ship didn't operate in the forefront of battle at the kind of efficiency as the KB, the Yorktowns, and the Essexes because they were afflicted with limitations of design, or speed, or general equipment that are not really portrayed in the limited specifications of the WitP database; not because the crews/captains/naval commanders were less imaginative than your typical WitP Player.

Any ideas as to how you would approach this Steve? I like the simple and sound approach you presented for the AA question alot.

Calculate how many aircraft could be launched from the deck (plus brought up by lift) allowing for the take-off run and avoiding spending all the time forming up/landing.

[jwilkerson]

Well, it turns out it is going to be easier to ignore fighter losses when doing the WITP Carrier Battle Testing. This is because enemy bombers shot down in a2a will always be shot down by the enemy CAP, whereas fighters could be shot down by either CAP or Escort.

For a first Coral Sea test, I tried to adjust the search and CAP percentages to produce the historical numbers of aircraft in the strikes, didn't come out perfectly, but pretty close.

The historical results were (and this is just for bombers and just for the day of the main carrier battle)

Shot down by USN Flak: 3 Shot down by IJN Flak: 0

Shot down by USN CAP: 10 Shot down by IJN CAP: 2

The first test results were:

Shot down by USN Flak: 10 Shot down by IJN Flak: 7

Shot down by USN CAP: 5 Shot down by IJN CAP: 10

Historical Results against the carriers were:

Shokaku: 3 Bomb hits Zuikaku: 0 hits

Yorktown: 1 Bomb hit Lexington: 2 Bomb hits, 2 Torpedo hits

Results in the Test were:

Shokaku: 6 Bomb hits, 3 Torpedo hits Zuikaku: 4 Bomb hits

Yorktown: 9 Bomb hits, 1 Torpedo hit Lexington: 0 hits


We might add that historically, a number of near misses on both Yorktown and Lexington may have caused as much, if not more damage than the hits. The game does not model near misses at all.

===

So how to summarize the results of this first test? Well, of course, more testing is needed!

A second observation would be that in the game, almost everything seems more effective than it was historically. The one exception would be the USN CAP. But again, in real life, the SBDs were supplementing the CAP and were apparently more effective on this day than the Wildcats were. In the game SBDs cannot supplement CAP.

More to come ...

[witpqs]

Joe,

I think it is a mistake to take out the Midway-based planes from the stats. It did not matter where they took off from when they were being defended against.

EDIT: Put another way, it isn't really carrier vs carrier steel cage matches we are concerned about, it's a) attacks on carriers and b) strikes from carriers.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: herwin


It reflects VT fusing (fairly large shells), and should actually be tripled for those guns with VT ammo. The rest didn't change.

The number of AA control positions should also play a role for long-range fire. Local control for nearby targets and for ships that lacked anything more.

Regarding VT, it could be argued that VT fused AAA shells should be quadrupled. One article I read indicated that VT fused shells required 500 shells per each aircraft shot down, whereas none VT shells required 2,000 shells per aircraft shot down.

Neither AAA directors nor surface directors are modeled directly in WITP, nor are they likely to be. We will have to deal with the parameters we are given instead.

This is probably a technical mistake - because you can't get there from here - but

in this case -

it is best to make most types of ships have only one shot per target - cut in half for almost all types - but full value for a true warship (e.g. a DD) likely to have a director

then we could give a cruiser (it would be nice if there was such a thing as an "old CL" which does not count),
battleship or CV two shots - at different targets at the same time - or at only one if there is only one target

Crude - but for most situations it would be true

a variation might give a US cruiser or battleship 3 targets/ shots - after about the end of 1943 - when there are four directors - arranged "lossenge" - one fore - one aft - one per side - and 3 should always bear

This does not allow for damage to directors however.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

The basic idea isn't bad. Certainly only the target ship itself can fire all its AAA weapons. [A big problem is that you cannot shoot on many bearings if there are friendly ships close by] The idea that a target ship and one screening vessel in good position is also a good simplification - and greatly reduces the amount of work figuring out what happened too.
But for more than a tiny task group - the number of screen ships able to fire should probably go up - perhaps on a ratio of 1 in 6, or better - 1 for 1 to 6 escorts, 2 if 7-18 escorts, 3 if 19 plus escorts. Still - not many get to shoot. And the COMPUTER picks who shoots - just as computer deck officers pick the formation (and try to spread it so things average out from all bearings - but won't be able to do it perfectly with odd ships present). Here we are assuming that the officers are screening for AAA properly. To which add: divide the screen vessel AAA by

The whole proposal I made was for the IJN only and was hopefully simple enough that it could be implemented "without designing a new game". It was the doctrine of the IJN to spread their ships over a 30000 - 40000 meter radius in 1942 with even the heavy units 8-10000 meters off from the CVs. That essentially made most of the AAA of all the ships in the screen irrelevant. Just look at photos of Japanese carriers under attack in 1942 (nice shot of Shokaku afire at Coral Sea where one can see a single DD within a 1500-2000 yds astern but a screening cruiser is just the faintest smudge on the horizon behind Shokaku). As you've already mentioned the early IJN DD had next to nothing for AAA anyways so it can be ignored. The Japanese didn't finally adopt a ring defense similar to the Allies until 1944. In the meantime they started upgrading the AAA suites of their DDs so for 1943 I propose to allow them to use the AAA of the target and one screening DD (selected at random (?) but by careful selection of the ships in a TF it could provide a small boost in the flak).

The same IJN that spread the ships in a TF out all over the ocean provided a ship's captain with unlimited sea room for radical manuevers. Although a US CV gave up a little of this ability to manuever while under attack the AAA support from the screening ships keeping station only 1000-1500 away tended to make up for such minor restrictions as the CV captain operated under. To simulate this slight manuevering advantage accorded an IJN ship under air attack I felt a slight manuever rating enhancement ((?)not sure exactly how manuever figures into attack resolution since merchies seem to have higher manuever ratings than warships which makes no intuitive sense to me (?)). In any case I sorta picked a -5% modifier to hit probability as the effect sought by whatever programming is needed.

AAA resolution for Allied TFs would essentially be handled identically to how they're handled now as would Japanese TFs starting in 1944.

The first problem with this approach is it requires players to use the same formations - which is stuff and nonsense. ["When you are in command, command" said Halsey to Nimitz] A game should not attempt to say "you can only do it one way" - and if it does - it does not permit us to learn what could have happened if it was not done the same way.

The second problem is that it ignores technical facts: Japanese AA destroyers were building BEFORE the war began - entered service BEFORE 1943 - and matter no matter what the radius is (although they matter more at GREATER radius - when they may more safely fire and there is more time for that fire to take effect). It would be much better to let the virtually nil value of the guns negate AAA for most ships early than to structurally prohibit the ships that have good guns from doing so - if they are actually present. That IJN didn't put these particular destroyers in the carrier formations until later does not mean a player should not be able to do so. Related to this - the later versions of Yamato were designed with 100 mm guns - and they also won't count (if say Shinano as BB is an escort) unless we let screening vessels count.
Similarly, there were AA modifications of Isuzu, Mogami, etc - and even strictly historical games should not structurally say "they won't matter." Because these used good 5 inch weapons with directors, they count - no matter the range.

A more typical US screening range is 2000 to 4000 yards - and going in at 1000 yards is very dangerous: it is normal to sound collision alarm at 1000 yards - and only formations in line ahead might use spacings that small or smaller - in which case there is no screen - or the screens are also line ahead - thousands of yards to port or starboard. Maneuvering a large formation in ring format requires ALL ships turn together - and that requires they all get the word - both the order and the EXECUTE to time it right. It is common for this to fail - and things get dicy if you are in close.
Worse - in a fight - you also render your ships AAA useless - else dangerous - in that close. Are you going to order the screens NOT to shoot? If not, you are going to be hit by their fire. Not nice either way. [In practice IRL it is more complicated than that: the ships have orders not to shoot on certain bearings, and the closer you are, the bigger the fraction of the arc you cannot shoot in - also the greater the risk some mount captain screws up and shoots anyway in excitement.]

The plane behind a carrier - up tight - is a "plane guard" - its job is to pick up pilots in the drink. But it ALSO is a screen - and if alone - free to shoot on most bearings freely.

The inner screen should be 2 nautical miles from the carrier/battleship/etc.

The outer screen should be 4 to 8 nautical miles from the carrier/battleship/etc.

Pickets should be over the horizon - 16 nautical miles or so - on all potential threat axis - ideally in all directions. And yes - pickets can shoot too - although only the one on the axis of the attack. Screens usually permit about 3 ships to "gang up" on a single incoming raid. Sometimes more. But in practice it rarely works out that way. Not everybody can see and understand the situation properly. There may be more raids in range than one. Some mounts which bear may be momentarily down because of injury, damage or need to restock ready ammunition. Rules of engagement may specify which ships fire - being just barely in range may not be worthy of expending your ammunition - etc.

[spence]

The US Army was not allowed to use Proximity fuzed AA shells over land (near the front anyways) until early in the Battle of the Bulge lest the secret of the shells be discovered because a dud landed in enemy territory. The "VT fuze bonus" probably should not be applied to all Allied AAA fire; and certainly not to some warlord's AA guns in China.