World War I Book

[arichbourg]

Having finished the book now, I do agree that the last chapters are a little silly. If he had taken the time to more fully develop the points, instead of getting all emotional, it would have been bettter.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: wargamer123


The German General Staff was good but for it's time, sort of like the USA's West Point

That is not remotely close to reality. There are a few obvious similarities, such as members of the organizations usually wore uniforms and discussed military stuff. West Point is a school, The German General Staff was a branch of the army, just like artillery, infantry, armor, quartermaster. One is a 4 year college with a commission as part of graduation, the other an assignment to a staff Branch that could last for over 30 years. During those 30 years, many schools would have been attended to keep up with requirements.

Prior to the General staff, the Prussian Army was heavily dependent on the skill of the king. If he was good, then everything was fine. If he was slightly inept, then you end up with a Jena. The creation of the General staff eliminated (or drastically reduced that problem) that problem.

There are many achievements that led to a modern military which were initiated by the General staff. Many of its brainchild's were adopted by other nations around the world.

[hjaco]

ORIGINAL: Disintegration
I'll save my money for the remainder of Hew Strachan's series.

I can only recommend buying the series as well. I was captured by the first volume especially because although it is very detailed it is all put into en overall concept. I was especially captured by the war in the colonies and the overall reasons for fighting them especially for the Entente. I would never have suspected the global strategic importance for German colonies acting as wireless communication relays to commerce raiders and the threat it posed to British interests.

[SMK-at-work]

Hjaco that's very remiss of you - all those peny packet colonies generally started life as coaling or watering stations - famously the Falklands - hte British battlecruisers were coaling htere when v Spee's Sqn came to raid it.

Use as wireless stations came later, but they were fortuitously placed!! 

But even in hte days of sail ships needed somewhere to stop and refresh supplies after a long sail - so you have penny-packet "colonies" all over the place - like Goa in India, various around the coast of Africa, Pacific Islands,  etc.  Of course some of htem also gave commercial access to large "native" hinterlands - Macau, HongKong and Tsingtao in China are probably hte most obvious of those.

[hjaco]

Yes but that does not change the situation the British faced at outbreak of WW1.

[wargamer123]

Weird, I never heard mention of the GHC Before Luderndorf or Hindenburg beyond the bounds of WW1 or WW2. As if they were the Fathers?

I get the West Point relationship to the Long Standing Military Tradition and Upper Echelon Officers of the US Armed Forces, I stand corrected however. Perhaps more like the JCS but that's all the branch of services in a collective

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

ORIGINAL: wargamer123


The German General Staff was good but for it's time, sort of like the USA's West Point

That is not remotely close to reality. There are a few obvious similarities, such as members of the organizations usually wore uniforms and discussed military stuff. West Point is a school, The German General Staff was a branch of the army, just like artillery, infantry, armor, quartermaster. One is a 4 year college with a commission as part of graduation, the other an assignment to a staff Branch that could last for over 30 years. During those 30 years, many schools would have been attended to keep up with requirements.

Prior to the General staff, the Prussian Army was heavily dependent on the skill of the king. If he was good, then everything was fine. If he was slightly inept, then you end up with a Jena. The creation of the General staff eliminated (or drastically reduced that problem) that problem.

There are many achievements that led to a modern military which were initiated by the General staff. Many of its brainchild's were adopted by other nations around the world.

[hjaco]

Well the German General Staff was unofficially created after the disaster at Jena in 1806 to Napoleon where initially the Prussians held the numerical advantage of some 35.000 men against a French Corps but due to failure in coordination and communications they ended up with fighting against some 90.000 men under Napoleon with a rather predictable outcome.

It was formally established after the victory over Napoleon in 1814.

After the German unification process it was actually Moltke (the elder) who brought professionalism to this institution which gave the Germans some unprecedented organizational superiority at that time - like the solid thrashing of the Danes (I am a Dane [:(])

[wargamer123]

No one can doubt the Prowess of the Prussian and soon after German Army. Denmark, AustriaHungary, France all in one package. They really should've abstained from WW1.

[SMK-at-work]

ORIGINAL: hjaco

Well the German General Staff was unofficially created after the disaster at Jena in 1806 to Napoleon where initially the Prussians held the numerical advantage of some 35.000 men against a French Corps but due to failure in coordination and communications they ended up with fighting against some 90.000 men under Napoleon with a rather predictable outcome.

It was established hten....but Iena was only part of hte day's fighting.

The twin battles of Iena-Auerstadt were fought only a few miles apart (8-10) - Bonaparte led most of the French army against about 1/3rd of the Prussian army under Prince Hohenlohe - the Prussians held fairly good defensive positions at the start, but Napoleon started with 50,000 men, rising to 90,000 during the day to Hohenlohe's 38,000, and defeated him fairly easily in the end.

Auerstadt was another story - Marshal Davout had only his own corps of about 27,000 men, and held off 65,000 men under the King of Prussia for the whole day - Napoleon at first couldn't believe it.

The failure of the Prussians to co-ordinate and their archaic command structure left a lasting impression on some up and coming officers - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz were all present!

[06 Maestro]

Unfortunately, I have yet to be able to settle down with A Genius for War=maybe tomorrow I can post a few good statistics. One thing I do recall is that Clausewitz was actually present at Jena and saw the mighty Prussian Army run away. Clausewitz did not hang (slang; continue to serve or stay with-sorry) with the Prussian government, so he never served with the French. He made his way to Russia and served in the Czars service until the "liberation" of Prussia. After that time he began to move up the chain in the army. IIRC, is was several years after the finale defeat of Napoleon that the General Staff was formed.
There are some funny tales in the book about the Germans interacting with Austrians and others in peace time. Young German officers were amazed at the frivolous attitude that their contemporaries held about their duties-attitudes that would get them bounced right out of the Prussian Army, if imitated. The new Prussian army set very high standards. It did not matter who your daddy was, what did matter was how well you performed your duties. The first professional NCO Corps was also a result of the General Staff. One of the sort of simple, but revolutionary ideas was task, conditions, and standards for all levels of soldiers. This created a real military machine that no one could match for a long time.
The disparity of losses in WW1 was not a fluke, one side was simply better at the business of war. Not infallible, of coarse. One of the most idiotic things was the mobilization of the officer training corps to break the Allied line as in Belgium in 1914-they were nearly annihilated. This was a great mistake that haunted the German command for a long time to come. I don't know how long it took to replace those losses, but it did cause a severe lack of junior officers for a good part of the war.

[hjaco]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro
One of the most idiotic things was the mobilization of the officer training corps to break the Allied line as in Belgium in 1914-they were nearly annihilated. This was a great mistake that haunted the German command for a long time to come. I don't know how long it took to replace those losses, but it did cause a severe lack of junior officers for a good part of the war.

Very interesting indeed. A German version of Stalins Army purges in 36'. Sure "only" the reserve officers but still. Shows stupidity is Universal

[hjaco]

ORIGINAL: SMK-at-work
The failure of the Prussians to co-ordinate and their archaic command structure left a lasting impression on some up and coming officers - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz were all present!

Some more detailed information on the background: http://www.napoleon-series.org/military ... aninf.html

[wargamer123]

Napoleon inspired a lot of fear. Any Senior Commander may have retreated in the face of a foe fearing they would be reprimanded by their King. I think battlefield iniative is something that takes a bit personal guts, failure would've meant some dire consequences...to commit those reserves to fail and then to have your King captured-killed. Some many Generals or Leaders err on the side of caution, losing the iniative, but how can you blame them. Few have the boldness to press forward and know when to do it.

Nelson and Napoleon changed the face of 19th century warfare as their tactics were still studied and used decades if not centuries after their deaths

[miral]

All I can say is be glad you have all these wonderful books to argue over. When I was in college around 1970 the number and quality of military history books on WWI and WWII were very limited and often only chronological rehashes. There was a lot of accepted wisdom that has since been challenged. Today we have a wave of great books challenging every accepted theory and offer huge amounts of facts and statistics uncovered in the last 40 years. Only problem is, so many cost so much. Has anyone read Robert Citino's book on the inherent deficiencies of the German Army stretching back to the 30 Years War, for example, (or rather, German Armies, before 1870)? I would love to do so, his thesis sounds most interesting, but the cost, the cost.

[miral]

Col. Dupy's book, A Genius for War, is highly contentious among militarians and by no means universally accepted. His belief that you can quantify war mathematically is especially condemned by many. Dupuy is one of the leading exponents of the 'German army was best just overcome by mass' school; same as there is a school that says same thing about the Confederates. For a counter view see H.P. Willmott's The Great Crusade, one of whose main themes it to demonstrate, as he puts it, "my contempt...for the pernicious myth of German military excellence." Willmott also says, frequently, that the Germans know how to win battles but not wars, and winning wars is the primary proof of military excellence.

The Germans, like the Confederates, lost the war and then, for 2-3 generations, won the war in the history books. But in the past 20 years or so there has been a backlash against this and the counterview that the Allies, particularly the Russians after mid 1942 and the Union for most of the CW, had the superior military organizations, as well as more coherent strategies and an understanding of the interlocking nature of armies and industries and societies in moder, total wars.

[miral]

Mosier, well he is a contrarian to the core. Every book he has written is radically revisionist. Has some excellent qualities but I detect a bit of arrogant 'no body can really see the truth behind the official lies but me' attitude. Useful, but read him with care.

Also, he was not trained as a militarian historian. Now, there is nothing wrong with this but he writes about different wars in different time periods and it is pertinent to ask if, given the vast literatures available on all modern wars, anyone can master the materials. And I inherently distrust historians who base much of their arguments on a great gushing of statistics. As H.P. Willmott so trenchantly points out, war is not rational, nor is it conducted rationally, and statistics are an effort to force irrationality into a numbers straight jacket. Still, we always need radicals to challenge perceived wisdom.

My own opinion, for what, if anything, it is worth, is in agreement with Willmott's, when he speaks of the 'pernicious myth of German military excellence'. Ludendorf's theory was, 'attack and see what happens'. Brilliant! He reduced Strategy to tactics at its lowest level. Clauswitz was spinning in his grave when the Germans were conducting their 1918 Offensive. In truth, Ludendorf had no real Strategy at all. The Germans have always confused operational brilliance with strategy; hence, they keep losing wars. But in 1918 you could not even speak of operational brillance, just bashing away and following the line of least resistance. Ludendorf did not seem to realize that fighting the Brits, French and Americans was not the same thing as fighting the Czar's army. Ludendor did not seem to realize much at all. Astonishing that a dunderhead like him was defacto dictator of Germany for two years. So much for the supposed incredible ability of the German General Staff to produce superb examples of military officers.

[06 Maestro]

miral

The General Staff did win a couple of wars. You have to keep in mind that the last real/ somewhat independent Chief of the General Staff was relieved by Hitler in mid '42. They may still have lost the war due to the overall strategic situation, but it would have progressed in a very different manner. For starters, there would not have even been a "Barbarossa". They followed the leaders instructions. One side can loose a war for reasons other than lousy doctrines.

[SMK-at-work]

ORIGINAL: wargamer123

Napoleon inspired a lot of fear.

I don't think so - respect certainly, but all sorts of commanders were prepared to take him on - such as teh incompetant Wrede who I think asttempted to stop the French after Leipzig with jsut 20,00 men or some similar small force - Napoleon said of him "Poor Wrede - even I can't make him a general" - wrede had previously served under Napoleon!