Modeling of Carrier Battles

[okami]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: okami
So what are you trying to say? That because Allied escorts are closer they get better AA? Ok but they should also be more vulnerable to the bombs and torpedoes that get through do to less maneuvering room. A picture only paints the story you want it to tell. How many torpedo hits on Japanese carriers during the war? How many on Allied? I could use those stats to prove whatever point I choose to make. Don't generalize or make arguements based on history if your navy does not engage the enemy to learn the lessons of history. Why should the allies gain all of the advantages they historically did in say 1944, if in the game they never fight in 1942-43? Everything in the game should be modified by experience. If your carrier group never does anything, it would never learn anything. And thus no flak bonus, no coordination bonus, no cap bonus. All these things were learned and if you as the allies never put your ships in harms way, how are you supposed to learn? That is how the carrier vs carrier should be modelled. The potential for all these improvements should be there, but they should be earned not just handed out.

And just WHAT had Kido Butai done before 7 December, 1941? Seriously, the Allied "flak bonuses" come mainly from the addition of improved light AAA (20mm and 40mm), radar fire control (for the 40mm and the 5") and proximity fuzes (for the 5")..., all physical improvements.

Japanese "upgrades" consisted of adding on a few more of their relatively inneffective 25mm's. Fire direction was still manual (take a good look at their movie about the death of the Yamato---light AAA fire control consists of a guy pointing with a stick! And that's from a Japanese film, not US propaganda).

All of the abilities of the KB on or before the start of the war a doctrinal. This is not modelled well in the game ie: multi-carrier task forces. All of the hardware improvements the allies gain are learned improvements ie: this gun has not proven to be effective let us make a better one. My point is that all the allies learned they paid a price for. The US did not enter the war with Hellcats. The Hellcat was developed after facing the Zero in the early 42 battles and capturing one in the Alutians after Midway. If the US never entered the war would they have developed the Hellcat? No. Experience and success or failure breed change. If the AA fire of a 1942 US Carrier was able to destroy any bomber that happened to attack, they would have no need to change what they were doing or with what they were doing it with. Impovements happen but radical changes do not. Evolution vs revolution. Seems you want improvement only for the Allies without paying the price for that improvement. Experience is the key, I can hand the best fighter to the average joe and he will not be able to use it, he has no experience.

[spence]

So what are you trying to say? That because Allied escorts are closer they get better AA? Ok but they should also be more vulnerable to the bombs and torpedoes that get through do to less maneuvering room. A picture only paints the story you want it to tell. How many torpedo hits on Japanese carriers during the war? How many on Allied? I could use those stats to prove whatever point I choose to make. Don't generalize or make arguements based on history if your navy does not engage the enemy to learn the lessons of history. Why should the allies gain all of the advantages they historically did in say 1944, if in the game they never fight in 1942-43? Everything in the game should be modified by experience. If your carrier group never does anything, it would never learn anything. And thus no flak bonus, no coordination bonus, no cap bonus. All these things were learned and if you as the allies never put your ships in harms way, how are you supposed to learn? That is how the carrier vs carrier should be modelled. The potential for all these improvements should be there, but they should be earned not just handed out.

The Japanese are the ones that the game sets up ahistorically as some kind of TF38/58 right from the get-go. That's my complaint. They had a better offensive doctrine but they had a very flawed defensive doctrine. The game gives them essentially the same defensive capabilities as the USN. The IJN "First Team" got hurt in every carrier battle they fought because of their defensive deficiencies. It should not be just a possibility that they get hurt in a CV vs CV battle but a better than even probability. Historically the USN also got hurt in these fights and learned from their mistakes. I'll concede that there is little likelihood the learning would have taken place had the USN run and hid. But I will also say that the current mechanics of CV battle in WitP makes running and hiding the only intelligent choice for the Allied Player (or as WitP wisdom has it, at least until you have TBFs and 36 F4Fs in your VF sqdrns).

The USN fought the IJN 4 times in carrier battles in 1942, twice with TBDs and reduced fighter complements. And neither side demonstrated a clear superiority over the other. Both were competent in their own ways and inflicted serious losses on the other in all the battles. That is what I would like to see as the median model of CV battles in WitP.

( Actually you can't get all that far with your stats about torpedos hitting carriers. With much better torpedos and initially better torpedo planes the KB flyers got 7 hits total on US CVs during the war: two on Lexington, 2 on Yorktown and 3 on Hornet. In the same period the US scored on Shoho and Ryujo, perhaps even as many times. Their experiences in battle led both navies to emphasize dive bombers as the instrument by which decision would be sought).

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: okami
All of the abilities of the KB on or before the start of the war a doctrinal. This is not modelled well in the game ie: multi-carrier task forces. All of the hardware improvements the allies gain are learned improvements ie: this gun has not proven to be effective let us make a better one. My point is that all the allies learned they paid a price for. The US did not enter the war with Hellcats. The Hellcat was developed after facing the Zero in the early 42 battles and capturing one in the Alutians after Midway. If the US never entered the war would they have developed the Hellcat? No. Experience and success or failure breed change. If the AA fire of a 1942 US Carrier was able to destroy any bomber that happened to attack, they would have no need to change what they were doing or with what they were doing it with. Impovements happen but radical changes do not. Evolution vs revolution. Seems you want improvement only for the Allies without paying the price for that improvement. Experience is the key, I can hand the best fighter to the average joe and he will not be able to use it, he has no experience.

The Hellcat was developed because the Corsair program was in trouble. The USN started work on the F4U, TBF, and SB2U well before Pearl Harbor. I believe all had flown by Dec 7, 1941. The TBF program is the only one that did not run into serious problems and end up getting delayed. The Hellcat was contracted as a stop gap until the Carsair was carrier ready. If those two programs hadn't run into problems, the late 42 carrier air wing would have consisted of TBFs, Corsairs, and SB2Cs.

As far as the US gaining more than the Japanese, the US was less rooted in the traditional ways and was willing and able to adapt doctrines in a shorter amount of time. Japan's culture did not favor radical new approaches and they were slow to adapt to the realities of the war. There are exceptions to this here and there, but the Americans tended to be much more adaptable.

This is one of the handicaps the Japanese player has to play with. Some of the worst problems Japan faced are not modeled much in the game at all. Japan's war effort was severely hampered by the interservice rivalry between the army and the navy. The rivalry was so intense that they did some things that were counter productive to the war effort. There is very little of that in the game.

I know the Japanese fan boys don't like it, but Japan had a lot of problems they were slow to overcome. Some problems they never overcame.

Bill

[spence]

Comments in the AARs along the lines of "I sank Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise and heavily damaged Hornet and Yorktown but I'm kinda disappointed because Hiryu took a bomb hit and has 35 sys" say about all that needs saying as far as the current accuracy of the WitP model of carrier battles.

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: spence
The Japanese are the ones that the game sets up ahistorically as some kind of TF38/58 right from the get-go. That's my complaint. They had a better offensive doctrine but they had a very flawed defensive doctrine. The game gives them essentially the same defensive capabilities as the USN. The IJN "First Team" got hurt in every carrier battle they fought because of their defensive deficiencies. It should not be just a possibility that they get hurt in a CV vs CV battle but a better than even probability. Historically the USN also got hurt in these fights and learned from their mistakes. I'll concede that there is little likelihood the learning would have taken place had the USN run and hid. But I will also say that the current mechanics of CV battle in WitP makes running and hiding the only intelligent choice for the Allied Player (or as WitP wisdom has it, at least until you have TBFs and 36 F4Fs in your VF sqdrns).

It would be nice if doctrinal changes were based on overall experience in combat. Sort of an institutional experience rating, but the game doesn't have it, and I doubt such a thing could be implemented before WitP II.

The USN fought the IJN 4 times in carrier battles in 1942, twice with TBDs and reduced fighter complements. And neither side demonstrated a clear superiority over the other. Both were competent in their own ways and inflicted serious losses on the other in all the battles. That is what I would like to see as the median model of CV battles in WitP.

( Actually you can't get all that far with your stats about torpedos hitting carriers. With much better torpedos and initially better torpedo planes the KB flyers got 7 hits total on US CVs during the war: two on Lexington, 2 on Yorktown and 3 on Hornet. In the same period the US scored on Shoho and Ryujo, perhaps even as many times. Their experiences in battle led both navies to emphasize dive bombers as the instrument by which decision would be sought).

I believe the Intrepid took a torpedo too, but I think you're point is valid. The Japanese focused too much on offensive capability and too little on defensive capability. Their fragile attack planes were very vulnerable to damage that would put them out of action before they could drop their load on the target.

Bill

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

So do you like the idea that we get NO escorts contributing to AA defense at all?

Doctrine is what sailors practice. Doctrine is what they know. Doctrine is how they fight. The ships of the IJN did not know and did not practice closely matching the wild manuevers of major warships with minor ones while under air attack. The major ships were free to manuever in whatever manner the CO thought best to avoid attack and the other ships gave him the room to do so. This placed them beyond the range where their AAA could contribute to the defense of his ship.

Even after Midway when the Japanese committed themselves to the proposition that the CV was the instrument of decision in naval battle they did not adopt a close escort of the CVs for AAA defense. Instead they put the CVs' "screen" out in front of the CVs by 100 miles or so along the most likely threat axis to give early warning of air attacks and possibly absorb some of the attacks meant for the CVs. But even the ships of "the screen" operated at the limits of visibility from one another. Basically each IJN warship defended itself from air attack throughout 1942 and 1943.

You say "If you're in command, command!" It's harder than that. In 1942, the USN had FDCs and a much better air defense doctrine than the IJN. Nimitz could not however order the FDO's to "get it right" and have any expectation that it would happen right away. He could not order DD skippers to get in close, attack with torpedos at night and score hits. Nobody knew how to fight that way and CINCPAC couldn't fix it with an order.

So the answer is YES. Each ship in the IJN should fight air attack off with its own AAA an no other in 1941-43.

You are misunderstanding

BOTH sides get no escorts for AAA - so it seems we are told

and the game should be able to evaluate it for both sides if it happens as well

You also don't get the point of a AA destroyer or cruiser in IJN. Your view is not correct - however well intentioned. Japan seems to have invented the on board AAFDC - and certainly invented the concept just before the war - implementing it in ships already building when the war began and others during the war. No way we can simulate the impact of these ships if we say "no escorts"

same for an Atlanta however - if no escorts are allowed.


not right IMHO

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

ORIGINAL: wdolson
As far as uberCAP goes, I think it is fairly realistic for late war vs. the US. The only time in the real world the US was had to defend Pacific bases from any major attacks late in the war (1944 and later), were in carrier battles. That's why the Hellcat guys ran up such a staggering kill to loss ratio and such a high total.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
This isn't actually so. The abandoned units at Rabaul build a whole air group out of wreaks - and healed fliers which had not been evacuated. They made planes we never hear about - a bomber mod of the Zero for example - and flew long range air strikes that were effective - twice. If we had done it there would be a movie about it. There is an English book about it (From Ashes to Caraval or something like that). But the point is, us bases were not effective vs obsolete aircraft.

I am unfamiliar with this effort. What time frame did it happen and how big an air fleet did they cobble together? Did this renewed force make massed, daylight air attacks on US bases in the Solomons? You said they were effective twice. When and against what Allied bases? How big were these raids, how effective were they, and what losses did the Japanese encur?

If it was late enough in the Solomons campaign, any success they did have was due to the Allies getting lax on defense because they hadn't had to do it in a long time. The game does not have any mechanism to model this.

Bill

I think you are right - they achieved surprise due to unexpected threats from an unexpected (impossible) direction - and it was pretty late. took time to rebuild wreaks - but I don't remember the details. I do have the book and can look at it when not going to work = like now

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

ORIGINAL: okami
All of the abilities of the KB on or before the start of the war a doctrinal. This is not modelled well in the game ie: multi-carrier task forces. All of the hardware improvements the allies gain are learned improvements ie: this gun has not proven to be effective let us make a better one. My point is that all the allies learned they paid a price for. The US did not enter the war with Hellcats. The Hellcat was developed after facing the Zero in the early 42 battles and capturing one in the Alutians after Midway. If the US never entered the war would they have developed the Hellcat? No. Experience and success or failure breed change. If the AA fire of a 1942 US Carrier was able to destroy any bomber that happened to attack, they would have no need to change what they were doing or with what they were doing it with. Impovements happen but radical changes do not. Evolution vs revolution. Seems you want improvement only for the Allies without paying the price for that improvement. Experience is the key, I can hand the best fighter to the average joe and he will not be able to use it, he has no experience.

The Hellcat was developed because the Corsair program was in trouble. The USN started work on the F4U, TBF, and SB2U well before Pearl Harbor. I believe all had flown by Dec 7, 1941. The TBF program is the only one that did not run into serious problems and end up getting delayed. The Hellcat was contracted as a stop gap until the Carsair was carrier ready. If those two programs hadn't run into problems, the late 42 carrier air wing would have consisted of TBFs, Corsairs, and SB2Cs.

As far as the US gaining more than the Japanese, the US was less rooted in the traditional ways and was willing and able to adapt doctrines in a shorter amount of time. Japan's culture did not favor radical new approaches and they were slow to adapt to the realities of the war. There are exceptions to this here and there, but the Americans tended to be much more adaptable.

This is one of the handicaps the Japanese player has to play with. Some of the worst problems Japan faced are not modeled much in the game at all. Japan's war effort was severely hampered by the interservice rivalry between the army and the navy. The rivalry was so intense that they did some things that were counter productive to the war effort. There is very little of that in the game.

I know the Japanese fan boys don't like it, but Japan had a lot of problems they were slow to overcome. Some problems they never overcame.

Bill

all true - but "the war between the generals" is about ALLIED service problems - which were severe

we never even unified command in PTO

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
You are misunderstanding

BOTH sides get no escorts for AAA - so it seems we are told

and the game should be able to evaluate it for both sides if it happens as well

You also don't get the point of a AA destroyer or cruiser in IJN. Your view is not correct - however well intentioned. Japan seems to have invented the on board AAFDC - and certainly invented the concept just before the war - implementing it in ships already building when the war began and others during the war. No way we can simulate the impact of these ships if we say "no escorts"

same for an Atlanta however - if no escorts are allowed.

not right IMHO

I may have missed something in this thread, but I don't recall mention of an all or nothing model in which both sides have to suffer the same limitations.

Bill

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
all true - but "the war between the generals" is about ALLIED service problems - which were severe

we never even unified command in PTO

I agree that the Allies had their problems which are not modeled either.

Bill

[treespider]

Time for my 2p's...and some rambling points to ponder...

A lot of this discussion is comparing apples to oranges...ie real life versus game.

In the game we see players pushing around the KB Death Star...part of the reason for this is the benefits of the uberCAP aspect of the game, another reason is that it just makes sense. In history, following PH the Japanese separated KB for different missions....something we rarely see in the game. IIRC Hiryu and Soryu went to Wake and two of the carDIV's went on the Darwin Raid. It was only for the Indian Ocean Raid that we once again see the Japanese attempt to form the six carrier KB however they had to put Kaga back into port because, in game terms, she had accumulated too much SYS damage requiring repairs.

Something no amount of code can easily simulate is the victory disease that began to afflict the Japanese in the early Spring of 1942. The disease that led them to one of the cardinal sins of warfare - dividing your forces when confronting the enemy. Yes Lee and Jackson pulled it off at Chancellorsville, but my point is we may have seen a very different outcome to the early carrier battles had the Japanese left the Striking force intact.

Now the what if's --

-What if they Japanese had sent the entire Striking Force to cover Operation MO instead of just CarDiv5? I would venture the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been something similar to what we see in game...

-What if Midway is delayed a few weeks because the entire Striking Force was sent to the South Pacific, and the entire Striking Force is again used for Operation MI, giving the Japanese six fleet carriers instead of four for the Midway Operation? Coupled with any potential losses the US would have suffered in the Coral Sea - if any had Nimitz decided not to confront the Japanese.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: spence

The Topic of the Thread is "Modeling of Carrier Battles". I took that to mean that the 5 battles that actually occurred would provide the basis of that modeling.

I must add something that is being ignored in spite of an earlier comment (so I'll put it differently).

Does it matter if a carrier is sunk by land based air? If it does matter, then let's include all attacks on carriers regardless of where they were launched from. Removing from the statistics the land based air that fell to IJN cap at Midway makes no sense. Focusing only on the 5 carrier to carrier battles makes no sense.

When we discuss carrier battles that means carrier air battles (not surface or sub attacks) - but certainly when land based air attacks a carrier TF the carrier will defend the same way. The commander didn't say "Wait! Those torpedo planes must be coming from Midway! Put plan B into action!"

[spence]

BOTH sides get no escorts for AAA - so it seems we are told

and the game should be able to evaluate it for both sides if it happens as well

You also don't get the point of a AA destroyer or cruiser in IJN. Your view is not correct - however well intentioned. Japan seems to have invented the on board AAFDC - and certainly invented the concept just before the war - implementing it in ships already building when the war began and others during the war. No way we can simulate the impact of these ships if we say "no escorts"

same for an Atlanta however - if no escorts are allowed.

The Japanese disposed the ships in their TFs such that the AAA of the screen was rendered mostly ineffective due to range. An AA destroyer with excellent 100 mm guns is useless if its 100 miles away from the target. The Japanese eventually (1944) moved the ships of the screen in close where those guns could do some good.

The USN started with the screen's guns in close and then added more and better guns (and better directors and better fuzing).

Now the what if's --

-What if they Japanese had sent the entire Striking Force to cover Operation MO instead of just CarDiv5? I would venture the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been something similar to what we see in game...

-What if Midway is delayed a few weeks because the entire Striking Force was sent to the South Pacific, and the entire Striking Force is again used for Operation MI, giving the Japanese six fleet carriers instead of four for the Midway Operation? Coupled with any potential losses the US would have suffered in the Coral Sea - if any had Nimitz decided not to confront the Japanese.

The tactical disposition of the fleets below the level of Player "command" is the issue. Showing up for the fight with 6 carriers to the enemy's 2 is operational should be rewarded with a massacre. Showing up one on one or two on two should pose a serious risk of disaster for whoever chooses to do that.

What if?

The Enterprise and Hornet were dispatched to the SOPAC after their return from the Doolittle Raid. In the event they were too late for Coral Sea. What if the Japanese had some delay for their op and then began after they showed up with the same forces. Then it'd be 2:1 in favor of the Allies. Might be interesting to see how WitP resolves it.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: spence

The tactical disposition of the fleets below the level of Player "command" is the issue. Showing up for the fight with 6 carriers to the enemy's 2 is operational should be rewarded with a massacre. Showing up one on one or two on two should pose a serious risk of disaster for whoever chooses to do that.

What if?

The Enterprise and Hornet were dispatched to the SOPAC after their return from the Doolittle Raid. In the event they were too late for Coral Sea. What if the Japanese had some delay for their op and then began after they showed up with the same forces. Then it'd be 2:1 in favor of the Allies. Might be interesting to see how WitP resolves it.

Wonder how the game would play if Japanese Air combat TF were only allowed to be composed of CV's and/or CVL's? And the Screen had to be placed into an ASW, Escort and/or Surface TF?

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: spence

What if?

The Enterprise and Hornet were dispatched to the SOPAC after their return from the Doolittle Raid. In the event they were too late for Coral Sea. What if the Japanese had some delay for their op and then began after they showed up with the same forces. Then it'd be 2:1 in favor of the Allies. Might be interesting to see how WitP resolves it.

What if IJ had been flexible enough (as many of us might be) to adjust their op. After all, their strategic target was not Midway, it was the US carriers. The US had just demonstrated that they would throw in two CVs to defend Port Moresby. Why not send KB down that way, try again, and see if they will toss in a couple more....?

[tsimmonds]

ORIGINAL: treespider

Wonder how the game would play if Japanese Air combat TF were only allowed to be composed of CV's and/or CVL's? And the Screen had to be placed into an ASW, Escort and/or Surface TF?

That's a really interesting idea. It would certainly give KB a potential glass jaw. It would also tend encourage the Allies to stand and fight, if there was a perceptible chance for a Midway.

It would further encourage IJ to be a bit circumspect with his irreplaceable assets.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: spence

The Topic of the Thread is "Modeling of Carrier Battles". I took that to mean that the 5 battles that actually occurred would provide the basis of that modeling.

I must add something that is being ignored in spite of an earlier comment (so I'll put it differently).

Does it matter if a carrier is sunk by land based air? If it does matter, then let's include all attacks on carriers regardless of where they were launched from. Removing from the statistics the land based air that fell to IJN cap at Midway makes no sense. Focusing only on the 5 carrier to carrier battles makes no sense.

When we discuss carrier battles that means carrier air battles (not surface or sub attacks) - but certainly when land based air attacks a carrier TF the carrier will defend the same way. The commander didn't say "Wait! Those torpedo planes must be coming from Midway! Put plan B into action!"

This is correct:

carrier battles vitally involve AAA combat and land based air strikes - and land targets. Whatever is coded into the game is going to be used universally - so it cannot ignore the other cases and work.

Further the function of a game is to show ALTERNATE possibilities. If you ONLY can recreate history - read a history book or see a movie. A GAME is supposed to put YOU in the driver's seat. If the game cannot figure it out when you change something - the game isn't working as it should work.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

ORIGINAL: treespider

Wonder how the game would play if Japanese Air combat TF were only allowed to be composed of CV's and/or CVL's? And the Screen had to be placed into an ASW, Escort and/or Surface TF?

That's a really interesting idea. It would certainly give KB a potential glass jaw. It would also tend encourage the Allies to stand and fight, if there was a perceptible chance for a Midway.

It would further encourage IJ to be a bit circumspect with his irreplaceable assets.

Nothing prevents users (players) from forming such TGs right now - or Allied opponents from requiring they do so as a house rule. It isn't the way it should be IMHO - but the opinion that matters is yours. The game should ALLOW you to do this - not REQUIRE you do this.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: treespider

Time for my 2p's...and some rambling points to ponder...

A lot of this discussion is comparing apples to oranges...ie real life versus game.

In the game we see players pushing around the KB Death Star...part of the reason for this is the benefits of the uberCAP aspect of the game, another reason is that it just makes sense. In history, following PH the Japanese separated KB for different missions....something we rarely see in the game. IIRC Hiryu and Soryu went to Wake and two of the carDIV's went on the Darwin Raid. It was only for the Indian Ocean Raid that we once again see the Japanese attempt to form the six carrier KB however they had to put Kaga back into port because, in game terms, she had accumulated too much SYS damage requiring repairs.

Something no amount of code can easily simulate is the victory disease that began to afflict the Japanese in the early Spring of 1942. The disease that led them to one of the cardinal sins of warfare - dividing your forces when confronting the enemy. Yes Lee and Jackson pulled it off at Chancellorsville, but my point is we may have seen a very different outcome to the early carrier battles had the Japanese left the Striking force intact.

Now the what if's --

-What if they Japanese had sent the entire Striking Force to cover Operation MO instead of just CarDiv5? I would venture the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been something similar to what we see in game...

-What if Midway is delayed a few weeks because the entire Striking Force was sent to the South Pacific, and the entire Striking Force is again used for Operation MI, giving the Japanese six fleet carriers instead of four for the Midway Operation? Coupled with any potential losses the US would have suffered in the Coral Sea - if any had Nimitz decided not to confront the Japanese.

[8D].......but......what has any of this to do with the actual issues being discussed, IJN vs Allied FLAK, lack of any range penalties for full group coordinated strikes, rigid tactical ranges in an operational scale game, allowing for bizarre outcomes (ie, Allied CVs rarely launching strikes as they are "out of range"...something that never occurred historically). We want a more historical model, not the one we are using currently.

[herwin]

See Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, chapters 6 and 11, for a discussion of carrier tactics when AA and CAP are weak. Spatial concentration is to be avoided. This is also the reason littoral operations are so different from blue ocean operations--there are so many ways to be mouse-trapped.