RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: central Pacific heats up
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RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: central Pacific heats up
EDIT: This thread originally was labeled as vs Torsten - until he pointed out he was Historiker to the Forum. It is a fine idea for him to play this test - the scenario was specifically done in response to his request for one in which it could be justified to add the Dutch battlecruiser type. We also worked in replacement Dutch CLs, and many other interesting ships - mostly with the help of the Forum. And we are using art contributed by Terminus - which may mark the first time he joined the RHS team as a direct contributer of material - and if so that may also be of "historik" significance. I must admit - although it was not my idea - it is in many respects my favorite scenario. Always a fan of BBO family - the war as it was planned - this scenario is very much like that - but with more toys to play with because of a longer period of greater tension.
Somewhat fittingly for the EBO world with its decade long focus on battleship and cruiser construction, Adm Kimmel decided to sortee!
Since Hawaii is under threat of invasion, this was probably wiser than staying in port - and the Japanese now have a problem: there are heavy units at sea in range of vulnerable invasion shipping.
Turn began with a long series of submarine attacks - Japan mass produced the Ro-33 class (as originally intended) - a fine medium boat (if without oxygen torpedoes). Most of these hit something - but so many Allied ships were at sea that two (I-172 and I-173) were cought and badly mauled by ASW armed ships (in Hawaiian waters). [A total of 11 torpedoes hit 6 ships - mostly transports - but including and AVD and the Dewey Dry Dock]
Two air superiority missions over Rangoon were interesting: Oscars killed 4 enemy fighters for a loss of 1 of their own, but a later wave of Zeros only did 2 for 2 - in spite of a presumably tired and discouraged enemy. Most of the Allied fighters were AVG P-40s.
Unescorted Ki-48s were able to kill 3 (on the ground) at Georgetown (with no losses), but escorted Ki-21s at Singapore scored 16 hits on ships, 21 hits on runways and destroyed 12 aircraft (with a loss of 8). Unescorted Nells and Bettys followed up - getting 7 more aircraft and 9 more runway hits (from high altitude) - for 4 lo
A massive attack on Clark (about 250 bombers) was unopposed - scoring 287 runway hits for one damaged Ki-21.
Many Japanese air strikes on naval and land targets scored some hits. Many Allied air strikes on ships scored no hits. The intersting air strikes of the day included one that sank USS Pensylvania outright and another that scored 4 torpedo hits on USS California. Old CL USS Detroit was also sunk outright - all this very near to Oahu. Many destroyers and transports of various kinds were sunk - along with probably fatal damage to two PGs near Shanghai.
A long pair of naval battles between PT Boats near Maui put a torpedo into IJN Yamashiro - allegedly - but she shows no damage whatever - so possibly it was a dud.
One of three PT units was sunk and another mauled by gunfire. The Japanese need to worry that some of the many high speed ships in task forces at sea - or in ports - may be used against the landing areas. No port attacks occurred - all the planes went for naval targets at sea. And the presence of planes at Oahu indicates either the airfields remain up (which seems unlikely) or that there are long range CAP from nearby islands (likely).
The First Raiding Brigade (barely) took Sankuliwang - destroying 6 aircraft when it did so.
Many other landings occurred, and Johnstan Island as well as Wake Island fell. Advance forces reached the lower Hawaiian Islands - but it is problematical if their transports can stick around to supply them and land the rest of the units.
Somewhat fittingly for the EBO world with its decade long focus on battleship and cruiser construction, Adm Kimmel decided to sortee!
Since Hawaii is under threat of invasion, this was probably wiser than staying in port - and the Japanese now have a problem: there are heavy units at sea in range of vulnerable invasion shipping.
Turn began with a long series of submarine attacks - Japan mass produced the Ro-33 class (as originally intended) - a fine medium boat (if without oxygen torpedoes). Most of these hit something - but so many Allied ships were at sea that two (I-172 and I-173) were cought and badly mauled by ASW armed ships (in Hawaiian waters). [A total of 11 torpedoes hit 6 ships - mostly transports - but including and AVD and the Dewey Dry Dock]
Two air superiority missions over Rangoon were interesting: Oscars killed 4 enemy fighters for a loss of 1 of their own, but a later wave of Zeros only did 2 for 2 - in spite of a presumably tired and discouraged enemy. Most of the Allied fighters were AVG P-40s.
Unescorted Ki-48s were able to kill 3 (on the ground) at Georgetown (with no losses), but escorted Ki-21s at Singapore scored 16 hits on ships, 21 hits on runways and destroyed 12 aircraft (with a loss of 8). Unescorted Nells and Bettys followed up - getting 7 more aircraft and 9 more runway hits (from high altitude) - for 4 lo
A massive attack on Clark (about 250 bombers) was unopposed - scoring 287 runway hits for one damaged Ki-21.
Many Japanese air strikes on naval and land targets scored some hits. Many Allied air strikes on ships scored no hits. The intersting air strikes of the day included one that sank USS Pensylvania outright and another that scored 4 torpedo hits on USS California. Old CL USS Detroit was also sunk outright - all this very near to Oahu. Many destroyers and transports of various kinds were sunk - along with probably fatal damage to two PGs near Shanghai.
A long pair of naval battles between PT Boats near Maui put a torpedo into IJN Yamashiro - allegedly - but she shows no damage whatever - so possibly it was a dud.
One of three PT units was sunk and another mauled by gunfire. The Japanese need to worry that some of the many high speed ships in task forces at sea - or in ports - may be used against the landing areas. No port attacks occurred - all the planes went for naval targets at sea. And the presence of planes at Oahu indicates either the airfields remain up (which seems unlikely) or that there are long range CAP from nearby islands (likely).
The First Raiding Brigade (barely) took Sankuliwang - destroying 6 aircraft when it did so.
Many other landings occurred, and Johnstan Island as well as Wake Island fell. Advance forces reached the lower Hawaiian Islands - but it is problematical if their transports can stick around to supply them and land the rest of the units.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Torsten
Total Allied aircraft losses were 268 (102 of them at Pearl Harbor) - compared to 106 total losses for Japan.
There were many ships damaged very badly - mainly at sea - so the total ship sunk report probably is not indicative of
the correct number after scuttlings and flooding out - but it is clear the Pacific Fleet heavy units - all carriers and all but
two battleships - has survived as a fighting force: in particular in the Central Pacific losses and damage were confined to
smaller warships and non-warships - excepting only Pennsylvania and California. There are so many task forces at sea
it is not clear if the heavy ship are at sea or not (although the carriers certainly are).
The Kiddo Butai and its baby - I call it the Ni Butai (literally "two force") - have no ship damage. But most Val units are low in
morale and some Kate units also are. Pearl Harbor is reported at 40 per cent runway damage - the lowest I have ever seen with
all the Vals set to take it down - and that means it is possible to fly from it. Johnson Island is reporting 80 per cent airfield damage -
too much to risk transferring in bombers (they will attrit badly and won't fly anyway). So we are not in a position to take down
the airfield with another strike before tomorrow: we will instead hunt down ships at sea - and cover the friendly forces with fighters
in case any air strikes appear.
Similar to USN at Guadalcanal, I am abandoning the troops without any supplies - ordering them to take the positions (Lanai and Kona are
undefended - and also Lahaina - which cannot stand up to a brigade assault). All the unloaded supplies and unit fragments - and all the second echelon engineers and AA units - and the tanker force - are to meet at a point SW of Hawaii (big island) - covered by Ni Butai - while
KB will take station East of Hawaii - just in range of the islands - to provide maximum coverage of any ships trying to fleet to the US West Coast - and to be deceptive - his warships are concentrated NW of Oahu - on the track KB used to enter the area - and we don't really want battleships in our carrier force - even though we probably would sink them.
My judgement is that the situation may be manageable - that we only risk a single brigade and SNLF forward anyway (plus three support units - an airfield one, an AA one and a CD one) - and we may be able to take down the airfields in two days. Also that - regardless of wether we stay or not - every enemy ship sunk now loses ALL her missions for years - many enemy ships are damaged and will easily be sunk - hit force is very spread out - he started with over a dozen elements and this is about doubled due to damaged ships breaking off - and not likely to be combat effective. This is a good time to sink ships - and we need to do that to be safe landing - else the landing transports might be hit by surface vessels. We also spotted PT boats at Lahaina - it might be better not to fight subs, surface ships, air strikes and PT boats all at the same time - so we will confuse him by leaving the hex altogether - and letting the Imperial Guards Brigade turn it into a friendly base - big enough we can enter port if damaged. Meanwhile at Johnston Island we will keep landing - and engineers will repair the airfield damage - and start building a port large enough to work on damaged units (getting rid of floatation damage before they begin the long trek to a real shipyard).
And we will capture Midway tomorrow - both points being useful for projecting recon over the Central Pacific region - and Johnston being close enough to use for bomber raids (the bombers are already at Maleolap, Wotje, Kwajalein and Enewetok waiting to have a good field - and covering the area with recon from there). Wherever his carriers are - they are not on our LOC - nor very near Hawaii - we have good recon on the carriers - torpedoless Kates with belly tanks - and sub recon (less reliable but farther out) - and lots of bomber and flying boats covering the area to the West - they are probably NE of Hawaii - otherwise SE of it - far enough out not to be an immediate threat - and too small in number and too poorly fitted with low quality planes to dare a fight with KB. I fear them vs transports - but not the major forces - and I have orderd the transport follow on groups to head for Johnston - the forward assembly point.
There were many ships damaged very badly - mainly at sea - so the total ship sunk report probably is not indicative of
the correct number after scuttlings and flooding out - but it is clear the Pacific Fleet heavy units - all carriers and all but
two battleships - has survived as a fighting force: in particular in the Central Pacific losses and damage were confined to
smaller warships and non-warships - excepting only Pennsylvania and California. There are so many task forces at sea
it is not clear if the heavy ship are at sea or not (although the carriers certainly are).
The Kiddo Butai and its baby - I call it the Ni Butai (literally "two force") - have no ship damage. But most Val units are low in
morale and some Kate units also are. Pearl Harbor is reported at 40 per cent runway damage - the lowest I have ever seen with
all the Vals set to take it down - and that means it is possible to fly from it. Johnson Island is reporting 80 per cent airfield damage -
too much to risk transferring in bombers (they will attrit badly and won't fly anyway). So we are not in a position to take down
the airfield with another strike before tomorrow: we will instead hunt down ships at sea - and cover the friendly forces with fighters
in case any air strikes appear.
Similar to USN at Guadalcanal, I am abandoning the troops without any supplies - ordering them to take the positions (Lanai and Kona are
undefended - and also Lahaina - which cannot stand up to a brigade assault). All the unloaded supplies and unit fragments - and all the second echelon engineers and AA units - and the tanker force - are to meet at a point SW of Hawaii (big island) - covered by Ni Butai - while
KB will take station East of Hawaii - just in range of the islands - to provide maximum coverage of any ships trying to fleet to the US West Coast - and to be deceptive - his warships are concentrated NW of Oahu - on the track KB used to enter the area - and we don't really want battleships in our carrier force - even though we probably would sink them.
My judgement is that the situation may be manageable - that we only risk a single brigade and SNLF forward anyway (plus three support units - an airfield one, an AA one and a CD one) - and we may be able to take down the airfields in two days. Also that - regardless of wether we stay or not - every enemy ship sunk now loses ALL her missions for years - many enemy ships are damaged and will easily be sunk - hit force is very spread out - he started with over a dozen elements and this is about doubled due to damaged ships breaking off - and not likely to be combat effective. This is a good time to sink ships - and we need to do that to be safe landing - else the landing transports might be hit by surface vessels. We also spotted PT boats at Lahaina - it might be better not to fight subs, surface ships, air strikes and PT boats all at the same time - so we will confuse him by leaving the hex altogether - and letting the Imperial Guards Brigade turn it into a friendly base - big enough we can enter port if damaged. Meanwhile at Johnston Island we will keep landing - and engineers will repair the airfield damage - and start building a port large enough to work on damaged units (getting rid of floatation damage before they begin the long trek to a real shipyard).
And we will capture Midway tomorrow - both points being useful for projecting recon over the Central Pacific region - and Johnston being close enough to use for bomber raids (the bombers are already at Maleolap, Wotje, Kwajalein and Enewetok waiting to have a good field - and covering the area with recon from there). Wherever his carriers are - they are not on our LOC - nor very near Hawaii - we have good recon on the carriers - torpedoless Kates with belly tanks - and sub recon (less reliable but farther out) - and lots of bomber and flying boats covering the area to the West - they are probably NE of Hawaii - otherwise SE of it - far enough out not to be an immediate threat - and too small in number and too poorly fitted with low quality planes to dare a fight with KB. I fear them vs transports - but not the major forces - and I have orderd the transport follow on groups to head for Johnston - the forward assembly point.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Torsten
The second turn is as hard as the first. The central Pacific campaign places enormous strain on Japanese logistics, so that one must carefully
evaluate where to send thigns? Adding to the strain is that I attempt a modest offensive to clear LOC in China - prepratory to taking the
most important logistics centers in the East and South.
The point of the Central Pacific Offensive is that the Americans are pinned by the threat to Hawaii and their "short" LOC to Australia - and victory is obtained if they are pinned (vice have a free hand to send the fleet where they want and send supplies and fuel directly). What matters is the quality and quantity of units in the area - not the events of a single day. If the American fleet is at sea - it will not do well vs an undamaged Kiddo Butai with undepleted air groups. But this "superman piece" is fragile - and a sustained campaign requires siezure and development of bases. Only land based air on such bases can sustain air and sea control of the area, and reduce the strong Oahu position. Only if Oahu is isolated and reduced can it be successfully invaded. But invading Oahu is icing on the cake: the startegic objective remains fulfilled if the American fleet is pinned until it is disabled, and if Oahu cannot be used as a LOC base for cargos bound for Austraila or points in the Carolines. The Japanese must above all preserve their fighting force and not suffer excessive losses to shipping or valuable land combat and support units: for this reason the major invasion elements only enter the area as a base network is established and able to provide air cover. Until these bases are established and the American bases wholly knocked down, forward forces must be provided with strong air defense. The mission for day two is to harvest as many enemy ships at sea as possible - and day three will continue that process - hopefully many ships will attempt to counterland or surface combat engage the landing areas in Hawaii (NONE of which will have ANY ships in them). After the Val force recovers morale - and Johnston and Lahaina are up as land bomber bases - we will try to take Ohau's airfields down again.
Meanwhile we will sink ships (with Kates) - and gather recon data on what other threats remain.
evaluate where to send thigns? Adding to the strain is that I attempt a modest offensive to clear LOC in China - prepratory to taking the
most important logistics centers in the East and South.
The point of the Central Pacific Offensive is that the Americans are pinned by the threat to Hawaii and their "short" LOC to Australia - and victory is obtained if they are pinned (vice have a free hand to send the fleet where they want and send supplies and fuel directly). What matters is the quality and quantity of units in the area - not the events of a single day. If the American fleet is at sea - it will not do well vs an undamaged Kiddo Butai with undepleted air groups. But this "superman piece" is fragile - and a sustained campaign requires siezure and development of bases. Only land based air on such bases can sustain air and sea control of the area, and reduce the strong Oahu position. Only if Oahu is isolated and reduced can it be successfully invaded. But invading Oahu is icing on the cake: the startegic objective remains fulfilled if the American fleet is pinned until it is disabled, and if Oahu cannot be used as a LOC base for cargos bound for Austraila or points in the Carolines. The Japanese must above all preserve their fighting force and not suffer excessive losses to shipping or valuable land combat and support units: for this reason the major invasion elements only enter the area as a base network is established and able to provide air cover. Until these bases are established and the American bases wholly knocked down, forward forces must be provided with strong air defense. The mission for day two is to harvest as many enemy ships at sea as possible - and day three will continue that process - hopefully many ships will attempt to counterland or surface combat engage the landing areas in Hawaii (NONE of which will have ANY ships in them). After the Val force recovers morale - and Johnston and Lahaina are up as land bomber bases - we will try to take Ohau's airfields down again.
Meanwhile we will sink ships (with Kates) - and gather recon data on what other threats remain.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
The second day began with the longest replay I have ever seen - by far - running possibly over an hour in duration - and involving so many battles it is like an entire campaign in one step. It revealed Historiker to be a very aggressive player - and he may be on to something: the Japanese need to fight a classical war of great battles and cannot win a war of attrition: In particular Japan has fragile operational assets that cannot be lost - or even risked - if they are to stay in the game. The Allies can lose every ship - and they will end up stronger than they began anyway.
The replay began with continuing initial landings at 9 points: Tarawa, Lae, Cagayan, Rabaul, Kavieng, San Fernando, Guam, Hollandia, Naga and Xuwin. Opposition was significant only at Lae, Rabaul and Xuwin - and none of that was major: this is deliberate: like the real Japanese I prefer to land unopposed rather than in the teeth of major coast defenses, consolodate, and then attack off the beach - if possible where there is no defense at all. These landings were mostly very successful: Guam fell to the first assault for the first time in any game, which likely is due to a good die roll since the force committed was not large; only at San Fernando was the position not taken by assault. Here the tiny battalion defending was reinforced by half a dozen other units of the Philippine Army - and they retained control of the hex for the first time I have ever seen - even when I try such a force it has failed. Nevertheless, we have a gigantic motorized division - the 48th - reinforced by the unusual 65th brigade (it is triangular with three two battalion regiments and is larger than most brigades - and was surprisingly effective IRL. This is a gigantic landing force and is likely to take the position - particularly if supported. Several additional landing sites were not assaulted - not being atols - without landings on this turn: notably Kona (on the Big Island), Lanai (a little island) and at Lahaina (Mauai) Roads - where I had ordered landing ships to leave the immediate area: the forces ashore were uniformly successful - although only at Lahaina was there opposition (we added defenses to Molokai, Mauai, Kauai and Hilo (on the Big Island) which were not present in stock or CHS so there is no free ride at these locations (that is, a sub landing party can take the place if nothing starts there). Surprisingly - he did not reinforce - which was permitted - and which might have mattered. [Running into a Regiment or more at Lahaina might have been decisive - and running into one at Lanai or Kona certainly would have saved the position]
He was lucky on the submarine side - this file set still has the old too effective ASW weapons so we are not testing those. I-23 missed its target. I-5 never saw its enemies, but got hit by them.
He was daring, brilliant and lucky at Midway Island - the greatest of only two Allied victories this day: a tiny surface action group (2 CA and 2 DD) - no doubt detached from a carrier TF - made a surface raid into the hex. Our recon (out of Marcus Island and Enewetok - and submarine air search) failed to disclose the carrier group during the approach - but he probably detected the invasion group with PBYs. He knew the objective - there is nothing else nearby - so it was a good guess to hit it with a surface action group. It was risky to deprive the carrier of her heavy escort - but it was a good move - and so we have a very long battle in which a large transport force - with a whole division embarked - is engaged by this tiny SAG. [It is not really the assault force for Midway - it is the second wave for Oahu - given this preliminary job en route].
Japan had a flotilla of escorts - led by an ancient CL - on principle. These bore the brunt of the fighting - but were not combat effective vs heavy cruisers - and they were all lost or so badly damaged they will be lost - and many transports were damaged - again fatally so far from any friendly base or support. There is grave doubt any of this force will survive - although it is so large it is probable something will - and it shows a major problem the Japanese planners have: how to cover forces over an approach front more than two thousand miles long. There are options - shorten the area contested - use thin covering - or take chances. This distant wing adopted the latter choice - security was in the form of "stay out of the way of anything big" - and when that something was not detected - the wing was in trouble. It is an accident of history the carriers were forward delivering planes - and "probing" for enemy ships - and I could not play as if I knew that. Nor do most players dare send the carriers in alone - but Historiker knew from the scenario that I must be in the lower islands - and he dared to try. It paid off - big time - with more cost in one day than I usually pay in six months. It is PQ-17 time (the only Allied convoy to be ordered to scatter in the face of enemy attrition attacks). This is how I fight - so I can hardly complain if he does it: carriers vs non-carriers is not a big risk.
More surprising for me was a series of four battles fought in the waters SW of Lahaina - where all the Japanese forward forces except KB were concentrated. I did not expect ANY battle this night - but a pair of probing cruiser destroyer groups did encounter the main body which was acting as a covering force. What might have happened had they run into ANY other group I shudder to think: the tanker group, the Lahaina invasion group, the Lahaina follow up Group and the Kona group might have been decimated (as happened at Midway). But the main body took on all comers somethign like the actions near Leyte Gulf IRL - and sank all or most of the attackers in long surface engagements - which except for the first two involved horrible Allied gunnery that failed to score at all. These two were still unequal exchanges and the main operational consequences are: (1) we must have poor ammunition states on the main body; (2) 1 battleship and 2 other warships are withdrawing to Johnston Island to deal with single digit damage issues (we don't like to have high damage thousands of miles from a Level 3 port - and we did not yet control any port in the Islands when the day's orders were issued. I really don't like this sort of thing: I am used to winning with Japanese warships early in WWII - but you never win big enough (Hara estimiates Japan must sink 6 for one to break even).
These actions were followed by 3 more sub actions - only one a success for either side - AK Bantam took 4 hits (2 torpedoes) - and sank later from these - near Singapore. Two Japanese forces bombarded Cagayan and Wuhan, and more landing operations continued at some of the above listed points - to which add an unplanned landing at Brunei (we changed to plan when a sub showed up at Miri) - and as expected there was some CD effort there - but only 1 hit was scored on an AK. Two more sub attacks - by Ro-30 and Ro-41 - failed to hit their targets.
The junks at Wenchow stayed in port - so we hit them with Ki-48s out of Shanghai - scoring twice. A stronger air attack at Changshi in South China revealed a dozen P-43s - not ROC P-43s but US ones (apparently given to ROC on the first day of the war). These did well vs Nates - and one Nate and 2 bombers were lost - for moderate damage to the field. [Normally I would think the RHS general house rule should apply - the rule is "if real commanders would not do it you don't do it" - BUT the PLAYER decides what is done WITHOUT consulting the opposite player.
As long as he rationalized some basis for this - it is allowed. RHS replaces a long list of house rules with a shorter list - these mostly being required by peculiar RHS features like shipping tracks - and this general case: I am not yet sure Historiker understands that a general rule is not the same as NO rule at all - but time will tell. It does not matter too much: those P-43s went to USAAF during this period of time - and they are no longer available to USAAF in this game.]
Air strikes by Japanese forces were generally unopposed - even where planes were present yesterday - e.g. at Kota Bahru, Georgetown and Clark - so we took losses to AA to damage undefended airfields at several diverse points. But we WERE opposed at Singapore - and there we lost 5 bombers in exchange for 3 fighters - and did only moderate damage. The Buffalo's morale must be high - and they are not yet exhausted. We have shut down only Clark AAF - and it was wholly undefended - and hitting it again was probably a mistake (even if it was in the plan). As per usual for this early period, Japanese attacks on land units were generally moderately damaging, and Allied air attacks on Japanese ships generally missed: but an exception was that four minelayers near Singapore were effectively attacked by awful Blenheims and Vildebeestes - and one was creamed by 2 torpedo and 2 bomb hits.
The story was very different at Midway - the whole war in this area is taking the opposite tak it has on most of the map - and two air strikes were very effective - scoring many bomb and torpedo hits on transports - even with the oldest and worst models of aircraft USN will ever use in this war. The only thing useful to be learned is that the Japanese 3 inch 60 should have been mass produced - a 1938 design - it served on only one ship and one battery ashore. It was a companion to the 100 mm gun - and used the same advanced fire control system - but was light enough to mount almost anywhere. Keeping the older 3 inch guns in production instead of this one (IRL) was a poor choice.
A tiny Japanese carrier group - I call it San Butai (literally "three force") - successfully engaged merchant shipping in the Visaya's - about four attacks. The Kiddo Butai and the Ni Butai - near Hawaii - were far more so - engaging about a dozen ships successfully in many attacks.
The only problem is - there are too many targets - and we probably are not hitting the important ones: the day ends with ALL the Pacific Fleet heavy units which began still in service - but we are low on ammunition on warships and planes.
A surprisingly strong force of 39 B-10s hit Sinkawang - unescorted - and this was not a good thing - since a squadron of Zeros was up there - and two B-10s were lost for no Zeros. Also surprising was a Betty raid out of Saigon - at Puerto Princessa (Palewan, Visaya's, Philippines) - vs 3 PG - hitting two of them. These are unusual Army Bettys - called Ki-50s in EOS - armed with 100 kg bombs rather than naval weapons. [I am generally pleased that many attacks by Kates and Nells and Betty's are happeing without torpedoes. RHS used a unit system - and I do not change the default load of the unit - and this is working well. This was an attempt to address the problem of too many torpedo attacks. In general, only certain units actually trained for torpedo attacks get to use them - and even they will not if the airfield level is to low - or if the target is at extended range. By reducing initial airfield levels we also helped to reduce the "too many torpedo attack" problem]
The replay began with continuing initial landings at 9 points: Tarawa, Lae, Cagayan, Rabaul, Kavieng, San Fernando, Guam, Hollandia, Naga and Xuwin. Opposition was significant only at Lae, Rabaul and Xuwin - and none of that was major: this is deliberate: like the real Japanese I prefer to land unopposed rather than in the teeth of major coast defenses, consolodate, and then attack off the beach - if possible where there is no defense at all. These landings were mostly very successful: Guam fell to the first assault for the first time in any game, which likely is due to a good die roll since the force committed was not large; only at San Fernando was the position not taken by assault. Here the tiny battalion defending was reinforced by half a dozen other units of the Philippine Army - and they retained control of the hex for the first time I have ever seen - even when I try such a force it has failed. Nevertheless, we have a gigantic motorized division - the 48th - reinforced by the unusual 65th brigade (it is triangular with three two battalion regiments and is larger than most brigades - and was surprisingly effective IRL. This is a gigantic landing force and is likely to take the position - particularly if supported. Several additional landing sites were not assaulted - not being atols - without landings on this turn: notably Kona (on the Big Island), Lanai (a little island) and at Lahaina (Mauai) Roads - where I had ordered landing ships to leave the immediate area: the forces ashore were uniformly successful - although only at Lahaina was there opposition (we added defenses to Molokai, Mauai, Kauai and Hilo (on the Big Island) which were not present in stock or CHS so there is no free ride at these locations (that is, a sub landing party can take the place if nothing starts there). Surprisingly - he did not reinforce - which was permitted - and which might have mattered. [Running into a Regiment or more at Lahaina might have been decisive - and running into one at Lanai or Kona certainly would have saved the position]
He was lucky on the submarine side - this file set still has the old too effective ASW weapons so we are not testing those. I-23 missed its target. I-5 never saw its enemies, but got hit by them.
He was daring, brilliant and lucky at Midway Island - the greatest of only two Allied victories this day: a tiny surface action group (2 CA and 2 DD) - no doubt detached from a carrier TF - made a surface raid into the hex. Our recon (out of Marcus Island and Enewetok - and submarine air search) failed to disclose the carrier group during the approach - but he probably detected the invasion group with PBYs. He knew the objective - there is nothing else nearby - so it was a good guess to hit it with a surface action group. It was risky to deprive the carrier of her heavy escort - but it was a good move - and so we have a very long battle in which a large transport force - with a whole division embarked - is engaged by this tiny SAG. [It is not really the assault force for Midway - it is the second wave for Oahu - given this preliminary job en route].
Japan had a flotilla of escorts - led by an ancient CL - on principle. These bore the brunt of the fighting - but were not combat effective vs heavy cruisers - and they were all lost or so badly damaged they will be lost - and many transports were damaged - again fatally so far from any friendly base or support. There is grave doubt any of this force will survive - although it is so large it is probable something will - and it shows a major problem the Japanese planners have: how to cover forces over an approach front more than two thousand miles long. There are options - shorten the area contested - use thin covering - or take chances. This distant wing adopted the latter choice - security was in the form of "stay out of the way of anything big" - and when that something was not detected - the wing was in trouble. It is an accident of history the carriers were forward delivering planes - and "probing" for enemy ships - and I could not play as if I knew that. Nor do most players dare send the carriers in alone - but Historiker knew from the scenario that I must be in the lower islands - and he dared to try. It paid off - big time - with more cost in one day than I usually pay in six months. It is PQ-17 time (the only Allied convoy to be ordered to scatter in the face of enemy attrition attacks). This is how I fight - so I can hardly complain if he does it: carriers vs non-carriers is not a big risk.
More surprising for me was a series of four battles fought in the waters SW of Lahaina - where all the Japanese forward forces except KB were concentrated. I did not expect ANY battle this night - but a pair of probing cruiser destroyer groups did encounter the main body which was acting as a covering force. What might have happened had they run into ANY other group I shudder to think: the tanker group, the Lahaina invasion group, the Lahaina follow up Group and the Kona group might have been decimated (as happened at Midway). But the main body took on all comers somethign like the actions near Leyte Gulf IRL - and sank all or most of the attackers in long surface engagements - which except for the first two involved horrible Allied gunnery that failed to score at all. These two were still unequal exchanges and the main operational consequences are: (1) we must have poor ammunition states on the main body; (2) 1 battleship and 2 other warships are withdrawing to Johnston Island to deal with single digit damage issues (we don't like to have high damage thousands of miles from a Level 3 port - and we did not yet control any port in the Islands when the day's orders were issued. I really don't like this sort of thing: I am used to winning with Japanese warships early in WWII - but you never win big enough (Hara estimiates Japan must sink 6 for one to break even).
These actions were followed by 3 more sub actions - only one a success for either side - AK Bantam took 4 hits (2 torpedoes) - and sank later from these - near Singapore. Two Japanese forces bombarded Cagayan and Wuhan, and more landing operations continued at some of the above listed points - to which add an unplanned landing at Brunei (we changed to plan when a sub showed up at Miri) - and as expected there was some CD effort there - but only 1 hit was scored on an AK. Two more sub attacks - by Ro-30 and Ro-41 - failed to hit their targets.
The junks at Wenchow stayed in port - so we hit them with Ki-48s out of Shanghai - scoring twice. A stronger air attack at Changshi in South China revealed a dozen P-43s - not ROC P-43s but US ones (apparently given to ROC on the first day of the war). These did well vs Nates - and one Nate and 2 bombers were lost - for moderate damage to the field. [Normally I would think the RHS general house rule should apply - the rule is "if real commanders would not do it you don't do it" - BUT the PLAYER decides what is done WITHOUT consulting the opposite player.
As long as he rationalized some basis for this - it is allowed. RHS replaces a long list of house rules with a shorter list - these mostly being required by peculiar RHS features like shipping tracks - and this general case: I am not yet sure Historiker understands that a general rule is not the same as NO rule at all - but time will tell. It does not matter too much: those P-43s went to USAAF during this period of time - and they are no longer available to USAAF in this game.]
Air strikes by Japanese forces were generally unopposed - even where planes were present yesterday - e.g. at Kota Bahru, Georgetown and Clark - so we took losses to AA to damage undefended airfields at several diverse points. But we WERE opposed at Singapore - and there we lost 5 bombers in exchange for 3 fighters - and did only moderate damage. The Buffalo's morale must be high - and they are not yet exhausted. We have shut down only Clark AAF - and it was wholly undefended - and hitting it again was probably a mistake (even if it was in the plan). As per usual for this early period, Japanese attacks on land units were generally moderately damaging, and Allied air attacks on Japanese ships generally missed: but an exception was that four minelayers near Singapore were effectively attacked by awful Blenheims and Vildebeestes - and one was creamed by 2 torpedo and 2 bomb hits.
The story was very different at Midway - the whole war in this area is taking the opposite tak it has on most of the map - and two air strikes were very effective - scoring many bomb and torpedo hits on transports - even with the oldest and worst models of aircraft USN will ever use in this war. The only thing useful to be learned is that the Japanese 3 inch 60 should have been mass produced - a 1938 design - it served on only one ship and one battery ashore. It was a companion to the 100 mm gun - and used the same advanced fire control system - but was light enough to mount almost anywhere. Keeping the older 3 inch guns in production instead of this one (IRL) was a poor choice.
A tiny Japanese carrier group - I call it San Butai (literally "three force") - successfully engaged merchant shipping in the Visaya's - about four attacks. The Kiddo Butai and the Ni Butai - near Hawaii - were far more so - engaging about a dozen ships successfully in many attacks.
The only problem is - there are too many targets - and we probably are not hitting the important ones: the day ends with ALL the Pacific Fleet heavy units which began still in service - but we are low on ammunition on warships and planes.
A surprisingly strong force of 39 B-10s hit Sinkawang - unescorted - and this was not a good thing - since a squadron of Zeros was up there - and two B-10s were lost for no Zeros. Also surprising was a Betty raid out of Saigon - at Puerto Princessa (Palewan, Visaya's, Philippines) - vs 3 PG - hitting two of them. These are unusual Army Bettys - called Ki-50s in EOS - armed with 100 kg bombs rather than naval weapons. [I am generally pleased that many attacks by Kates and Nells and Betty's are happeing without torpedoes. RHS used a unit system - and I do not change the default load of the unit - and this is working well. This was an attempt to address the problem of too many torpedo attacks. In general, only certain units actually trained for torpedo attacks get to use them - and even they will not if the airfield level is to low - or if the target is at extended range. By reducing initial airfield levels we also helped to reduce the "too many torpedo attack" problem]
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
ORIGINAL: el cid again
The second day began with the longest replay I have ever seen - by far - running possibly over an hour in duration - and involving so many battles it is like an entire campaign in one step. It revealed Historiker to be a very aggressive player - and he may be on to something: the Japanese need to fight a classical war of great battles and cannot win a war of attrition: In particular Japan has fragile operational assets that cannot be lost - or even risked - if they are to stay in the game. The Allies can lose every ship - and they will end up stronger than they began anyway.
The replay began with continuing initial landings at 9 points: Tarawa, Lae, Cagayan, Rabaul, Kavieng, San Fernando, Guam, Hollandia, Naga and Xuwin. Opposition was significant only at Lae, Rabaul and Xuwin - and none of that was major: this is deliberate: like the real Japanese I prefer to land unopposed rather than in the teeth of major coast defenses, consolodate, and then attack off the beach - if possible where there is no defense at all. These landings were mostly very successful: Guam fell to the first assault for the first time in any game, which likely is due to a good die roll since the force committed was not large; only at San Fernando was the position not taken by assault. Here the tiny battalion defending was reinforced by half a dozen other units of the Philippine Army - and they retained control of the hex for the first time I have ever seen - even when I try such a force it has failed. Nevertheless, we have a gigantic motorized division - the 48th - reinforced by the unusual 65th brigade (it is triangular with three two battalion regiments and is larger than most brigades - and was surprisingly effective IRL. This is a gigantic landing force and is likely to take the position - particularly if supported. Several additional landing sites were not assaulted - not being atols - without landings on this turn: notably Kona (on the Big Island), Lanai (a little island) and at Lahaina (Mauai) Roads - where I had ordered landing ships to leave the immediate area: the forces ashore were uniformly successful - although only at Lahaina was there opposition (we added defenses to Molokai, Mauai, Kauai and Hilo (on the Big Island) which were not present in stock or CHS so there is no free ride at these locations (that is, a sub landing party can take the place if nothing starts there). Surprisingly - he did not reinforce - which was permitted - and which might have mattered. [Running into a Regiment or more at Lahaina might have been decisive - and running into one at Lanai or Kona certainly would have saved the position]
He was lucky on the submarine side - this file set still has the old too effective ASW weapons so we are not testing those. I-23 missed its target. I-5 never saw its enemies, but got hit by them.
He was daring, brilliant and lucky at Midway Island - the greatest of only two Allied victories this day: a tiny surface action group (2 CA and 2 DD) - no doubt detached from a carrier TF - made a surface raid into the hex. Our recon (out of Marcus Island and Enewetok - and submarine air search) failed to disclose the carrier group during the approach - but he probably detected the invasion group with PBYs. He knew the objective - there is nothing else nearby - so it was a good guess to hit it with a surface action group. It was risky to deprive the carrier of her heavy escort - but it was a good move - and so we have a very long battle in which a large transport force - with a whole division embarked - is engaged by this tiny SAG. [It is not really the assault force for Midway - it is the second wave for Oahu - given this preliminary job en route].
Japan had a flotilla of escorts - led by an ancient CL - on principle. These bore the brunt of the fighting - but were not combat effective vs heavy cruisers - and they were all lost or so badly damaged they will be lost - and many transports were damaged - again fatally so far from any friendly base or support. There is grave doubt any of this force will survive - although it is so large it is probable something will - and it shows a major problem the Japanese planners have: how to cover forces over an approach front more than two thousand miles long. There are options - shorten the area contested - use thin covering - or take chances. This distant wing adopted the latter choice - security was in the form of "stay out of the way of anything big" - and when that something was not detected - the wing was in trouble. It is an accident of history the carriers were forward delivering planes - and "probing" for enemy ships - and I could not play as if I knew that. Nor do most players dare send the carriers in alone - but Historiker knew from the scenario that I must be in the lower islands - and he dared to try. It paid off - big time - with more cost in one day than I usually pay in six months. It is PQ-17 time (the only Allied convoy to be ordered to scatter in the face of enemy attrition attacks). This is how I fight - so I can hardly complain if he does it: carriers vs non-carriers is not a big risk.
More surprising for me was a series of four battles fought in the waters SW of Lahaina - where all the Japanese forward forces except KB were concentrated. I did not expect ANY battle this night - but a pair of probing cruiser destroyer groups did encounter the main body which was acting as a covering force. What might have happened had they run into ANY other group I shudder to think: the tanker group, the Lahaina invasion group, the Lahaina follow up Group and the Kona group might have been decimated (as happened at Midway). But the main body took on all comers somethign like the actions near Leyte Gulf IRL - and sank all or most of the attackers in long surface engagements - which except for the first two involved horrible Allied gunnery that failed to score at all. These two were still unequal exchanges and the main operational consequences are: (1) we must have poor ammunition states on the main body; (2) 1 battleship and 2 other warships are withdrawing to Johnston Island to deal with single digit damage issues (we don't like to have high damage thousands of miles from a Level 3 port - and we did not yet control any port in the Islands when the day's orders were issued. I really don't like this sort of thing: I am used to winning with Japanese warships early in WWII - but you never win big enough (Hara estimiates Japan must sink 6 for one to break even).
These actions were followed by 3 more sub actions - only one a success for either side - AK Bantam took 4 hits (2 torpedoes) - and sank later from these - near Singapore. Two Japanese forces bombarded Cagayan and Wuhan, and more landing operations continued at some of the above listed points - to which add an unplanned landing at Brunei (we changed to plan when a sub showed up at Miri) - and as expected there was some CD effort there - but only 1 hit was scored on an AK. Two more sub attacks - by Ro-30 and Ro-41 - failed to hit their targets.
The junks at Wenchow stayed in port - so we hit them with Ki-48s out of Shanghai - scoring twice. A stronger air attack at Changshi in South China revealed a dozen P-43s - not ROC P-43s but US ones (apparently given to ROC on the first day of the war). These did well vs Nates - and one Nate and 2 bombers were lost - for moderate damage to the field. [Normally I would think the RHS general house rule should apply - the rule is "if real commanders would not do it you don't do it" - BUT the PLAYER decides what is done WITHOUT consulting the opposite player.
As long as he rationalized some basis for this - it is allowed. RHS replaces a long list of house rules with a shorter list - these mostly being required by peculiar RHS features like shipping tracks - and this general case: I am not yet sure Historiker understands that a general rule is not the same as NO rule at all - but time will tell. It does not matter too much: those P-43s went to USAAF during this period of time - and they are no longer available to USAAF in this game.]
Air strikes by Japanese forces were generally unopposed - even where planes were present yesterday - e.g. at Kota Bahru, Georgetown and Clark - so we took losses to AA to damage undefended airfields at several diverse points. But we WERE opposed at Singapore - and there we lost 5 bombers in exchange for 3 fighters - and did only moderate damage. The Buffalo's morale must be high - and they are not yet exhausted. We have shut down only Clark AAF - and it was wholly undefended - and hitting it again was probably a mistake (even if it was in the plan). As per usual for this early period, Japanese attacks on land units were generally moderately damaging, and Allied air attacks on Japanese ships generally missed: but an exception was that four minelayers near Singapore were effectively attacked by awful Blenheims and Vildebeestes - and one was creamed by 2 torpedo and 2 bomb hits.
The story was very different at Midway - the whole war in this area is taking the opposite tak it has on most of the map - and two air strikes were very effective - scoring many bomb and torpedo hits on transports - even with the oldest and worst models of aircraft USN will ever use in this war. The only thing useful to be learned is that the Japanese 3 inch 60 should have been mass produced - a 1938 design - it served on only one ship and one battery ashore. It was a companion to the 100 mm gun - and used the same advanced fire control system - but was light enough to mount almost anywhere. Keeping the older 3 inch guns in production instead of this one (IRL) was a poor choice.
A tiny Japanese carrier group - I call it San Butai (literally "three force") - successfully engaged merchant shipping in the Visaya's - about four attacks. The Kiddo Butai and the Ni Butai - near Hawaii - were far more so - engaging about a dozen ships successfully in many attacks.
The only problem is - there are too many targets - and we probably are not hitting the important ones: the day ends with ALL the Pacific Fleet heavy units which began still in service - but we are low on ammunition on warships and planes.
A surprisingly strong force of 39 B-10s hit Sinkawang - unescorted - and this was not a good thing - since a squadron of Zeros was up there - and two B-10s were lost for no Zeros. Also surprising was a Betty raid out of Saigon - at Puerto Princessa (Palewan, Visaya's, Philippines) - vs 3 PG - hitting two of them. These are unusual Army Bettys - called Ki-50s in EOS - armed with 100 kg bombs rather than naval weapons. [I am generally pleased that many attacks by Kates and Nells and Betty's are happeing without torpedoes. RHS used a unit system - and I do not change the default load of the unit - and this is working well. This was an attempt to address the problem of too many torpedo attacks. In general, only certain units actually trained for torpedo attacks get to use them - and even they will not if the airfield level is to low - or if the target is at extended range. By reducing initial airfield levels we also helped to reduce the "too many torpedo attack" problem]
A Dutch sub - at Singora - failed to find a target - but was hit by a Japanese escort group (once). A combined US/Philippine Army PT boat attack at Linguyan failed utterly - two units were lost and they were surprised and generally unable to shoot.
The second Allied victory of the day was by a lone CA - ancient USS Pensacola - at Tarawa. Opposed only by two DD, she sank both, and their 5 inch shells were not effective against her. She did badly maul an old AV as well - but was unable to achieve an operational victory: the landing force was ashore and took its objective. Still - the force must scatter - and if she presses forward she may get one of them. This ship is in effective range of Betty's out of Maleolap - so she would be wise to retire now her presence is known. It was an interesting move - but once again I am hard pressed to believe a ship would abandon her mission to conduct such an attack. [Pensacola is esocrting a convoy now without an escort.] This is not how the navy trains escort commanders. But if HE does not think the general RHS house rule prevents it - it is allowed. The "police" is what you think - yourself- and not every person will make the same choices.
A third surface victory occurred near Lae when ancient Adelaide took on two transports and their PC escorts - but this is exactly what the Adelade was in those waters to do - and it is perfectly right she did it so well. A fourth minor victory occurred when a PG ran into a tiny minelayer in the South China Sea. Tsubame was sunk by six hits from Moth - two of which caused mine explosions.
Xuwin fell (unexpectedly) to the first assault. Cagayan did as well, but not a surprise there. So did Lae - it does not always go and depends on the die roll. The big surprises were already noted above - Guam fell but San Fernando did not. A minor surprise was that Kavieng fell unopposed - and again I question why? The tiny Special Forces unit there was there to OPPOSE a landing - for legal/political reasons (if you do not defend a territory, it is not your territory legally).
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
Second day concluding notes:
1) The AVD and recon flying boats (Dorniers) at Surong remained in place - and were lost to 3rd Airborne SNLFs attack. This in spite of defense by elements of a Philippine Division. Once again - it is hard to understand how one might rationalize moving such troops out of the Philippines? Regardless - they seem not to have been up to stoping even a company assault. The only problem with this op is that Airborne won't load on an AP - so we either have to send in another kind of ship - or fly them out.
2) The Japanese Army commander at Midway - himself doomed to die - as senior officer present afloat - ordered all damaged ships to run ashore on the island - while all undamaged ships will attempt to escape. The sheer number of troops and ships involved may make it interesting. Otherwise we transferred in a Squadron of Mavis to help track the enemy TF - sending it to Marcus Island - and ordered air ground support to Wake. If need be we will send Bettys up here.
3) For the moment the Betty's are focused on the CA near Tarawa - joined by Ki-49s intended to move to Hawaii - if we ever get airfields for them. This convoy also scattered - but this one is empty - and its mission already is achieved. The question here is can we sink that CA? If she moves North - probably yes. If not - very hard to say.
4) The San Butai (3rd Force) of CVEs off the Visaya's - and almost every other TF in the area - will concentrate on Legaspi. The San Butai (2nd Force) of CVLs - SW of Hawaii's big island - will cover the retreat of half the tanker TF back to Johnston Island - in case some cruiser destroyer force gets uppity before that becomes a good air base. It is repairing up - but isn't yet good enough for bomber use - and if services are mostly restored - the runway didn't repair at all for some reason.
5) We have severe problems with the main invasion forces. The Main Body battleships - now minus one of their number - are entirely without heavy ammunition - and there are about six enemy battleships out there. The Kiddo Butai has problems with aircraft morale and is not fit for major offensive action vs ships or airfields either- although it is up to strong air defense. We have no supplies or fuel ashore - aside from dribblets captured - but three units are ashore on three different islands. The good news is he evacuated PH - all those TF are the ships running - and recon - extensive recon - reports only 3 ships in port. Similarly, only PH shows aircraft - and the count is so low it is likely all damaged machines. The strong enemy air base complex is rendered useless not by our action but by his. So it may be possible to move in and bring up our own bases now - in a sense it never will be again. The trick is to organize things properly, which in this case means concentration of force. In a day or two Johnston and Lahaina might be operational air bases - and that will tip the scales - since we are organized to bring land based air forward into them. If that works - we then will bring up the major ground units - slowly - with supplies, fuel and support elements like AA, engineers, and CD units - while the air forces try to take down Oahu. Only after that happens - if it does - will we try to invade it. But we will try to deny the enemy other bases in the area. If we fail - he will still need a lot of time and effort to take them back - during which he is not messing with us where we care about - in the WESTERN Pacific.
1) The AVD and recon flying boats (Dorniers) at Surong remained in place - and were lost to 3rd Airborne SNLFs attack. This in spite of defense by elements of a Philippine Division. Once again - it is hard to understand how one might rationalize moving such troops out of the Philippines? Regardless - they seem not to have been up to stoping even a company assault. The only problem with this op is that Airborne won't load on an AP - so we either have to send in another kind of ship - or fly them out.
2) The Japanese Army commander at Midway - himself doomed to die - as senior officer present afloat - ordered all damaged ships to run ashore on the island - while all undamaged ships will attempt to escape. The sheer number of troops and ships involved may make it interesting. Otherwise we transferred in a Squadron of Mavis to help track the enemy TF - sending it to Marcus Island - and ordered air ground support to Wake. If need be we will send Bettys up here.
3) For the moment the Betty's are focused on the CA near Tarawa - joined by Ki-49s intended to move to Hawaii - if we ever get airfields for them. This convoy also scattered - but this one is empty - and its mission already is achieved. The question here is can we sink that CA? If she moves North - probably yes. If not - very hard to say.
4) The San Butai (3rd Force) of CVEs off the Visaya's - and almost every other TF in the area - will concentrate on Legaspi. The San Butai (2nd Force) of CVLs - SW of Hawaii's big island - will cover the retreat of half the tanker TF back to Johnston Island - in case some cruiser destroyer force gets uppity before that becomes a good air base. It is repairing up - but isn't yet good enough for bomber use - and if services are mostly restored - the runway didn't repair at all for some reason.
5) We have severe problems with the main invasion forces. The Main Body battleships - now minus one of their number - are entirely without heavy ammunition - and there are about six enemy battleships out there. The Kiddo Butai has problems with aircraft morale and is not fit for major offensive action vs ships or airfields either- although it is up to strong air defense. We have no supplies or fuel ashore - aside from dribblets captured - but three units are ashore on three different islands. The good news is he evacuated PH - all those TF are the ships running - and recon - extensive recon - reports only 3 ships in port. Similarly, only PH shows aircraft - and the count is so low it is likely all damaged machines. The strong enemy air base complex is rendered useless not by our action but by his. So it may be possible to move in and bring up our own bases now - in a sense it never will be again. The trick is to organize things properly, which in this case means concentration of force. In a day or two Johnston and Lahaina might be operational air bases - and that will tip the scales - since we are organized to bring land based air forward into them. If that works - we then will bring up the major ground units - slowly - with supplies, fuel and support elements like AA, engineers, and CD units - while the air forces try to take down Oahu. Only after that happens - if it does - will we try to invade it. But we will try to deny the enemy other bases in the area. If we fail - he will still need a lot of time and effort to take them back - during which he is not messing with us where we care about - in the WESTERN Pacific.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
The turn began with river craft landing engineers at Kmpg Phet (Kampon Phet) Thailand. This not only to capture it but to build it into
a Level 3 port. If the port hexes in the Thai river system are Level 3 they will feed this place - and Raeing to the North - and make better flow of supply, fuel, resources and oil than even the RR can do (and this location is not on the rail net).
Another landing (by SNLF) occurred at Tacloban. Later we learned that the location was abandoned. This - the third most important location in the Philippines (after Manila and Cebu) was defended by the Philippine Army for cause - and it should not have been abandoned without a fight. Giving the enemy free ports, airfields, industry and resources is not efficient. It also developed NOTHING in the lower Luzon area was defended - and landings took everything from Legaspi to the hexes right beside Manila - Lucena and Mauban Bay. This also is unwise - giving many ports, airfields, resources and even a rail connection between them up in a single stroke. This combines with detecting Philippine troops in New Guinea to imply this is a "evacuate" strategy - and it is not something that makes political or military sense. In political terms, it is a legal requirement you defend a place you want to claim to own - if is it not worth defending it was not really your territory de jure. And in military terms you want to make em pay in terms of casualties and even more in terms of time. Delay em - every day of delay is production you deny to them - and weaken em - so they run out of steam before they get somewhere even more serious - Dheli - Melbourne - name it.
USS Trout and Ro-27 made unsuccessful sub attacks - showing that subs don't always hit their targets or the torpedoes don't always work.
In their first mission of the war, the first and only Ju-88 unit hit Rangoon - at night - doing 1 base and 2 runway hits (for 10 planes). This out of Bangkok.
Historiker uses cruisers and PGs as USN intended in the 1930s - and PG Moth raided San Fernando - probably hunting transports. She ran into a surface action group of four six gun Furutaka type CAs and eight destroyers - and was surprised and sunk without getting off a shot. The Japanese ships went on to bombard San Fernando.
AVD Childs went to Jolo for some reason - and ran into an inbound bombardment mission by battleships - but they didn't get to do anything - because the escorts torpedoed and sank her before they could bring the big guns to bear. The battleships went on to bombard Jolo - which has some threat potential as an airbase - since it has aviation support.
One of the many IJN minelayers on lone distant missions - Okinoshima - ran into a surface action group at Canton Island including USS Indianapolis and five destroyers - and was sunk.
USS Portland - from I have no idea where (detached from a carrier group???) - raided Wake Island. Half the original group was still there - ships without troops and half the escorts had already left just to evade a raid of this sort - and sank a DE and an AV - and badly damaged 1 of the remaining 4 transports. I scuttled her - the group had abandoned offloading operations and run to sea - and the other three ships still have support troops on them. Since two submarines are also here - they kept on course for Enewetok - and will return AFTER a few days of sub hunting with airplanes. This is the second AV we have lost - we lost one at Tarawa - although she (Kamoi) managed to make port and offload both her air units before I scuttled her today. Both raids were by lone CAs which immediately ran - and even Bettys supported by flying boats failed to detect the Tarawa raider today. But we see the Portland - I had Mavis at Wake - and we have a good track on her - headed to Midway.
USS Helena (CL) and USS Helm (DD) - survivors of the battles of the previous night - should have run for some port like PH - but either could not - or got cought en route in the Lanai hex - by the Japanese havy surface action group. Lack of ammunition didn't help much - and both were sunk outright - with just a few shots - they apparently were not in good condition.
USS Plunger and RO-28 both made failed submarine attacks - so once again we see not all sub attacks work - and for BOTH sides.
Ancient CA Izumo and Iwate - joined by Ioshima and Yasoshima - bombarded Wuchang/Wuhan in central China.
AMC Manoora and Kanambla separately bombarded Sinkawang - with surprising effect - even killing a Zero. They repeated this process during the day - again killing a Zero.
Many (about ten) TFs of one or two ships landed troops on Midway Island. The garrison occasionally responded with fire, still more occasionally hitting targets with 1 to 4 shots - but about a regiment got ashore. This was bombarded by the defenders before making an automatic shock attack - which failed to take the island but did reduce the fortification level. It appears that the Midway garrison may be in trouble - many more troops remain on these ships - and in due course the rest of the division - and a regiment of replacements - can be sent in. The problem here is the four ship SAG (2 CA and 2 DD - not badly hurt) remains - along with a submarine - and I won't send in undamaged transports to engage them. But the follow up convoy has a SAG of its own - and I formed it up to run in and drive them away. I landed the support aviation engineers at Marcus Island - and transferred 2 kate units from Saipan (one armed with bombs, the other with torpedoes) to hunt a ship that escaped from Guam (I think we sank the other ship at Guam). We will try to fly some aviation support to Wake out of here - so the seaplanes and flying boats hunting subs will function - and so we may be able to get bombers at Wake to hunt the CA raider up there. In due course bombers from Marcus and Wake can support operations at Midway. Midway was mined - but a damaged MSW unit cleared them (too easily) before sinking from flooding left over from the previous day's battles.
Because we feared surface and sub attacks at San Fernando - the TF there landed at Vigan today - encountering no opposition. This insures things get ashore and provides a retreat path if required for the units at San Fernando - which ran into unusual and unexpected opposition ashore yesterday - but we gave the orders to divert before we knew they were going to have trouble - on principle - seeing recon of both naval and land opposition there.
Ro-29, Ro-39, Ro-41 and I-23 made successfull attacks - and RO 41 also made two failed attacks and I-25 made one failed attack. I-23 - enroute to San Francisco tracking six different TFs in its hex - and detecting a score of others in nearby hexes - shows that most of the ships at Pearl Harbor are evacuating the area and she made a second successful attack on another of these TFs. This was confirmed by carrier recon and long range flying boat recon. I diverted a sub from the waters South of San Diego to try to intercept these many TFs before they reach port - and moved one from the Aleutians on a track to Seattle from which she might be able to divert to pick off any slow straggler TF.
Air strikes at Pakhoi and Changsha airfields - both revealed by recon to have aircraft - show these planes had all left. This si a pattern - many of our air raids are going in on empty airfields - even when recon showed planes there the previous day. We lose planes to AA when we do this - it is an interesting tactic.
32 Oscars encountered 54 fighters at Rangoon (a handful of Ki-21s came along to bomb the airfield). The air battle lasted forever. 1 Oscar, 1 Sally were lost for 1 Buffalo, 3 P-40Bs, 1 Catalina and 1 B-17 - the latter killed on the ground.
32 Zeros fought a similar long air action with 48 fighters at Singapore, but fared far better (in spite of having no bombers along to hit things on the ground): 16 enemy aircraft were shot down for a loss of 2 Zeros. In both cases, P-40s appeared far better than Buffalos.
A strong air attack on Olangapo/Bataan repeated the pattern - all enemy planes had fled - but we took some damage from AA. Only yesterday this seemed to be a used air base.
Half a dozen ground support attacks went in at points in China and Brunei - uniformly doing some damage.
16 Vincents made a wholly ineffective attack on the three retiring Minelayers off Malaya - in any case too late to prevent them from dropping their mineloads.
43 Zeros escorted 7 Vals from KB (at Lahaina) into Pearl Harbor. It was defended by 24 fighters of 3 types. Ten were shot down (for a loss of 3 Zeros) - and 4 of the 7 Vals delivered bombs onto already damaged USS Hull (DD) - the first of these Vals scoring with all three bombs aboard (1 x 250 kg and 2 x 60 kg). This was followed by 21 Zeros escorting 10 Vals vs USS Monaghan. 3 fighters were shot down (for a loss of 1 Zero) and 8 hits were scored on the destroyer. The Val may continue to earn its reputation as the greatest killer of ships of all time. The Zeros may achieve the needed air control over this area we failed to get with bombers.
A strong Allied air strike occurred at Hanyang/Wuhan in Central China - doing remarkably little damage - for no clear purpose. Six B-17s out of Rangoon hit Pisanoluke Thailand - scoring about 1 runway hit. Clearly from operations out of China yesterday and Rangoon today the B-17s fled the Philippines before conducting operations from there. This is not in my view realistic: the effort to put them there was protracted, expensive and believed to be (quoting Marshall) "the greatest assemblage of strategic air power in history". No way they would leave before being used at least once IMHO.
Ten (of 12) Nells out of truk hit Port Moresby - losing 1 for no effective damage scored.
40 Zeros and 1 Pete let 19 Vals and 1 E13 Jake seaplane on a bomber run over Pearl Harbor. Only 11 fighters of 3 types responded. 6 enemy planes were destroyed for a loss of no Zeros - 3 Vals were shot down - but scored no hits. They attacked runways - and since I did NOT order that - I have no idea why?
4 Jakes put a bomb into tanker British Lord at Brunei.
USS Pampano and USS Trout and I-23 made failed submarine attacks.
Ro-21 made a successful submarine attack.
Nanyo Detachment made its first attack on Rabaul, reducing fortification level to 1.
Japanese troops at an airbase in central China - Nanchang - a salient - invested by 5 ROC armies - made a failed attack - although the foces involved are remarkably even - AI rated it as 0:1. Even so- casualties were about equal on both sides. There has not been time for additional troops to arrive by rail. Strong air support was provided out of Shanghai. We don't like losing a position on the main E-W rail system - and we will abandon Wuhan if need be - to secure this entire line first.
A deliberate attack at Hong Kong achieved 1:1 odds and nominally reduced the fortification level - from 5 to 5? Unless it was going to go to 6 this seems not to have been much an achievement. But it does eat their supplies and morale and cause some casualties. They will go - sooner or later - and in my experience a lot sooner than history (Christmas day called "black Christmas" in Hong Kong).
Several attacks in China - mainly on guerilla units - attritted some and made some retreat. Regardless, this is necessary to clearing the LOC of the area.
An Allied bombardment attack at Midway revealed there are 6800 Japanese troops already ashore and 2800 defenders. Since the transports are docked, many more will get ashore - regardless of the fate of the transports. This is far better than seemed likely to occur yesterday - and so far the division commander - who assumed command of the TF after all naval vessels were lost - looks like he may not be doomed to die after all. His decision to run in the damaged ships seems correct. None were lost (yet) - but we scuttled one - and surely will lose others to the SAG and sub in the hex - if not to air from a carrier (which seems to have fled).
For reasons unclear to me a Japanese shock attack occurred at Brunei (it is not an atol nor across a river - so why?). It failed - but it was premature - and should have waited for more troops to land. The outcome of the battle is not in doubt. We didn't want to land here - but diverted from Miri due to many Allied TFs and subs there - and it seemed safer to go where they were not.
a Level 3 port. If the port hexes in the Thai river system are Level 3 they will feed this place - and Raeing to the North - and make better flow of supply, fuel, resources and oil than even the RR can do (and this location is not on the rail net).
Another landing (by SNLF) occurred at Tacloban. Later we learned that the location was abandoned. This - the third most important location in the Philippines (after Manila and Cebu) was defended by the Philippine Army for cause - and it should not have been abandoned without a fight. Giving the enemy free ports, airfields, industry and resources is not efficient. It also developed NOTHING in the lower Luzon area was defended - and landings took everything from Legaspi to the hexes right beside Manila - Lucena and Mauban Bay. This also is unwise - giving many ports, airfields, resources and even a rail connection between them up in a single stroke. This combines with detecting Philippine troops in New Guinea to imply this is a "evacuate" strategy - and it is not something that makes political or military sense. In political terms, it is a legal requirement you defend a place you want to claim to own - if is it not worth defending it was not really your territory de jure. And in military terms you want to make em pay in terms of casualties and even more in terms of time. Delay em - every day of delay is production you deny to them - and weaken em - so they run out of steam before they get somewhere even more serious - Dheli - Melbourne - name it.
USS Trout and Ro-27 made unsuccessful sub attacks - showing that subs don't always hit their targets or the torpedoes don't always work.
In their first mission of the war, the first and only Ju-88 unit hit Rangoon - at night - doing 1 base and 2 runway hits (for 10 planes). This out of Bangkok.
Historiker uses cruisers and PGs as USN intended in the 1930s - and PG Moth raided San Fernando - probably hunting transports. She ran into a surface action group of four six gun Furutaka type CAs and eight destroyers - and was surprised and sunk without getting off a shot. The Japanese ships went on to bombard San Fernando.
AVD Childs went to Jolo for some reason - and ran into an inbound bombardment mission by battleships - but they didn't get to do anything - because the escorts torpedoed and sank her before they could bring the big guns to bear. The battleships went on to bombard Jolo - which has some threat potential as an airbase - since it has aviation support.
One of the many IJN minelayers on lone distant missions - Okinoshima - ran into a surface action group at Canton Island including USS Indianapolis and five destroyers - and was sunk.
USS Portland - from I have no idea where (detached from a carrier group???) - raided Wake Island. Half the original group was still there - ships without troops and half the escorts had already left just to evade a raid of this sort - and sank a DE and an AV - and badly damaged 1 of the remaining 4 transports. I scuttled her - the group had abandoned offloading operations and run to sea - and the other three ships still have support troops on them. Since two submarines are also here - they kept on course for Enewetok - and will return AFTER a few days of sub hunting with airplanes. This is the second AV we have lost - we lost one at Tarawa - although she (Kamoi) managed to make port and offload both her air units before I scuttled her today. Both raids were by lone CAs which immediately ran - and even Bettys supported by flying boats failed to detect the Tarawa raider today. But we see the Portland - I had Mavis at Wake - and we have a good track on her - headed to Midway.
USS Helena (CL) and USS Helm (DD) - survivors of the battles of the previous night - should have run for some port like PH - but either could not - or got cought en route in the Lanai hex - by the Japanese havy surface action group. Lack of ammunition didn't help much - and both were sunk outright - with just a few shots - they apparently were not in good condition.
USS Plunger and RO-28 both made failed submarine attacks - so once again we see not all sub attacks work - and for BOTH sides.
Ancient CA Izumo and Iwate - joined by Ioshima and Yasoshima - bombarded Wuchang/Wuhan in central China.
AMC Manoora and Kanambla separately bombarded Sinkawang - with surprising effect - even killing a Zero. They repeated this process during the day - again killing a Zero.
Many (about ten) TFs of one or two ships landed troops on Midway Island. The garrison occasionally responded with fire, still more occasionally hitting targets with 1 to 4 shots - but about a regiment got ashore. This was bombarded by the defenders before making an automatic shock attack - which failed to take the island but did reduce the fortification level. It appears that the Midway garrison may be in trouble - many more troops remain on these ships - and in due course the rest of the division - and a regiment of replacements - can be sent in. The problem here is the four ship SAG (2 CA and 2 DD - not badly hurt) remains - along with a submarine - and I won't send in undamaged transports to engage them. But the follow up convoy has a SAG of its own - and I formed it up to run in and drive them away. I landed the support aviation engineers at Marcus Island - and transferred 2 kate units from Saipan (one armed with bombs, the other with torpedoes) to hunt a ship that escaped from Guam (I think we sank the other ship at Guam). We will try to fly some aviation support to Wake out of here - so the seaplanes and flying boats hunting subs will function - and so we may be able to get bombers at Wake to hunt the CA raider up there. In due course bombers from Marcus and Wake can support operations at Midway. Midway was mined - but a damaged MSW unit cleared them (too easily) before sinking from flooding left over from the previous day's battles.
Because we feared surface and sub attacks at San Fernando - the TF there landed at Vigan today - encountering no opposition. This insures things get ashore and provides a retreat path if required for the units at San Fernando - which ran into unusual and unexpected opposition ashore yesterday - but we gave the orders to divert before we knew they were going to have trouble - on principle - seeing recon of both naval and land opposition there.
Ro-29, Ro-39, Ro-41 and I-23 made successfull attacks - and RO 41 also made two failed attacks and I-25 made one failed attack. I-23 - enroute to San Francisco tracking six different TFs in its hex - and detecting a score of others in nearby hexes - shows that most of the ships at Pearl Harbor are evacuating the area and she made a second successful attack on another of these TFs. This was confirmed by carrier recon and long range flying boat recon. I diverted a sub from the waters South of San Diego to try to intercept these many TFs before they reach port - and moved one from the Aleutians on a track to Seattle from which she might be able to divert to pick off any slow straggler TF.
Air strikes at Pakhoi and Changsha airfields - both revealed by recon to have aircraft - show these planes had all left. This si a pattern - many of our air raids are going in on empty airfields - even when recon showed planes there the previous day. We lose planes to AA when we do this - it is an interesting tactic.
32 Oscars encountered 54 fighters at Rangoon (a handful of Ki-21s came along to bomb the airfield). The air battle lasted forever. 1 Oscar, 1 Sally were lost for 1 Buffalo, 3 P-40Bs, 1 Catalina and 1 B-17 - the latter killed on the ground.
32 Zeros fought a similar long air action with 48 fighters at Singapore, but fared far better (in spite of having no bombers along to hit things on the ground): 16 enemy aircraft were shot down for a loss of 2 Zeros. In both cases, P-40s appeared far better than Buffalos.
A strong air attack on Olangapo/Bataan repeated the pattern - all enemy planes had fled - but we took some damage from AA. Only yesterday this seemed to be a used air base.
Half a dozen ground support attacks went in at points in China and Brunei - uniformly doing some damage.
16 Vincents made a wholly ineffective attack on the three retiring Minelayers off Malaya - in any case too late to prevent them from dropping their mineloads.
43 Zeros escorted 7 Vals from KB (at Lahaina) into Pearl Harbor. It was defended by 24 fighters of 3 types. Ten were shot down (for a loss of 3 Zeros) - and 4 of the 7 Vals delivered bombs onto already damaged USS Hull (DD) - the first of these Vals scoring with all three bombs aboard (1 x 250 kg and 2 x 60 kg). This was followed by 21 Zeros escorting 10 Vals vs USS Monaghan. 3 fighters were shot down (for a loss of 1 Zero) and 8 hits were scored on the destroyer. The Val may continue to earn its reputation as the greatest killer of ships of all time. The Zeros may achieve the needed air control over this area we failed to get with bombers.
A strong Allied air strike occurred at Hanyang/Wuhan in Central China - doing remarkably little damage - for no clear purpose. Six B-17s out of Rangoon hit Pisanoluke Thailand - scoring about 1 runway hit. Clearly from operations out of China yesterday and Rangoon today the B-17s fled the Philippines before conducting operations from there. This is not in my view realistic: the effort to put them there was protracted, expensive and believed to be (quoting Marshall) "the greatest assemblage of strategic air power in history". No way they would leave before being used at least once IMHO.
Ten (of 12) Nells out of truk hit Port Moresby - losing 1 for no effective damage scored.
40 Zeros and 1 Pete let 19 Vals and 1 E13 Jake seaplane on a bomber run over Pearl Harbor. Only 11 fighters of 3 types responded. 6 enemy planes were destroyed for a loss of no Zeros - 3 Vals were shot down - but scored no hits. They attacked runways - and since I did NOT order that - I have no idea why?
4 Jakes put a bomb into tanker British Lord at Brunei.
USS Pampano and USS Trout and I-23 made failed submarine attacks.
Ro-21 made a successful submarine attack.
Nanyo Detachment made its first attack on Rabaul, reducing fortification level to 1.
Japanese troops at an airbase in central China - Nanchang - a salient - invested by 5 ROC armies - made a failed attack - although the foces involved are remarkably even - AI rated it as 0:1. Even so- casualties were about equal on both sides. There has not been time for additional troops to arrive by rail. Strong air support was provided out of Shanghai. We don't like losing a position on the main E-W rail system - and we will abandon Wuhan if need be - to secure this entire line first.
A deliberate attack at Hong Kong achieved 1:1 odds and nominally reduced the fortification level - from 5 to 5? Unless it was going to go to 6 this seems not to have been much an achievement. But it does eat their supplies and morale and cause some casualties. They will go - sooner or later - and in my experience a lot sooner than history (Christmas day called "black Christmas" in Hong Kong).
Several attacks in China - mainly on guerilla units - attritted some and made some retreat. Regardless, this is necessary to clearing the LOC of the area.
An Allied bombardment attack at Midway revealed there are 6800 Japanese troops already ashore and 2800 defenders. Since the transports are docked, many more will get ashore - regardless of the fate of the transports. This is far better than seemed likely to occur yesterday - and so far the division commander - who assumed command of the TF after all naval vessels were lost - looks like he may not be doomed to die after all. His decision to run in the damaged ships seems correct. None were lost (yet) - but we scuttled one - and surely will lose others to the SAG and sub in the hex - if not to air from a carrier (which seems to have fled).
For reasons unclear to me a Japanese shock attack occurred at Brunei (it is not an atol nor across a river - so why?). It failed - but it was premature - and should have waited for more troops to land. The outcome of the battle is not in doubt. We didn't want to land here - but diverted from Miri due to many Allied TFs and subs there - and it seemed safer to go where they were not.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
Upon detail examination of the map I find that I - 25 probably is in the same hex as the carrier group by Midway - probably even tried to hit it - twice. This group is SE of Midway just too far to do air strikes - possibly in retirement or movement to Join Enterprise - possibly hovering to see if there is a chance to go back and do more damage?
- DuckofTindalos
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
I would recommend taking some screen shots, Sid.
We are all dreams of the Giant Space Butterfly.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
Things are settling down in most respects - and it appears Historiker is an Axis rather than Allied strategic thinker. He loves raiders - but does not think bases need to be actively defended by fleets. It appears the US Pacific Fleet - in spite of moving to PH as a base - has abandoned it altogether. The initial savage fighting was just a rear guard covering action - and what USS California was doing NW of Oahu is a mystery to me? [She was sunk there]
He mined Vigan - where I diverted the Luzon landing force - but a single (pair) MSW unit swept them - one of the big flaws in Matrix naval game design in my view - mines are not half the threat they should be. We landed there. Later in the day attacks here and at San Fernando both went home - almost unopposed (one artillery unit remained at San Fernando - and retreated - losing all its guns). He WON the battle for San Fernando yesterday - and I FAILED to reinforce the position (to prevent losses at sea to subs or surface attacks) - but he ABANDONED the position anyway. I will lose a day or two consolodating the forces - ALL my units are to land/assemble at San Fernando - due to his strong defense on the first day - but there is no question of getting ashore now - and there WAS a question yesterday. This is a pattern - most places he seemed to be fighting - but went passive immediately after the first day - so the doubts I had about the viability of landings at places like Midway or Hawaii are now gone. He does not intend to fight for them.
Many individual ship TFs landed the remaining troops at Midway - those that didn't run all unloaded - but one TF of two ships was driven off by coastal guns - and later scuttled - although only after unloading all the troops. The code forced another shock attack - costing 766 men - but the Japanese force ashore is bigger than the defending base force - and is only in trouble due to a lack of supplies. The surface action group failed to attack anything - and the sub Trout attacked but missed (never mind torpedoes that don't detonate - they did not even hit). We will just sit there until other forces arrive. A SAG formed up from a transport group at Marcus yesterday - and we are forming a large invasion TF behind it - and the scattered TF is assembling on that force. Recon out of Wake and Marcus lost the raiding CAs - and I-25 stayed on station with the enemy carrier group - which seems anchored in the ocean SE of Midway. I think we will send a carrier force up there - we don't need carriers in the South - he is not challenging Johnston - nor even Lahaina - with anything bigger than PT boats. There were three actions at Lahaina vs 3 units (9 vessels) of PT boats - two were Japanese surprise - one was US surprise and hit a DD with a torpedo. Two of the PT boat units were sunk or badly damaged and the third is doomed to sink. One strong and one weak bomber raids hit Lahaina out of PH - and were more or less wiped out by fighters. Not one bomber of either raid pressed home to attack - the air victory not won on the first day is being run incrimentally - by fighters instead of by bombers.
A large number of Japanese subs attacked - almost all successfully - theater wide - the most successful day I ever saw (eight hits in the night phase alone, eight more in the day phase). His forces were caught running from Sumatra to the Eastern Pacific. His ASW failed - with the notable exception of Fanning Island - where they damaged a sub. Japanese ASW ships failed to score on a Dutch sub at Singora. I 165 was nominally hit at PM - but not damaged in fact.
Adelade - which had tormented transports headed to Lae for two days - ran in on Kavieng - ran into Tanaka - and was sunk for its trouble.
PG Tulsa made two attacks on two APs at Tacloban - mauling them in the second (daylight) action. PG Ashville repeated this at Ormoc. This is classic Historiker - and it is the thing US PGs were designed to do - be "mini cruisers" in OCEAN warfare.
An Allied minefield at Bako scored a hit on an AP.
An Allied B-17 raid on Saigon - targeted an engine factory! 3 planes got one hit.
30 Zeros escorted 21 Sallys into Singapore - encountering strong fighter opposition and wining a decisive air battle. 3 Zeros were lost for 16 enemy fighters - and 2 more aircraft were destroyed on the ground - along with 21 runway and several other hits. Dutch Buffalos seemed to fight better than British ones - but most units got discouraged and left the battle after 1 or 2 losses.
An Allied air attack on Sinkawang scored 1 hit - at a cost of one bomber - a strange air battle in which not much happened.
A Japanese raid by a dozen Nells killed one Anson at Port Moresby.
A strange air battle saw 46 Zeros (and a Pete) escort 7 Vals into PH - a long fight resulted in 3 P-40s being shot down - but then 4 Vals were lost to flak - and the other 3 failed to hit anything.
The ground attack at Rabaul failed to take the position - and it will be two days before another goes in - but we will send in troops by fast transport tonight and again tomorrow night - by which time the entire Nanyo Detachment will be there. We also rearmed Tanaka's force - and will do so again - for bombardment attacks - also over two days.
A ground attack at Canton failed - in spite of heavy air support - and in spite of 4 to 1 odds in fact - it was rated as 0 to 1 by code - and it makes no sense whatever - costing 1800 men. Units at Hong Kong are also not willing to move into Canton - which is nonsense vs an enemy entering from the opposite direction. I hate this ground model - but I will turn this around - it is just a matter of time. I wanted to suck his invaders into Hong Kong as a trap - but that may not be so easy.
The strange Hupei Militia Regiment took on 18000 troops - and fought them to a standstill - as usual for the first days of the war - in the open rice contry of Eastern China near Tsingtao. Other guerillas to their west fought almost as well - but took heavy casualties holdign their position (relative to their size and relative to the enemy casualties). Both are likely to surrender in a couple of days.
ROC army made a surprising and stupid attack near Shanghai - without air support, HQ support or a lot of supplies - several corps took on three times as many Japanese troops - and lost almost 3000 men. A more sensable attack at the Nanchang salient - almost even - cost only 50 men (for 9 Japanese casualties).
He mined Vigan - where I diverted the Luzon landing force - but a single (pair) MSW unit swept them - one of the big flaws in Matrix naval game design in my view - mines are not half the threat they should be. We landed there. Later in the day attacks here and at San Fernando both went home - almost unopposed (one artillery unit remained at San Fernando - and retreated - losing all its guns). He WON the battle for San Fernando yesterday - and I FAILED to reinforce the position (to prevent losses at sea to subs or surface attacks) - but he ABANDONED the position anyway. I will lose a day or two consolodating the forces - ALL my units are to land/assemble at San Fernando - due to his strong defense on the first day - but there is no question of getting ashore now - and there WAS a question yesterday. This is a pattern - most places he seemed to be fighting - but went passive immediately after the first day - so the doubts I had about the viability of landings at places like Midway or Hawaii are now gone. He does not intend to fight for them.
Many individual ship TFs landed the remaining troops at Midway - those that didn't run all unloaded - but one TF of two ships was driven off by coastal guns - and later scuttled - although only after unloading all the troops. The code forced another shock attack - costing 766 men - but the Japanese force ashore is bigger than the defending base force - and is only in trouble due to a lack of supplies. The surface action group failed to attack anything - and the sub Trout attacked but missed (never mind torpedoes that don't detonate - they did not even hit). We will just sit there until other forces arrive. A SAG formed up from a transport group at Marcus yesterday - and we are forming a large invasion TF behind it - and the scattered TF is assembling on that force. Recon out of Wake and Marcus lost the raiding CAs - and I-25 stayed on station with the enemy carrier group - which seems anchored in the ocean SE of Midway. I think we will send a carrier force up there - we don't need carriers in the South - he is not challenging Johnston - nor even Lahaina - with anything bigger than PT boats. There were three actions at Lahaina vs 3 units (9 vessels) of PT boats - two were Japanese surprise - one was US surprise and hit a DD with a torpedo. Two of the PT boat units were sunk or badly damaged and the third is doomed to sink. One strong and one weak bomber raids hit Lahaina out of PH - and were more or less wiped out by fighters. Not one bomber of either raid pressed home to attack - the air victory not won on the first day is being run incrimentally - by fighters instead of by bombers.
A large number of Japanese subs attacked - almost all successfully - theater wide - the most successful day I ever saw (eight hits in the night phase alone, eight more in the day phase). His forces were caught running from Sumatra to the Eastern Pacific. His ASW failed - with the notable exception of Fanning Island - where they damaged a sub. Japanese ASW ships failed to score on a Dutch sub at Singora. I 165 was nominally hit at PM - but not damaged in fact.
Adelade - which had tormented transports headed to Lae for two days - ran in on Kavieng - ran into Tanaka - and was sunk for its trouble.
PG Tulsa made two attacks on two APs at Tacloban - mauling them in the second (daylight) action. PG Ashville repeated this at Ormoc. This is classic Historiker - and it is the thing US PGs were designed to do - be "mini cruisers" in OCEAN warfare.
An Allied minefield at Bako scored a hit on an AP.
An Allied B-17 raid on Saigon - targeted an engine factory! 3 planes got one hit.
30 Zeros escorted 21 Sallys into Singapore - encountering strong fighter opposition and wining a decisive air battle. 3 Zeros were lost for 16 enemy fighters - and 2 more aircraft were destroyed on the ground - along with 21 runway and several other hits. Dutch Buffalos seemed to fight better than British ones - but most units got discouraged and left the battle after 1 or 2 losses.
An Allied air attack on Sinkawang scored 1 hit - at a cost of one bomber - a strange air battle in which not much happened.
A Japanese raid by a dozen Nells killed one Anson at Port Moresby.
A strange air battle saw 46 Zeros (and a Pete) escort 7 Vals into PH - a long fight resulted in 3 P-40s being shot down - but then 4 Vals were lost to flak - and the other 3 failed to hit anything.
The ground attack at Rabaul failed to take the position - and it will be two days before another goes in - but we will send in troops by fast transport tonight and again tomorrow night - by which time the entire Nanyo Detachment will be there. We also rearmed Tanaka's force - and will do so again - for bombardment attacks - also over two days.
A ground attack at Canton failed - in spite of heavy air support - and in spite of 4 to 1 odds in fact - it was rated as 0 to 1 by code - and it makes no sense whatever - costing 1800 men. Units at Hong Kong are also not willing to move into Canton - which is nonsense vs an enemy entering from the opposite direction. I hate this ground model - but I will turn this around - it is just a matter of time. I wanted to suck his invaders into Hong Kong as a trap - but that may not be so easy.
The strange Hupei Militia Regiment took on 18000 troops - and fought them to a standstill - as usual for the first days of the war - in the open rice contry of Eastern China near Tsingtao. Other guerillas to their west fought almost as well - but took heavy casualties holdign their position (relative to their size and relative to the enemy casualties). Both are likely to surrender in a couple of days.
ROC army made a surprising and stupid attack near Shanghai - without air support, HQ support or a lot of supplies - several corps took on three times as many Japanese troops - and lost almost 3000 men. A more sensable attack at the Nanchang salient - almost even - cost only 50 men (for 9 Japanese casualties).
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
ORIGINAL: Terminus
I would recommend taking some screen shots, Sid.
I do not know how to do that.
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
Having completed the next turn, I have some observations. Patterns are emerging - and Historiker is making a grave strategic error in assuming he knows where he must lose. Instead of making the enemy earn victory, he gives it to him by not defending - even where he is strong and likely (or even certainly) would win.
At Midway he achieved local strategic air and naval dominance - by a combination of land based recon (potentially also strike), carrier air, and a small surface action group. He destroyed EVERY naval vessel in the approaching force - having achieved operational surprise in spite of (inadequate) long range Mavis and submarine air recon. It was not clear that ANY ship would survive - nor that any combat worthy fragment of an entire Japanese division would survive. By not following up - he has allowed a strong task force ashore - an even stronger division fragment to escape altogether - and only six of the horribly damaged transports are now certain to be lost (3 scuttled and 3 still unloading supplies prior to scuttling - if they survive long enough to do that). An enemy surface action group still needs several days to reach the area - and only long range land air power is a threat at this time. I decided to send a small carrier force - in case his ships don't run - and to insure the safety of the follow on invasion force. The support units are being joined by about 60 per cent of the original division en route. More Japanese troops died in routine landing operations (the way code works, forcing a shock attack) than did on ships at sea - by two orders of magnitude - and very little of the division is destroyed (although about 40 per cent of it has lots of damaged squads and few working heavy weapons). It will rebuild nicely if supplies are provided.
At Tarawa - he forced a TF to disperse - but he failed to sink even one of the ships that dispersed - not even an AV too damaged to do anything but return to Tarawa and beach her planes before being abandoned. He could have killed two enemy air units and got twice the points for sinking the ship in battle (vs scuttling).
At Hawaii it was not clear that ANY of the invasions was viable - if the almost in tact Pacific Fleet contested them. Instead of contesting - he ran for the US West Coast (I think - something is running for that). By not following up while the enemy had no supplies, functional support or air power - he allows an enemy base complex to be established in the area that can be used to dominate it. By evacuating the aircraft he makes the cost of doing this far less than it might be. It may be we will establish Hawaii can be conquered - when not defended in force.
His use of raiders is inconsistent: At Wake and Tarawa and the two PG in the Visayas ran - saving them from enemy reaction. But Adelaide kept on - penetrating deep - sailing right into Kavieng just after four enemy task groups did - one of them a powerful SAG. This was fatal, and since Kavieng is the logical assembly point - should have been anticipated as likely.
In Russia he is setting his patrol planes to cross Japanese territory - needless at this stage - and then not being apologetic when cought. And he has five submarines one hex off Hokkaido. Russian subs MUST remain in port - or get special passage - because the code does not understand them very well - will have them attacked by enemy ASW - and they will attack enemy shipping - unless the Japanese player creates a specific momentary passage where these things cannot happen. Sending five subs with no notice right up against Hokkaido is very provocatory - and likely to lose the subs too.
At Midway he achieved local strategic air and naval dominance - by a combination of land based recon (potentially also strike), carrier air, and a small surface action group. He destroyed EVERY naval vessel in the approaching force - having achieved operational surprise in spite of (inadequate) long range Mavis and submarine air recon. It was not clear that ANY ship would survive - nor that any combat worthy fragment of an entire Japanese division would survive. By not following up - he has allowed a strong task force ashore - an even stronger division fragment to escape altogether - and only six of the horribly damaged transports are now certain to be lost (3 scuttled and 3 still unloading supplies prior to scuttling - if they survive long enough to do that). An enemy surface action group still needs several days to reach the area - and only long range land air power is a threat at this time. I decided to send a small carrier force - in case his ships don't run - and to insure the safety of the follow on invasion force. The support units are being joined by about 60 per cent of the original division en route. More Japanese troops died in routine landing operations (the way code works, forcing a shock attack) than did on ships at sea - by two orders of magnitude - and very little of the division is destroyed (although about 40 per cent of it has lots of damaged squads and few working heavy weapons). It will rebuild nicely if supplies are provided.
At Tarawa - he forced a TF to disperse - but he failed to sink even one of the ships that dispersed - not even an AV too damaged to do anything but return to Tarawa and beach her planes before being abandoned. He could have killed two enemy air units and got twice the points for sinking the ship in battle (vs scuttling).
At Hawaii it was not clear that ANY of the invasions was viable - if the almost in tact Pacific Fleet contested them. Instead of contesting - he ran for the US West Coast (I think - something is running for that). By not following up while the enemy had no supplies, functional support or air power - he allows an enemy base complex to be established in the area that can be used to dominate it. By evacuating the aircraft he makes the cost of doing this far less than it might be. It may be we will establish Hawaii can be conquered - when not defended in force.
His use of raiders is inconsistent: At Wake and Tarawa and the two PG in the Visayas ran - saving them from enemy reaction. But Adelaide kept on - penetrating deep - sailing right into Kavieng just after four enemy task groups did - one of them a powerful SAG. This was fatal, and since Kavieng is the logical assembly point - should have been anticipated as likely.
In Russia he is setting his patrol planes to cross Japanese territory - needless at this stage - and then not being apologetic when cought. And he has five submarines one hex off Hokkaido. Russian subs MUST remain in port - or get special passage - because the code does not understand them very well - will have them attacked by enemy ASW - and they will attack enemy shipping - unless the Japanese player creates a specific momentary passage where these things cannot happen. Sending five subs with no notice right up against Hokkaido is very provocatory - and likely to lose the subs too.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
11 December 1941
The day began with another series of IJN submarine attacks vs fleeing Allied ships. Eleven hits were scored on five targets.
The first JAAF raid in the Central Pacific occurred when 4 Ki-48s hit Pearl Harbor airfields at night. There were almost no supplies ashore - so few got off the ground - and the planned Ki-21 daylight raid didn't occur at all. But airfield surpression is no longer an issue: the enemy ran no air strikes out of virtually undamaged PH - and has no other active airfield in the area.
Next the raider in Historiker sent an AMC named Westralia to Biak Island - where it beat up Havana Maru - the only ship remaining from landings there (offloading supplies). The one hit is not serious - and the area is covered by naval air patrols and naval bombers - so she better not stay around.
The last of the Hawaii based PT units attacked Lahaina - achieved surprise and one MACHINE GUN hit on Tokitsukaze - in the surface action group covering the hex. In spite of this seemingly insignificant achievement - the three PT boat unit was sunk - Tokitsukaze is badly damaged - presumably from secondary explosions - and should go back to Japan for repairs of extensive system issues.
The day began with another series of IJN submarine attacks vs fleeing Allied ships. Eleven hits were scored on five targets.
The first JAAF raid in the Central Pacific occurred when 4 Ki-48s hit Pearl Harbor airfields at night. There were almost no supplies ashore - so few got off the ground - and the planned Ki-21 daylight raid didn't occur at all. But airfield surpression is no longer an issue: the enemy ran no air strikes out of virtually undamaged PH - and has no other active airfield in the area.
Next the raider in Historiker sent an AMC named Westralia to Biak Island - where it beat up Havana Maru - the only ship remaining from landings there (offloading supplies). The one hit is not serious - and the area is covered by naval air patrols and naval bombers - so she better not stay around.
The last of the Hawaii based PT units attacked Lahaina - achieved surprise and one MACHINE GUN hit on Tokitsukaze - in the surface action group covering the hex. In spite of this seemingly insignificant achievement - the three PT boat unit was sunk - Tokitsukaze is badly damaged - presumably from secondary explosions - and should go back to Japan for repairs of extensive system issues.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
[quote]ORIGINAL: el cid again
11 December 1941
The day began with another series of IJN submarine attacks vs fleeing Allied ships. Eleven hits were scored on five targets.
The first JAAF raid in the Central Pacific occurred when 4 Ki-48s hit Pearl Harbor airfields at night. There were almost no supplies ashore - so few got off the ground - and the planned Ki-21 daylight raid didn't occur at all. But airfield surpression is no longer an issue: the enemy ran no air strikes out of virtually undamaged PH - and has no other active airfield in the area.
Next the raider in Historiker sent an AMC named Westralia to Biak Island - where it beat up Havana Maru - the only ship remaining from landings there (offloading supplies). The one hit is not serious - and the area is covered by naval air patrols and naval bombers - so she better not stay around.
The last of the Hawaii based PT units attacked Lahaina - achieved surprise and one MACHINE GUN hit on Tokitsukaze - in the surface action group covering the hex. In spite of this seemingly insignificant achievement - the three PT boat unit was sunk - Tokitsukaze is badly damaged - presumably from secondary explosions - and should go back to Japan for repairs of extensive system issues.
Four cruisers bombarded the enemy units at Nanchang.
All the ASW escorts were put in one TF at Singora. These found KXVII and hit it 8 times - and it is no longer visible in the area.
Old USN S boat S-38 scored two hits on a transport at Legaspi. IJN I-156 failed to score at Ambon.
Elements of a brigade landed at Kampang Pfet on the Thai river system - and will attack tomorrow to permit engineers to start building up the port in this hex. When all the hexes in the string reach Level 3 supplies will flow better to Rhaeing - and KP itself will automatically be fed.
Landings occurred at Rabaul by transport TF and at Molokai by two fast transport TFs. There will be ground attacks at both tomorrow.
A long air battle occurred over Rangoon when 70 Ki-41s led in 17 Ki-21 (Sally) bombers. The entire main element of the AVG was present and flying - which is very unusual: its 40 P-40B were joined by 18 Buffalos. 6 Oscars were lost destroying 23 enemy fighters (20 of them AVG P-40s) - but the enemy was high in morale and actually penetrated the larger escort - to kill one of the Sallys. If this seems trivial - the fact they so upset the Sallys that only one hit (total) was scored by them may be more impressive. Another Sally was lost to AA fire. Still - the AVG is greatly degraded as a fighting force.
A very strange air battle occurred over Singapore - when 29 Zeros of the Yamata Detachment escorted 14 different (high morale) Sallys - encountering NO opposition. One Sally was lost to AA fire - and 9 hits were scored (all but 2 runway hits). This combines with a near total lack of enemy detections in Malaya - other than static units. Historiker seems to be running here - in Hawaii - and we also encountered Philippine Army troops at Sorong (New Guinea) - so probably also in the Philippines. This potential of backing up his aggressive raider and submarine warfare with air power has eluded him - and the principle of forcing the enemy to concentrate at defended points so that sort of warfare can have predictable target LOC - has also eluded him. These places may fall with extraordinary speed.
Five G3M2 hit Port Moresby and did virtually no damage - but managed to destroy two PBYs.
Ju-88s made their first strikes out of Sinkawang. A single 12 plane squadron attacked in 3 plane elements - two of them escorted by 3 Zeros. There were both AM and PM strikes - and four ships were hit by eight (50 kg) bombs.
The Kiddo Butai headed into the Eastern Pacific to chase wounded ships fleeing to San Francisco - aided by half a dozen submarines - most with aircraft to spot targets. It was close enough to send a ground attack strike at Molokai - 9 A6M2, 12 D3A2 and 1 recon plane. One Val was lost to AA and no damage was done to any target.
A Chinese guerilla unit in the area East of the Yellow River flood zone was forced to retreat with 75 casualties. Farther East the Hopei Militia Regiment stood up to another day of heavy attacks by air and a whole division - but this elite unit stood its ground (again). A general attack occurred at Hong Kong - supported by lots of air - and it reduced the fortification level there. I would prefer to leave for the moment - but cannot due to code restrictions. So we are sending in another division 100 per cent planned for (but not used at) HK - and the stream of other units and supplies into Canton began to arrive today. We also set up attacks on a unit that ran from its position near Hainan - and against Pakhoi - and sent recon to Nanning.
Rahaeng (Thailand) fell.
11 December 1941
The day began with another series of IJN submarine attacks vs fleeing Allied ships. Eleven hits were scored on five targets.
The first JAAF raid in the Central Pacific occurred when 4 Ki-48s hit Pearl Harbor airfields at night. There were almost no supplies ashore - so few got off the ground - and the planned Ki-21 daylight raid didn't occur at all. But airfield surpression is no longer an issue: the enemy ran no air strikes out of virtually undamaged PH - and has no other active airfield in the area.
Next the raider in Historiker sent an AMC named Westralia to Biak Island - where it beat up Havana Maru - the only ship remaining from landings there (offloading supplies). The one hit is not serious - and the area is covered by naval air patrols and naval bombers - so she better not stay around.
The last of the Hawaii based PT units attacked Lahaina - achieved surprise and one MACHINE GUN hit on Tokitsukaze - in the surface action group covering the hex. In spite of this seemingly insignificant achievement - the three PT boat unit was sunk - Tokitsukaze is badly damaged - presumably from secondary explosions - and should go back to Japan for repairs of extensive system issues.
Four cruisers bombarded the enemy units at Nanchang.
All the ASW escorts were put in one TF at Singora. These found KXVII and hit it 8 times - and it is no longer visible in the area.
Old USN S boat S-38 scored two hits on a transport at Legaspi. IJN I-156 failed to score at Ambon.
Elements of a brigade landed at Kampang Pfet on the Thai river system - and will attack tomorrow to permit engineers to start building up the port in this hex. When all the hexes in the string reach Level 3 supplies will flow better to Rhaeing - and KP itself will automatically be fed.
Landings occurred at Rabaul by transport TF and at Molokai by two fast transport TFs. There will be ground attacks at both tomorrow.
A long air battle occurred over Rangoon when 70 Ki-41s led in 17 Ki-21 (Sally) bombers. The entire main element of the AVG was present and flying - which is very unusual: its 40 P-40B were joined by 18 Buffalos. 6 Oscars were lost destroying 23 enemy fighters (20 of them AVG P-40s) - but the enemy was high in morale and actually penetrated the larger escort - to kill one of the Sallys. If this seems trivial - the fact they so upset the Sallys that only one hit (total) was scored by them may be more impressive. Another Sally was lost to AA fire. Still - the AVG is greatly degraded as a fighting force.
A very strange air battle occurred over Singapore - when 29 Zeros of the Yamata Detachment escorted 14 different (high morale) Sallys - encountering NO opposition. One Sally was lost to AA fire - and 9 hits were scored (all but 2 runway hits). This combines with a near total lack of enemy detections in Malaya - other than static units. Historiker seems to be running here - in Hawaii - and we also encountered Philippine Army troops at Sorong (New Guinea) - so probably also in the Philippines. This potential of backing up his aggressive raider and submarine warfare with air power has eluded him - and the principle of forcing the enemy to concentrate at defended points so that sort of warfare can have predictable target LOC - has also eluded him. These places may fall with extraordinary speed.
Five G3M2 hit Port Moresby and did virtually no damage - but managed to destroy two PBYs.
Ju-88s made their first strikes out of Sinkawang. A single 12 plane squadron attacked in 3 plane elements - two of them escorted by 3 Zeros. There were both AM and PM strikes - and four ships were hit by eight (50 kg) bombs.
The Kiddo Butai headed into the Eastern Pacific to chase wounded ships fleeing to San Francisco - aided by half a dozen submarines - most with aircraft to spot targets. It was close enough to send a ground attack strike at Molokai - 9 A6M2, 12 D3A2 and 1 recon plane. One Val was lost to AA and no damage was done to any target.
A Chinese guerilla unit in the area East of the Yellow River flood zone was forced to retreat with 75 casualties. Farther East the Hopei Militia Regiment stood up to another day of heavy attacks by air and a whole division - but this elite unit stood its ground (again). A general attack occurred at Hong Kong - supported by lots of air - and it reduced the fortification level there. I would prefer to leave for the moment - but cannot due to code restrictions. So we are sending in another division 100 per cent planned for (but not used at) HK - and the stream of other units and supplies into Canton began to arrive today. We also set up attacks on a unit that ran from its position near Hainan - and against Pakhoi - and sent recon to Nanning.
Rahaeng (Thailand) fell.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
12 December 1941
An LCM TF taking a new division to Hong Kong encountered mnefields - and then PT boats - and while these large units (dozens of LC are represented) failed to sink - all are now in repair at Canton - and in danger of sinking or burning out. Landing in Hong Kong before the defenses are reduced is a bad idea - even at night - even by numbers of landing craft. Which may be correct. Vast numbers of other units began to arrive at Canton - and the lead elements of a division went up the Pearl River to cut the LOC. The enemy units in Hong Kong are in the black - that is - starving - and we need to do that to those in Canton before we kill them. So we will kill Hong Kong first - meanwhile starving the others.
A large minesweeper TF at Bako swept Bako and Takao - but both minefields remain. These must have been laid by many submarines out of Manila.
5 Destroyers hit I-153 near Balikpapan followed by 10 more destroyers in a different TF - and damaged it enough to send it home for repairs.
Night air strikes out of Singapore and Palembang (apparently) aimed at Sinkawang caused no damage.
A night air strike out of Lahaina aimed at Pearl Harbor caused no damage, but one Ki-48 was lost. A complimentary Allied air strike also caused no damage to Lahaina.
Ships that had been landing at Miri diverted to Brunei - and one of them got hit landing elements of a brigade there. The effect of the sub at Miri was to greatly speed up the assault on Brunei - which normally would occur in a couple of weeks.
Ro-24 and Ro-45 conducted attacks on AKs - the former scored 2 hits - the latter missed. Another AK hit a sub laid mine at Taboali.
A medium sized air strike hit Changsha- killing 2 ROC planes that showed up on the wrong side loss list - because they are in the wrong side slot. [This will not be the case in future - O2Us were replaced by Lysanders to prevent it in the last patch] 1 Ki-48 was lost.
An air strike on a port at Hinzada Burma scored one hit on an AK.
22 Nells scored 4 hits total at Port Moresby - revealing a continuing lack of air power there.
17 Me-109s led 20 Ki-21s into Pearl Harbor. 8 Allied aircraft were destroyed in the air or on the ground for a loss of 3 Sallys. Enemy fighters appear to be exhausted and ineffective. A total of 32 hits were scored - which seems quite high.
6 P-40s let 2 SBDs in an anti naval strike at gigantic TFs near Lahaina. They met 11 Me-109s and 3 Pete seaplanes. 1 fighter and both bombers were lost.
Vincents out of China made three raids on Bako. The first scored one hit on an AK. The other two raids were all turned back by local fighter defenses.
PG Ashville - which tormented us yesterday - was cought by carrier air strikes near Samar - and hit four times.
The small force of Ju-88s (12) and Bettys (9) at Sinkawang made several small strikes against ships. The second raid scored 7 hits on 2 AKs. The fourth raid scored 4 hits on 2 AKs. The fifth raid scored another hit on yet another AK. About 15 TFs are fleeing from Singapore toward Batavia - this is a target rich environment.
The light carrier force sent to Midway found PG Ontario and scored 2 torpedo hits on her. The area is otherwise undefended - so langing forces are coming in at full speed.
The KB - East of Hawaii - found wounded Ward - sinking her with 4 hits (lots more were available but she sank too fast). It also found and sank AK Kuala with 2 hits (same story). Finally it found and sank tanker Neosho (a big ship worth lots of points) - she took 15 bombs and 6 torpedoes. These TFs were scattered - indicating the tight package of TFs has now run towars many points of the compass to evade persuit. We split the KB up to get as many as possible tomorrow.
Ro-48 put a torpedo in an AP. Ro-36 put two into an AVD and sank her. One was fleeing Singapore. The other fleeing the Philippines.
The elite Hopei Militia Regiment stood another division assault in the flatlands of Eastern China. Outnumbered 18 to 1, it killed 122 Japanese for a loss of 20. This unit is unusual - it is full size - and it has a good leader and high morale. But I am surprised how well it fights. Farther west a guerilla regiment was driven back into Chinese lines.
Chaiang Mai Tailand was occupied. So was Kompong Pfet.
Alor Star fell to the first assault - it was defended only by the supply sink (so much for supply sinks are a big problem). No enemy is in sight in Malaya - except at Singapore. Same on Luzon - 37 units are at Manila - few anywhere else. This is a basition defense. We need time just to take the undefended hexes.
The first assault of Molokai failed - but the loss rates indicate it may fall tomorrow. It is rated as mountains - and it is hard to take.
But it has no defense except 2 base forces.
An LCM TF taking a new division to Hong Kong encountered mnefields - and then PT boats - and while these large units (dozens of LC are represented) failed to sink - all are now in repair at Canton - and in danger of sinking or burning out. Landing in Hong Kong before the defenses are reduced is a bad idea - even at night - even by numbers of landing craft. Which may be correct. Vast numbers of other units began to arrive at Canton - and the lead elements of a division went up the Pearl River to cut the LOC. The enemy units in Hong Kong are in the black - that is - starving - and we need to do that to those in Canton before we kill them. So we will kill Hong Kong first - meanwhile starving the others.
A large minesweeper TF at Bako swept Bako and Takao - but both minefields remain. These must have been laid by many submarines out of Manila.
5 Destroyers hit I-153 near Balikpapan followed by 10 more destroyers in a different TF - and damaged it enough to send it home for repairs.
Night air strikes out of Singapore and Palembang (apparently) aimed at Sinkawang caused no damage.
A night air strike out of Lahaina aimed at Pearl Harbor caused no damage, but one Ki-48 was lost. A complimentary Allied air strike also caused no damage to Lahaina.
Ships that had been landing at Miri diverted to Brunei - and one of them got hit landing elements of a brigade there. The effect of the sub at Miri was to greatly speed up the assault on Brunei - which normally would occur in a couple of weeks.
Ro-24 and Ro-45 conducted attacks on AKs - the former scored 2 hits - the latter missed. Another AK hit a sub laid mine at Taboali.
A medium sized air strike hit Changsha- killing 2 ROC planes that showed up on the wrong side loss list - because they are in the wrong side slot. [This will not be the case in future - O2Us were replaced by Lysanders to prevent it in the last patch] 1 Ki-48 was lost.
An air strike on a port at Hinzada Burma scored one hit on an AK.
22 Nells scored 4 hits total at Port Moresby - revealing a continuing lack of air power there.
17 Me-109s led 20 Ki-21s into Pearl Harbor. 8 Allied aircraft were destroyed in the air or on the ground for a loss of 3 Sallys. Enemy fighters appear to be exhausted and ineffective. A total of 32 hits were scored - which seems quite high.
6 P-40s let 2 SBDs in an anti naval strike at gigantic TFs near Lahaina. They met 11 Me-109s and 3 Pete seaplanes. 1 fighter and both bombers were lost.
Vincents out of China made three raids on Bako. The first scored one hit on an AK. The other two raids were all turned back by local fighter defenses.
PG Ashville - which tormented us yesterday - was cought by carrier air strikes near Samar - and hit four times.
The small force of Ju-88s (12) and Bettys (9) at Sinkawang made several small strikes against ships. The second raid scored 7 hits on 2 AKs. The fourth raid scored 4 hits on 2 AKs. The fifth raid scored another hit on yet another AK. About 15 TFs are fleeing from Singapore toward Batavia - this is a target rich environment.
The light carrier force sent to Midway found PG Ontario and scored 2 torpedo hits on her. The area is otherwise undefended - so langing forces are coming in at full speed.
The KB - East of Hawaii - found wounded Ward - sinking her with 4 hits (lots more were available but she sank too fast). It also found and sank AK Kuala with 2 hits (same story). Finally it found and sank tanker Neosho (a big ship worth lots of points) - she took 15 bombs and 6 torpedoes. These TFs were scattered - indicating the tight package of TFs has now run towars many points of the compass to evade persuit. We split the KB up to get as many as possible tomorrow.
Ro-48 put a torpedo in an AP. Ro-36 put two into an AVD and sank her. One was fleeing Singapore. The other fleeing the Philippines.
The elite Hopei Militia Regiment stood another division assault in the flatlands of Eastern China. Outnumbered 18 to 1, it killed 122 Japanese for a loss of 20. This unit is unusual - it is full size - and it has a good leader and high morale. But I am surprised how well it fights. Farther west a guerilla regiment was driven back into Chinese lines.
Chaiang Mai Tailand was occupied. So was Kompong Pfet.
Alor Star fell to the first assault - it was defended only by the supply sink (so much for supply sinks are a big problem). No enemy is in sight in Malaya - except at Singapore. Same on Luzon - 37 units are at Manila - few anywhere else. This is a basition defense. We need time just to take the undefended hexes.
The first assault of Molokai failed - but the loss rates indicate it may fall tomorrow. It is rated as mountains - and it is hard to take.
But it has no defense except 2 base forces.
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el cid again
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RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
13 December 1941
Part of the landing force sent to Miri - which diverted to Brunei because of submarine oppoisition at Miri - landed over the beach - taking 24 casualties for 8 defensive shots. Supported by bombers out of Indochina, this demi-brigade took the base later in the turn. The net result is that we are way ahead of schedule - and took a lot fewer casuaties - than would have occurred if we did the "safe" thing - land at Miri and march overland (two weeks of malarial jungle marching).
Japanese submarines were unusually and almost uniformly unsuccessful with torpedoes. But Ro-44 and Ro-45 managed to put shells into AKs on two different attacks. Ro-43 did manage a torpedo hit on a PC unit which was probably hunting her.
Allied night bombing attacks on Sinkawang were uniformly unsuccessful. Japanese night bombing attacks on PH were uniformly unsuccessful.
Medium Japanese surface groups bombarded Canton and Rabaul, with effect. But at Rabaul the defenses put a shell into DD Nowaki.
A heavy bombardment of Molokai resulted in 2 hits on destroyers. A follow up ground attack took Rabaul - unusually early and easily - the more so because there was no air support available to speak of. But there also was no significant air opposition to the operation. The challenge in this area is similar to that in Malaya - and on Luzon: how best to exploit the almost complete lack of defense of land points combined with almost no air (and virtually no fighter) opposition? Invasion units for Shortlands have jumped off - backwards - support from Kavieng will arrive before the infantry from Truk. Air units moved forward to Rabaul and may be able to strike some sort of naval target near Fisnishafen - probably an AK. A follow up attack took Molokai (on the second assault) - in spite of being mountains. It could easily have been reinforced with infantry - but was not. This means Japan controls a base complex in the lower Hawaiian Islands - and it is now safe to bring forward heavy land and air units.
Ro-31 was hit 3 times during ASW attacks and will retire.
An LCM force at Honk Kong, laded win 33rd Division troops, hit a mine and was damaged.
One mine TF swept mines at Bako and Taiao.
Large air strikes at Changsha did lots of runway damage, but failed ot encounter enemy aircraft.
A small air stike - again two Daunltess bombers escorted by P-40s - on Lahaina - lose one bomber and two fighters - for no Japanese effects.
PG Ashville was sunk East of the Visayas by the CVE force (San Force = 3 Force).
Nells out of Bangkok put 4 torpedoes into the Burma Barge Group, Later they put another into AK Bassien.
The CVE force hit Midway (3 Kate losses) to soften up the ground elements - this is Ni Force = 2 Force. Two AKs arrived to unload supplies (and in one case troops) - but the Taiyo Maru hit a mine and ALSO took a torpedo and a shell hit from USS Trout - a submarine. She was badly hurt (and won't go home) - and the laning of even a handful of men triggered a shock attack (because it is an atol) - but suffered miniscule casualties - indicating the (outnumbered) defenders are not in good shape. When the rest of the division arrives it will fall easily. The Ni Force also put a bomb into an AK at Manila - which has no fighter cover.
Kiddo Butai hit AV Wright (7 torpedo and 7 bomb hits) and AK Mercury (1 torpedo and 4 bomb hits). Enemy TFs seem to be running in parallel to the US West coast.
More to follow.
Part of the landing force sent to Miri - which diverted to Brunei because of submarine oppoisition at Miri - landed over the beach - taking 24 casualties for 8 defensive shots. Supported by bombers out of Indochina, this demi-brigade took the base later in the turn. The net result is that we are way ahead of schedule - and took a lot fewer casuaties - than would have occurred if we did the "safe" thing - land at Miri and march overland (two weeks of malarial jungle marching).
Japanese submarines were unusually and almost uniformly unsuccessful with torpedoes. But Ro-44 and Ro-45 managed to put shells into AKs on two different attacks. Ro-43 did manage a torpedo hit on a PC unit which was probably hunting her.
Allied night bombing attacks on Sinkawang were uniformly unsuccessful. Japanese night bombing attacks on PH were uniformly unsuccessful.
Medium Japanese surface groups bombarded Canton and Rabaul, with effect. But at Rabaul the defenses put a shell into DD Nowaki.
A heavy bombardment of Molokai resulted in 2 hits on destroyers. A follow up ground attack took Rabaul - unusually early and easily - the more so because there was no air support available to speak of. But there also was no significant air opposition to the operation. The challenge in this area is similar to that in Malaya - and on Luzon: how best to exploit the almost complete lack of defense of land points combined with almost no air (and virtually no fighter) opposition? Invasion units for Shortlands have jumped off - backwards - support from Kavieng will arrive before the infantry from Truk. Air units moved forward to Rabaul and may be able to strike some sort of naval target near Fisnishafen - probably an AK. A follow up attack took Molokai (on the second assault) - in spite of being mountains. It could easily have been reinforced with infantry - but was not. This means Japan controls a base complex in the lower Hawaiian Islands - and it is now safe to bring forward heavy land and air units.
Ro-31 was hit 3 times during ASW attacks and will retire.
An LCM force at Honk Kong, laded win 33rd Division troops, hit a mine and was damaged.
One mine TF swept mines at Bako and Taiao.
Large air strikes at Changsha did lots of runway damage, but failed ot encounter enemy aircraft.
A small air stike - again two Daunltess bombers escorted by P-40s - on Lahaina - lose one bomber and two fighters - for no Japanese effects.
PG Ashville was sunk East of the Visayas by the CVE force (San Force = 3 Force).
Nells out of Bangkok put 4 torpedoes into the Burma Barge Group, Later they put another into AK Bassien.
The CVE force hit Midway (3 Kate losses) to soften up the ground elements - this is Ni Force = 2 Force. Two AKs arrived to unload supplies (and in one case troops) - but the Taiyo Maru hit a mine and ALSO took a torpedo and a shell hit from USS Trout - a submarine. She was badly hurt (and won't go home) - and the laning of even a handful of men triggered a shock attack (because it is an atol) - but suffered miniscule casualties - indicating the (outnumbered) defenders are not in good shape. When the rest of the division arrives it will fall easily. The Ni Force also put a bomb into an AK at Manila - which has no fighter cover.
Kiddo Butai hit AV Wright (7 torpedo and 7 bomb hits) and AK Mercury (1 torpedo and 4 bomb hits). Enemy TFs seem to be running in parallel to the US West coast.
More to follow.
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el cid again
- Posts: 16984
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
13 December 1941 Continued
Kota Bahru Fell on the first assault. Most of a Japanese division moved down the rail lines from Singora. But the city was not defended by military units - only a supply sink. This is not a useful test comparing overland assault with the more normal (and historical) landing. But in other games the overland assault has more power than landing over the beach does - and KB usually falls sooner with less damage to the assault units. Here we have a different problem: no enemy units are in sight closer than Singapore - and it is a matter of how fast things can be moved to capture the entire penninsula in tact and undamaged. This is wholly wrong in every sense: it is not possible for the politics of the Empire in that era (and for that reason a violation of the primary RHS house rule - if a historical commander would not do it - don't you do it);
it is strategic folly to hand the enemy in tact bases and resources and industries; it is also strategic folly to hand him an open door to invade Burma (which - in force - must be done by sea). But since Burma is similarly abandoned - NOTHING is in most towns - static units excepted - it appears to be part of a general game Allied policy. This does defeat the purpose - we are not testing the scenario - and we can not learn how well or poorly units and things like supply sinks behave in combat. Nor can we test the allocation of Japanese forces or the adequacy of their logistic support. But that is what is (or rather isn't) happening. There were concerns the EOS family scenarios left Japan too weak for its SRA offensives: we cannot find out if they are allowed to win no matter how weak they are.
The daily attack on the Hopei Militia Regiment (a ROC guerilla unit - albiet an unusual one that starts at 100 per cent strength with good leadership) stood its ground once again - but must be weakening.
Baguio was attacked by the main body of 48th Division - and defended by a single Philippine Army battalion (without engineers). It fell without any damage to anything - a bad mistake. Baguio is mountains, easy to defend, resource rich, malaria free, and it should be either strongly defended or the center of a bastion defense.
Khorat Thailand was occupied by the Japanese.
Kota Bahru Fell on the first assault. Most of a Japanese division moved down the rail lines from Singora. But the city was not defended by military units - only a supply sink. This is not a useful test comparing overland assault with the more normal (and historical) landing. But in other games the overland assault has more power than landing over the beach does - and KB usually falls sooner with less damage to the assault units. Here we have a different problem: no enemy units are in sight closer than Singapore - and it is a matter of how fast things can be moved to capture the entire penninsula in tact and undamaged. This is wholly wrong in every sense: it is not possible for the politics of the Empire in that era (and for that reason a violation of the primary RHS house rule - if a historical commander would not do it - don't you do it);
it is strategic folly to hand the enemy in tact bases and resources and industries; it is also strategic folly to hand him an open door to invade Burma (which - in force - must be done by sea). But since Burma is similarly abandoned - NOTHING is in most towns - static units excepted - it appears to be part of a general game Allied policy. This does defeat the purpose - we are not testing the scenario - and we can not learn how well or poorly units and things like supply sinks behave in combat. Nor can we test the allocation of Japanese forces or the adequacy of their logistic support. But that is what is (or rather isn't) happening. There were concerns the EOS family scenarios left Japan too weak for its SRA offensives: we cannot find out if they are allowed to win no matter how weak they are.
The daily attack on the Hopei Militia Regiment (a ROC guerilla unit - albiet an unusual one that starts at 100 per cent strength with good leadership) stood its ground once again - but must be weakening.
Baguio was attacked by the main body of 48th Division - and defended by a single Philippine Army battalion (without engineers). It fell without any damage to anything - a bad mistake. Baguio is mountains, easy to defend, resource rich, malaria free, and it should be either strongly defended or the center of a bastion defense.
Khorat Thailand was occupied by the Japanese.
RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
ORIGINAL: el cid again
ORIGINAL: Terminus
I would recommend taking some screen shots, Sid.
I do not know how to do that.
You can hit the Print Screen button which will save a shot to clip board, then load it into a graphics program like Photoshop or Paint Shop Pro and save. That is the way I've always done it.
Distant Worlds Fan
'When in doubt...attack!'
'When in doubt...attack!'
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el cid again
- Posts: 16984
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
Thanks - I did not know that. But I am not a graphics program user - I have not used such programs in years - and while I probably have them - and even bought a bunch for WITP work - I never had to use them. Cobra (and sometimes others) did those functions for me - and I had enough to do without learning another sort of application. So I still don't actually know how to do it - just the principle that it can be done.
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el cid again
- Posts: 16984
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: RHSEBO Test vs Historiker: a savage opening
14 December 1941
An AP reached Midway - as did a bombardment group - triggering what must have been a spectacular night light show. I don't know what happened on the Allied side (except that Midway garrison seems unexpectedly weak) but aP Taiyo Maru hit a mine - and several destroyers were damaged by what must have been coastal gunfire. Later in the day a second air strike went in from the Ni Butai onto the airfields- and recon says only one Patrol Plane remains (3 more were killed today). The ground attack failed - for the peculiar reason that only a tiny detachment of 0 troops and 0 guns attacked - but the force ashore now is large and well supplied - so we ordered a general attack by what must be a reinforced Regimental Combat Team (or brigade) tomorrow. We ordered Ni Butai to switch to ground attack mode - except a unit assigned to hunt the sub in the hex - and a contingency anti-naval strike unit.
An AP reached Midway - as did a bombardment group - triggering what must have been a spectacular night light show. I don't know what happened on the Allied side (except that Midway garrison seems unexpectedly weak) but aP Taiyo Maru hit a mine - and several destroyers were damaged by what must have been coastal gunfire. Later in the day a second air strike went in from the Ni Butai onto the airfields- and recon says only one Patrol Plane remains (3 more were killed today). The ground attack failed - for the peculiar reason that only a tiny detachment of 0 troops and 0 guns attacked - but the force ashore now is large and well supplied - so we ordered a general attack by what must be a reinforced Regimental Combat Team (or brigade) tomorrow. We ordered Ni Butai to switch to ground attack mode - except a unit assigned to hunt the sub in the hex - and a contingency anti-naval strike unit.

