Modeling of Carrier Battles

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Allied AAA Bonus:

The right way to implement the VT Fuse (in the current game) would be to add an "VT Effective Date" field to the device. If this was 9999 then no VT ever, but if like 4301 then in Jan 43, this device would start firing VT Fused AAA ammo. I doubt we will get that, maybe in a patch, but probably not for initial release.

So instead, we have to pick a date for the land based VT weapons to take effect. I'd say in WITP terms 4501 would probably be a good number, this gives time for the Battle of the Bulge order to reach the Pacific. And even if the Chinese warlords get it by then also, it won't matter as much.

As to "heavy" versus "light", there is already a check to see of the "ceiling" is >25000 and if so then the VT effects apply. And this is for landbased and ship based. So if we like the 25000 filter, then we can leave that as it is.

If we could really make it device specific, I'd favor quadrupling the effect, rather than the current doubling. The RL data seems to indicate VT fused shells required 500 rounds to bring down a plane versus the 2,000 required for non-VT rounds. But, as long as we have to keep it generic, applying to all Allied "heavy" AAA then, maybe doubling is better.

I think VT frag applies UNDER 25,000 feet - but only for the big guns.

I think that there is another issue: light guns are MORE destructive to HEAVY bombers, heavy guns MORE destructive to light planes

IF we can separate heavy and light AAA attacks - we can let VT apply at all altitudes - but only with heavy guns -
AND we can let the algorithms make the AA be more effective vs larger planes (which we measure by number of engines)

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: TheElf
I wouldn't call Irrelevant's generalizations sweeping. They are general, but based on sound criteria. Specifically the battles of 1942 which you yourself use as qualification for your post above (1943). In fact you and Irrelevant agree that the TF's were single CVTFs except for the one at Midway.

But this is irrelevent[;)]. The Coordination failures did not happen at the TF level or due to the composition of the TFs. They were unit level (CAG) failures. Single TF Strikes don't even attempt to coord inate with other CVs. They are self-contained.

It came down to the planners and the experience/discipline of those who executed the plans. And whether the battle group leaders dabbled in tactical level decisions or they let their Airdales work unhindered and supported them operationally.

This is correct. As Lundstrom pointed out in the forward for Shattered Sword, the US "nemesis" was Teamwork above the squadron level. It doesn't matter if the CV or CV's are in seperate or combined TF's....the problem remains the same. That highlights the difference between the USN conducting a couple Fleet Problem exercises in the 30's where they combined carriers and the Japanese who took the steps to organize, train and practice the elements that made the 1st Air Fleet a reality, whether it had 2 CV's, 4 or 6 in the same TF. It also highlights the fact that the US problem could occur even within a single CAG on a single CV. The issue was further exaserbated by the differences in cruise speeds, max altitude and range between the three principle plane types...F4F, SBD and TBD

EDIT: I realize that the TFs at Midway attempted to coordinate in the sense they launch in a fashion that tried to bracket the supposed position of KB, but that is not the coordination we are talking about in the Game. That is tactical level coordination done on a scale not present in the current code so put that out of your head now.

They attempted....and failed.....miserably because the doctrine had not been established nor the kinks worked out. Each carrier's strikes not only parted seperately but further fragmented in the process. Yorktown, by herself....did the best due to experiences learned from Coral Sea. It should be noted that it was still not "coordinated" in the fashion done by the Japanese. The CAG employed a risky hyrbrid departure scheme that saw the individual squadrons rendezvouse along the way to the target. This time it worked and they arrived roughly together over KB at the same time (hence it could be called "coordinated" to a degree)

The squadrons still ended up fighting somewhat seperately due to additional problems. (VT-3 for example took a long time to form up for it's attack and ended up getting the Zero treatment just like the other TBD squadrons and the F4F escort got seperated from both bomber/torp squadrons and essentially fought a seperate defensive battle for survival while another escort fragment didn't get the radio call for help while the TBD's were being slaughtered for the third time) So in conclusion, they arrived coordinated....but the attack on the carriers themselves were not coordinated

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither sides CVEs should be capable of launching torpedo-armed strikes. The ships were too slow and their flight decks too short to get the planes off the deck so armed. I doubt any of them carried anti-ship torpedos in their magazines although some of the USN CVEs carried the FIDO ASW torpedo. The Mark 13s used by the TAFFY planes off Samar against Adm Kurita's Fleet were apparently obtained from an airstrip on Leyte.

The Japanese CVEs were too slow, too short and apparently even lacked arrestor gear such that they could only operate a very few aircraft simultaneously. They mostly served as aircraft ferries.

Can this be confirmed? Can it be an exclsuive statement? CVEs NEVER carried torpedoes in their magazines?

Let me know.

Hardly. Hosho did (although technically Hosho is a CVL, I consider it a CVE by WWII). And there is no inherant reason others could not. For training at least they likely did. It is more a matter of the plane than the torpedo: these are not shipa able to operate the late war B7s - in any sense. They would not even fit.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

A couple OTBWs...

1. Air Search has been modified a bit, but testing still needs to bear out whether the desired effect has occurred.

2. Naval TF AAA has been tweaked to account for the DOA (Direction Of Arrival) of attack. So a torpedo bomber making a run from the beam(most desirable angle)

The "most desireable angle" is on the bow - navy talk for about 45 degrees ahead of the beam.

The ideal torpedo attack is an "anvil" - two different attacks 45 degrees off the bow in both directions. If the ship turns one way - to "comb the wakes" of one attack - it is turning broadside to the other set - and vice versa if it turns the other way. A torpedo launched from ahead of the ship tends not to have to "catch" the target and gains some time/speed from the target's own speed. If the ship wants to comb such an attack (if from just one side) - it must turn TOWARD the torpedo - and actually close the range faster - making the pattern more likely to hit. If it tried to turn stern to the attack and comb the other way - it needs much more time - and must turn broadside to at the most likely time to be hit. Not nice choices.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

A couple OTBWs...

1
We discussed the idea of an outer ring with detection value and a modest opportunity to disrupt or damage a raid and figuring in the wider dispersment of ships in the outer screen, and then the inner screen increasing the intensity proportionally. Finally you have the target ship with it's facing AAA and a random chance for the USN to have a close escort CA, CLAA, CL, or BB assisting in what I call the "Terminal phase".

A principle taught in USN is that "no carrier escorted by a battleship was ever lost." This applies to Japanese carriers and others, not just our won. The heavy AA guns of an escort should apply to the defense - even if not the light ones - and it is very likely you will get MORE THAN ONE escort firing if the number of escorts is large enough - in any navy.

[Ron Saueracker]

Doctrine being the reason for the Japanese co-ordination rule...whatever. I can deal with this. What I really have a problem with is that not only do they get the cake, they get to eat it and everybody elses too given there is no range loss penalty for achieving it.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Doctrine being the reason for the Japanese co-ordination rule...whatever. I can deal with this. What I really have a problem with is that not only do they get the cake, they get to eat it and everybody elses too given there is no range loss penalty for achieving it.

I am not aware of any range limitation on the Japanese ability to form an integrated strike.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

When you look at the CV battles of 1942, on the US side they are all characterized by poor strike coordination, poor allocation and direction of CAP, and poor communication (particularly of scouting reports) between the various 1 carrier TFs present (only at Midway was there ever more than a single CV in one TF).

Contrast this with the performances turned in by the fast carrier groups in their raids during the last 6 months of 1943, and in operations Galvanic (Gilberts) and Flintlock (Marshalls). Clearly they had learned some things in the interim. Equally clearly, the lessons were dearly bought at the cost of 4 CVs lost in 1942.

I would go so far as to submit that had there been no Coral Sea, no Midway, no Eastern Solomons, no Santa Cruz, there could have been no Turkey Shoot. An epic CV battle fought in mid-1944 without the benefits of the experiences (as well as the attrition) of the 1942 battles might have had just about any result imaginable....add CarDivs 1&2 to the IJN OOB at Philippine Sea.....yes, USN would still have incorporated the great technological advances, but would its doctrine have evolved to use these to the great advantage as IRL?

At Midway virtually all the air strikes by the US were uncoordinated. Only poor Yorktown came close to delivering a coordinated strike (if that only means a partly coordinated strike) - and it was not exactly where it was sent either.
It may be that - failing an experience rating for ships re air combat - we should make strike coordination related to year.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: el cid again


Cid...unless we are provided with a variety of formation options, I submit that we be provided with the historical practice, not an imaginary one.

Unless you say I cannot assign an AA destroyer to a CV task force (or any other) - you cannot have it both ways. This is the point: IF they put the AA destroyers and AA cruisers in a CV task force, code should not ignore them. That they did not is not the point: a PLAYER may - and we need to figure out what that should mean. Otherwise it is nonsense - you only seem to have assigned the escort - and it isn't escorting in the AA sense at all.

[Nikademus]

a more proper example of a "cake and eat it" would be from the Fleet Defense standpoint. The Japanese ability to strike in my mind is well documented. Fleet Defense....is a more chancy matter. Midway, ironically, showed that the Japanese CAP was capable of defending KB and inflicting large scale losses on the enemy. However this does not mask the fact that their defensive measures were more dependant on outside factors than the US because they had no radar, and even when they did, they had no FDO established to help vector in the fighters to the threat. As a result, they were pretty much restricted to visual cues.

If the weather was good, and the lookouts of the TF sharp....they could respond effectively. If the weather was bad and/or if fatigue was high or they were just plain unlucky....they might miss the strike almost completely. Further, they might be very effective against a strike that attacks along a single vector....but could be overwhelmed by a multi vector attack. Case in point...and one of the most interesting factoids of the Battle of Midway that almost never gets mentioned.

Attack on the Hiryu. The Japanese do learn from their mistakes. (often its their leaders who bone-headedly continue doing things the old ways costing lives) They instituted a doctrinally more correct and better organized multi-tier CAP to protect against high and low threats. Despite this....the two CV worth of SBD's virtually cruised in unopposed and were actually beginning their dives before the CAP reacted. It was too late. The CAP got three bombers eventually...but it mattered not....Hiryu was doomed. Ditching was in their future.

What was the difference? Technically and doctrinally...the Hiryu CAP should have been more effective than the prior CAP's. It wasn't. Radar could have been a vital key along with better radios unless a SNAFU like what hit Enterprise at Santa Cruz occured. But restricted to visual aids only...and fatigued from one of the most intense days of combat seen in the PTO...the CAP was caught napping.

WitP tends to treat CAP in absolute matters. The only real rule in place is diminishing returns for each additional strike during one phase (AM and PM). CAPs also cover a whole hex when in fact they should be restricted to the TF they either originate from or are assigned to cover via LRCAP.

For the Japanese, there needs to be more dependance on weather and rolls for visual response and # of responders since there isn't any organzied vectoring from the ground. That way there's a chance for Midway type efficiency...but also provision for times like in the other carrier battles when CAP was more a nusience than threat. In 42, USN CAP should also not be absolute. They still had kinks to work out...but on average, their ability to vector and concentrate and respond should improve quickly. USN TF's with radar should also be very good at shooting down intruder search planes. A facet distinctly missing from WitP. As it stands right now search planes are largely invulnerable, esp over TF's.

God.....i promised i wouldn't get sucked into this thread. Bad Nik......bad.

[Nikademus]

BTW...a good way to test this fix and to visualize the point i'm making about CAP. It should NEVER be a sure thing for a Japanese player to use KB, esp an inflated KB (i.e. 6 CV + more CVL's) as a defensive tool to denude a geographic area of it's airforce. (offensive by striking planes on the ground is another matter) For example;

You build up a strong ragtag air-fleet at Java to make a concerted effort against the invasion you know is coming. Your Japanese opponent knows you've built up your forces. What does he do? He takes his inflated KB into range, stands down the bombers and sets all his Zeros to 90% or higher CAP and tries to trigger a naval strike on KB vs. the vulnerable transport fleets approaching. The Allied player has set his planes to naval attack for just that thing.

Instead, they attack KB.....a high value target to be sure. 90 to 110 Zeros later....you no longer have an airforce. KB might have had a close call or two with bomb droppings but for the most part, the CAP slaughtered the bombers and the escorting fighters and now you have no airforce. KB then sails back to port. Mission acomplished.

This is to me one of the biggest examples of a game gone wrong from a design perspective. One thing KB was NOT during the war...was a tool for attriting airpower by defensive action. It was a raider force, its biggest weapon...stealth and suprise....the best way to eliminate the enemy's airpower.....on the ground. NOT by waving a japanese meatball in the air and going...."Here I am mister Allied player....come get me!!!!"

A properly modeled Japanese CAP system, should make such a gambit a highly risky thing....not a sure fired tactic to air supremacy. Pretty much any early war CAP system should not be such a assured thing. This is Phillipines Sea type stuff aka 1944, and even then it was aided greatly by facing a carrier force that was half trained. Also, despite that i doubt you'd have Halsey or Spruance discontinuing plane raid strikes against bases in favor of allowing them to launch and attack you. aiee. risky.

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

BTW...a good way to test this fix and to visualize the point i'm making about CAP. It should NEVER be a sure thing for a Japanese player to use KB, esp an inflated KB (i.e. 6 CV + more CVL's) as a defensive tool to denude a geographic area of it's airforce. (offensive by striking planes on the ground is another matter) For example;

You build up a strong ragtag fleet at Java to make a concerted effort against the invasion you know is coming. Your Japanese opponent knows you've built up your forces. What does he do? He takes his inflated KB into range and sets all his Zeros to 90% CAP and tries to trigger a naval strike on KB vs. the vulnerable transport fleets approaching. The Allied player has set his planes to naval attack for just that thing.

Instead, they attack KB.....a high value target to be sure. 90 to 110 Zeros later....you no longer have an airforce. KB might have had a close call or two with bomb droppings but for the most part, the CAP slaughtered the bombers and the escorting fighters and now you have no airforce. KB then sails back to port. Mission acomplished.

This is to me one of the biggest examples of a game gone wrong from a design perspective. One thing KB was NOT during the war...was a tool for attriting airpower by defensive action. It was a raider force, its biggest weapon...stealth and suprise....the best way to eliminate the enemy's airpower.....on the ground. NOT by waving a japanese meatball in the air and going...."Here I am mister Allied player....come get me!!!!"

A properly modeled Japanese CAP system should make such a gambit a highly risky thing....not a sure fired tactic to air supremacy.

Agree 100%. I have done exactly this before....and felt bad about doing it afterwards. But it is hard not use those arrows that are in one's quiver....

It should be more risky. I have proposed using max 40% CAP for IJN CVTFs as a house rule. But I am not sure what would be accurate.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Agree 100%. I have done exactly this before....and felt bad about doing it afterwards. But it is hard not use those arrows that are in one's quiver....

It should be more risky. I have proposed using max 40% CAP for IJN CVTFs as a house rule. But I am not sure what would be accurate.

Yeah.....I was bitter at my opponent initially but i got over it quickly because it led me to create a better Nikmod version to help combat it. [:D]

Similar problem exists with fighter sweeps. Nice absolute method to denude a base of it's fighters by forcing combat. Goering wishes the BoB could have been fought under such rules. [:D]

[Nikademus]

While i'm feeling chatty...i'll add one more factor why the above example is wacked and it's very basic.

Airplanes simply arn't that easy to shoot down.....even unarmored ones. Yeah...the Japanese naval CAP got 55 at Midway. It was the ONLY time they got so many and they were helped by the fact that the attacks came in along single vectors, strung out and isolated. Get a big strike in at roughly the same time....its called saturation of defenses. Less planes would be shot down. (thats part of what happened to Hiryu. Even had the CAP been more alert....the large # of SBD's coming in all at once would have increased defensive ability of the bombers and overloaded the defenders giving them less time to develop attack runs.)

CAP's in the other three major carrier battles got far less planes for both sides. Its the same thing much of the time with land battles. Major slaughters just arn't common.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Allied AAA Bonus:

The right way to implement the VT Fuse (in the current game) would be to add an "VT Effective Date" field to the device. If this was 9999 then no VT ever, but if like 4301 then in Jan 43, this device would start firing VT Fused AAA ammo. I doubt we will get that, maybe in a patch, but probably not for initial release.

For purposes of WITP II (or III or ...) - hey, I think ahead! - we have to account for the fact that the VT ammo was not unlimited. Under really intense combat and resupply cycles, stocks in a area could (did IIRC) run low, but non-VT was available to fill in. Possibly (I don't know) some ships with the same weapons might not have been issued the ammo (AK's, etc?).

Maybe tuck that away in your "If I ever get to work on a WITP II" file for later consideration.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
A principle taught in USN is that "no carrier escorted by a battleship was ever lost." This applies to Japanese carriers and others, not just our own. The heavy AA guns of an escort should apply to the defense - even if not the light ones - and it is very likely you will get MORE THAN ONE escort firing if the number of escorts is large enough - in any navy.

You sure Cid? I thought KB had a couple of battleships along for Midway... Of course, comparing the AAA of a Kirishima to a South Dakota is a pretty one-sided contest.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Doctrine being the reason for the Japanese co-ordination rule...whatever. I can deal with this. What I really have a problem with is that not only do they get the cake, they get to eat it and everybody elses too given there is no range loss penalty for achieving it.

Besides Doctrine though Ron the Sortie Generation rate of two decks (Supra-Air Group Organization) vs. 1 means that while the US CV is launching it's TBDs the two IJN CVs are launching both DBs and TBs. One type from each of the DIV-mates. The Zeroes being the longest legs can launch first or last, they have the range and the speed to make up any deltas. This is the critical piece you are missing when you challenge the coordination pentaly. In addition to all the other strengths of the IJN early war-style.

The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

Wait a minute - then the same would apply to a single CV TF, yes? I do understand when you say that the strike might be split into 2 sub-strikes (for lack of a better term). However, if 1 CV can launch all it's aircraft in AM then surely 2 CV's can launch all their aircraft in AM.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: TheElf
The flip side to that is that the IJN CARDIVs still have their other component left to arm, warm up, spot and launch. The alternate units that was not launched in the first wave. If we were to do the IJN doctrine right we'd only see HALF the total Strike A/C available in the AM phase and the other half in the PM.

Actually, both strikes would fly in the AM, and might possibly fly again in the PM. They certainly did at PH. But no more than half of KB's planes should ever be in the SAME strike. Japanese doctrine should never produce a full strike, but two half strikes.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: TheElf

A couple OTBWs...

1. Air Search has been modified a bit, but testing still needs to bear out whether the desired effect has occurred.

2. Naval TF AAA has been tweaked to account for the DOA (Direction Of Arrival) of attack. So a torpedo bomber making a run from the beam(most desirable angle)

The "most desireable angle" is on the bow - navy talk for about 45 degrees ahead of the beam.

The ideal torpedo attack is an "anvil" - two different attacks 45 degrees off the bow in both directions. If the ship turns one way - to "comb the wakes" of one attack - it is turning broadside to the other set - and vice versa if it turns the other way. A torpedo launched from ahead of the ship tends not to have to "catch" the target and gains some time/speed from the target's own speed. If the ship wants to comb such an attack (if from just one side) - it must turn TOWARD the torpedo - and actually close the range faster - making the pattern more likely to hit. If it tried to turn stern to the attack and comb the other way - it needs much more time - and must turn broadside to at the most likely time to be hit. Not nice choices.

Yes, the Anvil. Even though I spent much time designing this attack type it will not make AE unfortunately.